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Abstract 
 
For over two decades, Pacific island states have been active participants in multilateral 
climate change negotiations. Yet little is known about how these small states perform 
inside multi party negotiations, far less their contribution in building and reaching a 
consensus. This thesis investigates the behaviour of fourteen Pacific island states, by 
examining their negotiators and their activities in international, regional and global 
negotiation processes. It uses global talanoa to trace their work in the making of the UN 
climate change Paris Agreement in 2015, by detailing the complexity of the structures, 
issues, actors, politics and decision making processes inside various multilateral forums: 
the Ad Hoc Durban Platform (ADP), Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the twenty first Conference of the Parties (COP21).  
Beyond the structural conditions (rules, formula, procedures, the Chair) and incremental 
stages of negotiations, this thesis finds there is a small core group of individuals in each 
forum that condition and precipitate the building and reaching multilateral climate 
change consensus. Underpinning the work of the core group of Pacific leaders and 
technical negotiators is their resilience and their successes in conducting cordial 
exchange of ideas, interests and building trust and respectful relationships in the 
coalitions they belong to, and amongst other parties in the negotiations.   
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 Chapter One: Introduction  
 
Today, we stand here facing one of the greatest challenges of humankind, 
climate change. We are at a critical point of history...For a country like Tuvalu, 
our survival depends on the decisions we take at this Conference. Let me 
emphasize this point. Our survival as a nation depends on the decisions we take 
at this Conference. This is not simply a stepping-stone to a better future. We 
stand on a cliff edge. Either we stand united and agree to combat climate change 
or we all stumble and fall and condemn humanity to a tragic future.  
      Enele Sopoaga, Prime Minister of Tuvalu1 
 
For more than two decades, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC or the Convention) has been addressing one of the greatest 
challenges of humankind, climate change. The Convention is a multilateral process to 
find global solutions for the global problem of climate change. This diplomatic 
endeavour of multiple states interacting simultaneously created a complex climate 
change regime of prolonged negotiations that exists to the present day. An intrinsic 
feature of modern-day multilateral diplomacy embedded in these negotiations is the 
ability of states to conform and innovate in a regime that promotes consensus decision 
making. The ability of the 196 signatory parties, each with unique national interests and 
ideological backgrounds, to reach consensus on an annual basis is a feat of international 
politics and diplomatic finesse.  
 
Since the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992, fourteen Pacific island countries have 
joined the multilateral negotiations2. These island states are some of the most vulnerable 
frontline states to climate change impacts. Despite their vulnerabilities, they have 
actively participated in these climate change multilateral consensus decision making 
                                                     
1 Enele Sopoaga, "Statement by Prime Minister of Tuvalu Hon Enele Sopoaga at Leaders Event Opening 
of COP21," UNFCCC https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/past-conferences/paris-climate-change-
conference-november-2015/statements-and-resources/statements-made-during-the-leaders-event. 
2 Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
  
 
2  
negotiations, their efforts have received little attention and it is this subject that this 
thesis is concerned with.  
 
The Puzzle 
This thesis examines how states behave inside multilateral negotiations, in particular, 
negotiations that utilise decision making by consensus. How do states build and reach 
consensus in multilateral diplomacy? Multilateral diplomacy is the management of 
international relations by negotiations among three or more states through diplomatic or 
governmental representatives. Multilateral consensus decision making is not unique to 
climate change negotiations. In fact, consensus decision making by many states has 
been well studied in economic and trade forums like the European Union (EU), World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB)3. The small and limited studies on consensus decision making in climate change 
negotiations have pointed to alternative decision making processes4. A common thread 
amongst all these bodies of work, despite prolonged and continuous negotiations with 
many impasses throughout the years, is that multilateral consensus decision making 
forums do work. The very existence of the UNFCCC is a sign that consensus in 
multilateralism does work. For international relations, the ability of states to advance 
their interests through dialogue to find common solutions by consensus is a cornerstone 
of international politics. For diplomatic studies, the fascination with consensus decision 
making follows the practices and activities that state practitioners employ in conducting 
negotiations. In providing insight into how states have sought to define and advance 
their interests in these international negotiations, this thesis ultimately puts a 
microscope on who the state practitioners are, and their activities that build and reach 
consensus.  
                                                     
3 Dorothee Heisenberg, "The institution of ‘consensus’ in the European Union: Formal versus informal 
decision‐making in the Council," European Journal of Political Research 44, no. 1 (2005). I William 
Zartman, International multilateral negotiation: Approaches to the management of complexity (Jossey-
Bass, 1994). Miles Kahler, "Multilateralism with small and large numbers," International Organization 
46, no. 3 (1992). Heisenberg. 
4 Robyn Eckersley argues in favour of minilateralism through regional climate councils, and Luke Kemp 
suggests to institutionalise voting into the decision making for the UNFCCC as Critical Mass 
Governance. Robyn Eckersley, "Moving forward in the climate negotiations: multilateralism or 
minilateralism?," Global environmental politics 12, no. 2 (2012). Luke Kemp, "Framework for the 
future? Exploring the possibility of majority voting in the climate negotiations," International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 16, no. 5 (2016). 
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This research is concerned with the behaviour of a particular group of states in climate 
change negotiations. The discursive nature of multilateralism, or “the practice of 
coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc 
arrangements or by means of institutions “5 offers a paradoxical dilemma. For great 
powers the benefits of multilateralism come from controlling the behaviour of another 
great power or rising power; while for small states, international institutions offer a 
platform to influence international policy decisions6. Much of the scholarship on 
multilateral negotiations is geared towards understanding the role of a few big states, 
with only a handful exploring what scholars call the ‘Lilliputians’7or ‘dwarfs’8. In main 
multilateral institutions like the United Nations (UN) where small states outnumber 
great states, little is known about the activities of small states and how they influence 
outcomes9. How do small states influence negotiations, and what are their contributions 
to the negotiations?  
 
In the climate change regime, some of the smallest and most vulnerable countries that 
participate in the negotiations are from the Pacific region. These small island states are 
not only vulnerable as frontline states to the impacts of climate change; they are also 
vulnerable in their limited capacity in terms of diplomatic representation and technical 
expertise in negotiations10. Despite these challenges, Pacific states, along with other 
small island states around the world, have had a long and successful history since the 
early days and continue to remain the moral conscience of the Convention11. While 
                                                     
5 Robert O Keohane, "Multilateralism: an agenda for research," International journal 45, no. 4 (1990): 
731. 
6 Robert O Keohane, "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in Internatinal Politics," International 
organization 23, no. 2 (1969). 
7 Ibid. 
8 Diana Panke, "Dwarfs in international negotiations: how small states make their voices heard," 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2012). 
9Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neumann, and Sieglinde Gsthl, Small states in international relations 
(University of Washington Press, 2012). 
10 George Carter, "Establishing a Pacific voice in the climate change negotiations," in The new Pacific 
diplomacy, ed. Gregory Fry and Sandra Tartte (Canberra: ANU e-Press, 2016). Carola Betzold, 
"‘Borrowing’power to influence international negotiations: AOSIS in the climate change regime, 1990–
1997," Politics 30, no. 3 (2010). 
11 Inés de Agueda Corneloup and Arthur PJ Mol, "Small island developing states and international 
climate change negotiations: the power of moral “leadership”," International Environmental Agreements: 
Politics, Law and Economics 14, no. 3 (2014). 
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studies of small island states exist especially on the negotiating bloc of the Alliance of 
the Small Islands States (AOSIS) in the UNFCCC that include Pacific states, there is no 
substantial research that focuses on their particular contributions or detailed analysis of 
how they influence consensus decision making.  
 
The remarks by Tuvaluan Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga cited at the beginning of this 
chapter, reflect the significance of climate change multilateralism for the people of the 
Pacific, let alone the survival of a nation. These words were shared by other Pacific 
leaders at the opening of the UNFCCC twenty first conference of the parties (COP21) in 
Paris 2015. For Pacific island states, climate change is more than an energy or economic 
issue, it is an existential threat. The UNFCCC is the main multilateral forum that allows 
their voice to be heard and influence a global solution.  
 
These collocations in the gap in the literature on multilateral consensus decision 
making, the unexplored contributions of small Pacific island states in international 
negotiations, and the significance of climate change to the states and people of the 
Pacific provide the empirical and theoretical underpinning of this thesis. This research 
asks: 
In multilateral climate change negotiations, how do small Pacific Island 
states build and reach consensus?  
The main research question is framed around understanding how Pacific island states 
behave and engage inside multilateral climate change negotiations. As Chapter Two 
will explain, consensus is both a process and an outcome.  During negotiations there is a 
process of debates, discussions, and compromise amongst multiple parties that attempt 
to achieve an outcome(s). Furthermore, the process assumes that Pacific island states 
are active members in the negotiations, where they assist in building and reaching that 
consensus. By tracing consensus both as a process and outcome, the research will 
illuminate two key elements of diplomatic studies’ investigation: the actors and their 
activities in conducting negotiations. This informs the two sub-questions of this 
research. Who are the actors representing the Pacific island states in consensus decision 
making? What activities do they employ in building and reaching consensus?  
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Research Design 
In 2015, the UNFCCC successfully negotiated the Paris Agreement or the Accord de 
Paris12. The agreement set forth new targets for global action and responses to climate 
change after 2020, at the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol. This global consensus came 
after more than three years of negotiations amongst the 196 parties. Following the 
failures of the climate change negotiations in Copenhagen 2009, an Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Durban Platform (ADP) was established in 2012 with the mandate to 
“develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force 
under the Convention applicable to all Parties, which is to be completed no later than 
2015 in order for it to be adopted at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020”.13 The 
mandate would establish a multilateral negotiation process premised on consensus 
decision making,  whereby states were called upon to build and achieve an outcome 
within a certain timeframe. Although the first two years of the ADP talks concentrated 
on guidelines, the actual negotiations would intensify from January until December 
2015. These diplomatic negotiations are the focus of this research. Climate change 
negotiations are seen here, as in the case of 2015, as operating within a particular 
timeline, but more importantly occupying and operating at multiple levels. While it is 
important to acknowledge that climate change discussions do occur in local community 
and national levels that determine national interest, the emphasis of this research is to 
explore multilateral negotiations of three or more party states. This leads the study to 
explore particular multilateral negotiating processes at the regional, international and 
global levels.   
 
This thesis will explore and trace the involvement of Pacific island states not only in the 
global Paris Climate Change Conference (December 2015), but also in the international 
negotiations of the ADP (June 2015) and regional forums of the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum (PIDF) and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (September 2015) leading 
up to the conclusion of the Paris Agreement.  By explaining the behaviour of Pacific 
                                                     
12 UNFCCC, "Paris Agreement," ed. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Paris: 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). 
13 "Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, held in Durban from 28 November 
to 11 December 2011," in FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, ed. United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (Durban2011), 2. 
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island states in multi-level multilateral forums, it will reveal the actors and their 
activities involved in consensus negotiations. These explanations in turn provide 
building blocks in what can be termed and explored in detail in the concluding chapter: 
international consensus, regional consensus and global consensus.  
 
International Negotiation Process 
The ADP process was conducted over 12 sessions of negotiations ranging from 
procedures to compiling a text to actually touching and negotiating text. In 2015, the 
ADP negotiations started with the eighth session (ADP2-8) in Geneva where a draft text 
was formulated which would serve as the basis in the following sessions in Bonn 
(ADP2-9, ADP2-10, ADP2-11) and in Paris (ADP2-12). The ADP mandate and 
expectations of states was that the negotiations of the text would be completed by 
ADP2-12; but this would not be the case. The ADP sessions were preparatory 
negotiations, an international process that was state-centric driven by party delegations 
to streamline and synthesise the various national positions. These international 
preparatory meetings were deemed essential in garnering the various positions and their 
limitations, or red lines, of states essential in finding a compromise. This research will 
take an in-depth description and analysis of the Bonn ADP2-9 in June. This 
international conference was the first meeting in which the draft of the then Geneva 
negotiating text would be open to parties to be streamlined. With a timeline ending in 
December later that year, there was no expectation amongst the parties that negotiations 
would end here. Therefore, for negotiators and the purpose of this research, what 
mattered was relationships, consent on process and more importantly consensus.  
 
Regional Negotiation Process 
The formal international negotiations process of the ADP throughout the year, would 
not be obvious from the attention of states and their governments in the Pacific region. 
In parallel to the international process, many regional and sub-regional organisations in 
the Pacific held with their annual meetings their own preparations for both the 
international ADP process and the global forum of the Paris Climate Change 
Conference. The regional process would see the issue of climate change negotiations 
elevated in the agendas of sub-regional organisations such as Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (MSG), Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG), Micronesian Leaders Summits 
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(MLS), and regional organisations like the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Program (SPREP), PIDF and PIF. Even regional partner-regional 
meetings with donor countries like Japan’s Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM), 
Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC), Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting, U.S.-Small Islands meeting, and France-Oceania Summit 
included in their dialogues common understanding on issues discussed at the UNFCCC. 
In the communiques and political declarations that would come out of the multilateral 
forums, there was a common call both implicitly and explicitly for Pacific state 
solidarity. From these regional meetings, the project will explore decision making in 
two multilateral regional forums: PIDF and PIF. Both these diplomatic forums took 
place within a span of 12 days; and the practice of consensus took on varied forms. The 
PIDF viewed consensus as inclusive in the participation of non-sovereign states, private 
and civil society, premised on principles of talanoa, while the pre-eminent political 
organisation PIF’s Pacific Way consensus tended to revolve around the decisions of 
leaders. This research traces the making of two key climate change declarations that 
emanated from these forums: the PIDF Suva Declaration on Climate Change, and the 
PIF Port Moresby Declaration on Climate Action.  
 
Global Negotiation Process 
The Paris Climate Change meeting or COP21 is determined here as the global process 
of negotiations. A global consensus was mandated to be reached at this final meeting. 
At this level not only would the international and regional negotiation processes 
converge, but so would the plethora of interested actors from state governments, NGOs, 
private industries and individual citizens. The COP21 was a megaconference of ideas, 
interests and political will that was expected to rectify the diplomatic failures of the 
2009 UNFCCC Copenhagen COP15, where consensus was not achieved. Not only was 
it to be a testing ground to regain the faith of the global community on multilateralism 
to provide a global solution, it would test the faith of states on the practice and vitality 
of consensus decision making.  
 
Consensus was achieved amongst the parties with the advent of the Paris Agreement 
2015. Every party in the negotiations played a vital role in their respective way, through 
compromise to reach global consensus. So too, did the fourteen Pacific island states. In 
this multilateral forum, the research explores how Pacific states navigated the complex 
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structures and political dynamics of global negotiations. It accentuates how Pacific 
solidarity and relationships were built through international and regional processes in 
delivering a Pacific voice in the negotiations. Most importantly, in the most pivotal 
moments of negotiations or the consensus point, it explores whether Pacific states and 
their actors could influence a final agreement.   
 
Having identified the puzzle, the main research question and the design of the research 
project, the next section will focus on the contributions and context of the research. It 
will provide an overview of the literatures on multilateral consensus decision making, 
climate change negotiations, and small states. It will identify a lacuna in the discipline’s 
understanding of how small states influence climate change negotiations, and especially 
the subjects of this investigation, Pacific island states. The final section will detail the 
methodology used in the research, Global Talanoa, that is, a hybrid of methods from 
process tracing, global political ethnography and talanoa. The chapter will then 
conclude by providing a summary of the structure of this research and the chapters that 
follow.  
 
Contributions and Context  
This thesis offers three key contributions to the disciplines of international relations and 
diplomatic studies. Firstly, the purpose of this research is not to test theory, but rather to 
substantiate conditions for theory making. These conditions provide building blocks to 
create new theories and broadening the scholarship on consensus decision making. It 
suggests a new analytical framework to explore the internal dynamics of multilateral 
negotiations through phases as they occurred in real time, to formulate theoretical 
conditions for multilateral consensus decision making. This research is concerned with 
micro-processes of negotiations, that is the internal or inside dynamics of processes and 
actors within negotiations. While the main unit of analysis remains the state, the 
analytical framework identified here goes beyond this. It specifies and differentiates 
propositions that apply to individual negotiators, states’ positions, coalitions, and 
explore links among them. This study uses the theoretical underpinnings of multi-
disciplinary scholarship from psychology’s literature on meeting science; international 
relations decision making theories and studies on multilateralism; and from diplomatic 
studies approaches to integrative negotiation analysis. These hypotheses or propositions 
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of state behaviour in consensus decision making are examined against a framework 
which goes inside negotiations and traces them through the following phases: from pre-
negotiation, negotiation, and agreement phase.  
 
A major methodological challenge in understanding international negotiations is 
typically that they are secretive and much of the complex process is informal, and not 
recorded14. This is compounded by a further empirical challenge that any experimental 
findings need corroboration with observational studies15. To meet these challenges, the 
second contribution of this research is through its methodological approach of global 
talanoa. To understand the nature of consensus decision making, and the practice of 
negotiations more generally, this research will take an in-depth approach by unpacking 
negotiations as they occur in real time. For global talanoa to take place, the researcher 
needs to act as a participant negotiator-observer with negotiations to build thick 
ethnographic descriptions or insider accounts of people, structures and events as they 
unfolded. The thick descriptions will then be corroborated with the propositions or 
hypotheses of consensus decision making part of the analytical framework. The 
concluding section of this introductory chapter will further explore the methodology of 
global talanoa.  
 
Thirdly, the empirical contribution of this thesis is to shed light on the remarkable story 
of Pacific island states and their diplomatic endeavours in multilateral climate change 
negotiations. The recent scholarship on new Pacific diplomacy16 with Pacific scholars17 
and negotiators18 have undertaken the first steps to address these lacunae. The work by 
                                                     
14 John Odell, "Negotiation and Bargaining," in Handbook of international relations, ed. Walter 
Carlsnaes, et al. (London: Sage, 2002), 394. 
15 Ibid., 395. 
16 Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte, The new Pacific diplomacy, ed. Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte (Canberra: 
ANU Press, 2016). 
17 Nicollette Goulding, "Marshalling a Pacific response to climate change," in The new Pacific diplomacy, 
ed. Gregory Fry and Sandra Tartte (Canberra: ANU Press, 2016)., Fulori Manoa, "The New Pacific 
diplomacy at the United Nations: the rise of the PSIDS," in The New Pacific Diplomacy, ed. Sandra Tarte 
and Greg Fry (Canberra: ANU e-press, 2015). 
18 Ian Fry, "The Paris Agreement: An Insider's Perspective-The Role of Small Island Developing States," 
Environmental Policy and Law 46, no. 2 (2016)., Espen Ronneberg, "Small islands and the Big Issue: 
Climate Change and the role of the Alliance of Small Island States," in The Oxford handbook of 
international climate change law, ed. Cinnamon Piñon Carlarne, Kevin R Gray, and Richard Tarasofsky 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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Ashlie Denton explores the power, knowledge and the contestation of global and local 
narratives, in effectively building a climate empire in the Pacific19. Moreover, it fills a 
crucial deficit in the disciplines that tends to study Pacific island states as mere objects 
or passive players in regional and international politics20. The empirical contributions of 
this research emphasise the agency and collective active participation of states, that 
situates them as subjects of international relations theory making.  
   
Multilateral Consensus Decision Making 
The main concept this thesis is concerned with is multilateral consensus decision 
making. It is defined here as the outcome agreement that is achieved from a non-voting 
decision making process that involves negotiating disagreements of interests, values 
and ideas among three or more party states collaboratively. There are two reasons why 
consensus decision making needs to be clarified. Firstly, it is frequently observed in 
international organisations. Secondly, it is viewed as more democratic than decisions 
made by majority rule. Decisions that are agreed to by all parties will gain higher levels 
of legitimacy. For climate change negotiations this is vital; as legitimacy will pave the 
way for collective action on implementing the decisions.   
 
As both a norm and procedure in multilateral conferences, consensus is achieved when 
multiple parties agree to common decisions without casting a vote. It is important to 
acknowledge decisions by consensus is not the only form of multilateral decision 
making utilised. Learning from the failures of decisions by unanimity in the early half 
of the twentieth century, international organisations established after World War II 
experimented with various forms of voting. From unit veto as in the UN Security 
Council, or weighted voting in the Boards of the WB to majority rule within the UN 
General Assembly; voting was preferred for its quicker results. But this was at the 
expense of creating binaries and divisions amongst disapproving parties that would 
prove detrimental when it came to implement these agreements. In effect consensus 
                                                     
19 Ashlie Denton, "Voices for environmental action? Analyzing narrative in environmental governance 
networks in the Pacific Islands," Global environmental change 43 (2017)., and Ashlie  Denton, "Building 
Climate Empire: Power, Authority, and Knowledge Within Pacific Islands Climate Change Diplomacy 
and Governance Networks,"  (2018). 
20 Elise Huffer, "Canoes v. carriers: International relations in the South Pacific," Journal of 
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 36, no. 3 (1998). 
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decision making allowed each party to have a veto during the negotiation process, and 
although the talks were laborious there was a higher assurance that agreements would 
be implemented. Decisions by consensus continue to enjoy favour today: in forums that 
exercise voting there is a preference that negotiations be achieved by consensus to avoid 
voting as much as possible. 
 
The existing literature on multilateral consensus decision, although small, has been 
focussed on the behaviour of great powers or regions of economic integration like the 
EU21.  Studies have compared and quantified multi-issue negotiations across various 
conferences and times, in order to tease out common features of this form of decision 
making. These studies tend to explain consensus based on the outcome, and through 
historical and retrospective accounts attempt to provide convincing arguments on 
conditions of how states build and reach consensus. The purpose here is to examine 
both the outcome and process of negotiations. To explore the purported benefits of 
consensus decision making, it is best to examine the exact nature of the practice and 
how it takes place in negotiations. The research uses an ‘insider approach’ to detail how 
negotiations take place within the rules of consensus procedures, and more importantly 
within a particular time.  
 
Climate Change Negotiations 
Climate change negotiations like many multilateral negotiations are complex. The 
UNFCCC is both the source of the international regime complex for climate change22, 
and the main site for multilateral forums on climate change. The level of complexity is 
far greater in a multilateral conference where negotiations are characterised by “multi-
parties, multi-issues, multi-roles, and multi-values”23. It is an arena involving seemingly 
endless and prolonged negotiations with wide ranging issues, a plethora of actors (state, 
civil society and private businesses) and coalitions with the aim of reaching global 
consensus and solutions to address climate. For over two decades member states on an 
                                                     
21 Arzu Hatakoy, "The effectiveness of decision making in European Union treaty negotiations,"  (2009). 
22 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, "The Regime Complex for Climate Change," Perspectives on 
Politics 9, no. 1 (2011). 
23 James P Muldoon Jr et al., Multilateral diplomacy and the United Nations today (Westview Press, 
2009), 11. 
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annual basis have continually negotiated on various issues and measures on the 
objective for the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system”24.  In this highly political forum, negotiating climate change has three main 
challenges. First, climate change is a global issue that prompts a need for a collective 
international response in lieu of national interest. Second, for most countries the impacts 
are either not noticeable, or inter-generational, and not severe enough to create 
collective political will by state leaders for action. Thirdly, any international solution 
requires a habitual change, with policies to alter behaviour change for billions of 
people25.  
 
Climate change is viewed by parties from various vantage points. For all states, and 
especially larger developed and emerging economies, climate change is an economic 
issue. Any measures around curbing mitigation26 constricts these states to control and 
regulate their energy sectors. For many developing states, adaptation27 measures apply, 
and it is vital that negotiations address finance, capacity and technical assistance to cope 
with existing climate change impacts. These impacts are more pronounced in the 
smaller island developing states, like of those from the Pacific region. Pacific island 
states produce less than 1% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, yet their 
economies and livelihoods are constantly under threat from natural disasters of extreme 
weather and sea level rise28. Compensation for the permanent loss of natural resources 
due to human induced climate impacts and establishing a global ambition for reducing 
emission to levels no more than 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, remain the core issues 
for islands from the Pacific. 
                                                     
24 UNFCCC, "United Nations Convention on Climate Change," in FCCC/Informal/84 GE.05-62220, ed. 
United Nations (Rio de Janeiro: United Nations, 1992). 
25Keohane and Victor,  7. 
26 Climate change mitigation consists of actions to limit the magnitude or rate of long-term climate 
change, generally involves reductions in human (anthropogenic) emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). 
27 Climate change adaptation are measures that seeks to reduce the vulnerability of social and biological 
systems to relatively sudden change and thus offset the effects of global warming. 
28 FRDP, "Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach to Climate 
Change and Disaster Risk Management (FRDP) 2017-2030," ed. Secretariat  of  the  Pacific  Regional  
Environment  Programme  (SPREP) Pacific  Community  (SPC), Pacific  Islands  Forum  Secretariat 
(PIFS),  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP),  United  Nations  Office  for  Disaster  
Risk  Reduction  (UNISDR)  and  University  of  the  South Pacific (USP) (Suva: Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community, 2016). 
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Small states and Multilateral Negotiations 
Despite the limited research on small states’ behaviour in multilateral negotiations, 
there have been notable studies that help frame the approach of this research. The 
growing literature of international political economy on small states participation in and 
dealings with the European Union is beginning to fill this gap. These studies explore the 
involvement of small European states and least developing countries which make up 75 
per cent of membership in the global trade regime and their increasing impact despite 
their negotiation-resource deficit. More relevant to this research is a special edition of 
the Cambridge Review of International Affairs on small states in various multilateral 
negotiations. These focus on niche and coalition diplomacy in the International 
Criminal Court and UNFCCC29; compliance bargaining in the WTO30; and tariff 
negotiations in the EU31.  
 
Challenges in Multilateral Negotiations 
These studies substantiate common challenges that small states encounter in multilateral 
negotiations, which all stem from limited financial resources. Small states tend to have 
limited diplomatic representation and research capacity. “Having an exceedingly high 
workload because the number of administrators, attachés or experts is limited can, in 
turn, lead to delays in the arrival of instructions in small states or to situations in which 
smaller states do not formulate national positions for all items on the negotiation 
agenda”32. Limited finance also leads to small number of delegates, who will find it 
hard to cover the breadth of negotiations meaning less time to develop compelling 
frames and conduct other argument-based strategies, or propose issue linkages 
positions. Thirdly, small states have limited options in bargaining as they cannot offer 
side payments, sequencing of demands, concessions and threats which great states 
employ in negotiations33. To overcome these challenges, Diana Panke summarises 
                                                     
29 Nicole Deitelhoff and Linda Wallbott, "Beyond soft balancing: Small states and coalition-building in 
the ICC and climate negotiations," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2012). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Diana Panke, "Being small in a big union: punching above their weights? How small states prevailed in 
the vodka and the pesticides cases," ibid. 
32 "Dwarfs in international negotiations: how small states make their voices heard," 316. 
33 Ibid. 
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research on small states in negotiations by suggesting two key strategies small states 
can employ. They are strategies in improving the capacity of state delegations, and 
strategies to shape the conditions of negotiations.  
 
Table 1. Small states strategies to build capacity in multilateral negotiations  
Strategy Type of Expertise 
Institutional actors; contacting secretariats 
and chairs. 
Increase expertise on subject matter and 
knowledge about positions of others  
NGOs: working with scientific, legal and  
industry lobbyists 
Increase expertise on subject matter 
Institutional knowledge: learning from past 
experiences and creating an institutional 
memory 
Increase expertise on how negotiations work 
in a particular setting; strengthen network 
Source: Diana Panke, "Dwarfs in international negotiations: how small states make their voices 
heard," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2012). 
 
Small states can increase their cognitive capacity by obtaining information from 
institutional organisations’ secretariats and chairs on background information and 
processes of how negotiations would operate. This background information will inform 
small states of the political dynamics and positions of other states. A second strategy 
that small states can employ is working with non-state actors. Ranging from NGOs, 
epistemic communities or industry lobbyists, these actors can “provide inexpensive 
scientific insights, information about the situation on the ground and additional 
information about risks and opportunities of different policy options”34. And thirdly, 
learning from past experiences in negotiation setting, and the consistency of 
negotiators’ participation and policies help counterbalance size-related disadvantages. 
The longer a state is a proactive member in negotiations, the more institutional 
knowledge and memory they possess in building their capacity effectiveness.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Small state strategies in shaping multilateral negotiations 
Strategy Type of influence 
                                                     
34 Ibid. 
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(Re-)framing   Influencing negotiation processes; changing the range 
and type of persuasive or bargaining based strategies 
that can be effective 
Causal arguing/ technical 
arguing  
Influencing negotiation outcomes via persuasion of other 
actors on the basis of scientific expertise 
Moral arguing/shaming 
   
Influencing negotiation outcomes via persuasion of other 
actors on the basis of moral arguments 
Legal arguing    Influencing negotiation outcomes via persuasion of a 
third party on the basis of legal expertise 
Coalition-building    Increasing the collective leverage (regarding bargaining 
power or regarding discursive power) 
Bargaining     Influencing negotiation outcomes via demands/ 
threats/concessions/offers 
Value-claiming   Influencing negotiation outcomes via first-mover 
advantages in distributive bargaining situations 
Source: Diana Panke, "Dwarfs in international negotiations: how small states make their voices 
heard," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2012). 
 
States may indirectly manipulate negotiations by framing or re-framing debates. Frames 
influence how an issue is perceived in negotiations; the use of moral or normative 
arguments can turn the direction of debates that may be inclined for technical outcomes 
that favour bigger states. The second condition on causal or technical arguments refers 
to small states prioritising one or few policy issues of high importance to a state. Their 
investment on a particular issue can systematically build expertise for effective 
technical and causal augmentation.  “Moral and normative arguments refer to 
institutionalized logics of appropriateness, used to delegitimize positions contrary to 
incorporated norms and values (thus, to shame actors representing ‘inappropriate’ 
positions) while strengthening positions in line with shared beliefs of what is 
normatively right and proper”.35 Their smallness can be used as a card to argue that 
positions by bigger states are less impartial and do not take into account the needs of a 
minority. Small states also need to prioritise legal capacity. Multilateral negotiations are 
generally geared towards creating some form of international legal agreement; thus, the 
necessity of having legal skills in delegations are vital. In order to maximise their 
positions in negotiations states will have to join or form bargaining blocs with 
likeminded states. “States can influence outcomes if they form winning coalitions or 
blocking minorities”. 36Despite small states having limited options in bargaining, they 
                                                     
35 Ibid., 317. 
36 Ibid. 
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can still voice their red lines by implicitly and explicitly hinting threats to leave the 
negotiations. Furthermore, small states can act as ‘neutral mediators’ or ‘honest 
brokers’, introducing their own interests through the back door by mediating towards 
their own position37. 
 
Although these strategies were found in the behaviour of small states from Europe and 
the Caribbean region, as well as negotiating blocs of small island states and least 
developing countries that include Pacific islands in their membership, empirical studies 
specifically focussed on Pacific states are limited38. These strategies in building 
capacity, and shaping negotiations are essential in this research as criteria to measure 
the effectiveness of Pacific island states in climate change negotiations. Moreover, this 
research will examine whether these criteria can also explain small states’ behaviour in 
negotiating forums that specifically employ consensus decision making procedures.  
 
Pacific Islands in Climate Change Negotiations  
Pacific island states were part of climate change negotiations even before the UNFCCC 
was established. Yet only a handful of studies highlight the work of Pacific states in the 
UNFCCC, and they are primarily focussed on their participation in the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS). The work of Robert Ashe et al39, Pamela Chasek40  Eric 
Shibuya and Carola Betzold41 have analysed the influence of AOSIS, especially in the 
                                                     
37 See Ivo Maes and Amy Verdun, "Small States and the Creation of EMU: Belgium and the Netherlands, 
Pace‐setters and Gate‐keepers," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 2 (2005): 344.; 
Anders Wivel, "The security challenge of small EU member states: Interests, identity and the 
development of the EU as a security actor," ibid.: 408. 
38 The work by Rebecca Gruby and Lisa Campbell on Pacific island delegations in biodiversity 
negotiations provide insights for comparison in climate change negotiations. Rebecca L Gruby and Lisa 
M Campbell, "Scalar politics and the region: strategies for transcending Pacific Island smallness on a 
global environmental governance stage," Environment and Planning A 45, no. 9 (2013). 
39 John W. Ashe, Robert Van Lierop, and Anilla Cherian, "The role of the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) in the negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)," Natural Resources Forum 23, no. 3 (1999). 
40 Pamela S. Chasek, "Margins of Power: Coalition Building and Coalition Maintenance of the South 
Pacific Island States and the Alliance of Small Island States," Review of European Community & 
International Environmental Law 14, no. 2 (2005). 
41 Carola Betzold, "'Borrowing' Power to Influence International Negotiations: AOSIS in the Climate 
Change Regime, 1990-1997," Politics 30, no. 3 (2010). 
  
 
17  
early days of the regime and recent sources of internal disagreements.42 While this body 
of work on AOSIS is useful in providing some insight in the work of Pacific Islands in 
negotiations, it does not fully uncover how the coalitions operate and the dynamics of 
their internal politics. In terms of negotiation analysis, this body of work would suggest 
small island states are effective in early phases of negotiations agenda setting, with little 
to no indication as to whether they can influence negotiations in the final moments. Can 
Pacific island states influence building and reaching consensus, and if so how? 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of the Pacific Islands. 
Source: Map provided by CartoGIS Services, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, The 
Australian National University. 
 
This thesis will focus on the fourteen Pacific island states that are signatory parties of 
the Convention: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, the 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu43. Eleven Pacific island states joined the Convention when 
                                                     
42Carola Betzold, Paula Castro, and Florian Weiler, "AOSIS. in the UNFCCC. negotiations: from unity to 
fragmentation?," Climate Policy 12, no. 5 (2012). 
43 Although Cook Islands and Niue are self-governing states and observers to the United Nations, 
however, these states are able to sign on treaties with specialised UN agencies like UNFCCC. The 
European Union, Palestine and the Vatican (as an observer) are also recognised in the same way.  
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it was first opened for signature at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, as evident in Table 1. 
Meanwhile, Niue and Tonga joined the cause in the late 1990’s, with Palau as the most 
recent member in 2000 after it gained full independence. Pacific island countries like 
Vanuatu, Samoa and Tuvalu were instrumental in the leadership of drafting of both the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which established the agenda and procedures 
of the regime. The notable accomplishments by these states were ushered in through the 
influence of and strategic alliances with other small island states in the formation of the 
negotiation coalition, the AOSIS. An in-depth history of Pacific island states 
participation in the regime is further explored in Chapter Three.  
 
Table 3. Pacific island states: UNFCCC, population and physical geography 
Sources: UNFCCC, "Status of Ratification of the Convention," UNFCCC, 
https://unfccc.int/process/the-convention/what-is-the-convention/status-of-ratification-of-the-
convention; Patrick D Nunn et al., "Classifying Pacific islands," Geoscience Letters 3, no. 1 
(2016). 
   
 
UNFCCC 
Signatory 
UNFCCC 
Ratified 
Population 
Size (2014) 
Number 
of 
Islands 
Total area 
of islands 
(km2) 
Average 
Islands 
maximum 
elevation 
(m) 
Cook Islands 1992 1993 15,000 15 297 73 
Fiji 1992 1993 847,600 211 799 134 
Kiribati 1992 1995 111,200 33 995 6 
Marshall 
Islands 1992 1992 53,800 34 286 3 
Federated 
State of 
Micronesia 1992 1993 102,800 127 799 45 
Nauru 1992 1993 10,600 1 23 71 
Niue   1996 1,600 1 298 60 
Palau   1999 17,700 33 495 58 
Papua New 
Guinea 1992 1993 7,587,200 437 67,754 135 
Samoa 1992 1994 190,700 7 3046 504 
Solomon 
Islands 1992 1994 611,500 415 29,675 88 
Tonga 1998 1998 104,200 124 847 56 
Tuvalu  1992 1993 11,000 10 44 4 
Vanuatu 1992 1993 271,100 81 13,526 330 
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Although geographically bound within the Pacific Ocean these states vary physically in 
land area and population size, not to mention their cultural diversity. Among the island 
states are larger continental or volcanic island states in the west that account for more 
than 90% of land area and population size of the Pacific: Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji. The Pacific is also home to some of the smallest states in the 
world with populations less than 10,000 and total land areas no more than a couple 
hundred square kilometres. States such as Tuvalu, Marshall Islands and Kiribati are 
conglomerations of societies living on low atoll islands with elevation less than five 
metres. The impact of climate change on individual islands also vary. 
The effects of climate change on islands and the communities that live on them 
are likely to be highly differentiated: not all places will experience the same 
changes; where changes are similar the magnitude and timing of them will likely 
differ; the sensitivity of ecological and social processes to changes differs from 
place to place; the capacity of social systems to adapt to these changes is not 
homogenous; and the significance of changes to the social systems will also 
differ44. 
 
Despite the diversity in physical, cultural and the magnitude of climate change impacts 
on individual states, there is shared understanding that not one state is better off, or 
immune from sea-level rise, and frequent and extreme weather patterns45. All Pacific 
states are similar in the challenges they face, in terms of their small economies, 
geographical isolation and social development. Climate change impacts intensify these 
challenges and increase their vulnerability. This shared vulnerability of Pacific island 
states has meant that they have used moral and normative arguments in their constructed 
identity in the negotiations as frontline states46.  As Chapter Three will explain, this 
identity as the frontline states or moral conscience of the climate change negotiations, 
has been used for strategic positioning to amplify their concerns in climate negotiations. 
                                                     
44 John Campbell and Jon Barnett, Climate change and small island states: power, knowledge and the 
South Pacific (Routledge, 2010), 22. 
45 The Pacific region has endured an increasing number and intensity, in natural disaster ranging from 
droughts, tropical cyclones, storm surges, heavy rainfall etc.  
46 M. Williams and D. McDuie-Ra, Combatting Climate Change in the Pacific: The Role of Regional 
Organizations (Springer International Publishing, 2017).  
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While they are most effective in the early phases of negotiations, this research will 
explore how valid this strategy is in the consensus point of concluding an agreement.  
 
Methodology 
The design of this qualitative research traces actors and their activities in various 
multilateral settings through an inductive approach of describing the different processes 
of negotiations and the perspectives of Pacific island parties. The methodology draws 
on talanoa a Pacific research method and global talanoa, a term that this research has 
coined to describe the use of process tracing47 and global political ethnography48 for this 
research. 
 
Talanoa Method 
The unique method used in this qualitative research is the application of talanoa 
method49. Talanoa is an existing cultural practice found in mainly Polynesian cultures50 
to depict formal and informal conversations, storytelling and experiences which has 
become a popular and prominent methodology to study Pacific communities51 by 
                                                     
47 James Mahoney, Erin Kimball, and Kendra L Koivu, "The logic of historical explanation in the social 
sciences," Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 1 (2009)., Rosemary C. Reilly and David Walner, 
"Process tracing and causal mechnism," in Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
ed. Alexander L and Andrew Bennett George (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005)., Rosemary C.  
Reilly, "Encyclopedia of Case Study Research," ed. Gabrielle Durepos & Elden Wiebe Albert J. Mills, 
Encyclopedia of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010), 
under "Process Tracing." 
48 Finn Stepputat and Jessica Larsen, Global political ethnography: A methodological approach to 
studying global policy regimes (DIIS Working Paper, 2015). 
49 Some of the work around talanoa as a method of inquiry and methodology in social research include 
Mo'ale Otunuku, "How can talanoa be used effectively an an indigenous research methodology with 
Tongan people?," Pacific-Asian Education 23, no. 2 (2011)., Tamasailau Suaalii‐Sauni and Saunimaa Ma 
Fulu‐Aiolupotea, "Decolonising P acific research, building P acific research communities and developing 
P acific research tools: The case of the talanoa and the faafaletui in S amoa," Asia Pacific Viewpoint 55, 
no. 3 (2014)., Peggy Fairbairn-Dunlop and Eve Coxon, Talanoa, Building a Pasifika Research Culture 
(Dunmore Publishing, 2014)., Nāsili Vaka'Uta, "Talanoa: Building a Pasifika Research Culture ed. by 
Peggy Fairbairn-Dunlop," the contemporary pacific 29, no. 1 (2017). 
50 The concept and practice of talanoa are found across many Polynesia cultures in Samoa, Tonga, Cook 
Islands Fiji, Niue, Hawaii and Solomon Islands. See more Semisi M Prescott, "Using talanoa in Pacific 
business research in New Zealand: Experiences with Tongan entrepreneurs," AlterNative: An 
International Journal of Indigenous Peoples 4, no. 1 (2008). 
51 Trisia Farrelly and Uanasi Nabobo-Baba, "Talanoa as empathic research" (paper presented at the 
International Development Conference (3-5 December). Auckland, New Zealand, 2012), 2. 
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Sitieveni Halapula52 and Timoti Vaioleti53. This research is more concerned with 
talanoa as a method of data collection and how it is used in academic studies to 
encompass the use of cultural-specific protocols, to conduct research with Pacific 
communities on particular issues. 
In practice talanoa is an umbrella term to denote various forms of both individual and 
group interviews, which are either informal conversations (chatting or offload) or 
formal intensive interviews54. In defining the term, tala holistically intermingles 
researchers’ and participants’ emotions, experiences and knowing; while noa is the 
space and conditions55. These methods are explained in established humanities 
disciplines as face to face informal open-ended narrative interviews or an open 
dialogue56. However, what distinguishes talanoa from ethnographic methods of 
intensive interviews is the empathetic reciprocal relationship between the participant 
and the researcher. It is a relationship where the researcher recognises the complexity of 
cultural and political lived realities of participants: from notions of relatedness, 
expectation, assumptions, values, protocols and how they communicate with each 
other57. By opening the space for flexible opened-ended discussions, talanoa is effective 
once trust is built and participants not only reflect on questions prompted but share their 
personal stories and emotions58.  Talanoa encourages reciprocity for the participant to 
create and formalise a relationship by asking the researcher questions on the project and 
its contribution to the knowledge imparted.  
 
While participant observation allows the researcher to objectively detail the process of 
negotiations, talanoa is subjective. The method of participative observation is a mixture 
                                                     
52 Sitiveni Halapula, a Tongan researcher used the talanoa method in post-conflict and peace studies to 
facilitate dialogue among multi-cultural societies and organisations in post-2000 Fiji. Sitiveni Halapua, 
"Talanoa process: The case of Fiji," East West Centre, Hawaii  (2000)., and  
53 Timote Vaioleti a Tongan researcher identified eight various methods of talanoa (talanoa vave, faikava, 
usu, tevolo, faka’eke’eke, po talanoa, talanoai, talanga ) when engaging with Pacific, or distinctively 
Tongan communities. Timote Vaioleti, "Talanoa: Differentiating the talanoa research methodology from 
phenomenology, narrative, Kaupapa Maori and feminist methodologies," Te Reo 56 (2013). 
54 Timote M Vaioleti, "Talanoa research methodology: A developing position on Pacific research," 
Waikato Journal of Education 12, no. 1 (2006). 
55 Ibid., 24. 
56Ibid., 21., Trisia Farrelly and Unaisi Nabobo‐Baba, "Talanoa as empathic apprenticeship," Asia Pacific 
Viewpoint 55, no. 3 (2014): 3. 
57Vaioleti,  21. 
58 Ibid. 
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of passive (researcher is only in the bystander role) and moderate participation 
(researcher maintains a balance between "insider" and "outsider" roles)59. Subjectivity is 
fundamental when using global talanoa as it establishes professional and cultural 
connection using multiple insider and outsider identities. Fieldwork involved ten 
months of access into various sites of negotiations, the researcher was able to gain the 
trust of Pacific leaders and negotiators who would share information with someone who 
was attempting to tell their story. This involved introducing the research first and 
foremost using an outsider identity of documentary researcher when they were informed 
of the ethics and main questions of the research. At the same time the researcher 
introduced the project by stating his insider identity as an advisor attending as many 
meetings as possible early in the year. Furthermore, it was important that negotiators 
were informed that the researcher was a Samoan national of Tuvaluan, i-Kiribati, 
British and Chinese ancestry, attempting to also find out if there were idiosyncratic 
features of cultural affinity in the negotiation styles of Pacific negotiators. These 
insider-cultural and outsider-professional identities of the researcher, and consistent 
participation in the multiple multilateral meetings gradually built trust and rapport with 
Pacific leaders and negotiators to share their stories and perspectives through talanoa 
interviews.  
 
When participants were made aware of the ethics and questions of the research they 
were informed that did not have to talanoa with the researcher immediately. They were 
given the opportunity to choose the place and time throughout the year in the various 
meetings, and in as many occasions they would like to share. These led to talanoa akin 
to semi-structured interviews in the intervals during the negotiations, in hotel and 
airport lobbies, offices, restaurants and not to mention reflective discussions in the 
midnight hours during heated negotiations. In total 35 participants would offer their 
insights through 65 sessions of recorded talanoa throughout the year, as affixed in 
Appendix I. Participants were given the choice to be attributed, or if they prefer to be 
anonymous to be given a pseudonym in the study. These sessions did not include the 
rich information obtained through corridor talks that relayed both the relief, frustration, 
suspicions and predictions of actors during negotiations. In essence participants would 
                                                     
59 Kathleen Musante Dewalt, "Participant Observation," in Handbook of Methods in Cultural 
Anthropology, ed. H.R. Bernard and C.C. Gravlee (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014). 
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also lead or direct the researcher, using snowball tactics to identify other key negotiators 
in the meetings- and in many cases hand-hold the researcher to follow them to key side 
meetings that would prove useful in documenting both the complexity of the negotiation 
process and political dynamics in the multilateral forum.  
 
Global Talanoa: process tracing through global political ethnography 
Global talanoa is the term used to describe the use of process tracing and ethnography 
for this research design. Process tracing is a collective term60 for numerous approaches 
that look at identifying, validating, and testing causal mechanisms within case studies in 
a specific, theoretically informed way. In Chapter Two, from the disciplines of 
psychology, international relations and diplomatic studies, various hypotheses on the 
extent of how consensus is built and reached in multilateral negotiations will be 
interrogated through ethnographic narratives. Global political ethnography allows 
students of policy studies to understand linkages and impacts of policy in its multiple 
levels from the global to the local. The methodology allows for collection and testing of 
data from multiple sites61 of diplomatic conferences62. Together, they are useful in 
supplementing the data gathered from the talanoa method. 
 
Document and Sources 
This research collected documentary evidence from various sources. The official 
negotiation documents from UNFCCC, PIF and PIDF secretariats on the draft texts, 
negotiation procedures, official speeches or submissions by states and coalitions 
distributed before or during the conferences were pivotal in understanding the context 
and process of negotiations as they unfolded. Some of these documents were uploaded 
                                                     
60 The four distinctions of process tracing are linking conditions to outcomes of decision making; 
independent and dependent variables of causal mechanism; instantiating a mechanism schema by testing 
various phases, and verification of a single inference in a process. Reilly and Walner, 67. 
61 Multi-sited ethnography made famous George Marcus study of phenomena dispersed across borders 
and articulated in flexible networks. It broke with static mono-locational conceptualisations. See more E 
George Marcus, "Multi-sited Ethnography," Multi-Sited Ethnography: Problems and Possibilities in the 
Translocation of Research Methods  (2011).  
62 Studies of conference ethnography are prevalent in the work of Lisa M Campbell et al., "Studying 
global environmental meetings to understand Global Environmental Governance: Collaborative Event 
Ethnography at the tenth conference of the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity," Global 
Environmental Politics 14, no. 3 (2014). Catherine Corson, Lisa M Campbell, and Kenneth I MacDonald, 
"Capturing the personal in politics: Ethnographies of global environmental governance," ibid. 
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onto their official websites. The daily records of UNFCCC proceedings from Earth 
Negotiation Bulletin and ECO Newsletter were useful accounts in reflecting on how 
events unfolded, and a macro outlook of negotiations. These were compared with 
accounts from news media and academic blogs that captured day-by-day shifts at the 
negotiating conferences. However, the most vital documents were emails of issue 
position papers and strategies shared by Pacific delegates and coalitions during the 
negotiations. Access to these documents could come to me only because I participated 
in these negotiations both as a researcher and negotiator.  
 
Participant Observation  
Global talanoa explores multiple sites at different levels using participant observation. 
As indicated in the design of this research, the data is sourced from multiple multilateral 
forums of the UNFCCC COP21 and ADP2-9, as well as regional meetings of PIDF and 
PIF.  This multi-sited and multi-level study took place in 2015, where the researcher 
undertook fieldwork in seven multilateral conferences over a period of ten months63. 
The researcher was able to gain special access from the governments of the Independent 
State of Samoa (PIF, ADP2-9, COP21), and Tuvalu (PIF Smaller Island States meeting) 
to attend these meetings as a pro-bono advisor64. In the process of attaining these special 
accesses, the researcher and the relevant ministries of foreign affairs agreed that under 
no circumstance would the researcher speak on behalf of these countries in the 
negotiations, but merely follow leaders and officials to document the process of the 
meetings. The access into these meetings as state official or ‘pink badge’ holder was 
beyond the access that media or NGOs had, which kept them outside of the closed 
negotiation chambers. The delegations also respected the circumstances of the 
researcher not to engage in any policy or strategy advice. The insights into the 
discussions of plenaries, coalitions, state delegation meetings, bilateral, informal side 
meetings, drafting meetings, high-level ministerial meeting, including access into 
                                                     
63 These included the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Program’s Pacific Climate 
Change Roundtable/High-Level Support Mechanism I in Apia (May), UNFCCC ADP2-9 in Bonn (June), 
Pacific Islands Development Forum Summit in Suva (August), Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting 
in Port Moresby (September),  Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Program’s High-Level 
Support Mechanism II in Apia (November), Pacific Small Islands Developing States negotiation bloc 
meetings in New York (November) and the Paris Climate Change Conference/COP21 in Paris 
(December) 
64 This practice of involving academics in delegations were not peculiar to Samoa and Tuvalu- in fact was 
a common practice with other Pacific and developing country delegations.  
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COP21 leaders holding room provided insights into the world of negotiators and 
negotiations process that are rarely analysed in academia. The access into these rooms 
informed the thick ethnographic narratives of description of place, actors, activities, 
relationships and political dynamics before and during the negotiations.  
 
Conclusion and Outline 
In multilateral climate change consensus negotiations, how do Pacific island states build 
and reach consensus? This chapter has put forth the broad contours of the research 
question, and the deficiencies in the multiple literatures that international relations and 
diplomatic studies seek to explain how Pacific island states, as small states, behave in 
consensus building and reaching consensus in climate change negotiations. 
Furthermore, this chapter has introduced the methodological basis of this qualitative 
global talanoa approach that structures this thesis.  
 
The next chapter introduces the hypotheses of multilateral consensus decision making 
drawn from various literature and theories of psychology, international relations and 
diplomatic studies. These existing studies have explored consensus in various levels of 
human collective decision making: society, national, regional and international levels.  
 
Chapter Three provides a historical context not only to the UNFCCC climate change 
negotiation process, but especially the history of Pacific island states in the regime. The 
structural and political history of the UNFCCC is essential to contextualise the 
complexity of the 196 party negotiations and the challenges it imposes on small island 
states. Meanwhile the complicated political history of the UNFCCC explains why the 
2015 negotiations were pivotal not only for the purpose of a global consensus, but also 
for the very survival of the climate change regime. And at the very heart of the story of 
the regime, was the participation of Pacific islands and their leadership in AOSIS. The 
chapter will also introduce the complexity of the Pacific regional climate change 
regime, through the vested interests and contributions of regional multilateral 
organisations. The historical chapter will conclude by setting the contours of the politics 
and dynamics in 2015, and the timeline of multilateral meetings as they unfolded. Four 
of these meetings that occurred in 2015 would serve as the basis of the empirical 
chapters.  
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Chapter Four will explore climate change negotiations at the international level, with a 
focus on the ADP2-9 in Bonn Germany. These international negotiations were part of 
the UNFCCC mandate to draw up a draft text. It will explore the internal structure of 
the ADP process, by emphasising the role of coalition or negotiation-bloc politics in 
building multilateral consensus. It traces the dynamics of Pacific island states behaviour 
and their relationship with the various coalitions they are associated with.  
 
Chapter Five will examine two multilateral meetings at the regional level, the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum and the Pacific Islands Forum. These multilateral meetings 
were held within 10 days of each other, amidst an environment and expectation for a 
Pacific collective voice on climate change. The chapter explores the structures of both 
organisations that were essential in building regional consensus on two political 
declarations: the PIDF Suva Declaration on Climate Change, and the PIF Port Moresby 
Declaration on Climate Action. The chapter also explores the concepts of Pacific Way 
and Talanoa65 as specifically Pacific approaches and tools of diplomatic consensus 
decision making and how they are practiced or used in real time negotiations.  
 
The decisive forum to conclude all global level negotiations was the Paris Climate 
Change Conference, will be explored in Chapter Six. The chapter goes inside the 
negotiations by detailing three key events in the negotiations that involved Pacific 
island states. The research explores the contributions of the Pacific Small Islands 
Developing States (Pacific SIDS) group during the negotiations, and the vital roles of 
Tuvalu and Marshall Islands in the final days of negotiations.  
 
The concluding chapter will argue the key thesis arguments. It draws out the insights 
and substantiates conditions in understating, and future work in building a theory on 
multilateral consensus decision making. It identifies nine conditions of interactional 
behaviour on how states build and reach consensus in a multilateral negotiation setting. 
From these nine conditions of state behaviour, the research finds three overall guiding 
                                                     
65 Not to be confused with Talanoa as a research method. 
  
 
27  
principles in multilateral consensus decision making: the process is party driven, the 
process of negotiations occurs in incremental stages of consent, and more importantly is 
the active presence of a core group of negotiators from beginning to end. The final 
condition of a core group aptly describes the roles and significance of Pacific island 
climate change technical negotiators who are present in all four multilateral negotiations 
forum examined in this research. The chapter concludes with limitations of this research 
and questions for future research that this thesis has prompted. 
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Chapter Two: Multilateral Consensus Decision Making  
 
Introduction: 
This theoretical chapter has three key aims: to provide a conceptual understanding of 
consensus decision making, identify propositions of multilateral consensus negotiations, 
and establish an analytical framework to study multilateral consensus negotiations. 
Beyond the study of international relations, an eclectic literature from the disciplines of 
psychology (including sociology and anthropology) and diplomatic studies have all 
contributed to understanding this endeavour of human collective action. This multi-
disciplinary approach is needed to help identify the lacunae in the consensus decision 
making literature in international relations. This is also an acknowledgement and 
reflection of the fact that consensus decision making is not a phenomenon peculiar to 
just multilateral forums. Decision making occurs in all levels of society from 
negotiations at the UNFCCC, a business board room, ministerial meetings, church 
groups, village fono66, to even the family unit. Furthermore, a multi-discipline approach 
is informed by the eclectic methodology of global political ethnography and process 
tracing used here, which draws upon participant observations, talanoa interviews, and 
textual analysis on how states navigate multilateral negotiations. 
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section will  provide a broad 
definition of the key terms under consideration.  The discipline of psychology and its 
literature on meeting science will be explored in the second section; this body of work 
studies the behaviour of individuals at the local level, as in community and business 
meetings. The findings from understanding meetings at this level helps us to understand 
consensus decision making at the multilateral international level. Two sub-fields of 
international relations namely decision making theories and study of multilateralism 
substantiate the importance of actors. Consensus as a procedural rule illuminates how 
consensus has become a multilateral norm and will be discussed in the third section. 
The scholarship on multilateral negotiations in diplomatic studies that emphasises the 
                                                     
66 ‘Fono’ in Samoa means meeting place. In this context village fono denotes council of chiefs and elders- 
that decide on the matters social and economic well-being of villagers, where decisions are made by 
consensus. 
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importance of actors, activities and stages will be explored in the fourth section of this 
chapter. All these disciplines and their contribution to understanding consensus decision 
making culminate in the analytical framework discussed in the concluding section.  
 
Consensus Decision Making: Outcome and Process 
This thesis asks the question: in multilateral climate change negotiations, how do small 
Pacific island states build and reach a consensus? The general question then becomes: in 
multilateral negotiations, how do states build and reach consensus? It puts parameters 
around the enquiry of multilateral negotiations, and specifically negotiations by 
consensus. At the same time, the question rests on three assumptions:  
1) Assumption that states are active in building consensus (process). 
2) Assumption that states are active in reaching consensus (process). 
3) Assumption that multilateral negotiations achieve or lead to a consensus 
(outcome). 
This line of enquiry supposes that consensus is an outcome, that is achieved from a 
consensus process. There is no consensus on what the term consensus means; however, 
there is an understanding of where it takes place, in decision making situations. “When 
it is combined with words like procedure, process or technique, consensus denotes a 
specific form of decision making…but used alone consensus usually denotes the 
product of the process- outcome”67. Therefore, this research is concerned with 
consensus decision making as a product of process, and the ability of group actors 
(Pacific island states) to effectively participate in regional, international and global 
climate change negotiations.   
 
Across the humanities and science disciplines, consensus is a concept used to explain 
the rationality of group decision making. Wherever and whenever individuals gather to 
make decisions, the sum decision is perceived to be the consensus: whether it is an 
agreement to conclude, continue or defer. Whether it be a group of friends deciding on 
what movie to watch, or a village meeting to decide a moratorium on fishing grounds, 
or states negotiating a treaty on conservation of forests – consensus decision making is a 
                                                     
67 Mary E Footer, "Role of Concensus in GATT/WTO Decision-making," Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business 17 (1996): 655. 
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practice of everyday life. Studies by anthropologists and historians have identified 
forms of consensus decision making that were present in societies throughout history 
and across the globe. From early hunter‐gatherer societies68, to village communities in 
Japan69 Sierra Leone,70 India71, Vietnam72 and Papua New Guinea73. The various 
disciplines differ in their approaches, not to mention the subjects at the focus of their 
analysis. For psychology the behaviour and mind of individuals in a group are key in 
their analysis; sociology and anthropology explore societal groups and their 
relationships, interactions and cultures of individuals in a decision making setting; while 
international relations and diplomatic studies focus on the behaviour of states in a 
multilateral setting. In other words, consensus decision making is present and studied at 
three levels: the individual, societal groups, and states. Despite these differences of unit 
analysis there is general understanding even as presented in the simplest of definitions: 
consensus is achieved (an agreed outcome), and what it represents (a group solidarity or 
belief in an idea or opinion)74.  
 
By exploring the process in which individuals, societal groups or states come together 
to make decisions, there is an added richness in understanding the complexity and 
management of this endeavour. Through tracing the complexity of actors and issues, 
and the management of activities in consensus decision making, this can help explain 
factors in building and reaching consensus. When unpacking the process or the 
negotiations that lead to universality, there are many differences in what consensus 
could be. In essence, this thesis attempts to understand consensus decision making in a 
multilateral setting: the outcome of regional, international and global climate 
                                                     
68 George Silberbauer, "Political process in G/wi bands," in Politics and History in Band Societies, ed. 
Eleanor Burke Leacock and Richard B. Lee (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge University Press, 
1982). 
69 Thomas C. Smith, The agrarian origins of modern Japan (Stanford: Standord University Press, 1959). 
70 Mariane Ferme, "The violence of numbers: Consensus, competition, and the negotiation of disputes in 
Sierra Leone," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines 38, no. 2-4 (1998). 
71 Louis Dumont, Homo hierarchicus: the caste system and its implications, Complete rev. English ed. 
(Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 1980). 
72 Samuel L. Popkin, The rational peasant: the political economy of rural society in Vietnam (Berkeley: 
University Of California Press, 1979).  
73 Leo Marai, "The Psychology of Consensus in Melanesia," Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology 1, no. 2 
(2007). 
74 Merriam-Webster, " Consensus,"  www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consensus. 
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negotiations that Pacific island states participated in 2015, and more importantly the 
processes of negotiations in these forums. With this in mind, the chosen literature from 
psychology, international relations and diplomatic studies helps us to understand state 
behaviour. These building blocks will form the analytical framework in order to unpack 
the various multilateral forums as explored in Chapters Four, Five and Six.  
 
Defining Consensus Decision Making 
Despite the differences across disciplines, there is an understanding of what consensus 
decision making is not. Consensus is and should not be seen as unanimity, where 
unanimity is a situation where all parties agree; it is one of many outcomes of group 
decision making. This is a common misunderstanding, as elaborated further in this 
chapter, where it is postulated that unanimity is an action that takes place in finalising a 
consensus process where a stalemate may occur. This usually is the form of a voting 
model that may be applied to affirm a group’s agreement. Whether it be a small 
community group or international organisations, consensus is viewed as a substitute, or 
a decision made without having to use a vote.  
 
The process of consensus decision making involves “reducing the uncertainty about the 
participants’ future actions by jointly accepting a position that obligates them to act 
accordingly and thereby coordinates collective action”75. It is a political concept that 
yields to the practice of persuasion by parties to influence, compromise and agree on 
solutions.76 At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that not all participants 
have an equal footing in terms of power. This power imbalance is more pronounced in 
multilateral negotiations where states are answerable to domestic constituencies with a 
wide spectrum of interests. Thus, the process of consensus decision making is not a 
discussion of straightforward yes or no questions; but rather a forum or situation of 
negotiating multiple options proposed by interested parties. Not all participants would 
                                                     
75 Christoph Haug, "What is consensus and how is it achieved in meetings? Four practices of consensus 
decision-making," in The Cambridge handbook of meeting science., ed. Joseph A. Allen, Nale Lehmann-
Willenbrock, and Steven G. Rogelberg (New york: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 562. 
76 Louis B. Sohn, "United Nations Decision-Making: Confrontation or Consensus," Harvard 
International Law Journal 15, no. 3 (1997): 441. 
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agree on one option or combinations; consensus decision making is a forum of 
disagreements. 
 
Reaching an agreement can prove to be a time-consuming affair, and so the complex 
process has to be both dynamic and creative. Consensus decision making is used to 
avoid a process that either leads to a formal voting system, or where one or small 
number of parties make decisions on behalf of the rest of the group. This leads to what 
some may call consensus as an agreement not to disagree77 or the lowest common 
denominator of residual possibilities78. Here we identify three key elements of this 
study: Consensus Decision Making, Building Consensus and Reaching Consensus.  
 
This thesis finds a more useful definition of consensus decision making: as the 
outcome agreement that is achieved from a non-voting decision making process that 
involves negotiating disagreements of interests, values and ideas among three or more 
parties collaboratively. This definition underscores both the outcome and process of 
decision negotiations that involves two key critical phases: the phase of building 
consensus, and the phase of reaching consensus. This dual process is the main 
theoretical hypothesis for this research: multilateral consensus decision making is the 
sum of two processes of building and reaching consensus.  
 
Before exploring the literature of consensus decision making in international relations 
and diplomatic studies, we should note that psychology uses approaches from 
organisational sociology and anthropology to explain how humans behave in small 
consensus decision making units.  
 
 
 
                                                     
77 Courtney B Smith, "The politics of global consensus building: a comparative analysis," Global 
Governance 5, no. 2 (1999). 
78 Pamela S Chasek, Earth negotiations: Analyzing thirty years of environmental diplomacy (United 
Nations University Press, 2001), 32. 
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Psychology: Interactional Consensus 
From the discipline of psychology, infused with applications and approaches from 
anthropology and sociology comes the burgeoning literature on meeting science79. 
Meetings are an inevitable part of everyday life, just as multilateral meetings of three or 
more states are the reality of diplomatic life. Meeting science analyses organizational 
effectiveness of meetings by providing a window into the employees’ experiences with 
the organization80. According to proponents of the subfield, its literature point to two 
forms of consensus: mental and interactional. Mental consensus81 refers to individuals’ 
cognitive agreement based on orientations through mental constructs, shared 
understanding, perceptions and attitudes82. These studies revolve around an individual’s 
or small group preferences on conceptualisation of an idea, issue or problem. This is 
explored through surveys where a researcher determines the aggregate degree of 
agreement that exists among participants at one particular time of a process.  
 
On the other hand, interactional psychology explores what individuals or groups do to 
achieve consensus. It draws on research from sociology and anthropology that take an 
interest on the interactive construction of consensus in meetings from a wide range of 
groups: co-housing groups83, the Religious Society of Friends (the Quakers)84, political 
activists85 an Aboriginal community in Australia 86, to multilateralism (the Council of 
                                                     
79  See Joseph A Allen, Nale Lehmann-Willenbrock, and Steven G Rogelberg, The Cambridge handbook 
of meeting science (Cambridge University Press, 2015). And Lawrence E Susskind, Sarah McKearnen, 
and Jennifer Thomas-Lamar, The consensus building handbook: A comprehensive guide to reaching 
agreement (Sage Publications, 1999). 
80 Allen, Lehmann-Willenbrock, and Rogelberg.  
81 See Simone Chambers, "Deliberative democratic theory," Annual review of political science 6, no. 1 
(2003). 
82 Haug, 558-61. 
83 Mary Ann Renz, "The meaning of consensus and blocking for cohousing groups," Small Group 
Research 37, no. 4 (2006). 
84 Darcy K Leach, "'Why Just Go for 51%?'Organizational Structure in the Religious Society of Friends,"  
(1998). 
85 See David Graeber, Direct action: An ethnography (AK press, 2009). and, Marianne Maeckelbergh, 
The will of the many: How the alterglobalisation movement is changing the face of democracy (Pluto Pr, 
2009). 
86Fred R Myers, "Reflections on a meeting: Structure, language, and the polity in a small‐scale society," 
American Ethnologist 13, no. 3 (1986). 
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the European Union87 and a study of plenary meetings of the World Trade 
Organisation88). Consensus decision making is observed through the behaviour of 
participants; where participants determine the object and conclusion of decision 
making89. Psychologists argue that it is vital for participants to know the object or aim 
of discussions in order to assess whether to oppose a proposal or not. This is important 
as Christophe Haug argues “[i]n order to be able to act according to the decision in an 
uncertain future, (participants) need to understand the spirit of the decision so that they 
can interpret the decision in coherent ways when the context changes unexpectedly”90. 
In this study, consensus is viewed as an interactional enterprise of state representatives 
in negotiations, and their activities to build and reach consensus. Needless to say, the 
data collected from individual talanoa interviews complements the observation of actual 
events and document analysis in 2015 that led to Pacific states reaching consensus. 
These personal views and interactions from Pacific negotiators provide a snapshot of 
personal aspirations and behaviour especially of key individuals. 
 
The distinction between mental consensus and interactional consensus is summarised in 
Table 4. Adapted from the work of Christoph Haug, his observations on interactional 
consensus provides the basic propositions and hypotheses of consensus decision making 
to be analysed in this thesis. The interactions of states can be observed through 
characteristics of collective decisions, which are conscious acts of what participants or 
states decide. A consensus outcome is not when states agree on an agreement, but 
rather, when states agree not to disagree or object to when decisions are made. The 
present study looks at how states and their representatives participate in multilateral 
forums and consciously try to achieve consensus. Furthermore, it goes beyond the study 
of consensus decision making in one forum and follows a series of regional and 
international meetings that build towards a global agreement.  
 
                                                     
87 Stéphanie Novak, "The silence of ministers: Consensus and blame avoidance in the Council of the 
European Union," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51, no. 6 (2013). 
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Table 4. Mental Consensus and Interactional Consensus 
Source: Christoph Haug, "What is consensus and how is it achieved in meetings? Four 
practices of consensus decision making," in The Cambridge handbook of meeting science., ed. 
Joseph A. Allen, Nale Lehmann-Willenbrock, and Steven G. Rogelberg (New york: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 
 
Unanimity ‘Vote’ and Consensus ‘Agreement not to Disagree’ 
The literature on meeting science also proposes explanations on what is not consensus 
decision making. Consensus and unanimity differ. An outcome by unanimous 
agreement is a result of decision making where a vote took place to affirm a decision91. 
While a decision may be viewed as unanimous consent/consensus, it does not 
necessarily mean that every participant agreed. In reality, a majority of participants may 
have approved a decision, and a minority voted otherwise. To achieve unanimity, it 
follows a logic of approval, where participants must actively agree on every step in the 
                                                     
91 Tim Barnett, "Consensus and Unanimity,"  
http://www.groupfacilitation.net/Articles%20for%20Facilitators/Consensus%20&%20Unanimity.html. 
Defining Consensus Mental Consensus Interactional Consensus  
What constitutes 
consensus? 
Mental states 
(people’s interactions) 
Interactions  
(what people/states do) 
How is it observed? Inferred from individual 
behaviour (usually self-
reports, surveys) 
Directly observable collective 
behaviour 
Who determines 
consensus exists and 
what its object is? 
Exogenous: an external 
behaviour 
Endogenous: only the 
participants themselves 
Mechanism of scaling 
from individual to 
collective 
Aggregation of individual 
data 
Communication and 
negotiation among 
individuals/states 
Type of observation Snapshot of an ongoing 
process 
Closure of deliberations 
Temporality Continuous Discrete/incremental 
Type of unity Congruence Absence of opposition 
What consensus 
represent? 
Social cohesion/integration A collective decision 
Result/consequence of 
consensus 
Homogeneity of orientation Obligation to collective action 
Awareness of subjects? Can be aware of pluralistic 
ignorance) falsely believe in 
consensus 
Consensus is established by 
a conscious act 
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decision making process. Consensus on the other hand is a situation when no 
disagreement is articulated. While unanimity means agreement in totality, consensus 
allows participants to let a position or decision of a group stand, while individually 
taking a different or no position at all at the later stages of negotiations92. Decisions by 
consensus tend to be ambiguous and susceptible to be re-opened for more deliberations, 
thus leading a process to continue. If participants are silent on a position on the table, it 
is assumed that they have no disagreement with the final option on the table.  
 
This agreement not to disagree, or rule of non-opposition is a core principle. Consensus 
and voting models of collective decisions making are distinct. In a setting where voting 
is the norm, each participant will express their preferred decision option which is 
compared to others, and if all participants express the same preference then this chosen 
option is the unanimous decision. On the other hand, consensus decision making means 
the distribution of individual preferences remains unknown and changes overtime; 
however, it is not the expression of an agreement with an option but about the absence 
of expressions of disagreement93. Consensus is achieved when “participants observe the 
absence of expressed disagreement to the proposal (from other participants) which is 
thereby accepted as the collective position of the group” 94. These distinctions between 
unanimity and consensus are highlighted in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Distinction between Unanimity and Consesnus 
                                                     
92 Margaret Gilbert, "Modelling collective belief," Synthese 73, no. 1 (1987): 579. 
93 Haug, 565. 
94 Ibid. 
Unanimity Consensus  
Achieved through voting Achieved without voting 
Follows a logic of approval Follows a logic of consent 
Everyone expresses their preferences 
with regard to available options 
Not everyone (possibly only a minority of 
the participants) expresses their 
preferences 
The distribution of preferences among 
the options is observed by counting the 
votes 
The distribution of preferences hence 
remains unknown; there is no counting 
involved.  
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Source: Christoph Haug, "What is consensus and how is it achieved in meetings? Four 
practices of consensus decision making," in The Cambridge handbook of meeting science., ed. 
Joseph A. Allen, Nale Lehmann-Willenbrock, and Steven G. Rogelberg (New york: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 
 
Decisions by consensus do not require every participant to express preference or 
agreement. The distributions of these preferences are unknown, and an outcome is 
reached when there is no more visible opposition. When participants observe the 
absence of expresses disagreement to the proposal, it is thereby accepted as the 
collective position of the group95. The propositions around interactional consensus and 
what distinguishes the practice from unanimity provide a useful starting point to build a 
framework. The scholars in this sub-field focus their analysis on multiple small 
meetings from activist groups, unions, business management meeting to small simulated 
student groups, in order to ascertain key traits found in these static face-to-face 
meetings96. The clues in this unitary level of consensus help narrow the definition and 
approach, when analysing interactional consensus of states in multilateral negotiations. 
This leads to the questions explored in the next section, why is consensus important at 
the multilateral level? How is it practiced, and more importantly analysed in 
international relations?  
 
International Relations: Actors and Institutions  
Consensus decision making is part of diplomatic life. A survey of the literature as 
summarised in the table below finds the concept is explored in two approaches of 
                                                     
95 Ibid., 570. 
96 See Gayle W Hill, "Group versus individual performance: Are N+ 1 heads better than one?," 
Psychological bulletin 91, no. 3 (1982)., Richard P Bagozzi and Utpal M Dholakia, "Antecedents and 
purchase consequences of customer participation in small group brand communities," International 
Journal of research in Marketing 23, no. 1 (2006). and David G Myers and Helmut Lamm, "The group 
polarization phenomenon," Psychological bulletin 83, no. 4 (1976). 
A quantitative decision rule is applied to 
determine which of the options becomes 
the decision. Commons decision rules 
are: simple majority, super majority (e.g. 
two-thirds, 90 percent, or 100 percent is 
equal to unanimity) 
The decision is made once a proposal is 
no longer contested. i.e. when the 
absence of opposition is apparent 
Aggregation individuals acts of 
acceptance 
Letting the decisions stand as the 
decision of the group (joint acceptance) 
Discontinuity between deliberation and 
decision 
Continuity between deliberation and 
decision 
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inquiry of international relations: one focussing on decision making (actors), and 
another focussing on structure and institutions (process).  The latter finds favour in the 
theories and approaches of liberalism, constructivism, functionalism, and global 
governance, that are interested in the study of international organisations or 
multilateralism. The actor-specific body of work looks at how consensus is studied 
within decision making theories, in particular decision making in foreign policy 
making.  
 
Actor-Specific: Decision/Foreign Policy Making 
The actor-based camp emphasises the scholarship on decision making and foreign 
policy making theories. A sub-field emanating from the work Richard Snyder, H. Bruck 
and Burton Sapin in 195497, who argue for the discipline to expand its level of analysis 
to include the people behind foreign policy decisions; a “perspective that suggested 
people matter in international affairs”98.  The actor-based analysis argues that all that 
occurs between states and across states is grounded in human decision makers acting 
individually or in groups. Snyder et al continue to maintain that the nation-state is the 
most fundamental level of analysis in international relations but have discarded the state 
as a metaphysical abstraction. “By emphasizing decision‐making as a central focus (the 
authors argue they) have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action 
around those officials who act for the political society”99. Decision making theories 
unpack the unit of the state, and by exploring “behaviour of policymakers as 
individuals, in groups, and in contexts of organisations”100. These individual actor-level
                                                     
97 Richard C Snyder, Henry W Bruck, and Burton Sapin, "Decision-making as an Approach to the Study 
of International Politics," in Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Revisited) (Springer, 2002). 
98 Joe D. Hagan, "Does Decision Making Matter?," International Studies Review 3, no. 2 (2001): 5. 
99 Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 53. 
100 Paul't Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, Beyond groupthink: Political group dynamics and 
foreign policy-making (University of Michigan Press, 1997), 6. 
 analysis in the scholarship gave rise to theories such as bureaucratic politics model101, 
groupthink model 102 and cognitive approaches to governmental decision making103.  
 
Bureaucratic Politics/Organisational Model  
Although the bureaucratic politics model was developed by Graham Allison to explain 
how foreign policy is created in times of crises like the Cuban Missile Crisis, it offers 
insights in how actors behave in bureaucratic systems and organisation process. Beyond 
the idea of the state as a unitary actor, the approach articulates a system of many 
internal actors (departments, agencies, politicians, organisational ethos) participating in 
a game of internal bargaining. Both bureaucracies and organisations put their own 
survival at the top of their priorities. These actors come to the game with varying 
preferences, abilities, and positions of power that negotiate and strategise for outcomes 
that best serve their organisational and personal interests. This is best explained by 
Miles Law in the formulation where you stand depends on where you sit104. 
 
The proponents of the model ask three key questions that also serve the purpose of this 
research. Who are the actors? What factors influence each actor’s position? How do 
actors’ positions come together to generate governmental/international policies? 
Inadvertently this line of questioning also asks what type of actor are they? Actors are 
influenced in many ways whether it be through the research information they receive, or 
by something as simple as the setting. “The venue in which bargaining takes place—
cabinet room, boardroom, public news media, and so forth—may also privilege some 
actors and some interests over others”105. Although this study does not explore how 
climate change policy is created and negotiated at the state level, the basic foundation 
                                                     
101 Graham T. Allison, Essence of decision: explaining the Cuban missile crisis (Boston Little, Brown, 
1971). 
102 Irving L. Janis, Victims of groupthink: a psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and fiascoes 
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1972). 
103 Robert Jervis, Perception and misperception in international politics (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976)., and Ole R Holsti, "Foreign policy decision-makers viewed psychologically: Cognitive 
processes approaches," in Thought and action in foreign policy (Springer, 1977). 
104 A term made famous by a US budget official Rufus Miles, that explained the U.S. Congress 
government budget crisis of 1950s that emanated by the party politics and polarisation of the Republicans 
and Democrats. 
105 Brent Durbin, "Bureaucratic politics approach," Encyclopædia Britannica, inc, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/bureaucratic-politics-approach. 
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and questions around the role, background and place of actors in a decision making 
system are useful in this manner. “To understand the actions of a state indeed, of any 
large, complex organization, one must understand the rules governing its decision 
making processes and the motivations of actors participating therein. The result of such 
a process may well indicate a compromise point without any clear internal strategic 
logic and may even reflect the unintended consequence of a dynamic tug-of-war among 
actors”106. 
 
Small Group Politics 
A second branch of decision making theories emphasises group dynamics or more 
specifically small-group contexts. These studies have identified a small group of elites 
that emerge to make the final decisions in foreign policy making. Drawing upon 
sociology and social psychology, scholars explore the apex group, such as a cabinet or 
special crisis management response group, by detailing their interactions. “Underlying 
these models are the premises that the group is not merely the sum of its members (thus 
decisions emerging from the group are likely to be different from what a simple 
aggregation of individual preferences and abilities might suggest), and that group 
dynamics can have a significant impact on the substance and quality of decisions.”107 
Small groups often perform better than individuals in coping with complex tasks owing 
to their diverse perspectives and talents, an effective division of labour, and high-quality 
debates on definitions of the situation and prescriptions for dealing with it108. However, 
there is a challenge when there is too much cohesion in the small group. Irving Janis’ 
seminal work on groupthink finds that defiance in a fraction of a group enhances 
performance in decision making. The motivation to maintain group consensus and 
personal acceptance by the group can cause deterioration of decision‐making quality109.  
 
                                                     
106 Ibid. 
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In light of this research, small group theories prescribe consensus decision making is 
best when it is controlled by a small group. When canvassing the existing literature of 
UNFCCC multilateral negotiations, the research finds groups of likeminded countries 
that band together and negotiate in political grouping blocs110 or inter-state coalitions111. 
These scholars have argued that coalitions are an integral part of the UNFCCC 
regime112 as they manage complexity113 inside the climate change negotiations. Inter-
state climate coalitions have existed in the regime since its early years114, but since the 
diplomatic failures of Copenhagen COP15 2009 coalition groups have fragmented115 
and formed new smaller regional and issue-specific coalitions116. Although small group 
theory explains foreign policy making especially in crisis situations, two propositions 
can be reached from small group theory to shed light on multilateral climate change 
negotiations. Firstly, are these country negotiation coalitions the small groups that are 
decisive in building and reaching consensus? Or will there be another small group of 
officials that decide on the actual outcome agreement in multilateral negotiations? 
 
Individual Decision Making 
The final branch of decision making theories focusses on the individual decision maker, 
or more explicitly state leaders. These theories analyse leaders’ decision making 
through the classical model of rational decision making and the substantial body of 
theory and evidence on the constraints they may face in relatively simple choice 
situations117. “Drawing upon cognitive psychology, these models go well beyond some 
                                                     
110 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, "Party Groupings," United Nations 
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of the earlier formulations that drew upon psychodynamic theories to identify various 
types of psychopathologies among political leaders: paranoia, authoritarianism, the 
displacement of private motives on public objects”118 to name a few. These studies 
attempt to explain how leaders deal in complex situations of half-truths and conflicting 
information. There are three common approaches when analysing individuals or leaders. 
The first approach looks at leaders as bounded rationalists that seek satisfactory 
information for optimal solutions. A leader is seen as a cognitive miser or “one who 
seeks to simply complex problems and to find short cuts to problem solving”119. A 
second approach views the decision maker as an error prone intuitive scientist that is 
likely to commit a range of mistakes and at the core of this is the fact that the leader is a 
“victim of flawed decision rules who uses data poorly”120. The final approach view 
decision makers as those whose decisions cannot be calculated, however researchers 
look at their belief systems, images of relevant actors, perceptions, information-
processing strategies, heuristics, and certain personality traits. 
 
Individual decision making theories and approaches are not studied in climate change 
negotiations scholarship. There is little correlation, mainly because multilateralism does 
not depend on the decision of one person. It is an endeavour of multiple states. 
However, this branch of decision making theories leads to questions about key 
individuals that may emerge as essential players in climate decision making. Are these 
leaders’ cognitive misers who actively seek or depend on information to form strategy 
to problem solving? Or are these individuals prone to mistakes?  
 
Process Specific: Institution-oriented/Multilateralism studies 
The second body of work in international relations that can assist in explaining 
multilateral consensus decision making can be found from the study of multilateralism, 
or more precisely the processes within multilateralism. One of the seminal works in this 
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area of study by Robert Keohane defines it as “the practice of coordinating national 
policies in groups of three or more states through ad hoc arrangements or means or 
institutions”121. This research focuses on international institutions and as noted below, 
the study of multilateral institutions came to the fore of the discipline with its necessity 
post World War II, with a renaissance after 1990 at the end of the Cold War emergence 
of multi-polar politics.  
 
Both rational (neo-realists and liberal institutionalists) and reflectivist (constructivism, 
post-modernism and critical theories) schools of thought have sought to explain the 
phenomena of multilateral international organisations. Neo-realists argue that 
international organisations are a reflection of a state’s power 122 and any agreement they 
enter must serve its national interest123. Institutions are part of systemic approach in 
international politics that create governance regimes that regulate state behaviour124, 
through hegemonic stability125, and mediating interests and outcomes126. Neoliberals 
and functionalism view international organisations as social organisations based on 
common interests and the needs shared by states through collective action. While 
rational theories favour institutions and their strategic design for decision making, they 
do not explain how actors within an institution have their own interests and identities 
which drive them to interact, and ultimately create new identities127. Reflectivist 
approaches have explanatory power in this case. From constructivism to post-
modernism research the emphasis is on both actors and institutions that have norms, 
cultures, identities, knowledge which are created, and can create new forms. Despite 
                                                     
121 Keohane, "Multilateralism: an agenda for research," 731. 
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different approaches these main camps of the discipline look at analysing international 
institutions—they both explore common knowledge possessed by actors in an 
institution. Rational theories explore how common knowledge affects strategic decision 
making, while reflectivists look at how common knowledge is created128.  
 
In effect this basic understanding of these approaches, that is impacts on strategic 
decision making and how decision making is created, informs how the rest of this 
section will proceed. Despite the limited literature that specifically focuses on theorising 
consensus decision making129 in international relations, there is a substantial body of 
work that explores the historical, organisational, and the institutional concept and norm 
of consensus as a multilateral meeting procedure.  
 
Multilateralism 
The study of multilateralism and international organisations follows the liberal 
institutionalist underpinnings of collective decision making to avoid war through 
diplomacy, trade, and resolving transnational problems. “The practice of coordinating 
national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by 
means of institutions” is what Robert Keohane defines as multilateralism130. 
International multilateral organisations have multiplied from only 37 in 1909, to 123 by 
the end of the second world war, to as many as 244 in 2006131. These institutions anchor 
the common aim of transnational cooperation and collective cooperation. “Whether 
their memberships are inter-governmental or non-governmental, (institutions) serve 
similar purposes: they lower transaction costs for members and produce information; 
they encourage members to think about their future (“lower their discount rate”); create 
                                                     
128 Hui Cao, "Do international institutions matter?," in Working Paper Series on European Studies 
(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2014), 10. 
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linkages across issues; and they serve as agents that both create and diffuse ideas, norms 
and expectations”132.  
 
Multilateralism is discursive in nature as these institutions incorporate states from great 
powers to small states, that have interests in avoiding unilateralism. For small states, 
international institutions offer a platform to influence international policy decisions133, 
while for great powers the benefits of multilateralism come from controlling the 
behaviour of another great power or rising power. Multilateral institutions have 
experimented with many forms of decision making, like consensus decision making, in 
order to keep these organisations relevant and effective for member states. The 
popularity of consensus decision making in multilateralism today is not coincidental. In 
fact, the pattern of decision making within international organisations is closely 
associated with phases of evolution of the international system in the past century. 
 
Multilateral Unanimity to Voting 
Prior to World War II unanimity was the main form of decision making in international 
organisations. Unanimity was considered the true embodiment of the Congress of 
Vienna 1815 principles of non-interference and the equality of states as primary units of 
decision making134. “Every state ha(d) equal voice in international proceedings, and that 
no state can be bound without its consent; … sovereign equality and sovereign 
immunity from externally imposed legislation’ imply demanding unanimity in all 
decisions taken between states”.135 Ultimately, the preeminent international organisation 
after World War I, the League of Nations, utilised the rule in its deliberations. The 
intention of the procedural process of all must agree was to restrain a majority of states 
from making decisions that would be harmful to a minority. However, the pressure for 
compromise did not take into account the strength of the minority who have been forced 
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to agree on certain issues136.  This as Jenks and many other scholars attests to the failure 
of unanimity multilateralism and the ultimate demise of the League of Nations137.  
 
The enthusiasm for multilateral institutionalism returned post 1945 in Bretton Woods 
and San Francisco conferences as means to avoid another great war through collective 
security. For the most part, the multilateral institutions and conferences of post WWII 
were convened by major powers that focussed on issues of peace and war. The 
avalanche of institutions and conferences that came after WWII had a broader interest 
on economic, financial, social and cultural questions138 that consciously considered the 
growing international society. The indecision and ineffectiveness of the League of 
Nations suggested the need for voting in its decision making procedures.  However, 
designers of these new institutions still had to overcome questions of the voting 
formula, or the conundrum of what Stephen Zamora called the equality before the law, 
and equality of participation and responsibilities 139. The former was associated to the 
one equal vote majority rules, while the latter preferred the weighted voting procedure.  
  
With the failures of unanimity to produce decisive agreements, the early designs of 
multilateral institutions swayed in favour of weighted voting systems. The inclination 
by great powers to set the rules of decision making in favour of weighted voting was 
evident in the UN Security Council (UNSC) veto power and permanent seats or the 
World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) shareholder contribution 
votes. “The idea of giving all nations an equal vote sounds decent and democratic, but it 
is not…it gives citizens of Iceland a voting equal to America and China…it is of course 
necessary for the great nations to have a veto”.140 The argument here was that equal 
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voting was unjust for great powers as they had the added burden, responsibility, and 
contribution in these institutions141.  
 
Nevertheless, the procedure of majority voting was also introduced in other subsidiary 
bodies of the UN, WB and IMF as a means to give new states a place in the 
international system. The UN’s General Assembly (UNGA) and the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC), General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now the 
World Trade Organisation) utilised one vote-majority rules. To garner the interest and 
active participation of smaller and new states, the principle of sovereign equality 
through majority voting was the preferred choice142. For GATT the preference on 
majority vote system was a means to include developing countries in the decision 
making process of the institution143.  
 
Despite relative success in its early years, questions emerged about the weighted voting 
system in the 1960’s with the emergence of new formed states in the period of 
decolonisation. As Barry Buzan states, the dilemma of “international decision making is 
the divorce of power from voting majorities resulting from the expansion of 
membership in the international system”.144 Proponents for majority rules came mainly 
from small states and “their professed fear was that the relative reduction of their 
representation would expose them to the rapacious impulses of a putative coalition of 
the large states”.145 It was not just weighted or majority voting, but voting as a 
procedure of decision making as a whole that was being questioned. The voting 
procedure started to be viewed as ineffective and useless in international rule making, 
given the prominence of the ideological divisions at the time: East and West, North and 
South, developed and less-developed states.  
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Multilateral Consensus Procedure 
The search for a new decision making technique that would enjoy broader-based 
support started to gain momentum; especially in a situation where “highly divided 
system (was) most apparent when decisions on the management of scarce natural 
resources and a range of economic transitions (were) considered”146. The voting system 
left scars, a sense of victory and defeat after the procedure of voting took place (overt 
confrontation).147 The procedures of consensus decision began to seem appealing. 
Scholars like Jonathan Charney writing in the 1960’s stated: 
“The consensus system assures that decision making at a multilateral negotiation 
of a convention will not be dominated by the numerical superiority of any group 
of nations. Rather, procedural significance will be given to the variations in the 
power of nations. Since it is difficult to obtain acceptance of voting systems that 
overtly recognize the differences in nations' importance, the consensus approach 
permits the maintenance of an egalitarian procedure which in practice may 
assure that multilateral negotiations reflect the real geopolitical power of the 
participating nations”148. 
 
Though experiments on the consensus procedure were practised in the early days of the 
UN system149 it was not until 1971 that it became formalised into UNGA rules of 
procedure. The UNGA Resolution 2837 (XXVI) approved the conclusion that the 
adoption of decisions and resolutions by consensus was desirable when it contributed to 
the effective and lasting settlement of differences150. The resolve was that the collective 
decision making approach would strengthen the authority of the UN.  However, the 
procedural rule did allow without prejudice the right of every member state to set forth 
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its views in full agreement with a proposition. Member states were given the right of 
reply to make their concerns known, despite their formal agreement or rejection to a 
proposal.   
 
Soon after, subsidiary organs of the UN system, namely the World Conferences, started 
to incorporate the procedure in its decision making process. The UN Convention on 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1973 and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
Population Commission 1974, agreed upon the necessity of decisions on important 
matters of substance shall be taken by consensus. The UNCLOS article 39 of its rules of 
procedures called this the gentleman’s agreement that “before a matter of substance put 
to vote, a determination that all efforts reaching general agreement have been exhausted 
shall be made by the majority”151.   
 
Outside of the UN system, new multilateral institutions emerged during the 1970s-
1990s in the form of regional, inter-regional or trans-lateral organisations that pursued 
the consensus rule over a voting system in its deliberations. The successful experiments 
of the procedure in the UN system led to consensus being the preferred system in the 
GATT152, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OECD) and 
geographical regional institutions like the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the Caribbean Community (CariCom), and the South Pacific Forum153 to 
name a few. The procedure of consensus became enshrined in all their respective 
charters’. This was unsurprising as member states were also active UN members. 
Furthermore, the appeal for a non-voting system was that in most cases (other than the 
European Union), these new institutions did not have a mandate to create hard law or 
binding agreements.  
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UNFCCC and the Pitfalls of Consensus Procedure 
Not all UN conferences however, were successful in adopting consensus as rules of 
procedure. Of significance to this research and the climate change regime, the parties of 
the UNFCCC failed to adopt a decision in its initial conferences on the rules of 
procedure to govern future conferences. At the Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee on Climate Change (INC), the series of conferences from 1991-1995 that 
negotiated terms of the climate treaty, the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) countries led by Saudi Arabia consistently blocked the option of 
voting154. When the issue was brought up again at the UNFCCC COP1 Berlin 1995, 
Saudi Arabia again blocked any form of decision making by voting, and there was no 
agreed procedure on voting for any substantial matters155. Rule 42 of the procedures 
provided two alternatives on majority voting which are indented as drafts. Dissident 
parties to the idea of voting were afraid that majority voting would compel them to 
accept further greenhouse gas emission reduction and believed a consensus would allow 
them to veto emissions and control progress.156 In the absence of specific rules on 
decision making, there has been a general understanding amongst Parties that consensus 
is needed for the adoption of substantive decisions157.  
 
The consensus procedure became the default rule for UNFCCC negotiations, and in 
effect all decision making in the global climate change regime.  There was widespread 
belief that consensus had greater political force than those resolutions which one or 
more delegations have refused to support in a vote158. It is desirable that a collaborative 
collective endeavour should proceed only with the consent of all participants. However, 
this does not mean that consensus has been overtly successful in all forms of UNFCCC 
decision making. The debates around the inefficiency of the consensus procedure and 
over false consensus will be explained in Chapter Three.  Needless to say, the example 
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cited above on Saudi Arabia blocking the use of voting procedures for a preference on 
consensus, begs the question: which states benefit from consensus? 
 
Who benefits from Consensus Procedure? 
The literature on multilateral studies informs not only when and how the procedure of 
consensus was introduced in multilateral organisations, but also the question which 
states, or what type of states are more likely to benefit from consensus? Scholars such 
as Ngaire Woods159 and William Gianaris160 have argued that the prominence of the 
consensus procedure was a concession by great powers to the increasing number of new 
states in multilateral organisations. They argue that the consensus rule was promoted by 
less powerful states in order to influence international policy making. This influence, it 
is assumed, would be exercised by joining coalition blocs as evident in seen in the 
lobbying powers of the developing countries in multilateral forums like the UNGA and 
UNCTAD161. These coalitions of developing states162 were united through shared 
experiences of low economic development and legacies of decolonisation when these 
newly established states joined the international system in the 1960’s. Comprising just 
over two-thirds of the international system, developing states would form various 
coalitions to influence the decision making process. Yet while the numbers game may 
seem to benefit developing states, other scholars argue otherwise.  
 
Great or major powers who were in a minority actually controlled the progression of 
negotiations by promoting consensus. Lockwood Payton analysed 250 international 
organisations’ voting systems and found that 78% of international organisations that 
used the consensus procedure do so because of the rule enshrined in its respective 
organisational charter.163 In all these organisations, major powers were present in the 
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prescription of the charters.  The hypothesis Lockwood argues is that major powers 
would push for weighted voting before a consensus decision, with the preference for 
majoritarian voting as the final option; while developing countries would prefer 
majoritarian voting before consensus decision making, and lastly weighted voting 
procedures164.  Majority voting procedures alienated the major powers, while weighted 
voting deterred participation of the developing states in these organisations. The 
consensus procedure became the middle ground for both camps. To prevent the majority 
from controlling decisions, major powers encouraged consensus procedures to block 
negotiations in order to re-negotiate terms, and influence decisions of smaller parties 
through side payment.   
 
In both these conflicting arguments, whether it be the major states or the smaller less 
powerful states that benefit, there is at least one commonality. Irrespective of power or 
status in the international system consensus favours the state or group of states in the 
minority position. “Voting minorities will advocate in favour of consensus decision 
making”165. Multilateral decision making by consensus effectively gives each state a 
veto. This veto would allow any one state to derail, delay or leave negotiations at any 
time. Despite the popularity and usage of the consensus procedure, the fact remains that 
in the event of failure to agree by consensus the voting mechanisms will then be 
enacted. A state could hold negotiations at ransom until its conditions are met; but at the 
same time may also drop its position if a vote is provoked. The threat of a vote may also 
be seen here as a condition to building consensus166. Therefore, the literature on 
multilateralism supports and further develops Christoph Haug’s observations of 
consensus.  In multilateral institutions where consensus is the mode of decision making, 
a state with a minority position will be the more likely to express preferences. Or in 
other words states with a disagreement will control the process of negotiations.  
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Diplomatic Studies: Negotiations 
With its origins in international relations, diplomatic studies offer a third perspective in 
understanding consensus decision making. This vantage point comes in the study of the 
actual practice of building and reaching consensus in multilateral settings, that is, 
through negotiations. As Jan Evensen argues “consensus is a state of art emerging from 
negotiations”167. There is a normative preference for decisions by consensus for its 
ability to have strong moral force; an impediment to allow for an agreement to be 
executed universally. The literature on negotiation studies and multilateral conference 
diplomacy provides a deeper perspective on the actual practice of consensus in 
multilateral meetings.  Negotiation research normally explains process and outcome 
based on internal dynamics within a specific negotiation (e.g., interests, position, power, 
strategy)168. Negotiations revolve around the management of relations between 
governments and governments, and governments and international organisations that 
take places in international conferences169. Geoff Berridge views consensus decision 
making in this field of study as “an attempt to achieve an agreement of all participants 
in a multilateral conference without the need for a vote and its inevitable 
decisiveness”170. Avoiding the vote procedure is seen here as the ultimate purpose of 
negotiations.  
 
Amidst the numerous definitions that speak to the purpose, nature, process and 
participants in multilateral negotiations, Johann Kaufmann’s characterisation is relevant 
to the study at hand. Multilateral negotiations are “the sum total of talks and contacts 
intended to solve conflicts or to work towards the common objectives of a 
conference.”171 This encompassing view of negotiations considers disputes that arise 
before and during the sessions, but more importantly the intricacy of formal open 
plenary sessions, closed door meetings, and informal sessions before and corridor 
                                                     
167 Jens Evensen, "Three Procedural Cornerstones of the Law of the Sea Conference: The Consensus 
Principle, the Package Deal and the Gentleman's Agreement," in Effective Negotiation: Case Studies in 
Conference Diplomacy, ed. Kauffman Johan (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989), 78. 
168 Larry Crump, "Negotiation process and negotiation context," International Negotiation 16, no. 2 
(2011). 
169 Johan Kaufmann, Conference diplomacy: An introductory analysis (Houndsmill, Basingtoke: 
Macmillan Press, 1996), 2. 
170 G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005), 24. 
171 Kaufmann, Conference diplomacy: An introductory analysis, 3. 
  
 
54  
meetings during a formal meeting to name a few. This leads to questions of how 
multilateral negotiations can and have been studied?  How can these studies help us to 
understand how consensus is built and reached in multilateral negotiations? 
 
Analysing Multilateral Negotiations 
In one of the first seminal studies on post-Cold War multilateralism, I.William Zartman 
and scholars of diplomatic studies explore the notion of negotiation complexity172.  
They view modern multilateral negotiations as having six characteristics of complexity: 
multi-party and its diverse actors involved; multi-issues discussed sometimes not 
necessarily part of main objective; multi-role differentiation of parties involved; 
decision making frequently by consensus; the outcomes of negotiations as matters of 
rulemaking; and, the formation of coalitions to manage the sheer numbers and issues 
negotiated173. The multi-party, multi-issue and multi-role explain the context of 
negotiations, while coalition and rulemaking concern the outcome. Consensus they see 
is the most frequent decision rule used in modern day conference diplomacy, and voting 
is reserved for exceptional “cases of vital national interest”174.  
 
Zartman further develops the feature of consensus in contemporary multilateral 
diplomacy from his observations of multilateral negotiations. A consensus outcome is 
achieved from strategies of incremental participation175. These incremental strategies 
occur in multiple phases of a negotiation process. Where parties may not agree, the 
tendency by states to abstain would be perceived as an affirmative rather than a negative 
vote176. Or in other words an agreement arrived at consensus is an agreement where 
members agree without opposition. This consensus building exercise through multiple 
phases almost certainly results in lowest common denominator agreements that are 
without teeth177. Decisions that are reached by consensus create national socio-political 
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pressures, rather than legal obligation to conform178. Zartman offers three observations, 
two of which relate to what psychologists have called interactional consensus, and a 
third which will be explored further in this chapter. First is the notion of logic of 
consent throughout negotiations, second that outcomes will be the lowest common 
denominator, and third that negotiations occur in stages or phases. 
 
Despite the many categorisations of the negotiation’s literature, there are five central 
approaches commonly utilised to study multilateral negotiations: structural, 
strategic/decision, behavioural, process and integrative. Structural analysis looks at 
power-oriented explanations of international negotiations; closely associated with realist 
and neo-realist thought it analyses negotiations on the international distribution of 
power, on the behaviour of states and the role of power deciding political outcomes179.  
Strategic/Decision analysis approaches explain utility maximisation and models of 
decision making. From game theory to linkage and concession analysis, this body of 
work assumes a clear strategy for the best course of action and the best outcome for 
each party might receive in a negotiation. Behavioural analysis focuses on the 
negotiator; this literature explains individual negotiator actions and personality, 
especially focussing on roles of leaders and mediators. Process analysis addresses the 
context of international negotiations by focussing on the dynamics of process, by 
explaining outcomes through a series of concessions in stages and phases180. Utilising 
structural elements, process analysis attempts to predict outcomes by explaining fixed 
points: starting point of discord, end point of convergence. An integrative analysis 
utilises all four approaches of process, individual, power and strategy to analyse 
negotiations. Rather than seeing a process that works from fixed points of discord to a 
common point of convergence, integrative analysis emphasises the imprecision of 
parties’ interest in their own minds181.  For the purposes of this study, frameworks used 
in the integrative analyses are useful in unpacking how Pacific island states navigate 
regional, international and global level negotiations with a deeper understanding of the 
internal politics and cohesion amongst themselves. Such an analysis that looks at the 
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actors and their activities in various phases of negotiations should consider the various 
aspects of process, individuality, power and strategy.  
 
Integrative Analysis of Multilateral Negotiations 
Integrative analysis emphasises the need to examine phases, actors, and their activities 
in negotiations. Similar to process analysis, the integrative approach considers that over 
a period of time, concessions on positions will be made during negotiations. These 
adjustments to initial positions turn multilateral negotiations from a zero-sum game into 
an endeavour or initiative with a positive sum182. The pre-negotiations process also 
matters.183 This approach acknowledges that bargaining begins before official 
negotiations, but the crux of analysis focuses on the turning points and closure of 
negotiations. Integrative analysis explores negotiating actors and their conceptualisation 
of the problem under negotiation; it stresses that these positions will change over the 
duration of negotiations184. This allows for interpretation from the perspective of one or 
group of negotiators and the activities they pursue to comprehend the issues at various 
stages of negotiations. An integrative analysis considers negotiators’ interactional and 
mental interplays at each phase of negotiations, and in doing so can detail issues where 
they are successful and issues where they cannot make a deal185. The literature on 
decision making theories inform this research approach studying the actors in 
multilateral negotiations. As indicated earlier, scholars who use an integrative approach 
have observed and emphasise the study of phases. The next section explores how these 
perspectives help build our understanding of multilateral consensus decision making. 
 
Stages of Multilateral Negotiations 
Integrative models of negotiations pay special attention to sequence of events during 
negotiations and detail possible stages or phases of negotiations. Essentially scholars 
view negotiations as an art of problem solving, where the outcomes are explained by the 
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performance of behaviours at particular appointed phases of negotiations186. The stages 
model is a useful conceptual device for both negotiators and scholars as a means to 
chart progress and identify any disjuncture in a negotiation process. From this 
identification of progress and changes, a recognised pattern of expectation and 
behaviour will emerge. By predicting stages of negotiations and with experience from 
previous negotiations, stages allow practitioners to evaluate alternative agreements187.  
 
There is no one way to categorise stages in negotiations. Various studies explore stages 
from diverse types of international negotiations: whether it be the format (bilateral, 
multilateral, and multi-level), issue specific (security, trade, political, environmental) 
and temporal factors (pre-determined procedure or open timeframe).  I.William 
Zartman’s work on bilateral U.S-Vietnam talks identifies three stages: the first stage is 
negotiating a formula that is acceptable to both sides; with the second stage focusing on 
the search for detail that followed from the agreed image; the last is the endgame188. An 
elaborate eight stage model by Phillip Hugh Gulliver identifies a mixture of tasks and 
behaviour of negotiators as: search for an arena; composition of the agenda and the 
definition of issues; establishing maximal limits to issues in dispute; narrowing the 
differences; preliminaries to final bargaining; final bargaining; ritual affirmation; 
execution of the agreement. Needless to say, studying stages in negotiations (whether 
bilateral or multilateral) is synonymous with the concept of turning point.189 Donald 
Druckman identified four stages in building a package; defining scope or agenda; a 
search for formulas or principles; flushing out the issues; and the search for 
implementation details, in negotiations190.  
 
Despite the differences in the scholarship of stages in negotiations, there is a degree of 
similarity. Stages occur in sequential progression in time; there exists alternating 
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antagonistic and coordinative behaviour across the various stages of any negotiations; 
and stages are not rigid as some may overlap with each other.  A simpler framework and 
model to study negotiations is one that Saadia Touval191 promotes.  In this model phases 
are divided in terms of the progression of international multilateral negotiations: pre-
negotiation, formal negotiation, and agreement phase, by which interests of multi-
parties are adjusted for a joint decision for reaching an agreement 192.  
 
Pre-negotiations: this phase is characterised by informal contact among the 
parties. During this phase there are significant aspects of the negotiation 
typically addressed: the list of participants is agreed upon, and initial coalitions 
or political groupings emerge; role differentiation takes place among the 
participants (leaders, mediators); and substantiative and procedural issues are 
addressed. Parties will learn more about the problems, develop an agenda, and 
search for a formula or general framework.  
Formal negotiations: this phase is where exchange of information, and the 
negotiation proper over the detailed terms of an agreement takes place. The 
parties explore various alternative packages, and may reach some tentative, 
conditional understandings. 
Agreement phase: Parties will translate a tentative understanding into legally 
phrased agreements. Participants will often have second thoughts about the 
terms that they have agreed upon from the previous stages. Furthermore, 
concerns about the implementation of the agreement tend to increase. Such 
misgivings may prompt efforts to obtain new assurances about compliance and 
implementation. 193 
 
One important observation that Touval proposes in the agreement phase is the last 
minute scenario. He states in his description of multilateral negotiations that last minute 
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problems will arise that may prolong or delay the conclusion of multilateral 
negotiations. The introduction of any new proposal, or situations where participants 
press for adoption of proposals that thus far are unacceptable will occur. At this point, 
actors have considerable leverage by withholding consent at the last minute.194 This 
description of a last-minute scenario is what this research identifies as the Consensus 
Point.  
 
Actors in Multilateral Negotiations 
Within negotiation studies literature there are three categories of actors analysed in 
negotiations: leaders, state delegations and coalitions.  Membership of multilateral 
forums, or in this case the forums investigated in this research, are restricted to 
signatory states. Multilateral negotiations are state-centred negotiations; states play a 
major role as the initiator and host, and shepherd the negotiation process until there is 
an agreement195. States have and remain the most influential actors in international 
decision making. However, beyond states representatives there are a plethora of 
interested non-state individuals and organisations that participate in multilateral 
negotiations. 
 
Despite this, there is no preconceived notion or rule on who these state delegates are 
and should be. State representatives are the prerogative of states themselves, whether it 
be government officials or non-state actors like NGO or business lobbyists. States 
decide who can be accredited and who would officially speak on its behalf. In terms of 
the UNFCCC accreditation classification system, state officials are accredited with pink 
badges196. Meanwhile heads of delegation are accorded with a red badge. The other 
actor most commonly acknowledged in the literature are the coalitions or like-minded 
political groupings. A feature of climate change and any other form of multilateral 
negotiations is the formation and bargaining presence of coalitions. States will form and 
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join one or many coalitions that best suits their interests in the negotiations. A more 
detailed examination of coalitions is highlighted in Chapter Three.  
 
While the attention here on states, leaders and coalitions - and the focus of this research 
- is limited to those deemed accredited representatives of states. It is important, 
however, to acknowledge there are more actors involved in negotiations who will be 
described here as procedural actors. These actors are but not limited to the chair or 
president of proceedings, secretariats, heads of secretariats and their executives such as 
the UN Secretary General and other UN bodies. 
 
Negotiations’ scholarship utilising integrative analysis also provides clues about who 
are the actors, and their activities in multilateral forums. The state is not a unitary actor 
in actual negotiations. As with people/actor-specific approaches in international 
relations, integrative analysis encourages researchers to look within state delegations at 
negotiations. An important endeavour of this research is to unpack Pacific island state 
delegations and to identify who are the representatives, the skillset and knowledge they 
bring, and their influence in the politics of delegations and the wider climate change 
negotiations. 
 
Activities in Multilateral Negotiations 
Having identified who the actors in multilateral negotiations are, this thesis refers to 
evidence that may inform the question: what activities do actors perform in 
negotiations? Donald Druckman’s analysis of stages and turning points, describes 
negotiators engaging in two general types of activities during negotiations: monitoring 
and strategising. By monitoring, negotiators determine the extent to which various 
parties maintain interest in the negotiation process197. The multiple parties involved, as 
well as the secretariat, chairman and observer organisations all have a stake in the 
outcome. The interest of these agencies in the negotiation are considered feedback 
variables. Negotiators must weigh all interests and coordinate a response and attempt to 
communicate them effectively in the negotiating process. These activities are dependent 
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on the composition and capacity of its state delegations and coalitions, and their 
channels of communication. While monitoring and coordinating positions occur 
throughout negotiations stages, these are most commonly used in the early phases of 
pre-negotiation and negotiations. It is pre-supposed that during these stages, negotiators 
are more cautious, and “side searches for indication from other (parties) behaviour that 
negotiations are being conducted in good faith, and (all) sides are reluctant to entertain 
new proposals…”.198 
 
Communication is one aspect of strategy. This takes the form of actions to influence the 
course, including tabling a position, decomposing and aggregating relevant information, 
packaging issues, deciding on the order of discussion of an issue, and proceedings from 
point on point by reconciling different position of parties199. The main aim of strategic 
activities is to ensure negotiations move along. As negotiations continue, negotiators 
and their associated coalitions will engage one another in “polemical discourse intended 
to give shape to a framework from which details can be derived”200. Once these 
conceptual issues are laid out negotiators will engage in persuasive debating and 
bargaining of positions to refine issues and to work out details. The issue priorities 
intertwined with cultural and ideological differences heavily influence the persuasive 
debates of negotiators. During situations when bargaining is performed, negotiators 
would strategise to use a state’s relative power position, or external events and issues as 
a means to influence other party positions. In doing so exchanges of concessions are 
made on tangible items and haggling over wording of the agreement. This explanation 
of activities processes that take place in multilateral negotiations are depicted in Table 
6.  
Table 6: Activties in multilateral negotiations 
Activity Process  Critical Influences 
Monitoring and 
coordinating 
Seeking feedback: is 
performance in line with 
instructions? 
Are they negotiating in good 
faith? 
Team composition 
Channels of 
communication 
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Persuasive debates Resolving conceptual 
differences toward an 
acceptable definition of 
purpose, or an agreement in 
principle 
Issue priorities and 
objectives 
Cultural and 
ideological differences 
Bargaining Building a balanced package by 
trading on preferences of 
utilities; involves deducing the 
details from the agreed principle 
Relative power 
Audiences 
External events 
Source: Daniel Druckman, "Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiating Military Base 
Rights, Spain and the United States," Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no. 2 (1986) 
 
However, integrative analyses emphasis on phases, and in particular the focus on the 
interpretations of group of negotiators, belies the critique that it is ineffective to provide 
full description of negotiations, or convincingly provide pathways to a negotiation 
theory. Subsequently, a growing branch of this analysis focusses on precise mechanisms 
for identifying the best possible deal that each party can obtain given the differences in 
the nature of interests201. Studying negotiations using an integrative approach is an 
arduous process that involves mapping dimensions and identifying components to a 
party’s interests that would provide the best trade-offs and greatest durability for an 
outcome. Although models from integrative studies of negotiations may have yet to be 
widely accepted they do not lack meta-narratives or empirical richness. This is what 
Olser Hampson identifies as the struggle between theory and empirical data in 
negotiation studies; where empirical richness is lost in the elegance of analytics while 
formal models of negotiations seek hypotheses and generalise negotiations across space 
and time202. But then again diplomatic studies scholars are wary of predictive models of 
negotiations as they do not necessarily account for change, where sweeping 
generalisation can also be useless. Having established how multilateral negotiations are 
studied and the usefulness of an integrative framework, this research looks more deeply 
into the building blocks of negotiations. More specifically, what does literature say 
about the conditions of building and reaching consensus?  
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Building Consensus in Multilateral Negotiations 
Understanding how states build consensus in a negotiation process requires 
understanding the complexity of each forum. Of high relevance to this thesis is 
Courtney Smith’s seminal work that analyses the internal dynamics and processes in the 
UNGA203. The work follows how the UNGA makes decisions by comparing four 
separate issues, by identifying the internal politics of state delegations, lobbying by 
numerous non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations, and the work of 
the UN secretariat. More importantly, the research proposes a framework and blueprint 
of how consensus building might work through three key variables: formal institution, 
strategic interactions and informal networking.  
 
Formal Institution 
By formal institutions Smith refers to the internal structures of an organisation, and the 
procedures that would be used in making the decisions204. International organisations, 
like the UNGA, have specific characteristics: size, formal leadership, negotiating 
groups, procedures and goal convergence. By unpacking these features, he proposes that 
the likelihood of consensus is greater when: there is a smaller number of participants, 
formal leadership (chair) is sanctioned through procedures of negotiations, a formal ad 
hoc group is formed, there is flexibility in procedure and there is a greater convergence 
in the goals of actors205. It is important to note here the proposition made that formal ad 
hoc negotiation groups established during the process may act as fire brigades to 
manage complexity in negotiations. 
  
Strategic Interaction  
Strategic interaction explores on the interaction amongst actors, with a focus on the 
activities and characteristics of participants with in a decision unit. “The basic idea is 
that each actor in the organisation has linkages to the outside environment, and these 
linkages have an impact on the power and resources and actor has within the 
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organisation.”206 The framework proposes that consensus building is greater in a 
situation when issues discussed are amenable to compromise and less salient to actors in 
the minority position, that there is a greater degree of autonomy, and greater use of 
strategies that focus on the substance of issues, and when a representative of actors are 
willing to serve as broker.  
 
Informal Networking 
Not all activities during multilateral negotiations operate in formal settings. Smith 
argues that behind the scenes there is informal networking process and relationships that 
form amongst participants. “The importance of informal patterns of interaction that 
make up the status systems, communication networks and working relationships” 207 
play a pivotal role in ushering in consensus. In this view, there is a greater degree in 
building consensus when: there are informal contacts among members on a particular 
issue, where they form and have a trusting working relationship, participants have a 
high level of skills and reputations they offer, that ad hoc leadership is perceived as 
legitimate, and when members are willing to look beyond the narrow interests of actors. 
Of significance is the creation of informal contacts in regard to an issue and the more 
contact they have together with the skills and reputation they bring the more the 
likelihood of building consensus. 
 
Ultimately the conditions and propositions that Smith presents, are a blueprint in how 
consensus is built during negotiations. The global consensus building framework is 
useful in analysing case studies through historical narratives, but not necessarily when 
tracing actual negotiations step by step. While it offers clues into actors’ activities 
especially their role in informal networks, it does not offer convincing explanations of 
how consensus is reached. It does not address the stage in negotiations where an 
outcome is finalised. Or in other words, the situation whereby negotiations cross the 
final line, or what is termed here as the consensus point. 
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Reaching Consensus in Multilateral Negotiations 
What happens when an outcome is reached, and who determines when a consensus is 
achieved? In Saadia Touval’s explanation of phases points to a third phase when 
analysing negotiations: the agreement phase. During the first two phases of pre-
negotiation and negotiation stages, delegations and its participants form like-minded 
and issue specific coalitions. However, as Pamela Chasek argues that the final 
bargaining phase is strictly state-centred and characterised by “numerous consultations 
on the remaining peripheral details in the agreement”208. Coalitions will have a limited 
role where delegates engage in dialogue or negotiations by representatives where 
representatives or usually leaders of these coalitions represent their views209. The point 
of reaching a consensus often begins from a small core group who are most interested in 
a given issue and are able to reach agreement on it. This small coalescence group of a 
few select negotiators then proceeds to win the adherence of the other participant who 
are less concerned with that issue210.   
 
In this final phase, parties will conduct bilateral bargaining with each other on points of 
disagreement. One technique is narrowing an outcome to cover only the issues where 
there is an agreement and leaving out unresolved issues. Another technique is what 
William Zartman calls commodity bargaining211 or counterfeit agreements where an 
agreement is produced with ambiguous and imprecise wording giving an illusion of an 
agreement, when little agreement actually exists212. However, this ambiguity has its 
benefits, “it is often better to arrive at an imprecise agreement (thus establishing a 
modicum of cooperation) than to use the continuing gap between existing positions to 
justify refraining from any cooperation. Ambiguity greatly facilitates the conclusion of 
multilateral agreements”213. 
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This scenario is explained by Ronald Walker as one of the vilest features of multilateral 
conference.  
The long hours spent in airless rooms late at nights, amending draft texts so that 
they mean less and less consequently are acceptable to a greater number of 
delegations. This process is readily disparaged as watering down the text; but 
that is an emotional and incomplete way of evaluating it. The essential purpose 
is to find a text that will attract the broadest possible support—that it is to say 
that will more correctly represent the view of the majority- or in other words, of 
the conference214. 
 
In this final phase of multilateral negotiations, agreement is facilitated when “none of 
the participants opposes the agreement, although the degree of support for the 
agreement among them may vary”215. Conclusion is often facilitated by the aversion of 
states to isolation, and while states may veto in multilateralism this is at the risk of 
exclusion. “Being alone while many agree is uncomfortable for governments - to avoid 
isolation states may withdraw their objections”216.  
 
Multilateral Consensus Decision Making: An Analytical Framework 
What do all these juxtapositions mean? To explain how Pacific island states, participate 
in the multilateral enterprise of consensus decision making, this chapter has sought to 
source a definition, and hypotheses from various literatures and propositions in order to 
build an analytical framework. This framework would be corroborated with thick 
ethnographic descriptions of how negotiations took place the various multilateral 
climate change negotiations at the international, regional and global levels. The main 
question this research asks: in multilateral climate change negotiations, how do small 
Pacific island states build and reach consensus?  The inquiry is thus divided into two 
sub-questions to form a simple hypothesis: 
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Multilateral Consensus Decision Making = Building Consensus + Reaching Consensus 
 
The main hypothesis of this research is that, multilateral consensus decision making is 
the process negotiations that involves states building and reaching consensus.  
Building consensus refers to processes in the early phases of negotiations that 
involve participants highlighting multiple interests, values and ideas of parties; 
and their attempts through negotiations to streamline them into viable options.  
Reaching consensus are processes in the final stages of negotiations that 
involve finalising a decision, where viable options are bargained to the point that 
parties agree not to disagree. 
From the eclectic literature explored here, the following propositions will be explored in 
the four multilateral forums examined in this thesis. 
Table 7: Propostions of building and reaching consesnsus in multilateral negotiations 
Propositions: Multilateral Consensus Decision Making (Process A+B) 
- Interactional process of states: what states do to achieve consensus 
- It is visible in the collective behaviour of states, and only states themselves can 
determine the rules, and when an agreement has been achieved 
- Although time consuming, it takes place incrementally (stages) in logic of consent;  
Propositions: Building Consensus (Process A) 
- Takes please when there when there is discussion among states of multiple 
proposals  
- Only a minority inclined to express their preferences, with a disagreement: 
- Coalitions will emerge and differentiation of roles in the groups. 
- Only a few number of issues will be discussed, narrowing of issues 
- Participants provide consent, continuity between deliberation and conclusion  
Propositions: Reaching Consensus (Process B) 
- Discussion by a smaller coalescent group 
- Dropping objections: achieved through bilateral bargaining, construction of 
packages, compensation and side payments 
- Last Minute Scenario     
- Decision is made once a proposal is no longer contested; unity is achieved through 
the absence of opposition 
 
Table 8: Analytical Framework to observe how consensus is built and reached in 
multilateral negotiations  
 Phases Actors Activities 
Building 
Consensus 
Pre-negotiation  
(Informal) 
 
Leaders 
State Delegations 
Coalitions 
Monitoring and Coordinating 
Informal Networking 
Participants agreed;  
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 Coalitions emerge 
Role Differentiation; leaders 
and mediators 
Negotiation Stage 
(Formal/Open) 
  
 
Leaders 
State Delegations 
Coalitions 
Small ‘Coalescence 
Groups’ 
Monitoring and Coordinating 
Persuasive Debates 
Bargaining 
Informal Networking 
Exchange of Information 
Explore Alternative Packages  
Reaching 
Consensus 
Agreement Stage 
(Formal) 
Leaders 
State Delegations 
Small ‘Coalescence 
Group’ 
Monitoring and Coordinating 
Bargaining 
Informal Networking 
Second thoughts 
Last Minute Scenario  
Consensus Point 
 
In order to explain how Pacific states, build consensus in the respective forums, the 
research will trace Pacific states and their negotiators in the pre-negotiations, 
negotiations and agreement phases. For the pre-negotiations phase the hypotheses state 
that leaders, state delegates/negotiators and coalitions will emerge; and will participate 
in activities that revolve around monitoring and coordinating both in formal and 
informal forums. It is predicted that in the negotiations phase, bargaining will start to 
emerge as parties form packages and a tentative agreement. It is expected at this stage 
that small coalescence groups will emerge that will focus on particular issues. In 
reaching consensus, it is expected that negotiators will start to decrease with only those 
with disagreements becoming active in the negotiations. Within this phase, this thesis 
will pay special attention to the actors and activities that occur in the ‘consensus point’ 
or the last-minute scenario. At this most crucial point in negotiations, which states, and 
its negotiators will be present?  
 
The analytical framework presented here is a guide only. Analytical frameworks are 
means to guide the data generation techniques and the analysis of this thesis. It is built 
around the conceptualisation of current literature that explore consensus decision 
making at all levels - individual, society and state from literature of psychology, 
international relations and diplomatic studies. At its core, the framework assists in this 
inductive research of explaining the actors, activities and issues pursued by Pacific 
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island states in climate change negotiations. More importantly, how these states and its 
representatives behave in multilateral consensus decision making will draw out 
conditions of consensus building and reaching consensus. These conditions will inform 
the necessary building blocks on a theory on multilateral consensus decision making. 
This will be examined in detail in the concluding chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite the limited scholarship in international relations on consensus decision making, 
this thesis finds approaches on studying actors and institutions useful for this research 
framework. Decision making theories focus on the utility of the actors of the state and 
the interactions and cognitive abilities to behaving in group thinking processes. The 
approaches encourage such analysis when exploring actors in negotiations and take into 
account the role of leaders, small groups, and the motivations/influences of individual 
actors in bureaucratic/organisational complex. The study of international organisations 
is vast. In this study the focus is on how consensus as a procedure rule has become a 
procedural norm in multilateralism. When exploring studies predicting what type of 
state or actor benefits in this decision making process, the literature points not to 
whether it is a small or large state—in effect because of the multilateral veto that every 
member has, the state or group of states with a disagreement will control the 
negotiations. The minority, or state with disagreement matters.  
 
The study of negotiations within diplomatic studies provide the final clues. In essence 
the research explores behaviour and states in various climate change multilateral forums 
throughout 2015, culminating in the Paris Agreement of December 2015. Negotiations 
studies thus provides the main backbone of the framework. The integrative approach of 
studying actors, process, behaviour and the cognitive dimension217 is relevant to the 
ethnographic methods used and data collected in this research, but especially unpacking 
the phases of negotiations. Using the propositions from psychology on building and 
reaching consensus, and merging with scenarios negotiations studies on phases, actors 
                                                     
217 By cognitive here the research refers to data collected from Talanoa interviews where participants 
shared aspirations and expectation on the progress of negotiations.  
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and activities, the following rubric of analysis be will used to explore the four forums: 
UNFCCC ADP 2-8, PIDF, PIF and UNFCCC COP21. 
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six are the empirical chapters focusing on formal UNFCCC 
ADP2-9, informal PIDF and PIF, and UNFCCC COP21 respectively. The chapters will 
follow the pre-negotiations, negotiations and agreement with a concluding section on 
consensus point. The next chapter will put into context and situate the year of 2015 in 
the history of UNFCCC negotiations, and a history of Pacific island states participation 
in international and regional climate change negotiations.  
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Chapter Three: UNFCCC and the Pacific island states 
 
Introduction:  
This chapter is a study of climate change negotiation processes at the global and 
international level of the UNFCCC, and the regional architecture of climate change 
governance in the Pacific. Climate change negotiations as this chapter will show are a 
complex phenomenon that transcends all levels of diplomacy. The purpose here is to 
provide context on the complexity of the issues and structures of the UNFCCC 
negotiations, and the collective regional responses by Pacific island states to address 
climate change over the past two and half decades.  
 
The first section will explore the complex history and structural institutions of the 
UNFCCC from its inception up until 2014. The chapter will then detail a trajectory of 
Pacific island states’ participation in both the UNFCCC and key moments at the 
regional level during this time, a history that is commonly paint-brushed over as part of 
AOSIS, and at times ignored in the literature. The concluding section focuses on the 
context of negotiations in 2015, which sets up the timeline for the next three empirical 
chapters. It will highlight the series of meetings under the formal international 
UNFCCC ADP process that is distinguished by the text diplomacy 218 for the Paris 
Agreement; as well as the timeline of multilateral regional, sub-regional and regional-
partnership meetings that can be explained as collective diplomacy or new Pacific 
diplomacy. 
 
The Climate Regime: A short but complex history of UNFCCC 
Global Warming Consciousness  
Although the current international climate change regime is associated with the signing 
of the climate change convention in 1992, global concerns can be traced back to as early 
as the 1960s. During this time various research networks were established to study the 
                                                     
218 Pamela Chasek and Lavanya Rajamani, "Steps toward enhanced parity: negotiating capacity and 
strategies of developing countries," in Providing global public goods: managing globalization, ed. Inge 
Kaul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 255. 
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impact of concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere219. The climate research 
from various scientific centres was central to the World Meteorological Organisation 
(WMO) arguments to establish the first ever international conference in 1979 devoted to 
the problems of the climate, namely the World Climate Conference (WCC)220. Over the 
next decade, the impetus that came from this science collaboration was a need for 
political action; one of these calls came from the Villach Conference on Global 
Warming 1987221. Political action was needed to address “the rate and degree of future 
warming (would be) profoundly affected by governmental policies on energy 
conservation, use of fossil fuels, and the emission of some greenhouse gases”.222 The 
concern that anthropogenic increases of emissions enhanced the natural greenhouse 
effect, and would result on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface, saw 
the necessity of the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) in 1988.  
 
A political congress of hundreds of scientists and specialists from around the world, the 
IPCC, collated scientific information related to the various aspects of climate change. 
The body would evaluate the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of climate 
change and formulate the response strategies for the management of climate 
change.  The second WCC in 1990, adopted the first IPCC assessment report that 
substantiated a correlation between global warming and greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs). Its findings further underscored the need for understanding the science of 
climate change, and secondly, created a state-led diplomatic platform to craft an 
integrated and comprehensive regulatory system to manage a new situation where small 
                                                     
219 In the 1960s these research networks were wide and varied, ranging from  Study of Mans Impact on 
the Climate (part of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment), Lawrence Livermore National 
laboratories, the National Centre for Atmospheric Research, the National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the UK Meteorological Office and University of California. 
Campbell and Barnett, 52.  
220 The global conference would establish the World Climate Programme, jointly-organised under WMO, 
UN Environmental Programme and the International Council of Science. 
221 The World Commission on Environment and Development’s (WCED) Brundtland Report’s Our 
Common Future 1987 not only created and popularised the term sustainable development, but also the 
work of the Villach Conference on Global Warming. 
222 Campbell and Barnett, 86. 
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island states mobilised diplomatically, heeding the calls by scientists and the realities of 
sea level rise from global warming impacting their island nations223. 
 
The Need for a Treaty and Regime 
Heeding the recommendations of scientists, the UNGA passed Resolution 45/212 
establishing the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (INC). Supported by UNEP and WMO, the INC was 
mandated to prepare the skeleton of a possible treaty/conventions, agenda and bodies of 
a climate regime. In five negotiation sessions between February 1991 and May 1992, 
delegates from 150 states discussed the difficult and contentious issues of: binding 
commitments; targets and timetables for the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions; 
financial mechanisms; technology transfer; and common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities of developed and developing countries224. 
The INC sought to achieve an ambitious task of consensus that could be supported by a 
broad majority, rather than drafting a treaty that dealt with specific policies that might 
limit participation225. By May 1992 the INC completed its work with a consensus text, 
which would become the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
 
At the UN Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Rio Earth 
Summit in June 1992, the UNFCCC text was opened to parties for signatures. 
Considered the mother of all environmental meetings, the Rio Earth Summit 
encapsulated three key conventions: climate change, biodiversity and desertification226. 
From 155 signatories in 1992 it has since increased to 196 states and entities that have 
ratified the Convention (193 states of the UN, the regional entity of the European 
Union, and the non-state entities of Palestine, Cook Islands, and Niue).  At the heart of 
the UNFCCC was the call for signatory parties to "stabilize greenhouse gas 
                                                     
223 Ibid.  
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concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system".227 While the ultimate call by scientists, and small 
island states, would have been to decrease GHGs, a compromise with industrialised 
countries led to the ambiguous aim of stabilising greenhouse gas emissions efforts. An 
intrinsic element of the treaty was the differentiation of the developed world into Annex 
I228 categories, and non-Annex I for the global south based on the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities. It denotes that all states have a shared obligation to 
address climate change but have different responsibilities due to their development 
capabilities. Annex I countries who had benefited from industrialisation in the past had 
the specific aim to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2009. Furthermore, these 
countries had the responsibility to provide financial assistance and promote technology 
transfer to developing countries. This differentiation of countries has left a legacy of 
political polarisation within the negotiations,’ of a firewall between the north Annex I 
countries and the south non-Annex I countries. 
 
The treaty, after receiving its 50th signatory, came into force in 1994, and in the 
following year the first Conference of the Parties (COP) took place in Berlin. The tasks 
of COP1 were to complete the architecture of the climate regime and the rules of 
procedure and to affirm the new home of the secretariat in Bonn, Germany to carry out 
the work of the regime. However, at the end of COP1 participants concluded that the 
goals previously reached by those participating in the UNFCCC treaty were not 
sufficient to meet the challenge of global warming and needed to go beyond the year 
2000229. The treaty did not provide a rule book on how states should decrease 
emissions, and mechanisms to channel funding for climate adaptation. The Berlin 
Mandate established an ad hoc process of negotiations for parties to establish a legally 
binding standards and emissions limits.  
 
                                                     
227Ibid. 
228 Canada, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine. 
229 Originally, the UNFCCC had a goal of returning greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. 
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Kyoto: A Protocol for climate mitigation and adaptation 
The Kyoto Protocol was finalised after two years of negotiations that concluded at 
COP3 in Japan in 1997. It put forth a ‘top-down’ compliance system that committed 
industrialised countries and countries in transition (Annex I), to reduce their overall 
emissions of six GHGs by an average of 5% below 1990 levels in 2008-2012 (first 
commitment period). These mitigation targets varied from country to country. 
Recognising that developed countries were principally responsible for the high-levels of 
GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial 
activity, the Protocol placed a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibility.230 Adaptation, or adapting to climate 
change impacts became a key component for all countries, with specific financing and 
technology transfers to be endowed from developed Annex I countries.  
 
Despite global optimism in reaching an agreement in Kyoto, it took more than a decade 
before it was implemented in 2008. The delay was in part a product of slow negotiations 
on implementing the Protocol that concluded in 2001, known as the Marrakesh 
Accords. One major setback was the refusal by the U.S. to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, 
fuelled by resentment of the U.S. Republican party government. The withdrawal of the 
world’s largest economy and biggest GHG polluter led to anxiety that the Protocol 
would fall apart if countries follow the American stance.  Nonetheless, Kyoto survived 
with Iceland and Russia’s support, leading to ratification in 2004231.  
 
Before the start of the Kyoto Protocol commitment period, the Bali COP13 in 2007 
marked another turning point in climate change multilateralism. The Bali Action Plan 
(BAP) set forth a mandate to initiate negotiations to include a focus on mitigation, 
adaptation, finance, technology; and a shared vision for long-term cooperative action. 
The latter was vital in situating concerns at this time for a global agreement post 2012 
                                                     
230 UNFCCC, "Kyoto Protocol Introduction," United Nationa Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol  
231 The Protocol survived with Iceland (as the 55th state 2002) and Russia (ratification in 2004), it met 
Article 25 “the article enters into force” on February 2005. Article 25 states that the Protocol shall enter 
into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties [Iceland] to the 
Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I [Russia] which accounted in total for at least 55 
per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited 
their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
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when the implementation period for Kyoto concluded232. Thus, parties consented on a ta 
mandate for negotiations to begin on a new form of the protocol, to be concluded in 
2009.  
 
Copenhagen: Diplomatic Failure  
Deemed as ‘Hopenhagen’, the Copenhagen COP15 was the biggest global gathering 
with over 40,000 participants negotiating a new agreement on climate action233. The 
conference situated climate change prominently in the international agenda and became 
the largest diplomatic endeavour in history. According to Radoslav Dimitrov, 
negotiators believed in the “heads-of-state factor as a solid guarantee that something 
will be decided, since failure to produce any document would be a politically 
unaffordable scandal”234. COP15 started under a veil of conspiracy with a rumour of a 
secret ‘Danish text’, where select countries were invited by the Chair (Denmark) known 
as Friends of the Chair, and revisions were negotiated and put together to be tabled at 
the meeting. A draft document was subsequently leaked to the UK Guardian newspaper 
just as the Copenhagen meeting started235.  As a result of this rumour, the Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin reported that many negotiating groups and ad hoc coalitions 
began working on their own texts, some of which were also leaked to the media236.  
 
The aftermath of Copenhagen was a devastating blow to the climate regime process and 
multilateral diplomacy. The rumours of a secret informal process of a select few 
spearheaded by the Danish Chair, gave way to protests in favour of process 
transparency, inclusive participation of all states and accountability both within 
                                                     
232 ENB, "Summary of the Geneva Climate Change Conference 8-13 February 2015," in Establishment of 
the INC/FCCC, ed. Earth Negotiation Bulletin (Berlin: Earth Negotiation Bulletin, 2015). 
233 "A brief analysis of the Copenhagen Climate Change Confernce: an IISD commentary," in 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 2009, ed. Earth Negotiation Bulletin (Copenhagen Earth 
Negotiation Bulletin, 2009), 1. 
234 Radoslav S Dimitrov, "Inside Copenhagen: the state of climate governance," Global environmental 
politics 10, no. 2 (2010): 19. 
235 John Vidal, "Copenhagen climate summit in disarray after 'Danish text' leak," in The Guardian 
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negotiation rooms, and civil society on the streets of Copenhagen237. These suspicions 
unfolded when more than 115 heads of governments arrived in the final days of 
Copenhagen, where an impasse had awaited them. Throughout the two-week 
conference, various coalitions under the G-77 and China or global South, staged various 
walkouts and the Annex I coalitions blocked progress citing procedural reasons238. The 
more than 200 pages of negotiated texts from the two years prior were ‘trashed’, as 
leaders frantically attempted to ‘cover up the failure’ with a new text agreement in the 
final 48 hours239.  
 
Away from the formal negotiations, the Friends of the Chair, 28 Presidents and Prime 
Ministers240 drafted a two and half page, Copenhagen Accord text late in the evening of 
December 18, 2009. The text was subsequently submitted to the plenary at 2am for final 
debate in a heated and 13-hour marathon final plenary241. Tuvalu was the first state to 
openly object and renounce the Accord, followed by Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba and 
Nicaragua as untransparent and undemocratic242. Given the lack of a consensus, the 
Copenhagen Accord was cited by parties to take note of in the COP decisions, with the 
mandate for negotiators to continue in 2010.  
 
Climate Change Finance  
Despite its diplomatic failure to achieve an outcome among parties, Copenhagen was a 
step forward in climate policy and global action. COP15 was the first occasion since the 
early days of the Convention that climate change received both high-level leadership 
support and wider global media and citizenry attention. In the months leading up to 
Copenhagen, there was an “avalanche of positive developments” by the EU, Japan, U.S. 
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Brazil, China and India in carbon emission target pledges243, following years of careful 
diplomacy by UN Secretary Ban Ki Moon and the UNFCCC leadership to garner 
political will. It was the first time the emerging economies and other developing 
countries joined Annex 1 in pledging voluntary mitigation goals, where in 2010 more 
than 80 countries submitted mitigation targets244 and more importantly established a 
global climate stabilisation goal of average temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels. “The 2°C target was officially sanctioned as essential policy guidance, with the 
hope that it may subsequently become a legal goal in a new climate agreement”245. 
Furthermore, mentioned under the Copenhagen Accord, and later adopted under the 
Cancun Framework the next year, a global fund was to be established for parties to 
pledge USD$30billion annually, expected to rise to USD$100 billion in 2012 to support 
parties’ mitigation and adaptation efforts. However, the events in Copenhagen were a 
shock to many. The multilateral process was questioned over lack of inclusion, 
transparency and the decision making of the Danish Chair, and the collective actions of 
technical negotiators to draft a text over two years could not lead to a consensus. 
Political bargaining by leaders overshadowed the work of multilateral process at the last 
minute. 
 
Rebuilding faith in the multilateral consensus process 
Over the next three years, the negotiations would focus on saving the regime by 
restoring the faith of negotiators in the process, and its global legitimacy to provide 
international climate policy direction. Cancun COP16 saw the establishment of the 
Green Climate Fund to administer the USD $20billion/$100 billion global fund pledged 
in Copenhagen. However, Cancun still could not provide a consensus on the 
outstanding matter from COP15, a replacement protocol/agreement for post-Kyoto. The 
Durban meeting in the following year was more successful in cementing a guiding 
framework. Parties agreed to establish of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform (ADP) to negotiate both a process and a text for a new agreement after 2020. 
Parties and the Secretariat, learning from the failures of 2009, needed a drawn-out 
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process that was open and gave enough time for negotiators to absorb and negotiate the 
text.  
 
The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol or Doha Climate Gateway 2012 
encouraged states to ratify a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
However this time Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia did not sign and joined the 
U.S. stance in ignoring to ratify the protocol. In Warsaw 2013, parties continued 
negotiations on two key issues by establishing two bodies. By the time negotiations had 
come around COP20 Lima 2014 and the ADP process was at the centre of attention.  
The Lima Call for Climate Action set in motion the negotiation process for an 
agreement to be concluded by the end of 2015. While over the previous four years 
progress had been made over contentious issues in the regime such as the Warsaw 
International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), mechanism for reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD), 
and intended nationally determined contributions (INDC), 246there were still 
apprehensions that history would repeat itself when it came to negotiate a protocol. 
Thus, as explored later in this chapter and throughout this thesis, negotiating climate 
change is far from an easy or straightforward process. 
 
Institutional Process and Bodies of the Regime 
The short history of the negotiations detailed above provides insights into the 
complexity of issues around international climate change policy leading up to 2015.  
However, this trajectory does not detail the intricacy of activities and actors that 
participate within the UNFCCC negotiating arenas. The purpose of this sub-section is to 
provide context for the structure of negotiations by looking at the bodies or institutions 
within the UNFCCC. Understanding the structures and bodies within the UNFCCC 
provides a framework to understanding how and where states and their delegations 
participate in the negotiations detailed in later chapters.  
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The INC negotiations affirmed and established four key basic institutional structures: 
the COP, Subsidiary Body of Implement (SBI), Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA), and to provide support in implementing decisions the 
Secretariat247. It is important to note that while the main bodies like COP, SBI and 
SBSTA are formal, their internal structure and operations have changed gradually over 
the years. In other words, while the COP, subsidiary and ad hoc bodies are identified as 
formal negotiating arenas, however, upon closer inspection these bodies operated with 
smaller informal bodies and groups.  
 
Conference of the Parties (COP) 
As the supreme body of the Convention, the COP is the forum where all 196 party 
members have an equal seat at the table during annual meetings at the end of each year. 
The role of COP is to “review the implementation of the Convention and any other legal 
instruments that the COP adopts and take decisions necessary to promote the effective 
implementation of the Convention, including institutional and administrative 
arrangements”.248 The COP also served as the arena for the parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol- known in its official name as the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), where all party members are 
represented except U.S., Sudan and Afghanistan which are observers, considering these 
states have not ratified Kyoto. They participate as observers.249 The COP/CMP 
confirms the decisions of the subsidiary bodies, and ad hoc working groups in its main 
plenary sessions, and attracts no fewer than 10,000 participants from states, observers, 
and media250. 
 
Subsidiary Body of Implementation  
“The agenda of the SBI is shaped around the key building blocks of the implementation 
of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol: transparency, mitigation, adaptation, 
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technology, capacity-building and financing”.251 The SBI is also considered important 
in the organisation of intergovernmental meetings or administrative, financial and 
institutional matters. In this forum, member states negotiate and suggest to COP for 
final approval, the establishment of specialised bodies and institutions that facilitate 
implementation of the key building blocks. In the years leading up to 2015, some of 
these specialised committees have been the Adaptation Committee, Standing 
Committee on Finance, and the Technology Mechanism. The “SBI has the 
responsibility of maintaining the political momentum and ensuring transparency on 
decision making on these matters”252. 
 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice  
The SBSTA focusses on the provision of timely information and advice on scientific 
and technological matters in relation to the Convention and Protocol. The body’s key 
work includes the impacts of vulnerability to and adaptation to climate change, 
promoting the development and transfer of environmentally-sound technologies and 
conducting technical work to improve the guidelines for preparing and reviewing GHG 
emission inventories from Annex I Parties253. It promotes collaboration in the field of 
research and systematic observation of the climate system, especially the Convention’s 
link to the scientific information provided by expert sources such as the IPCC and other 
relative international organisations.  
 
There are multiple committees, institutions and working groups housed underneath each 
of the two permanent bodies. These sub-bodies are composed of elected representatives 
from regional or coalition nominees that meet throughout the year to discuss the agenda 
and issues. Not operating in silos, both the SBSTA and SBI work together on cross-
cutting issues that include the vulnerability of developing countries to climate change 
and response measures, discussions under the Technology Mechanism, the Adaptation 
Committee and the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated 
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with climate change impacts. The two bodies meet twice a year: firstly, in May/June 
usually at the secretariat in Bonn, and again during COP. The recommended decisions 
of the SBI and SBSTA are subsequently transferred for approval in the COP plenary.  
 
Secretariat 
With over 500 employees the UNFCCC secretariat provides organisational support and 
technical expertise to the UNFCCC negotiations and institutions and facilitates the flow 
of authoritative information on the implementation of the Convention and the Kyoto 
Protocol. Located in Bonn, Germany, the secretariat prepares the official documents for 
the COP and subsidiary bodies, the coordination of In-Depth Reviews of Annex I Party 
national communication, and the compilation of GHG inventory data, among various 
other functions254. The head of the secretariat is the Executive Secretary. In 2015 former 
Costa Rican negotiator, Christiana Figueres, held the post since 2010. The work of the 
secretariat is vital in coordinating at least two meetings annually.  
 
The Chair and Bureau 
The Presidency or Presiding Officer/Chair of the COP rotates among the five 
recognised UN regions - Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central 
and Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and Others regions. While the Presidency 
usually hosts the COP in their respective country, if this is not possible, the COP is 
hosted at the UNFCCC Secretariat in Bonn, Germany255. The Chair has the pivotal role 
in orchestrating the process, especially the conduct of final key moments in ushering a 
consensus from parties. Presiding countries employ various diplomatic strategies such 
as informal ministerial meetings throughout the year, conducting ‘Friends of the Chair’ 
or bilateral meetings with discerning parties on key issues, and emphatic declarations to 
members in plenary meetings, and in media. Similar to the role of the UN Secretary 
General and Executive Secretary of UNFCCC, these key individuals are responsibility 
of building political will not only amongst global media and leaders, but especially 
negotiators. Although the chair has a structural role (selected from its peers) it has the 
significant role of ensuring that all parties come to the table to negotiate.  
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The Bureau composed of eleven delegates elected by the parties assisted the President 
of the COP. Similar to the rules of procedure for the presiding officer, it was decided at 
the INC negotiations that there will be two members from each of the five UN regions. 
However, unique to climate change negotiations is the eleventh seat, and as further 
detailed later in this chapter, this representative is a member of the Small Islands 
Developing States (SIDS seat). From the bureau or the Vice Presidents of the 
COP/CMP, two of its members are commonly selected as Chairs of SBI and SBSTA 
(these posts are not rotational amongst the regions) and one member as the Rapporteur 
of COP. Although no political negotiations take place in the bureau, the eleven 
members at times consulted with parties and coalitions of respective regions on certain 
issues256. They advise the President and keep an eye on the pulse of negotiations; they 
would be called at times to facilitate any contact groups and informal consultations 
during negotiations.   
 
Complexity Within a Complex Process 
With the growth of the regime so too are the issues that are impressed on the agenda of 
COP, SBI and SBSTA. To alleviate complexity, working groups, committees and 
numerous informal negotiations operate in parallel at one time. From the outside, 
meetings occurring during COP, SBI and SBSTA sessions may be seen as formal 
meetings of the climate regime. However as reflected in the work of Joanna Depledge, 
257and the findings of this thesis, within these meetings, there are an array of formal 
plenary/working groups, and numerous informal negotiating arenas. As Table 9 on the 
negotiating arenas shows, there are numerous informal arenas from contact and working 
groups, friends of the chair and unofficial negotiations behind the scenes.  
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Table 9. Main types of negotiating arenas in UNFCCC 
Negotiating Arena Category of Arena 
Plenary meetings (COP and Subsidiary bodies) 
COP working bodies 
Formal, Open 
Informal groups (eg. Contact groups, working groups) 
Informal consultations 
Spin-off groups 
Informal, Open/Closed (some open to 
observers if parties consent, but 
mostly closed 
‘Friends’ groups, consultations Informal, Closed (State delegates 
only) 
Behind the scenes: internal coalition, bilateral 
communication 
Unofficial 
Source: adapted from  Joanna Depledge, The organization of global negotiations: Constructing 
the climate change regime (Earthscan, 2013). 
 
To put in perspective the complexity of multiple meetings occurring simultaneously, on 
the official agenda of December 3, 2014 (Day 3 of the Lima COP20) – at 10.00am there 
were at least 17 meetings under five bodies (COP, CMP, SBI, SBSTA, and ADP) taking 
place258. This count was only for the formal meetings on the UNFCCC agenda, this 
number did not include the closed meetings of spin off groups, coalitions and 
delegations, nor multiple side events, roundtables, meetings with NGOs and unofficial 
closed meetings that took place during the morning hours of December 3, 2014. 
However, this example foretells a challenge that all state delegations, especially small 
states, face in the climate change negotiations, that is coordination and ensuring there is 
a state negotiator represented in each negotiating rooms.  
 
Formal Arenas: Plenaries 
The plenaries of the main and ad-hoc bodies are the core arenas where formal decisions 
take place259, with little to no negotiations. The exception here, are last minute huddles 
that take place in final plenaries and discussed in Chapter Six as the consensus pont. 
Similar to other plenaries of multilateral meetings, they are sites of diplomatic rituals. 
They “provide all parties with an equal and public opportunity to posture and stake out 
their positions, formally placing their views on the table and making a bid for their 
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preferences in the negotiations”260. The opening plenary of COP, SBI and SBSTA will 
confirm the agenda and then refer all matters to informal contact groups or facilitated 
working groups for negotiations. The main conference plenaries and plenaries of 
contact groups act as stocktaking groups where informal working groups report back to 
delegates, NGOs and non-Anglophones that could not attend these states-only 
negotiations to comment. The latter is important in deciphering if a meeting is formal or 
informal. The language of UNFCCC negotiations is English. From observation of 
negotiations in practice, informal negotiation groups usually do not have language 
translators in the room.  
 
Informal Arenas: Negotiating groups 
Informal working groups have been known in the UNFCCC meetings by various 
names: contact group, draft group, non-groups, cluster groups or even negotiating 
groups261. The names have changed from year to year according to the COP Presidency 
and if they have a specific mandate. However, as this research shows in Chapters Four 
and Six informal groups are the crux of where negotiations take place. They are 
established through a mandate by members or suggestions of the Chairs, for members to 
negotiate the details of the issue or text. In the likelihood of another impasse on a 
particular aspect or text language another informal group or spinoff may be established 
to iron out disagreements, before reporting back to the informal working group, which 
then reports back to the main plenary. Yamin and Depledge describe these various 
forms of informal negotiating arenas as ‘open-ended’ (as open to all state-delegate 
members) – where two facilitators (one from Annex I and  one from non-Annex I) are 
suggested by the President of the COP or Chair of the Convening group approved by 
the parties. These informal negotiating groups  are at times open to NGO observers, but 
may be asked to leave the room if requested by the facilitators)262. There are no set rules 
that guide the working group or are bound to meet at traditional times of UN meetings 
(10am-6pm), and so upon the approval of delegates may often meet into the night. 
However, there is established practice that no informal working group should take place 
at the same time as a COP plenary. 
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To add to the complexity, the presiding officers may conduct informal consultations 
during the proceedings. The function of these private meetings is to forge consensus 
amongst certain parties and coalitions on issues that have an impasse, or where progress 
is stagnant. As Chapters Four and Six will detail they may be in the form of either a 
‘bilateral with the Chair’ and at other times ‘Friends of the Chair’ for two contrasting 
reasons. Firstly, on more technical and procedural issues, where there is limited general 
interest, a full scale informal group is not warranted to be established. Alternatively, 
informal consultations are sometimes convened “on sensitive political issues, where it is 
feared that a more open group negotiation might give dangerous prominence to the issue 
or trigger unproductive confrontation”. 263 In the literature of UNFCCC negotiations 
these meetings tend to escalate occurring in the ‘finale’ of each political segment of 
COPs, and in some instances, the Chair/President may appoint another party member 
delegate to facilitate the impasse/stagnation meeting. This scenario is significant in 
explaining what this research terms as the ‘consensus point’ 
 
The bodies of the UNFCCC, and the informal working and consultation groups 
described so far, explain the structural complexity within a UNFCCC meeting. Whether 
established by the Convention, or via the mandate of members, or the suggestions of the 
Chair, these arenas of negotiations promote an atmosphere of bargaining and a sense of 
specialisation that leads to coherence of issues.  
 
Coalitions and political groupings 
UNFCCC is a party-state led system; states and their official delegates are the main 
actors in these negotiations. To navigate and manage this complexity in multilateral 
institutions, states form inter-state coalitions to coalesce around certain positions. The 
political groupings or coalitions amongst the parties are an integral part of the 
international climate change negotiations, that trace their ancestry to a period before the 
UNFCCC. The existence of coalitions, some of which speak with a common voice, help 
to streamline the negotiation process and transaction costs. At the same time, coalitions 
may block or slow progress in reaching agreement. The strategies and the dynamics that 
                                                     
263 Depledge, 115. 
  
 
87  
coalitions bring to climate change coalitions is seen by scholars as introducing a third 
level game for states - gaining both agreement of its domestic and fellow coalition 
members before negotiating at the table264. Their very presence leads to a dual structure 
in the climate change regime: issues are negotiated at the coalition level first, before 
common positions are presented in COP/SBI/SBSTA and their respective working 
groups.  Coalitions inadvertently become clearinghouses or filters for key positions and 
rallying support for major submissions.  
 
Like informal working groups and informal consultations, there are no fixed procedures 
in establishing rules of operandi in how coalitions are created in the regime. It is the 
prerogative of states to create or associate themselves to party groupings. A group of 
countries only need to inform the Chair of COP or informal working group of their 
existence, and their request to take the floor. Although ad hoc coalitions come and go, 
during the two-decade long negotiation process certain coalitions have become 
established almost as permanent fixtures to the regime. According to the work by 
Carola Betzold, Paula Castro, and Florian Weiler  in Figure 2, states were not 
necessarily part of one exclusive coalition but associated with multiple coalitions 
depending on their preference of advocacy. These coalitions are based on traditional 
alliances, regional affiliations or issue-based groupings that are divided by the 
firewall—the Annex1 “North” developed countries, and the Global “South” under the 
G-77 and China group265. Coalitions started to form from as early as the drafting days of 
the Convention during the INC. The INC being part of the UNGA system, the 
negotiating styles and the coalitions of the UNGA would naturally replicate in the 
regime. The North and South divide emphasised the notion at the time of the North 
(Annex I) as the polluters, and the main position the South (non-Annex I) pursued was 
the polluter pays.  
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Figure 2: Country groups in the climate change negotiations  
Source: Carola Betzold, Paula Castro, and Florian Weiler, "AOSIS. in the UNFCCC. 
negotiations: from unity to fragmentation?," Climate Policy 12, no. 5 (2012) 
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In Nicholas Chan’s work on the trajectory formation of southern coalitions in the 
UNFCCC, he notes by the time the Convention was established the North’s coalitions 
of Economies in Transition, European Commission (Union) and Umbrella Group, and 
the South’s traditional coalitions from the UNCTAD days of G-77 and China, and the 
Least Developing Group were in place266. Outside of these traditional UN coalitions, the 
Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the newly formed small islands 
developing states coalition AOSIS were present in the agenda setting negotiations. Once 
the Kyoto Protocol and its implementation negotiations phase came around the UN 
regional groupings the African Group, Group of Latin America and Caribbean 
Countries and the Arab Group, although present from the beginning, started to have an 
assertive voice in the negotiations267. By the time of the Bali COP13, 2007, and 
Copenhagen COP15, 2009, scholars attest to the fragmentation and explosion of 
coalitions - that took on board advocacy of specialised issues like carbon sinks and 
clean carbon mechanisms, reforestation, and climate migration to name few268. As Lau 
Øfjord Blaxekjær and Tobias Dan Nielsen detail in their mapping of coalitions in the 
regime in 2013 in Table 10, the context of climate negotiations leading up to 2015 was 
also a coalition complex. 
 
Table 10. Coalition Blocs in UNFCCC Negotiations 
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Annex I non-Annex I Both Annex I and 
non-Annex I 
Economies In 
Transition (EIT) 
African Group (AG) Environmental Integrity 
Group (EIG) 
European Union (EU) Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) Cartagena Dialogue for 
Progressive Action 
(CD) 
Umbrella Group (UG) Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our 
America (ALBA) 
Durban Alliance (DA) 
 
Central American Integration System (SICA) 
 
 
Central Asia, Caucasus and Moldova 
(CACAM) 
 
 
Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CfRN) 
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Source: Lau Øfjord Blaxekjær and Tobias Dan Nielsen, "Mapping the narrative positions of new 
political groups under the UNFCCC," Climate Policy  (2014) 
Notes: The list is attributed mostly to coalitions that arise after COP15 in Copenhagen 2009. 
The coalitions which the 14 Pacific states are a part of are coloured red (six out of 20 coalitions) 
 
UNFCCC Procedures and Consensus 
An idiosyncratic feature of the climate regime relates to its rules of procedure, and of 
significance to this research is the interpretation, application and creation of consensus 
among parties. The proceedings, basic structure and form decision making are detailed 
in written rules of procedure. 269However, despite an extensive rules book, the parties 
have differences in opinion over the voting rule and concept of consensus. Since the 
early days of the INC and COP1, parties have held firm positions pertaining to 
decisions in the COP to whether or not to make decisions by majority voting. Saudi 
Arabia, representing Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) states, 
argued firmly on language that would not allow a voting mechanism to take place in the 
regime but only consensus270. The European Union suggested that all matters relating to 
the financial mechanism should be taken by consensus; while members of the G-77 
agreed that all matters should be decided by consensus or, if no consensus is possible, 
by a three-fourths majority vote271.  These differences in opinion on voting, have left 
‘Draft Rule 42’ with two alternatives: on decisions by vote inadvertently leaving no 
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Brazil, China, South Africa, India (BASIC) 
 
 
Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) 
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opportunity for voting; or all matters to be decided by consensus.  The Chair of COP1, 
Germany’s Angela Merkel could not find agreement amongst parties and so the matter 
was referred to COP2 for further consideration. The practice of referring the rules for 
the next COP for discussion continues today, and the rules of procedures are agreed to 
parties in principle at the opening plenaries except for rule 42.   
 
This absence of a voting procedure has led to the general understanding amongst parties 
that almost all decisions of importance are agreed to by consensus272. Although there 
were times in the history of negotiations where voting was suggested. One such case 
was during the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol where COP Chair Raul Estrada-
Oyuela, in face of numerous objections to the ruling that there was consensus on a 
decision, offered to put his ruling to vote, resulting in the dissenting Parties 
withdrawing their objections273. As one scholar argues, countries generally prefer to 
avoid conflict and reach consensual agreement rather than resort to a confrontational 
vote. “What voting rules should operate in the vacuum left by Rule 42 has been the 
subject of intense debate and speculation… most delegates seem to concede that, in the 
absence of a specified majority voting rule, decisions should be taken by consensus”.274 
Furthermore, attempts by Mexico and Papua New Guinea since COP17 to reconsider 
the use of the voting system in decision making remains an ongoing agenda, and like 
the rules of procedure this agenda is referred to the next COP. For parties advocating 
the consensus system, it allows one country to essentially block negotiations if 
decisions are deemed unfavourable; rather than a process where a majority of states may 
impede or force commitments on economies.  
 
Consensus as a default rule has not always worked and is seen by some as the main 
obstacle in actually reaching a final outcome275. The UNFCCC was adopted without 
                                                     
272Yamin and Depledge, 444., Daniel Bodansky and Lavanya Rajamani, "The evolution and governance 
architecture of the climate change regime," in International Law and International Relations ed. Detlef 
Sprinz and Urs  Luterbacher (Boston: MIT Press, 2012). 
273 Yamin and Depledge, 444. 
274 JD Werksman, "Procedural and Institutional Aspects of the Emerging Climate Change Regime: 
Improvised Procedures and Impoverished Rules?" (paper presented at the concluding workshop on the 
project entitled Enhancing Policy-making Capacity under the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the Kyoto Protocol, London, 1999), 6. 
275See more in Frank Biermann and Aarti Gupta, "Accountability and legitimacy in earth system 
governance: A research framework," Ecological economics 70, no. 11 (2011)., Heike Schroeder, Maxwell 
  
 
92  
consensus in 1992, and negotiations at COP6 The Hague in 2000 collapsed due to an 
inability to reach consensus276. As indicated earlier, another example of where the lack 
of consensus led to a derailing of negotiations was famously demonstrated in the failure 
of Copenhagen COP15 and the inability of a small group of states to agree to the 
Accords.  
  
Implications of Consensus Procedure on Regime 
The lack of an agreement amongst parties to affirm a voting procedure on making 
decisions has ultimately made consensus the modus operandi for the climate regime. 
“The effect of consensus would be to give veto power to a single country.”277 Rule 42, 
of voting, is not applied at any session except under circumstances agreed under the 
Convention where voting is allowed for adoption of amendments and annexes.278 
Subsequently, the consensus procedure has bestowed on the regime both a sense of 
ambiguity, and more importantly a greater emphasis on procedure. The former revolves 
around the legal definition of where there are no stated formal objections to a decision. 
But as Depledge argues, in practice within the negotiations a state would agree in 
principle or give its consent, but argue in its final remarks at plenary its reservations to 
be noted in the final draft.279 A notable example is the U.S. stance on the Kyoto 
Protocol, where the U.S. affirmed “it would not stop others from moving ahead” in 
ratifying and implementing the Protocol.280 The ambiguity of when a decision can be 
seen as a consensus when ultimately a state or group of states have not agreed thus 
gives the President of the COP certain powers to exercise whether a consensus has been 
reached or not. “Ultimately, however, the presiding officer can only declare consensus 
with the acquiescence of the parties, and the meaning of consensus can thus become a 
struggle.” 281  
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The second impression of consensus on the climate negotiations has revolved around 
greater emphasis on process. Whether it be climate or other international regimes, 
consensus has become an accepted and integral part of decision making. Intrinsic in this 
decision making is procedural equity— where there is an attempt to accommodate the 
views of great powers and small minorities.  Decisions by consensus have greater 
transaction costs and are time consuming, while decisions by vote move decisions 
faster. Consensus decision making creates a process where all viewpoints are accounted 
for, however at the expense of the delay occasioned by one state or group of countries 
deliberately filibustering. With the need to account and accommodate for all, a situation 
is created where decisions are themselves ambiguous or reflect the lowest common 
denominator.  
 
History of Pacific island states’ involvement in climate negotiations 
Having identified the complex history and machinery of the UNFCCC, this next section 
answers the question: what has been the history of Pacific island states participation and 
involvement in climate change negotiations? The following account of Pacific islands 
involvement traces the story both at the UNFCCC level, and at the regional level. It 
traces key moments, state-delegates and leaders as represented in both existing 
literature, and accounts of negotiators. The first section focusses on the Pacific story at 
the UNFCCC level, especially their work in various coalitions. A pivotal coalition is the 
grouping of small island states, AOSIS. The section will then trace key moments within 
the work of two regional organisations, mandated by Pacific state member countries to 
support climate negotiators at the UNFCCC: the PIF and SPREP.  
 
Small island states unity under the Alliance of Small Island States 
Before the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992, Pacific island states were actively 
lobbying and strategically paving the way for a climate convention. Despite their 
limited diplomatic and technical expertise capacities, both existing literature and 
accounts of negotiators emphasised their notable contributions in raising global 
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awareness on climate change and setting the agenda282 and architecture of the climate 
treaty. Evidence of Pacific states and leaders zealous efforts can be found in the 
literature on the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). 
 
In 1987, the Indian Ocean low atoll nation of Maldives was hit with a series of flooding 
from storm surges and higher than normal moon tides caused by sea level rise. 
Determined to tell the world Maldives President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom made it his 
mission for climate change to be on the international agenda on three occasions: the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHG) meeting in Vancouver, UNGA in New 
York and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Maldives283. A 
notable number of Pacific island states leaders were present at these meetings, and 
sharing similar environmental damages they brought the issue of climate change to the 
Pacific Islands Forum where climate change has become a longstanding regional 
priority.284 Supported by The Commonwealth and Australia, the Maldives hosted the 
Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise in November 1989, to discuss possible 
international action, and more specifically small states action on the issue of climate 
change. From the onset of unfavourable predictions on the future of island states and sea 
level rise, the Male Declaration on Global Warming and Sea Level Rise became the 
calling point not only for global action, but also small states diplomatic agency. 
In light of the scientific consensus regarding the likelihood of climate change 
and global warming and deeply concerned over the changing global 
environment and its possible adverse effects, particularly the threat of sea level 
rise, the Small Island States gathered here declare their intent to work, 
collaborate and seek international cooperation to protect the low-lying small 
coastal and island States of the world from the dangers posed by climate change, 
global warming and sea level rise.285 
                                                     
282 John W. Ashe, Robert Von Lierop, and Anilla Cherian, "The role of the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS) in the negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)," Natural Resources Forum 23, no. 3 (1999). 
283 Government of Maldives, "Conference Report" (paper presented at the Small States Conference on 
Sea Level Rise 14-18 November 1989, Male, 1989). 
284 Campbell and Barnett, 86. 
285 Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise, "Male’ Declaration on Global Warming and Sea Level 
Rise," ed. Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise (Male’: Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise 
14-18 November 1989, 1989), 1. 
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Amongst the 14 small island states from the Indian, Caribbean and Mediterranean 
oceans present at the Male Conference oceans were the Pacific leaders and officials 
from Kiribati, Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu.  The declaration called for a need for 
“negotiations for framework convention on climate change”,286 and for “a campaign to 
increase awareness of the international community of the particular vulnerability of the 
small States to sea level rise”287. To pursue this the conference called upon the need for 
inter-regional collaboration and joint collaboration from the various ocean regions by 
forming a Male Action Group.288 
 
By the following year states from the Pacific became prominent actors in the 
international arena on climate change. In what Jon Barnett recalls as Tuvalu’s 
emergence as climate change cause célèbre at the second World Climate Conference 
(WCC) 1990, Tuvalu’s then Prime Minister Bikeniu Paeniu famously stated the 
following. 
I can assure each and every one of you that I speak today from real experience 
because I live on one of the… smallest island groups in the Pacific. We are 
therefore, along with others, extremely vulnerable to environmental hazards and 
the dangers of Greenhouse Effect and sea level rise. These are the problems 
which we have done the least to create but now threaten the very heart of our 
existence.289 
Together with the growing interest from international media reporting on the stories of 
small islands vulnerability, Tuvalu’s Prime Minister and other leaders lobbied countries 
with larger emission profiles to cut emissions. Tuvalu acting together with other small 
island states in the Male’ Action Group sprang to action to form a likeminded small 
negotiation bloc of 24 countries.290 Recognising their common characteristic of extreme 
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vulnerability to a range of external forces, especially climate change, the negotiation 
bloc of AOSIS was born. The name of the group was coined by environment minister 
Lincoln Mayers of Trinidad and Tobago291, and together with the support of Tuvalu’s 
Paeniu and the zealous efforts of top diplomats like Vanuatu’s ambassador to the U.N. 
Robert Van Lierop the group was formed to represent the collective positions of small 
island nations.  From small beginnings the group has grown considerably over the past 
two decades to become a formidable coalition within the climate regime with 44 state 
members and observers. 
 
AOSIS members recognised that they did not enter UN negotiations with economic or 
political sources of power, nor did they have the technical resources to defend 
themselves from the erosion of coastlines, the contamination of freshwater resources 
and the variability of ocean trends.292 This incapacity for bargaining power, and the 
realisation of facing climate change impacts first hand, motivated Pacific states to join 
other low lying and small island states from other regions under one coalition. Despite 
important differences in terms of culture, language and geography, their coalition was 
forged by common recognition of the disproportionate vulnerability of territories and 
populations to withstand the negative consequences of climate change as well as shared 
development and environment challenges and concerns.293 This unity did not however 
mask the differences in priorities of Pacific states from Caribbean states as explored by 
Pamela Chasek in the negotiations of the Barbados Plan of Action294.  
 
Pivotal in AOSIS’ work has been its commitment to climate change negotiations, but 
also its negotiation finesse extending beyond the regime to incorporate sustainable 
development. Throughout the preparatory phases and negotiations of the 1992 Rio de 
Janeiro Earth Summit, Pacific countries within AOSIS successfully pushed for 
recognition of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and their special circumstances 
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within the Summit’s Agenda 21. This SIDS special consideration would prove crucial 
as a safety valve for all future environmental and sustainable development conventions 
to consider the needs and the limited capacities of island nations295. Furthermore, the 
coalition was able to negotiate Chapter 17 in Agenda 21 - the protection of oceans, seas 
and coastal areas—where it highlighted the need for a special global conference on 
sustainable development of SIDS296. This led to the establishment of the first UN SIDS 
conference in Barbados 1994 that put forth a framework for planning and implementing 
development in island states known as the Barbados Plan of Action (BPOA). These 
frameworks would be renegotiated every 10 years, with Mauritius (and the Mauritius 
Plan of Action) in 2005 and most recently in Samoa in 2014 (S.A.M.O.A Pathway).  
 
Framing and establishing special consideration 
Beyond sustainable development forums, it was in the climate change arenas where 
AOSIS would become visible and recognised as a formidable political player in climate 
politics. AOSIS’ first formal appearance in the climate negotiations started at the pre-
negotiations of the INC 1, where the group of small island states focussed on 
recognition for specific needs of SIDS and attaining necessary representation for all its 
member countries297.  Vanuatu’s Ambassador Van Lierop, who became the first chair of 
AOSIS, passionately argued the case and used the term ‘frontline states’ to climate 
change298. Van Lierop was asked to join INC Bureau as the small islands representative 
and was tasked with leading the negotiations in drafting the text and initial body of the 
Convention299. This was heralded as one of the first occasions that a Pacific state was 
given a leadership role in UN climate negotiations300. During the INC negotiations, 
AOSIS successfully negotiated that an additional seat on top of the predetermined ten 
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seats of Bureau301,  be one from SIDS, under the small islands’ special consideration 
argument of Agenda 21, and the fact that island states were frontline states to existing 
impacts of climate change. A notable feature of the SIDS seat also known as the Small 
Islands Vice President is that it has always been held by a Pacific state. As one AOSIS 
seasoned negotiator stated, there was an understanding within the “AOSIS caucus that 
the SIDS seat would be someone from the Pacific, as the Caribbean region was 
guaranteed under Latin American seats”302. As Table 11 shows, in all COP meetings 
there has always been a Pacific representative on one of the critical decision making 
bodies, the Bureau. One notable feat was in COP19 and 20, when Fijian ambassador 
Amena Yauvoli, became the first Pacific islander to chair a major body of the UNFCCC 
regime303. In all instances, each one of the Pacific representatives on the SIDS seat has 
been an ambassador or deputy permanent representative from one of the Pacific 
missions in New York.  
 
Table 11. UNFCCC Vice President Representatives of SIDS Seat in the Bureau 
1995 COP 1- Berlin Tuiloma Neroni Slade, Samoa 
1996 COP 2- Bonn Tuiloma Neroni Slade, Samoa 
1997 COP 3- Kyoto Espen Ronneberg, Marshall Islands 
1998 COP 4- Buenos Aires Espen Ronneberg, Marshall Islands 
1999 COP 5- Bonn Tuiloma Neroni Slade, Samoa 
2000 COP 6- The Hague Tuiloma Neroni Slade, Samoa 
2001 COP 7- Marrakech Max Rai, Papua New Guinea 
2002 COP 8- New Dehli Enele Sopoaga, Tuvalu 
2003 COP 9- Milan Enele Sopoaga, Tuvalu 
2004 COP 10- Buenos Aires Masao Nakayama, Federated States of Micronesia 
2005 COP 11- Montreal Enele Sopoaga, Tuvalu 
2006 COP 12- Nairobi Ali’ioaiga Feturi Elisara, Samoa 
2007 COP 13- Bali Ali’ioaiga Feturi Elisara, Samoa 
2008 COP14- Poznan Colin Beck, Solomon Islands 
2009 COP 15- Copenhagen Colin Beck, Solomon Islands 
2010 COP 16- Cancun Phillip Muller, Marshall Islands 
                                                     
301 The other ten seats of the Bureau were formed under the formula of two members from the five UN 
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302 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 5), in discussion-talanoa with the author, November 5, 2017.  
303 In 2016, Fiji successfully won the bid to be the chair/president of COP23 (2018-2019). This would be 
the first time a Pacific island state, let alone a small island state chair UNFCCC.  
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2011 COP 17- Durban Jane J. Chigiyal, Federated States of Micronesia 
2012 COP 18- Doha Jane J. Chigiyal, Federated States of Micronesia 
2013 COP 19- Warsaw Amena Yauvoli, Fiji. (Also Subsidiary Body on 
Implementation SBI Chair) 
2014 COP 20- Lima Amena Yauvoli, Fiji. (Also Subsidiary Body on 
Implementation SBI Chair) 
2015 COP 21- Paris Colin Beck, Solomon Islands 
Source:  UNFCC, "Bureau of the COP bodies." United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/bureau-cop-bodies-page. 
  
Pacific leadership within AOSIS 
Although AOSIS exists without any formal charter, or a regular budget, the coalition’s 
work was primarily coordinated through their UN diplomatic missions in New York 
with major policy decisions taken at the ambassadorial-level plenary sessions304. The 
AOSIS Chair has traditionally been a UN ambassador that would rotate every three 
years between the coalition’s three key sub-regions: Pacific, Caribbean and African-
Indian-Mediterranean (AIMS). These three sub-regions would nominate one 
representative each to form the Bureau.305 In more recent times, the three 
representatives would be selected from either a regional-political organisation 
representation roster or general agreement amongst UN ambassadors. For the Pacific, 
and discussed further in Chapters Five and Six, the Pacific SIDS collective comprised 
of UN Pacific ambassadors would select a head to represent the Pacific seat. In 2015, 
Tonga’s Ambassador Mahe ’Uli’uli Sandhurst Tupouniua, would take up the leadership 
role of PSIDS and the Bureau representative for the Pacific. The Chair of the AOSIS 
would be selected from within the Bureau under a rotational roster of every three-four 
years. Although an unwritten rule, the general agreement was so that chairmanship 
would move in between regions in which Vanuatu, Samoa, Tuvalu and Nauru306 would 
come to lead on various occasions. The preoccupation of UNFCCC procedures to give 
the chair of key coalitions speaking time at the plenary and last-minute negotiation talks 
                                                     
304 AOSIS, "About AOSIS," Alliance of Small Island States, http://aosis.org/about/. 
305 The AOSIS bureau consisted of three ambassador-representatives from the three regions: AIMS 
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would give Pacific chairs and their state delegations access to final moments of 
negotiations. For Van Lierop it was the success of setting the agenda of the regime307, 
for Tuiloma Neroni Slade of Samoa it was strengthening and keeping alive the Kyoto 
Protocol, for Enele Sopoaga of Tuvalu it was calling attention to alarming rise in global 
emissions and the need to reduce them, and for Nauru’s Marlene Moses it was about 
ensuring a long-term agreement to be reached in 2015 by emphasising the 1.5 degrees 
long-term temperature goal and loss and damage308.   
 
To support the coordination role of the Chair and their respective UN missions, NGOs 
would play a vital back office role. During the Nauru AOSIS chair of 2011-2014, 
Ambassador Moses affectionately called her team the ‘Pacific Chair’ that comprised top 
women negotiators that were selected from around the Pacific and the New York based 
NGO, Islands First. The pivotal role of Islands First in coordinating thematic multi-
country negotiator teams, providing coalition secretariat services, legal support and 
media/public diplomacy are further detailed in Chapters Four and Six. In fact, from the 
early days of establishment to the very composition of AOSIS country negotiators, there 
is a smorgasbord of NGO representatives.  Carola Betzold argues one success of AOSIS 
has been its ‘borrowing power’ using third parties (non-state actors) in their strategies of 
negotiations.309 In the early days, the Foundation for International Environmental Law 
and Development (FIELDS) lawyers were part of Pacific state delegations that provided 
legal expertise. According to one negotiator, “AOSIS were united with FIELD lawyers 
on the complicated issues of markets and carbon trade that needed expert approach”.310 
Scientific and meteorological conservation NGOs like Greenpeace, World Wildlife 
Fund and a regional inter-governmental organisation like the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Regional Environment Program to name few, found a home in the coalition. Non-state 
actors became essential in assimilating leaders, diplomats and officials from island 
nations to quickly learn ‘climate speak’.   
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AOSIS Contributions and Issues of Priority 
The contributions of AOSIS both in UNFCCC’s climate regime and diplomacy as 
whole is profound. As one scholar argues, “if the small island states had not been 
actively engaged in UN climate negotiations, it could be argued that preventative action, 
including UN capacity building (scientific research and skill building) would not 
emphasize lowland and small island concerns and transformative procedures, and 
dispute resolution mechanism in the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol would not have 
been incorporated in these arguments”311. During the discussions in 1994 at INC XI that 
negotiated options for a legally binding protocol AOSIS Chair Tuiloma Neroni Slade 
introduced a draft proposal. This draft protocol stated that Annex I Parties to the 
protocol were to reduce their CO2 emissions by 2005 to a level of at least 20% below 
that of 1990312; although that would later be watered down to 5%, AOSIS proved to set 
the bar high affirming an extreme to start negotiations. The issue on parity of mitigation 
and adaptation and the need for more support for developing countries were major 
issues for the coalition during the early 2000s. Leading up to and post-COP15 
Copenhagen, limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5°C and support for up-
scaling and access to climate finance, capacity building and technology, avenues or loss 
and damage have become pertinent issues for island states313. The issue of loss and 
damage has been a pillar argument of AOSIS ever since it was unsuccessfully 
introduced by Vanuatu’s Van Lierop in the 1990’s314, the issue was vindicated two 
decades later with the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss 
and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (Loss and Damage Mechanism) 
established at COP19. 
 
Although Pacific state contributions in the UNFCCC are usually overshadowed by the 
AOSIS body of work, a closer analysis traces key Pacific individuals and activities 
within AOSIS that have made an impact in the regime. Many scholars and media 
discourses have linked “climate change, or at least its impacts,… with the small and 
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apparently vulnerable nations of the Pacific”315. Low lying coral atoll nations like 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu, and in effect the coalition have been 
affectionately known as the ‘conscience’ or the ‘moral conscience’ of the 
negotiations316. However, AOSIS while traditionally the main coalition body to which 
Pacific states are aligned, is not the only political grouping where they are active in the 
negotiations. 
 
Pacific countries and UNFCCC coalitions 
For small state delegations, association and active participation in UNFCCC coalitions 
allow them to manage regime complexity317, and in return act as vehicles for positions 
to be negotiated to garner support for a louder voice. Among the records and literature 
of climate negotiations leading up to 2014, Pacific states have traditionally belonged to 
four groupings of states under the global South non-Annex I group of countries: G-77, 
AOSIS, CfRN and LDC. The divide of north and south country coalitions, or ‘the 
firewall’318, originated in the way the Convention and subsequent protocol of 
implementation was established, where developed countries led the way in cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions. The fifth coalition would be the Cartagena Dialogue group 
that consist of states from both the north and south, where only a handful of Pacific 
states were associated with.  
  
Group of 77 and China (G77 China)  
Considered the hub of global south coalitions, the Group of 77 and China coalition has 
been in existence in most UN meetings and conventions since the establishment of the 
UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964. China did not associate itself 
politically with the Group of 77 for many years and does not consider itself a member 
state, however it is an active member in the work of the Group. With 134 members, this 
dynamic group is the main clearing house for its members and their respective 
coalitions from various regions - African Union, Arab League, Latin American 
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(GRULAC and ALBA), small island states (AOSIS), least developing countries (LDC), 
oil exporting countries (OPEC), and to large (emerging BASIC) and middle-income 
nations. G-77 China, like AOSIS has been active since the early days of the UNFCCC. 
Samoa and Papua New Guinea under various occasions have been selected to chair 
subsidiary bodies, but the first Pacific state to ever Chair and convene the Group’s 
positions in climate negotiations was Fiji in 2013. Despite being the largest grouping, 
only ten states319 from the Pacific are part of the coalition. Cook Islands and Niue are 
not state members of the UN, Palau withdrew from the coalition. According to 
Campbell and Barnett, Tuvalu has preferred not to join the group citing differences in 
positions with bigger states in G-77 China320.  
 
Least Developing Countries (LDC)  
The term Least Developed Country is a UN categorisation of countries from the 1970’s, 
but the coalition itself became active in the climate negotiations in 2000. Concerned 
with the vulnerabilities and capacities of poorer countries to effectively report on 
requirements of the Kyoto Protocol, a coalition was created to ensure special 
consideration of least developing countries from around the world321. In a repeat of 
history as the initial head of AOSIS, Vanuatu would again become the inaugural chair 
of LDC by its members, when the coalition made submissions at subsidiary body 
meetings in 2000. Working together to defend the vulnerability of their states and 
claims to adaptation consideration322, LDC have been instrumental in creating a special 
LDC Fund ensuring a permanent agenda in the subsidiary bodies to allow for discussion 
of special matters relating to LDCs. The LDC fund, on top of other UNFCCC mandated 
funds like Green Climate Fund and Global Environment Fund provided the 48 state 
members including the then five countries from the Pacific with more direct climate 
access. But before Samoa graduated from LDC in 2014, leaving Tuvalu, Solomon 
Islands, Kiribati and Vanuatu in the coalition, it benefited in high investment flows in 
its climate change projects especially through the LDC Fund. As one negotiator casually 
                                                     
319 Fiji, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu. 
320 Campbell and Barnett, 107. 
321 Chan,  190. 
322 UNFCCC, "Party Groupings," United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings  
  
 
104  
remarked, “Samoa had the brightest bunch, during LDC days they had the highest 
climate aid per capita”.323 As Chapter Four and Six will highlight, LDC with AOSIS 
would prove pivotal in taking the Loss and Damage issue all the way to the end of the 
Paris Agreement. 
 
Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CfRN) 
As the regime moved into negotiations around carbon markets, an issue-specific 
coalition was born in 2004. The CfRN led by Papua New Guinea and other tropical 
rainforest developing countries emphasised the need to reconcile forest stewardship 
with economic development. Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu would be the other 
voluntary members of the coalition. The coalition operates as a forum to facilitate 
consensus among participating countries on issues related to domestic and international 
frameworks for rainforest management, biodiversity conservation and climate stability. 
The work of the bloc has been instrumental in the establishment of the Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) program, which was 
vigorously negotiated as an insert to the Bali Action Plan. This success of the REDD 
program owes much to the tactical skill of Papua New Guinea’s lead negotiator Kevin 
Conrad in the Bali COPS 2007. Famously quoted as the breakthrough moment in the 
‘the mice that roared’ incident, Conrad called out to the U.S. “if you're not willing to 
lead, then get out of the way.”324 
 
Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) 
The coalition, founded a month before COP15 Copenhagen in 2009, is an international 
partnership of countries highly vulnerable to a warming planet. The Forum claims to be 
based around the idea of a South-South cooperation platform for participating 
governments to act together to deal with global climate change325. Within its 20-
member country grouping are Kiribati and Vanuatu. The forum of highly vulnerable 
developing countries argue that they are already experiencing the negative effects of 
climate change. In 2010 Kiribati was the chair of the CVF and hosted the Tarawa 
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Climate Change Conference. More importantly it brought together leaders326 to witness 
first hand impacts and the vulnerability of island atolls like Tarawa to climate change.  
 
Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action (Cartagena) 
Established in 2010, the group was formed after the breakdown of Copenhagen and the 
need that then arose to rebuild trust between the developed and developing countries. 
The group continues to meet outside the formal UNFCCC negotiations. While its 
members claim it is not a political bloc, the dialogue provides a platform for delegates 
from developed and developing countries to have frank discussions to better understand 
each other’s’ positions and find areas of possible ‘middle-ground’.327 Membership is 
fluid, as developing countries apparently find it difficult to be associated too closely 
with developed countries in negotiations due to formal group memberships and a sense 
of loyalty to G-77328. Of the 30 plus countries involved in the dialogue, only Samoa and 
Marshall Islands have been actively involved. The 2014 Cartagena Dialogue was held in 
the Marshall Islands and focussed on opportunities to break the international deadlock 
and find common position for a 2015 binding agreement329. 
 
The trajectory and growth of climate change in the international arena were not immune 
to efforts at national and regional political forums. This research acknowledges that 
each of the fourteen Pacific island countries have elevated climate change policies as 
part of human security and sustainable development goals domestically. To the present 
day, mainstreaming climate change at national and community levels is a crucial 
element of policy formulation for most if not all states. The next section however, will 
focus on the regional level, how climate change has become a regional priority in both 
political and environmental technical forums. Of particular focus, are the place and role 
of the Pacific Islands Forum and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Program.  
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Climate Change as Regional Priority  
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)  
Pacific leaders and policy makers were not oblivious to the attention on climate change 
at the international level in the late 1980’s, especially in the region’s premier political 
institution, then the South Pacific Forum (now known as the Pacific Islands Forum or 
PIF). A regional multilateral organisation that was established with a seven-state 
membership in 1971 that included Australia and New Zealand, over the years it has 
grown in capacity, membership, and purpose to cater for its now 16 member states330 
and territories. While the issue of climate change was lobbied at UNGA and CHG, 
Pacific state leaders canvassed the issue for regional political support. The PIF 1988 
communique emphasised leaders’ concerns on economic and social impacts from a 
changing environment, and Australia stepped in to take leadership in establishing a 
climate monitoring network for the region331. A communique is a record of agreed 
decisions by leaders, in this case one that sets the work agenda for PIFS and the Council 
of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP), while a political declaration 
underscores a consensus agreement on policy, belief on a particular issue is shared by 
leaders. By 1989, the issue of ‘climatic changes’ was elevated with linkage to sea level 
rise, and the PIF communique impressed upon Pacific leaders and statesmen to “draw 
world attention to the way the environmental problem (of sea level rise) affected the 
South Pacific, and to represent regional views at appropriate international gatherings, 
possibly including by way of a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly”.332 
Over the next two decades, climate change would become a consistent fixture of the PIF 
agenda as evident in its subsequent communiques and declarations in the 1990’s and 
2000’s.   
                                                     
330 Although 16 full members in 2016, since 2016 PIF membership has increased to 18 with the 
involvement of French territories New Caledonia and French Polynesia. The PIF membership are: 
Australia, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. 
331 PIF, "Forum Communique: Nineteenth South Pacific Forum Nukualofa Tonga," ed. Pacific Islands 
Forum (South Pacific Forum) (Nukualofa: Pacific Islands Forum 1988). 
332 "Forum Communique: Twentieth South Pacific Forum Tarawa Kiribati," (Tarawa: Pacific Islands 
Forum (South Pacific Forum), 1989). 
  
 
107  
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP) 
Originally established as a section under the Secretariat of the Pacific Commission 
(SPC) in 1970’s to overlook the work on various regional Conventions on Conservation 
of Nature, Protection of Natural Resources and Environment, Dumping and Pollution, 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP)333 evolved into a 
separate inter-governmental regional body with headquarters in Apia, Samoa by 1993. 
A key governance arrangement and a vital link of SPREP to PIFS is the annual SPREP 
meeting, a gathering of environmental ministers to discuss, evaluate and establish 
environmental priorities of the region. In line with international progress and PIF 
leaders’ mandates, SPREP’s work program expanded from its convention obligations of 
the early 1990’s as the principal intergovernmental environmental and sustainable 
development organisation to include climate change. Intrinsic in SPREP’s regional 
support on climate and UNFCCC is its leadership role in providing technical advice in 
negotiation skills training for member states, and their UNFCCC national 
communication for adaptation work programs and global mitigation gas emissions.334 
SPREP was an integral actor in the early INC and UNFCCC negotiations, together with 
the Caribbean Community, in providing scientific and technical research support for 
member states335. 
 
Interplay and intensification of PIF and SPREP climate change efforts 
SPREP’s work program on climate change - capacity support for member countries on 
adaptation, mitigation and policy implementation - started to take shape in its first 10 
years. However, it was not until 2005 when regional action and political response to 
international climate change work intensified. The PIF member states, under the 
auspices of SPREP, endorsed the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate 
Change 2005-2015 (PIFACC), as the implementation guide for ongoing and planned 
activities to address climate change in the region336. In a way the PIFACC became both 
                                                     
333 The organisation went through a name change from the South Pacific Regional Environment Program, 
to Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program in 2004. 
334 SPREP, "Climate Change Current Programmes,"  http://www.sprep.org/Policy-and-Science/current-
programmes.  
335 Ronneberg, 763. 
336 SPREP, "Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change 2006-2015," ed. Secretariat of the 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme (Apia: Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme, 2006). 
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a response and strategic plan not only to assist islands but as a means to be active in 
international climate dialogues. The PIFACC337 constituted the Pacific Climate Change 
Roundtable (PCCR) that would bring together public, private and civil sectors to meet 
bi-annually to discuss and share information on existing climate-change related projects 
at all levels.  
 
Although climate change was prioritised in the communiques since the 1980’s, the first 
first regional political declaration specifically on climate change came in the form of the 
PIF Niue Declaration on Climate Change in August 2008338. The Niue Declaration was 
a call for global action in support of the UNFCCC multilateral system by strengthening 
their contributions for adaptation projects and strong commitments for greenhouse gas 
emissions. PIF states were to “develop Pacific-tailored approaches to combating climate 
change, consistent with their ability to actively defend and protect their own regional 
environment, with the appropriate support of the international community”.339 It was no 
coincidence that the Niue Declaration came in the time of heightened global political 
attention in preparation for the Copenhagen COP15340. The urgent need for global 
political will was reiterated in the PIF Leaders’ Call on Action on Climate Change 
annexed in the 2009 communique 341. This time the declaration laid out key positions of 
convergence for the Pacific states to pursue at the talks, namely on climate finance and 
the capacity for adaptation and mitigation projects. The declaration highlighted the lack 
of negotiation capacity, thus reaffirming the necessity that SPREP should continue its 
scientific and negotiator skills/training expertise support for Pacific negotiators at the 
UNFCCC.  
 
                                                     
337 The PCCR is a powerful conference- expo of climate change leaders, policy-makers, practitioners, 
scientists, community and individuals working within the climate change space in the Pacific. 
338 PIF, "The Niue Declaration on Climate Change," ed. Pacific Islands Forum (Niue: Pacific Islands 
Forum 2008). 
339 Ibid. 
340 The Pacific Islands in line with AOSIS and wider G-77 and China coalitions have traditionally been 
the loudest proponents on Adaptation to Climate Change planning, capacity and finance. As the frontline 
states facing current impacts of climate change, Pacific Islands since exception of the issue post Kyoto 
negotiations have argues for more support from polluting nations in order to deal with climate change 
negative impacts.  
341PIF, "Pacific Leaders' Call to Action on Climate Change: Forum Leaders Communique ", ed. Pacific 
Islands Forum (Cairns: Pacific Islands Forum 2009).  
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Pacific’s Response: Majuro Declaration 
With the diplomatic failure of COP15 Copenhagen, the top-down compliance structure 
that was the Kyoto Protocol was in jeopardy especially with the concerns by Annex I 
countries and big emitting developing countries. A compromise from the Durban COP 
was for parties to explore bottom-up voluntary system. The Pacific’s regional response 
to this global exercise was the PIF Majuro Declaration on Climate Leadership in 
September 2013; a declaration that emphasised not only the political will and leadership 
of the region, but also the willingness and practicality of Pacific governments to 
experiment with the process at the regional level. Under the stewardship of Marshall 
Islands as the chair of PIF in 2013, the Majuro Declaration was an attempt by the PIF 
countries to carry out the ADP mandate. In demonstrating climate leadership, the then 
16 member countries of PIF submitted nationally determined contributions and 
commitment targets (both adaptation and mitigation measures) that would contribute to 
a perceived global goal.342 The declaration was heralded by Marshall Islands as the 
“Pacific’s gift”343 to the world, and was presented at the UN Secretary General Climate 
Summit in September 2013, to “catalyze ambitious climate action and mobilize political 
will for a universal, ambitious and legally-binding climate change agreement by 
2015.”344 This declaration and its contributions would prove to be a helpful experiment 
for the region, in order to materialise and understand the process of achieving a global 
consensus, an agreement of post 2020 actions on climate change to be decided in Paris 
2015. 
 
Setting the Scene in 2015 
This third and final section will set out the context of the processes of climate change 
negotiations in 2015 explored in this thesis: the formal international UNFCCC ADP 
process and the informal regional political process. The formal process traces the 
UNFCCC ADP mandate that set forth a negotiation process to build and negotiate text 
from 2012 to be finalised in 2015. At the same time this section will put into context the 
five key ADP meetings (ADP2-8 to ADP2-12) that occurred throughout 2015. The 
                                                     
342 "Majuro Declaration for Climate Leadership," (Majuro, Marshall Islands: Pacific Islands Forum, 
2013). 
343 Kiery Manassah, "Accepting the Pacific gift," Pacific Institute of Public Policy 2013. 
344 PIF, "Majuro Declaration for Climate Leadership." 
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second half will focus on the key political regional, sub regional and partner-regional 
forums that took place in 2015. Although these political forums are not directly linked 
to the UNFCCC, they do play a pivotal role in explaining the mobilising of actors, 
prioritising of key issues, and strategising activities that would prepare Pacific states in 
the international negotiations. The year 2015 would see an explosion of political 
declarations from the region that prioritised and called for political support for a Paris 
agreement that accounted for the needs of frontline states.  
 
The international UNFCCC ADP and global UNFCCC COP21 
The formal negotiations in Paris 2015 did not operate in a vacuum or from a blank slate. 
To reiterate, it would take a four-year process of UNFCCC meetings that intensified in 
the last twelve months preceding the Le Bourget conference. The Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform (ADP) was created with the task of producing a protocol, 
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, by COP21 in 2015345. 
In the final moments of COP17 Durban negotiations, dialogue centred on the need for a 
new agreement to guide the climate change regime after 2020. As highlighted earlier in 
this chapter, the procedural failures and last minute high-level political intrusion in 
Copenhagen, would be fresh on the minds of negotiators. Despite these many 
reservations, states established a mandate for ADP the new negotiating body, to come 
up with a new agreement.  
 
In essence ADP would become a subsidiary body within the negotiations where all 
member states and observer organisations were invited to participate. In its first year 
parties were focussed on the ‘bigger picture’ on process and elements that could be 
discussed, these meetings were known as ADP1. Upon agreement of these terms in June 
2013, the ADP2 process would then be divided into two purposes or workstreams. 
Workstream One would focus on establishing a process that would establish a protocol 
of another legal instrument with legal force under the Convention346. At the same 
Workstream Two negotiations focussed on a workplan to enhance member states 
                                                     
345 UNFCCC, "Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventeenth session, Durban November 28-
December 17, 2011," ed. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Durban: UNFCCC, 
2011). 
346 "ADP Bodies," UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/adp-bodies-page. 
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mitigation and explore options of actions that could close the ‘ambition gap’.  The 
ambition gap was the “significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties' 
mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and 
aggregate emission pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the 
increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial 
levels”347. The work of the ADP was conducted through a series of in-session round 
table discussions, workshops, technical expert meetings and briefings that took into 
account submissions from both parties and observer organisations as invited by the 
subsidiary body throughout 2013 and 2014. By the Lima COP20 in December 2014, the 
work of ADP2-6348 was elevated as parties negotiated the final process that would take 
place in 2015. After lengthy negotiations that concluded at 3am which was twenty-four 
hours after it was intended to end, the ‘Lima Call for Climate Action’ gave a mandate 
for ADP to establish ‘negotiating draft text’ to be drawn up before May 2015. This text 
was to be based on the skeleton frame or core issues identified by the previous ADP 
sessions to be included in the new agreement; these elements were annexed in the 
decision of COP 20/1349.  
 
Timeline of ADP 2015  
With the mandate from Lima to develop a negotiations draft text, the work of ADP 
started two months afterwards in Geneva. Parties and especially via their coalitions, 
took on the task of filling in specific conditions or providing alternative text options for 
each of the core elements from Lima. There were little to no negotiations; the process 
was a shopping list of options from interested parties that were all put into brackets 
meaning open for debate. By the end of the one-week conference in February, the 
Geneva negotiating text would accumulate 86 pages that would be the basis of 
negotiations throughout the year350. Taking on board the surmountable work ahead, 
parties agreed that it would need four extraordinary sessions for ADP to remove the 
brackets in the text or the points where there was no consensus agreement.  
                                                     
347 Ibid. 
348 The acronym ADP2-6 denotes the sixth meeting of the ADP2 process. 
349 UNFCCC, "Lima call for climate action," in UNFCCC twentieth conference of the parities 2014, ed. 
UNFCCC (Lima: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2014). 
350 ENB, "Summary of the Geneva Climate Change Conference 8-13 February 2015." 
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In June, ADP2-9 would convene with the task to streamline and consolidate clustering 
and conceptual discussions of the Geneva negotiating text, including on: preamble; 
general/objective; mitigation; adaptation and loss and damage; finance; technology 
development and transfer; capacity building; transparency; timeframes; implementation 
and compliance; and procedural and institutional provisions. A thorough explanation of 
events at the Bonn ADP2-9 with a focus on Pacific states participation in this 
negotiation forum is explored in Chapter Four. The meeting established a process of 
how the text is negotiated, where the main contact group will be the formal plenary 
while facilitated groups and spin-offs will negotiate key differences.  
 
From August 31-September 3, parties reconvened in Bonn to continue streamlining the 
negotiated text. In the previous Bonn meetings, the member states allowed the two ADP 
Co-Chairs, to revise the text based on negotiations in ADP2-9. The work of negotiators 
continued in the contact group and facilitated dialogue and spin off groups. By the end 
of the five-day conference, there still was little movement on textual proposals, and 
parties were still engaged in conceptual discussions on key issues.351 By the end, the 
Co-Chairs were again given another mandate to revise the text based on discussions 
made throughout the week, and the text was reduced to 45 pages.  
 
By the October ADP2-11, the Co-Chairs produced a revised test and proposed text-
based negotiations to begin. “However, when parties returned to Bonn six weeks later 
for ADP 2-11, they were in a considerably less hopeful frame of mind, following the 
release of a Co-Chairs’ text that many found unbalanced and unacceptable as a basis for 
further negotiations”.352 While the hope was to increase the pace of negotiations, parties 
recompiled the text with some returning to original positions in Geneva and 
compromises made in ADP2-9 and ADP2-10. For coalitions from the global South 
there was trepidation that many of their positions on mitigation and adaptation were not 
                                                     
351 "Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Conference 19-23 October 2015," ed. Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin (Bonn: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2015). 
352 Ibid. 
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reflected in the then negotiating draft. By the end of the conference, parties did not give 
the Co-Chairs a mandate to revise the text but were to continue the work in Paris.  
 
The final ADP2-12 session would take place in the global negotiations in Paris during 
the first week of COP21. With only five days before the end of the APD mandate it 
seemed a completed text would not be possible. The ADP Co-Chairs were to produce a 
‘consolidated text’ so that come December 5 the task of concluding the text negotiations 
would then become the main task of the French COP presidency.  
 
The regional negotiations: climate politics of regional, sub-regional partner-
regional forums 
While international UNFCCC ADP negotiations focussed on text diplomacy, the 
politics of climate change and the necessity for a coordinated regional response would 
find itself on every agenda of the multilateral meetings taking place in the region. Signs 
of climate policy divergence emerged between the Pacific island states on the one side, 
and the more developed economies of Australia and New Zealand on the other. This 
deviation was symptomatic of the firewall from UNFCCC coalitional politics - where 
Australia and New Zealand priorities were aligned with Annex I coalitions, while the 
island states found their voice in the AOSIS and greater G-77 and China political 
groupings.  In line with the SIDS S.A.M.O.A Pathway 2014353 and through its 
membership with AOSIS, Pacific island states went into 2015 prioritising the perceived 
agreement: the status of special consideration of small islands developing states 
enshrined in a legally binding agreement; a long-term global temperature goal lower 
than 1.5 degrees; a standalone article and international mechanism to address Loss and 
Damage; and scaling up climate finance pledges before 2020 to support adaptation and 
mitigation projects354. These positions remained firm throughout the year, and were 
echoed in regional, sub-regional and partner-regional meetings.  
 
                                                     
353 SAMOA Pathway, "SIDS accelerated modalities of action outcome statement," ed. UN Economic and 
Social Affairs (Apia: United Nations, 2015). 
354 AOSIS, "Statement by Republic of maldives on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States at the 
High-Level Event on Climate Change," news release, 2015. 
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Oceania 21-Lifou Declaration (April) 
The first diplomatic setting in the region to discuss Paris COP was in April, under the 
auspices of the New Caledonia hosted third Oceania 21 Summit on Sustainable 
Development. The biennial summit brought together representatives of the 22 Pacific 
island states and territories. As France was the incoming chair of the Paris meeting later 
in the year, it was not a surprise that climate change was one of the main priorities at the 
French-Pacific hosted regional talks. The Lifou Ministerial Declaration on Climate 
Change asserted that “insufficient funding for mitigation and adaptation policy 
implementation, insufficient capacity building and transfer of technological advances, 
weakness of existing measures in terms of loss and damages as well as the lack of 
inclusion of civil society in climate negotiations”355 needed to be addressed in Paris. 
The declaration itself was a reaffirmation of the key AOSIS positions, except 
discrepancies on the long-term temperature goal then included “limiting global warming 
to less than 2°C or even 1.5°C”356, and did not explicitly support the creation of a new 
Loss and Damage mechanism. The participation of New Zealand, Australia and France 
officials in Oceania 21 highlighted policies of divergence amongst Pacific states: 1.5 
degrees long-term temperature goal, and loss and damage.  
 
SRPEP High-Level Support Mechanism 1 (May) 
The next opportunity came a couple weeks later at the SPREP High-Level Support 
Mechanism (HLSM) held on the final day of the Pacific Climate Change Roundtable in 
May 2015357. The HLSM was part of the SPREP mandate in providing international 
climate policy advice. Since 2012 SPREP had utilised the services of a German based 
NGO Climate Analytics to update and train officials from Pacific states on the 
impending ADP process358. Held in a closed one-day session, officials and technical 
experts from the islands discussed the Geneva text, and updated on the state of play of 
political dynamics of countries and coalitions in the regime. This platform allowed 
                                                     
355 Oceania 21, "Lifou Declaration "Paris 2015:Save Oceania!" Lifou Loyalty Islands, New Calediania 30 
April 2015- 3rd Oceania 21 Summit," (Lifou New Caledonia: Oceania 21, 2015). 
356 Ibid. 
357 There were two High-Level Support Mechanism meetings in 2015: one in May 15 (preparatory for 
ADP2-9) and November 4-6 (preparatory for COP21).  
358 Climate Analytics, "HLSM High Level Support Mechanism for for LDC and SIDS," Climate 
Analytics, http://climateanalytics.org/projects/hlsm-high-level-support-mechanism-for-ldc-and-sids-on-
climate-change.html.  
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technical negotiators from the region to strategise on how to engage in the negotiations 
through coalitions, before the next meetings in Bonn. The training day utilised seasoned 
lead Pacific negotiators from the formal UNFCCC process that stressed a Pacific voice 
united under AOSIS359.   
 
Japan: PALM 7 (May) 
Climate change especially adaptation and climate finance was a priority agenda for the 
seventh Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM7). The PALM forum is Japan’s main 
diplomatic conference with Pacific PIF states, including Australia and New Zealand, 
and it allows Japan to dialogue both bilaterally with each state, as well as in a regional 
setting. In essence the forum allows for discussion and unveiling of Japan’s cooperation 
packages for the region in the next three years. The outcome statement, Fukushima 
Iwaki Declaration360 reflected agreement on more climate and adaptation by 
acknowledging Japan’s contribution to the Green Climate Fund. At the same time Japan 
reaffirmed its commitment to the Pacific through assistance to build a Pacific Climate 
Change Centre at SPREP, and support for Adaptation Initiative and renewable energy. 
PALM7 would serve as the first opportunity for Pacific heads of governments or 
ministers of foreign affairs to meet on the issue in 2015. The politics of UNFCCC were 
never far away, as Japan is a member of the umbrella group with Australia and New 
Zealand. It was unsurprising that the controversial issues on support for 1.5 temperature 
goal, loss and damage were not discussed, or reached the outcome statement361. There 
was however, special mention of the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM), Japan’s credit 
sharing mechanism through its overseas projects to offset its emission targets.  
 
                                                     
359 The author participated in both HLSM in May and November, as part of fieldwork. There was 
difference in mood of participants in both workshops: the earlier meeting focussed on aligning and 
supporting the work of the established of AOSIS, while the November session still keeping its 
relationship with AOSIS- there were more instances and calls for a Pacific voice and Pacific position. The 
participants stated the need for a Pacific coalition, or direct influence in the negotiations. 
360 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The Seventh Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM7) 
Leaders’ Declaration- Fukushima Iwaki Declaration -“Building Prosperous Future Together”," Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/page4e_000261.html#section3. 
361 Ibid. 
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Micronesian Presidents’ Summit- Boknake Haus Communique (July) 
The Micronesian Presidents’ Summit (MPS) established in 1990, became a forum that 
allowed for the three Presidents of Palau, Marshall Islands and Federated States of 
Micronesia to discuss issues of “working together to improve communication and 
planning on areas of common interest to their nations and to the region”362. Since the 
first summit in 2001, the UNFCCC negotiations was prioritised in the MPS agendas for 
‘a greater role and voice from Micronesia’. This was again reiterated in the 2015 
Marshall Islands’ Boknake Haus Communique363. Amongst many sub-regional 
initiatives agreed in the meeting, it emphasised the need for a plan of action for the three 
states and their role in the Road to Paris364. The three island states Presidents agreed 
upon the positions pursued by AOSIS especially the 1.5 degree issue. Furthermore, it 
was agreed that there would be joint coordination and communication in Paris, with 
Marshall Islands offering to provide a Micronesia Pavilion at the COP21 expo to 
showcase the vulnerability of the islands in climate change. More importantly and 
echoing the sentiments of the PIF Majuro Declaration 2013, it called for Micronesian 
leadership in climate action at home and its commitments in the international climate 
negotiation process365. 
 
Polynesian Leaders Group - Taputapuatea Declaration (July) 
With the aim of providing a “systemic approach to cooperation amongst Polynesian 
countries to develop, promote, and protect common interests and objectives of the 
members of Polynesia”366, climate change has been a priority for the Polynesian 
Leaders’ Group (PLG) since its establishment in 2011367. A day after the Boknake Haus 
communique was released, the Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate Change was made 
public by the PLG on ancient ‘marae’ chiefdom grounds of Tahiti in French 
                                                     
362 Gallenm Suzanne Lowe, "Micronesia Sub-Regional Diplomacy," in The new Pacific diplomacy, ed. 
Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte (ANU Press, 2016). 
363 MSP, "Boknake Haus Communique: 15th Micronesian Presidents' Summit Majuro Marshall Islands 
July 14-15 2015," (Majuro Marshall Islands: Micronesia Presidents' Summit, 2015). 
364 Ibid. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Marieta Heidi Ilalio, "Polynesian Leaders Group Formed in Samoa," Samoa Observer 2011. 
367 Iati Iati, "Pacific Regionalism and the Polynesian Leaders Group," The Round Table 106, no. 2 (2017): 
177. 
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Polynesia368. Taputapuatea reaffirmed the original red line positions of AOSIS for the 
1.5 degree temperature goal and emphasis on mechanisms that addressed loss of 
territorial integrity. The Taputapuatea Declaration’s P.A.C.T (Polynesia Against 
Climate Threats) revitalised an issue which was silent in the formal negotiations thus 
far—climate justice (population displacement, natural and cultural heritage) and the 
importance of oceans369. The PLG’s use of cultural affinity and Polynesian identity as a 
rallying point, underpins the strong stance on the linkage of climate change to people 
and culture, and climate justice which was not evident in other declarations.  
 
India-Pacific - Jaipur (August) 
By late August, at the invitation of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Pacific 
leaders would meet in Jaipur for the second Forum for India-Pacific Islands 
Cooperation. This partner-regional forum followed Modi’s visit to Suva in 2014. India’s 
new diplomatic reach and cooperation with the Pacific underscores its ‘Act East’ policy 
of seeking support from smaller nations beyond the Indian Ocean region. Areas of 
cooperation focussed on support for a UN security council seat, space monitoring 
program in the Pacific to observe Indian satellites and rockets, site visits by Indian 
navy, and trade prospects370. The opportunity was used by leaders to gauge exchange of 
views on climate change. “India’s position against mandatory carbon cuts for 
developing countries has been forcefully articulated, while the PIF countries have 
projected their concern over continuing growth in total carbon emissions into the 
atmosphere”.371  Except for Samoa and Palau, Pacific countries would soon 
afterwards converge on Suva for the first regional forum for the year.  
Pacific Island Development Forum- Suva Declaration (August) 
Under the theme ‘Building Climate Resilient Blue Economies’, the 500 plus attendees 
from government, civil and private sectors would take on the task of formulating ‘key 
                                                     
368 PLG, "Taputapuatea Declaration: Polynesian Leaders Group- Polynesia Against Climate Threats 
(P.A.C.T) Papeete July 16 2015," (Papeete, French Polynesia: Polynesian Leaders Group, 2015). 
369 Ibid. 
370 Sreeram Chaulia, "For India, small is big," The Straits Times, 
https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/for-india-small-is-big. 
371 Bhasker Balakrishnan, "Forum for India Pacific Islands Cooperation moves ahead," Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses, 
https://idsa.in/idsacomments/ForumforIndiaPacificIslandsCooperationmovesahead_bbalakrishnan_25081
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messages’ or priorities for the Pacific in Paris COP21. The PIDF was the newest player 
in regional politics; climate change and more importantly the negotiations at the 
UNFCCC, would be the main focus of this third leaders’ summit. The Suva Declaration 
on Climate Change would be the consensus outcome statement of these participating 
states. 372 The declaration returned to the key positions of limiting global temperature to 
less than 1.5 degrees, a standalone clause on loss and damage, and 100% financing for 
Pacific SIDS adaptation measure. In addition, the open participatory nature of the 
Summit saw not only prominence given to efforts that included the support and climate 
action from civil and private sectors especially, but also the areas of gender-based 
inequality and discrimination. The Suva Declaration sought to reflect the various sub-
regional declarations to date as well as to reflect the hard-line position of small island 
states which AOSIS stated at the UNFCCC negotiations. It reaffirmed the positions on a 
long temperature goal, loss and damage and special consideration financing for 
adaptation, mitigation and capacity however, the declaration went even further. Suva 
stated that the Paris Agreement must include an approach on low carbon sea transport, a 
moratorium on extractive fossil fuel industries and mechanisms for the payment of 
ocean and ecosystem services. These three notable issues were not reflected in the final 
Paris agreement, as not only were they introduced late in the negotiating rounds but 
deemed to be outside the parameters of the climate change convention.  
 
Pacific Island Forum’s Smaller Island States- SIS Leaders Climate Change 
Action Declaration (September)  
A week after PIDF issued its Suva declaration, the mood changed from optimism to one 
of uncertainty as leaders converged into Port Moresby for the Pacific Islands Forum 
leaders meeting. But before all PIF 16 leaders met, the special seven member373 Smaller 
Island States (SIS) sub-group374 meeting was convened on September 7. The sub-group 
had always been part of the PIF institution since the 1980’s but were given teeth in 2006 
with a formal structure, to advocate for the peculiar needs of this group within the 
                                                     
372 PIDF, "Suva Declaration on Climate Change," in Pacific Islands Development Forum (Suva: PIDF, 
2015). 
373 Cook Islands, Palau, Nauru, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Niue and Tuvalu  
374 PIF, "Smaller Island States,"  http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/strategic-partnerships-
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Pacific Islands Forum375. During the one-day meeting, leaders of the sub-group called 
for a climate change declaration that reflected smaller islands needs. There were 
concerns that “[Australia and New Zealand] will not water down our positions from the 
Suva declaration last week” that would be pursued in the main PIF Leaders 
declaration376. The SIS declaration was negotiated in less than two hours during the 
lunch hour of the meeting377. The description of events as they unfolded on the day, will 
be explored in detail in Chapter Five. 
 
Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting Port Moresby Call for Climate 
Action Declaration 
The PIF Port Moresby leaders meeting would be the first testing ground leading up to 
Paris for Pacific island countries to find a compromise with its fellow regional Annex 1 
partners, Australia and New Zealand. While the main plenary and photo opportunities 
with leaders was a grandiose and jovial affair, there was a slight uneasiness among 
climate change policymakers in Port Moresby, as the ADP2-10 had then just finished in 
Bonn over the weekend where there was a deadlock in the talks. The outcome was the 
Port Moresby PIF Leaders Declaration on Climate Change Action 2015; the list of 
climate change declarations from the region  are summarised in Table 12. On the 
surface it seemed most of the key asks were listed including the 1.5 degrees and the loss 
and damage378. But upon close inspection of the text, the declaration was ambiguous as 
it upheld the Lima COP language, “holding the increase in global average temperature 
below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”379. However, for the first time there 
was compromise on the issue on of loss and damage as a standalone clause in the 
agreement. As detailed later in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, this compromise from 
Australia and New Zealand reflected manoeuvring by Tuvalu at the international 
negotiations.  
 
                                                     
375 Ibid. 
376 Smaller Island State official (Talanoa 27), in discussion-talanoa with the author, September 8, 2015. 
377 SIS, "Smaller Island States Leaders' Port Moresby Declaration on Climate Change," (Port Moresby: 
PIF SIS, 2015).  
378 PIF, "Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Declaration on Climate Change Action," ed. Pacific Islands 
Forum (Port Moresby: PIF, 2015). 
379 UNFCCC, "Lima Call for Climate Action Decision 1/CP.20," (Lima: UNFCCC, 2014). 
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Table 12. Regional and Sub Regional polictical declarations on climate change 
Organisation Declaration Date Participating Members 
Melanesian 
Spearhead 
Group 
MSG Declaration on 
Environment and 
Climate Change 
2013 Fiji, PNG, Solomons, Vanuatu 
Pacific Islands 
Forum 
Majuro Declaration for 
Climate Leadership 
2013 Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
Australia, New Zealand 
Oceania 21 Lifou Declaration 
“Paris 2015: Save 
Oceania” 
April 
2015 
Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, French Polynesia, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, 
Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands 
Niue*, Palau*, Tokelau*, Vanuatu* 
Timor Leste, Wallis Futuna  
Micronesian 
Presidents’ 
Summit 
Boknake Haus 
Declaration 
July 
2015 
Marshall, Palau, Federated States of 
Micronesia 
Polynesian 
Leaders’ Summit 
Taputapuatea 
Polynesian Leaders 
Declaration on Climate 
Change 
July 
2015 
Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, 
American Samoa, French Polynesia, 
Tokelau 
Pacific Islands 
Development 
Forum 
Suva Declaration on 
Climate Change 
Sept 
2015 
Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu 
French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Timor 
Leste, Tokelau 
Pacific Islands 
Forum  
 
Smaller Island States 
Leaders’ Declaration 
Sept 
2015 
Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall, Nauru, 
Niue, Palau, Tuvalu 
Pacific Island Forum 
Leaders Declaration 
on Climate Action 
Sept 
2015 
Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu 
Australia, New Zealand 
The 14 Pacific island states who are signatory to UNFCCC are emphasised in BOLD 
*Attended the Oceania 21 meeting but did not sign the final agreement. France, Australia and New Zealand representatives 
were also present as observers; ** Samoa, Niue and Palau did not join in the PIDF meeting 
 
SPREP – High-Level Support Mechanism 2 (November) 
The outcome of the PIF Port Moresby declaration was vital in establishing a political 
mandate that called for unity at the COP21 negotiations and support from various 
regional agencies. The second HLSM held in Apia on November would be the site to 
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coordinate and train regional and national ministers and officials on the issues the 
Pacific states would present in Paris. Essential in this endeavour was the involvement 
and drive from technical expertise of CROP agency officials, as well as members of 
PIDF and PSIDS New York. In contrast to the May HLSM, the November meeting was 
an intensive three-day session of political negotiations and media training, in a secluded 
resort. This isolation tactic not only allowed countries to strategise and align 
coordinating positions before Paris, but essentially cemented negotiator relationships 
among state negotiators and regional organisation support teams. The participants 
involved and strategies discussed in this meeting effectively led to the establishment of 
the Pacific SIDS coalition, a regional coalition from the Pacific that were instrumental 
at the Paris Climate Change Conference. This will be explored fully in Chapter Six. 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has sought to trace three contextual factors in the story of Pacific islands 
states participation in global, international and regional climate change negotiations: the 
history of UNFCCC negotiations, the participation of Pacific island states in the regime, 
and the politics of climate change negotiations in 2015. The history, structure and issues 
discussed at the international UNFCCC level are complex. In tracing how Pacific 
islands states have participated in negotiations, this research finds Pacific negotiators 
and their leaders have managed well.  Despite the complex process of negotiations, the 
plethora of actors involved and the ambiguity of consensus; Pacific states and key 
individuals from the Pacific were at the forefront of climate talks. Most notable has 
been their involvement in inter-state coalitions. Coalitions like AOSIS, have allowed 
Pacific state delegates to mobilise and coordinate their positions, and at the same time 
be a part of leadership roles in the coalitions and the regime. What is not addressed in 
this historical analysis is what happens inside negotiations. First, Pacific states have a 
high level of cohesion within a coalition like AOSIS, or amongst other coalitions they 
are associated with.  Secondly, while accounts show Pacific states are effective in 
agenda setting or the early phases of negotiations, they do not point out how and if 
small states can influence consensus decision making at the final moments or consensus 
point, of negotiations. In order to answer this more clearly and effectively, the research 
in the next three chapters will focus on what happens inside climate change 
negotiations. However, not satisfied with just the international UNFCCC ADP process 
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leading up to the global COP21 negotiations, this thesis will explore how states build 
and reach consensus in regional multilateral forums.  
 
This chapter has also detailed the various diplomatic meetings in 2015 that pronounced 
the importance of canvassing political support before COP21. The UNFCCC ADP 
process, while simplistic in its description here, masks an unruly, strenuous and highly 
charged arena where states and their delegates are constantly trying to outmanoeuvre 
each other. As Chapter Four and Six will show, these heated forums of vested political 
actors require creative diplomacy and strategic relationships. The formal international 
UNFCCC ADP process follows the making of text diplomacy, and in all the remaining 
chapters, the thesis will explain the skill set of wordsmithing and pushing the ‘red lines’ 
at the final moments.  
 
Since the issue of climate change entered the regional agenda-basket in the late 1980s, 
regional political forums and technical organisations, namely PIF and SPREP have 
made it a top priority. The regional and sub-regional meetings, and their respective 
declarations, may on the surface be forums to build and strategise positions; they were 
also socialisation sites of leaders, negotiators and observers to build relationships and 
networks that would prove helpful in Paris. The context of the informal regional 
negotiations resonates with ideas around collective diplomacy or the new Pacific 
diplomacy. It emphasises the newly “assertive attitude, the emphasis on Pacific Island 
control of the diplomatic agenda, the creation of new institutions, its appeal to regional 
identity, and its concern with negotiating global agendas that are impacting Pacific 
societies”380. The proactive approach thus far by Pacific states within UNFCCC and in 
the Pacific region is witnessed in their proactive leadership. This climate leadership has 
not been limited to just the international UNFCCC level, but more importantly is 
sourced from multiple sites of power, both regional and sub-regional. 
  
                                                     
380 Fry and Tarte, 3. 
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Chapter Four: International Negotiations - UNFCCC Ad Hoc Durban 
Platform Ninth Session (ADP2-9) 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this first empirical chapter is to explore multilateral consensus decision 
making at the international UNFCCC level. It traces the negotiations that took place 
within the ninth session of the Ad Hoc Durban Platform (ADP2-9) meeting in Bonn, 
Germany from June 1-11, 2015. With a specific focus on the behaviour of Pacific island 
states in this multilateral negotiation, the analysis here traces how these countries 
navigate complex negotiations through the inter-state coalitions they are associated 
with. This micro-negotiation analysis of coalition behaviour allows the research to 
unpack how states build consensus amongst likeminded countries, and specifically the 
challenges of cohesiveness. What happens inside these coalitions, and how do states 
make decisions by consensus? Who are the actors and who are the actors involved in the 
decision making? What is their input and can Pacific island states through coalition 
influence the final outcome? 
 
In the context of UNFCCC negotiations, the ADP2-9 meeting was the half way point in 
the international negotiations. After years of multi-party discussions that led to draft 
negotiating text (the Geneva text) in January, this meeting would kick start text 
diplomacy negotiations – or the first substantive negotiations around streamlining and 
refining the draft agreement text. This meeting was not expected to reach a final 
outcome, but rather to build consensus amongst the 196 parties. With this scenario in 
mind, this chapter traces the mechanisms or the actors, strategies and issues, which the 
14 Pacific island states utilised in order to build consensus. A second point of departure 
is the existing literature on small states in the climate change regime that promote the 
importance of inter-state coalitions arguing that they help states streamline and manage 
complexity in the negotiations.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections based on the analytical framework on 
multilateral consensus decision making phases: pre-negotiation, negotiation and 
agreement. However, the emphasis of the descriptive analysis here will be on building 
consensus or the pre-negotiation and negotiations phases. The pre-negotiations phase 
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describes the preparatory meetings of the various coalitions Pacific states were 
associated with, in the week prior to the start of negotiations. The second section of the 
chapter will explore the events that unfolded in the ten days of ADP negotiations from 
June 1-11, or the negotiations phase. The final section will touch upon the agreement 
phase of the international conference, which was based on the consent of party members 
for the negotiations to continue. The three sections are complemented by three ‘inside’ 
accounts into the work of Pacific delegates in international multilateral negotiations.  
 
The three ‘inside’ ethnographic accounts or snapshots of certain facets of the 
negotiations, detail the vitality of Pacific negotiators and their coalitions. The first set of 
accounts detail the structure, politics and cohesiveness during pre-negotiations of four 
coalitions: the Alliance of Small Island States, G-77 and China, Coalition of Rainforest 
Nations, and Cartagena Dialogue. During the negotiations, coalitions not only become 
forums to achieve a compromise amongst likeminded states, but also become the main 
actors in the actual negotiations. This is evident in the second inside account following a 
day in the work life of a Pacific lead coordinator. The last inside account details the 
emergence of a Pacific SPREP-SIDS collective in the meeting born out of the need to 
be more active in the negotiation process. By following and tracing the work of Pacific 
negotiators inside the chambers of negotiations, these accounts highlight three 
significant political phenomena: internal coalition cohesiveness, bargaining amongst 
coalitions, and coalition formation.  
 
ADP2-9 Context 
Multiple Meetings  
After more than three years of negotiating an agenda and a process that was acceptable 
to all 196 parties of the Convention, the work towards a text for a new agreement had 
started. This work began in February 2015 at the Ad Hoc Working Group on the 
Durban Platform’s eighth session (ADP2-8) in Geneva, where parties started to insert 
options and alternatives thus creating the Geneva negotiating text381. The world’s 
attention then turned to Bonn, Germany, the home of the climate change negotiations’ 
                                                     
381 ENB, "Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Conference 1-11 June 2015," ed. Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin (Bonn: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2015). 
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secretariat. The ninth session of the ADP was not the only meeting taking place at 
UNFCCC headquarters in June 1-11. Under the UNFCCC calendar, two of the three 
main bodies of the UNFCCC would also hold its regular meetings during this time, 
namely the 42nd session of the SBI and SBSTA. This meeting was reported to have 
attracted nearly 4,000 participants, representing parties and observer states, international 
organisations, NGOs, and media382. While the SBI and SBSTA were carrying out 
routine negotiations around the outstanding elements of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Convention, “all eyes, ears and focus are on ADP”383 as one negotiator stated. 
 
The Geneva Negotiating Text  
From Geneva, an imperfect text of 92 pages formed the basis of a working draft text to 
be negotiated. The text was a laundry list of options and alternatives proposed by the 
parties and their various coalitions. These options and alternatives were categorised 
under 12 key clauses: general/objective; adaptation and loss and damage; mitigation; 
finance; technology development and transfer; capacity building; transparency; 
preamble; definitions; time frames; implementation and compliance; and procedural and 
institutional provisions. The aim of the ADP2-9 session was simple: for negotiators to 
streamline and consolidate the text, as well as clustering and conducting conceptual 
discussions of issues from the Geneva negotiating text. This stage of negotiating a text 
was a normal practice in the negotiations regime of agreeing to procedures of “how to 
engage, touch and massage the text”384. On the surface it seemed like a simple task, but 
as the events unfolded during the three-week conference, finding a consensus among 
196 parties to initiate this work proved difficult.   
 
In the months leading up to the Bonn meeting, the UNFCCC secretariat had circulated 
the political and technical focal points of the program and agenda for the session. For 
the UNFCCC process, each party member nominates two representatives as a focal 
point, political or technical, who receives all communication and invitations to mandate 
sessions and workshops. For the ADP2-9 package, this also included possible options 
                                                     
382 Ibid. 
383 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 11), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 29, 2015. 
384 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 11), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 29, 2015. 
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for streamlining the Geneva drafting text where there were parallel options coordinated 
by the UNFCCC secretariat. All these packages were posted on the UNFCCC ADP2-9 
session website one month prior to the meeting385. The generic information from the 
packages was also posted on the UNFCCC website and its Negotiator conference app. 
Additionally, in what had become a traditional fixture of the international climate 
change negotiations, the week prior to the ADP2-9 session was allocated for preparatory 
meetings of particular political groupings or coalitions. This took place between May 
26-31 and specific details of this week will be presented in the following section, the 
pre-negotiations phase. 
 
Politics Heading into Bonn 
In the four months prior to Bonn, key international meetings with linkages to the 
UNFCCC had taken place. The chairs of COP20 Peru, and COP21 France, hosted 
informal consultations for lead negotiators from 49-member states, strategically invited 
as having strong positions in the text. The consultations in Lima (March) and Paris 
(May) were not negotiations, but a dialogue to find common grounds for agreement.  
From the Pacific, representatives from Marshall Islands and Tuvalu were invited to 
these forums. The informal consultation would be elevated into informal ministerial 
meetings that would meet four times later in the year leading up to Paris. The Major 
Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change (MEF) would also meet in the 
months leading into Bonn. The MEF was an initiative established by U.S. President 
George W. Bush that would bring together leaders of 17 developed and developing 
economies386 as a means for candid informal dialogue to generate climate change 
political will and understanding amongst the top economies. The MEF has since 
evolved to incorporate UNFCCC secretariat officials and key states in the process. The 
group’s officials would be dubbed by climate change journalists as the who’s who and 
the most influential climate diplomats that “play a part in developing an agreement that 
can be acceptable and applicable to all”387. When the group met in Washington DC in 
                                                     
385 UNFCCC, "ADP2-9," United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/past-conferences/bonn-climate-change-conference-june-2015/adp-
2-9. 
386   Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United State 
387 Ed King, "Who’s who in the world of climate change diplomacy?," Climate Home News, 
http://www.climatechangenews.com/about-us/. 
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April, Marshall Island’s Tony de Brum would have been invited consecutively for the 
past two years. This was also the time when IPCC held its 41st session in Kenya, the 
Green Climate Fund held its ninth board meeting, and in New York, the negotiations on 
the post development agenda which would become the Sustainable Development Goals 
took place. 
 
For Pacific states, the months leading into Bonn was filled with informal lobbying at the 
regional level and inter-state coalition networks, as well as mobilising policy processes 
within capital and respective diplomatic postings.  At the regional level, the SPREP’s 
Pacific Climate Change Roundtable meeting in April would initiate a one-day HLSM 
training for regional technical officials to study and strategise positions over the Geneva 
text. As explored in Chapter Three, this was followed by meetings of leaders and 
officials at the meetings in New Caledonia (Oceania 21), Marshall Islands (MPS) and 
Tahiti (PLG) where their respective declarations called for climate action.  
 
At the national level, special climate change committees were reinvigorated to prepare 
state mandates for its negotiators.  Such was the case of Papua New Guinea, where a 
special taskforce on climate change negotiations led by the Climate Change and 
Development Authority with membership of the attorney general, environment and 
conservation and finance departments had been meeting round the clock finalising red 
lines, streamlining and strategising with the text388. For Samoa, on top of regular 
briefings with AOSIS climate change negotiators in New York, its ambassador was 
constantly in touch with the country’s technical focal point at the Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources and regional inter-governmental organisations in 
Apia, if the diplomat was not travelling to the region to train other climate 
negotiators389. For others like a representative from Tuvalu, as coordinators of the LDC, 
the months in between Geneva and Bonn June 2015, saw a schedule littered with skype 
meetings, email correspondence and text manoeuvre strategies with partners from 
Angola and Timor Leste390.  
                                                     
388 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 1), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 13, 2015. 
389 Samoan negotiator (Talanoa 20), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 3, 2015. 
390 Tuvaluan negotiator (Talanoa 5), in discussion-talanoa with the author, July 26, 2015. 
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Pacific island states participation at ADP2-9 
Of the 4,000 participants attending the Bonn session, only 51 participants in total 
represented the 14 Pacific states391. The Bonn sessions were purely technical; there was 
the odd occasion where a state minister would be present, and this was case for the 
Pacific delegations. As in all UNFCCC meetings state officials were recognised by their 
pink coloured accreditation badges, with the brown coloured badges delineating the 
head of a delegation.  As Table 13 shows, other than Niue, each Pacific state sent at 
least two delegates, which was also the minimum number of delegates funded by 
UNFCCC per party to attend the negotiations. While more than half of delegates were 
technical experts from respective countries’ environment or climate change entities, 
there was also representation of diplomatic negotiators from New York missions. They 
included Marshall Islands climate work with a non-profit organisation, consultants from 
Independent Diplomat392, and Palau’s close association with members of the Berlin 
based organisation, Climate Analytics. Pacific regional organisations officials  carried 
out their advisory role for the delegates  while being accredited under the Cook Islands, 
Samoa and Fiji delegations—during these negotiations only SPREP and the PIDF were 
present in Bonn. Tuvalu’s diplomatic association with Taiwan included two 
representatives from Taipei on their delegation, who were not directly engaged in the 
negotiations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
391 UNFCCC, "Provisional list of participant UNFCCC SBSTA SBI ADP 2-9 1-11 June," (Bonn: United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015).  
392 Independent Diplomat a non-profit organisation of experienced former diplomats and international 
lawyers; their contributions discussed in detail in Chapter Six.  
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Table 13. Pacific island states official delegation composition at ADP2-9 
  
Govt 
Officials 
Govt 
Diplomat 
Reg. 
Orgn. 
Intl 
Consult 
NGO 
Reg / 
Local 
Consult 
NGO 
Media Private 
Sector 
Academia TOTAL 
(Capital) (NY) 
Cook 
Islands 
2   2* 1**         5 
Fiji 1   1***           2 
Kiribati 2 1             3 
Marshall 
Islands 
1 2   2"         5 
Micronesia 
(Federated) 
2               2 
Nauru 1 2             3 
Niue 0               0 
Palau 3     4""       1^^ 8 
Papua New 
Guinea 
5               5 
Samoa 1 1 1*         1^^ 4 
Solomon 
Islands 
1 1             2 
Tonga 1 2             3 
Tuvalu 4 1         2^   7 
Vanuatu 2               2 
  State Actors- 36 Non-State Actors in Official Delegations- 15 51 
* members of Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program  
** independent consultant 
*** member of Pacific Islands Development Forum/ Chair of SBI 
" consultants from Independent Diplomat  
“” consultants from Climate Analytics 
^ representatives from Republic of China/Taiwan 
^^ researchers from Yale University and the Australian National University  
Source: UNFCCC, "Provisional list of participant UNFCCC SBSTA SBI ADP 2-9 1-11 June," 
(Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). 
 
ADP2-9 Pre-Negotiation Phase 
ADP Process 
One defining feature in climate negotiations is the work of political groupings or 
coalitions in streamlining positions of likeminded member states. In acknowledging this 
role, and at the request of member states, the UNFCCC in its work allocated one week 
prior to any body meeting - COP, SBI and SBSTA - for member states to meet as 
groups. The UNFCCC calendar in this preparatory week has always been allocated to 
developing southern coalitions. The preparatory week for the Bonn SBI/SBSTSA/ADP 
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2-9 program was as follows: Least Developing Countries (LDC) would convene on 
May 26 and 27; Small Islands Developing States (under AOSIS) and African Group 
would meet May 28 and 29, followed by the G-77 and China (G-77) on May 30 and 31. 
Although not officially listed on the UNFCCC program, it was common practice that 
negotiators from other coalitions like the Umbrella Group, Independent Association of 
Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), Arab League, Likeminded Group, 
Cartagena Dialogue, Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CfRN) and the European Union 
would also use this opportunity for face to face consultation and planning. For Pacific 
state delegations, this week meant lobbying in multiple coalitions, some in parallel, to 
ensure that their key positions were reflected in the work of coalitions. The following 
accounts explore the internal monitoring and coordination that takes place within 
coalitions, especially in relation with the ADP2-9 process as seen through the AOSIS, 
G-77, CfRN and Cartagena Dialogue393. These preparatory meetings are not recorded 
and restricted to only member state delegations of each group. The following accounts 
are an insider’s reflections on the work of coalitions in the preparatory phase, namely 
AOSIS, G-77, CfRN and Cartagena Dialogue. These accounts not only reflect the 
intricacies of building cohesiveness inside coalitions, but also their linkages and 
bargaining amongst the various political groupings.  
 
Inside: AOSIS and small states’ politics 
Although on the official program the SIDS/AOSIS was allocated May 28 and 29, an 
email from Chair of AOSIS Maldives, was sent a week earlier notifying of an additional 
day of preparations on May 27. Changes to the schedule and additional matters to the 
agenda were a constant feature, it proved to be wise to be in the know, or better still to 
anticipate these changes. In the conference room of the Königshof Hotel around 50 
delegates from the various ocean regions would convene to prepare for the upcoming 
ADP2-9. AOSIS was the historical home for Pacific island delegations, and this 
gathering would be the first opportunity to gauge areas of common ground on positions 
and continue to forge relationships with small island states from the Caribbean, Indian, 
Atlantic and Mediterranean oceans.  
                                                     
393 The researcher’s access was restricted to these four coalitions which Samoa is associated with. The 
LDC held daily coordination meetings and were active in the negotiation throughout. The CVF were 
mainly active during the COP21 negotiations.    
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AOSIS Coalition Plenary 
The participants organised themselves in their respective country delegations behind a 
table microphone. There was no set order as to where countries sat; delegates would 
simply collect their country plaque from the entrance of the conference room and place 
it where they sat. In this main coalition plenary, the heads of delegations or their 
representative would be given the opportunity to speak, by signalling gestures of tipping 
the flag plaque or raising their flag plaque to get hold of the Chair’s attention. One of 
the first procedural rituals for the heads of delegations or their representatives was to 
email the AOSIS secretariat with their delegation contact list394. This confirmation of 
participants to the AOSIS secretariat, in this case the Maldives, would ensure members 
would receive all coalition negotiation information. 
 
The first order of business would be given to state representatives to present any 
updates on high-level meetings, or UNFCCC committee meetings that took place 
between Geneva and Bonn. The delegations from Marshall Islands and Singapore 
would apprise the group of the MEF Washington and the Petersburg Dialogue focussing 
on areas of pre-2020 ambition and mitigation in the Geneva draft text. From the 
Caribbean, Belize informed the group of that regions’ High-Level Support 
Mechanism395 meeting and negotiator training. The same opportunity would be given to 
Samoa to detail the work from the Pacific from its Pacific Climate Change Roundtable 
and negotiator training. The coalition would also come to know the discussions around 
climate change adaptation partnership between Pacific countries and Japan, at the 
Japan-initiated Pacific Leaders Meeting (PALM 7). 
 
Outside of the UNFCCC discussions, SIDS representatives in the various regime bodies 
would update the group on progress. Of key importance were the discussions around the 
Structured Expert Dialogue working group looking at the issue of the 1.5 degrees long-
term temperature goal. The remainder of this first day of preparations was devoted to 
                                                     
394 Although the heads of delegations and some notable delegates did not need were automatically added 
on the email list, member countries were encouraged to re-introduce members present at the beginning of 
each negotiating session. 
395 The German based NGO Climate Analytics, as explored in Chapter Six, were influential in 
coordinating and leading training for SIDS and LDC countries. there would two HLSM for the Pacific, 
and two HLSM for the Caribbean states in 2015.  
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presentations of experts from the coalition involved in off-session workshops and 
dialogues around loss and damage, mitigation and adaptation. The issue of finance and 
the possible complications in the agreement for the Global Environment Fund and the 
Green Climate Fund was a particular priority and focus of discussions. The 
presentations and candid discussions from amongst the coalition members also looked 
at political profiling. By this, the group conducted a stocktake of possible country and 
coalition partners that may support or impede the groups’ established positions, both 
within the G-77 China and wider Annex I countries.  
 
AOSIS Coordination Groups and Coordination Leads 
The second and third day of preparatory meetings for the AOSIS was divided into 
‘coordination’ thematic groups. The coordination groups for AOSIS, and in all other 
coalitions in climate change negotiations, are the main wheels that drive the political 
groupings’ vehicle forward. For AOSIS and its preparations for ADP, it had been 
determined at the Geneva conference as well as meetings at the UN Missions in New 
York that there would be four key coordination thematic groups for ADP2-9: 
Adaptation and Loss and Damage, Finance, Mitigation and Legal. During the four 
month interval, the Chair had put out a request for states to nominate and at the same 
time individually approach possible negotiators to lead the four coordination groups. 
There were two ‘lead coordinators’ for each thematic group; with an unwritten principle 
to try and have equal membership from the three ocean sub-regions396. At the time of 
ADP2-9, Marshall Islands had two delegates leading coordination in the mitigation and 
legal groups. Depending on instructions from their capital, some states chose to follow 
one or two issues, and some had delegates jumping from one coordinating group to the 
other. Parties with sizable delegations, like Singapore, had the luxury of having three to 
five negotiators following each of the groups in comparison to states like Samoa, where 
one person would follow two or three coordination groups. 
 
During the coordination meetings, the thematic group coordinators would lead 
discussion amongst the group on who would follow what issue in the negotiations. For 
the Adaptation and Loss and Damage unit, discussions revolved around breaking the 
                                                     
396 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 5), in discussion-talanoa with the author, July 26, 2015 
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team into two subgroups (adaptation group and the loss and damage group) with 
individuals following particular clauses or articles of the negotiations. Although state 
red lines are a priority for delegates, the information sharing, and tasks allocated 
provide a sense of belonging and building cohesion. By speaking on behalf of another 
state during the negotiations, not only provided a sense of responsibility to represent 
others, but also built an obligation to the group. The coordination groups shared 
intelligence and networks from other coalitions and strategised a way of working with 
them. In this political stocktake, similar to the stocktaking that took place at the 
coalition plenary level, there was a more personal or individual profiling. In one 
instance, the mitigation group identified the second lead negotiators from Japan and 
New Zealand as the key players from the Umbrella coalition whom they needed to 
follow and look out for in the corridor.  
 
The monitoring of information and receiving up to the minute information is key to 
surviving in the negotiations - therefore it was vital for delegates to sign up not only to 
the emailing list of the coordinating group, but also its various social media platforms 
like WhatsApp, google drive, dropbox and skype chat groups. Similar to the way the 
main coalition emailing list was used, members of the coordination groups were 
encouraged to sign up again to reflect the active members of the group in the current 
session. 
 
As indicated in Chapter Three, most negotiations take place within the various spin-off 
negotiation chambers. The main actors or negotiators that enforce both the positions of 
their countries and coalitions, are the coordination groups. To be exact, in the practice 
of AOSIS (and as practiced by other coalitions), the main spokesperson for the coalition 
in these spin-off chambers are the lead negotiators. They would make interventions on 
behalf of a coalition or yield the floor to a fellow coalition-coordination member to 
make the intervention. However, as one Pacific negotiator affirms, this does not mean 
that states cannot make individual interjections as “it is our sovereign right to speak, 
intervene or seek clarification”397. The same negotiator went on to state, “but this is a 
rare moment, because it will show to other coalitions that AOSIS is not cohesive, and 
                                                     
397 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 7), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 28, 2015. 
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we have no coalition consensus”398. Despite what seemed like clock-work operations, 
there were certain positions that the coordination groups could not agree upon. In one 
case, in the mitigation coordination a negotiator from Grenada did not agree to points 
raised by Singapore on the matter of review cycles and language on the 1.5 degrees 
long-term temperature goal. With the support of fellow Caribbean countries and 
Marshall Islands, the coordination leads sought an agreement from the group to refer the 
matter back to the coalition plenary and heads of delegations. 
 
AOSIS Coalition Cohesiveness: managing differences and strategies 
On the final day of preparatory meetings, the coordinators would make presentations to 
the caucus on key issues and what to expect in the coming week. The issues where there 
would be no agreement from the coordination groups were then brought up for 
discussion. By the time these grievances were raised, the members with differences 
would have already conducted informal talks; sometimes with their state lead 
negotiators or heads of delegations. In the case of Grenada and Singapore, the issue did 
not find an agreement and the Maldives Chair asked that the matter be referred to the 
heads of delegations meeting to follow in the next two days. This was a strategy in of 
itself for the Chair. By reassuring coalition caucus that all was not lost and there was 
another option to find consensus, the Chair bought himself time to approach the 
delegations with vocal grievances - Grenada, Singapore, St. Lucia and Marshall Islands, 
both bilaterally and as a group for a compromise on the language.  
 
From finalising AOSIS key positions, the coalition-plenary discussed strategy, most 
importantly the strategy of working within the G-77 China bloc. Many scholars,399 and 
negotiators,400 have pointed to the increasing fragmentation of the southern-developing 
coalition group. With more than 13 regional, issue-specific, and economic coalitions all 
lobbying on the basis of a diverse set of interests, AOSIS needed to take into account a 
political stocktake of the group. The strategy that many negotiators in the room adopted 
                                                     
398 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 7), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 28, 2015. 
399399 See Betzold, Castro, and Weiler., and Lau Øfjord Blaxekjær and Tobias Dan Nielsen, "Mapping the 
narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC," ibid. (2014). 
400 Four seasoned Pacific negotiators commented in separate talanoa sessions, the increasing number of 
smaller regional and issue specific groups within the G-77 over the years.  
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was the numbers game. By gaining the support of the 136 states G-77 on a position, 
there would be more weight on the position when negotiating with Annex I states. As 
ADP2-9 was not the last session before Paris, the more seasoned negotiators strategised 
that Bonn was a technical or procedural negotiation. There would be no agreement in 
Bonn but to streamline the text; for negotiators it was important to outreach, to rally as 
much support as possible, rather than negotiating the text401.  During the plenary, the 
AOSIS Chair stressed to lead coordinators the need to garner the support of key 
countries like Saudi Arabia, China, Brazil, India, Bolivia and Indonesia to the 
coalition’s cause. 
 
The coalition plenary was also the site to raise any differences in regard to the AOSIS 
communication strategy. At the highest level would be the chair’s formal speeches to 
the group during the ADP plenaries (opening, closing or during negotiations), as well as 
the plenaries of the G-77. Accompanying these official speeches would be a press 
statement from the group drafted by lead coordinators, affirming both its positions and 
any serious concerns (usually its red lines) in the negotiations. The practice for AOSIS, 
is that the Chair secretariat would circulate by email these statements one day or the 
night before the next plenary. Member states with concerns were invited to contact the 
chair directly or voice strong dissent within the group plenary. Silence or no 
communication for changes was perceived as consent from the group. Nevertheless, 
throughout the week, it would be a rare occasion that there would be a statement 
without any changes after circulation. As these speeches and press statements act as 
official records of the group’s position, there was notable scrutiny amongst parties402 of 
each line in the event the Chair misrepresented the compromises by states as agreed to 
inside AOSIS.  
 
The coalition plenary also acted as a venue for a group bilateral: between AOSIS and 
the Co-Chairs of ADP2-9403. There were various forms of group bilaterals. Depending 
                                                     
401 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 6), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 27, 2015 
402 From observations during plenary and spin off sessions, negotiators from Marshall Islands, Solomon 
Islands and Tuvalu were constantly vocal in negotiations. This behaviour is not surprising, as they were 
lead coordinators/negotiators for AOSIS and LDC.  
403 The Co-Chairs for ADP were Dan Reifsnyder of U.S. representing Annex I countries, and Ahmed 
Djoghlaf of Algeria representing non-Annex I countries. 
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on the advice of the Chair the AOSIS representatives would be either heads of 
delegations only, or key negotiator coalition leads, with an open invitation to any state 
willing to attend, or in this case a full coalition caucus. The AOSIS bilateral with the 
Co-Chairs was an opportunity for the delegates and the coordinators to raise questions 
on procedural format and express their concerns on how negotiations should operate. 
Beyond the Co-Chairs, coalitions or states that may have a position standoff with 
AOSIS, may conduct a bilateral with the wider group in a plenary, or privately with 
selected representatives. These bilateral meetings with AOSIS were a common practice 
throughout the two week ADP2-9 session.   
 
AOSIS Heads of Delegations Group 
The most pressing differences in positions, affirming the strategies of AOSIS are raised 
in the heads of delegations group. Like coordination groups, the heads of delegation are 
an additional layer of authority that comes into play during negotiations. For ADP2-9 
the majority of heads of delegations were at the UN ambassador or deputy ambassador 
level, with the rare instance of a permanent secretary from the capital attending. 
According to one Pacific head of delegation, because of the familiarity of the 
ambassadors with each other over the years, the discussions can range from friendly to 
tense404. The heads of delegation try as much as possible to iron out any differences, as 
in the case of the mitigation between Grenada and Singapore where only at the heads 
level was AOSIS able to find agreeable language on the five-year cycles. At the same 
time some of the most sensitive group issues are also raised. One of these issues raised 
by a particular member state, was the use of non-governmental organisation 
‘consultants’ by states. According to one Pacific head of delegation, this issue 
questioned the use of scientific and legal experts and possible leaking of the AOSIS 
position, happens from time to time, “it leaves us with an awkward feeling, and mistrust 
among the group’s technical negotiators”.405 States using NGO consultants was not 
peculiar to just Pacific states but applied throughout AOSIS and all member states in the 
climate negotiation regime. “It is always NGOs that drive [the UNFCCC process] … 
they were always on the negotiation table”.406 
                                                     
404 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 20), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 3, 2015. 
405 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 25), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 8, 2015. 
406 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 17), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. 
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AOSIS Secretariat: Maldives and Islands First 
A notable arm in the work of the coalition is the Chair and its secretariat. The Maldives 
delegation were not only present in all coordination groups, but so too were its team of 
associated NGO experts. The Islands First, a non-profit organisation first came to be 
involved in AOSIS and climate change politics under the Nauru chair from 2011-2014. 
Their institutional knowledge in the UNFCCC and the previous AOSIS chair was key in 
Maldives retaining the work of Islands First into 2015; the group like all other NGOs in 
the process were accredited to Maldives.407 With its mission to amplify and empower 
island voices by advancing their priorities in climate change and sustainable 
development forums408, Islands First supported the Maldives mission in New York by 
providing research and information sharing capacity. The Chair’s role in coordinating 
and monitoring the group’s positions and maintaining cohesiveness required a strong 
secretariat. In the preparatory meetings and throughout the negotiations, the secretariat 
officials would constantly be on their toes compiling talking points, speeches, and press 
statements from thematic coordinators, before reporting back to the membership for 
consent. Vital to the consistency of the messages of the group was the planning of daily 
morning and evening AOSIS coordination meetings during the negotiations, as well as 
any necessary strategic meetings throughout the year.  
 
Inside: G-77 and China ‘balancing multiple coalitions’  
For the final two days of preparatory meetings, the eleven coalitions409 from the south 
would converge to find a common ground. From managing states in a coalition in 
AOSIS, G-77 had the double task of managing states and coalitions within a coalition. 
Premised on the notion of providing developing countries’ solidarity for its 134 member 
states, in the climate regime this also meant managing and producing a coalition 
solidarity for the south. The straightforward but accommodating diplomatic style of 
South Africa would prove vital in its assumption of the role of chair. The structures and 
                                                     
407 AOSIS negotiator (Talanoa 13), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 11, 2015. 
408 Islands First, "Islands First About Us," Islands First, http://www.islandsfirst.org/mission/. 
409 African Group, Arab Group, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), Independent Association 
of Latin America and the Caribbean, Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS), Central Asia Caucasus and Moldova (CACAM), Coalition for Rainforest Nations 
(CfRN), Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs), Like-Minded 
Developing Countries (LMDCs), Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)  
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procedures of AOSIS were similar to those of G-77, in fact it could be argued that 
AOSIS utilised the best practices of G-77. The procedural structures such as heads of 
delegations group, the chair and its secretariat, thematic coordination groups and lead 
coordinators and a coalition plenary were part and parcel of the political grouping.  
 
The opening G-77 coalition plenary began with official remarks from the various 
coalitions affirming key positions and concerns they may see in the cohesiveness 
amongst the coalitions. These statements set the tone for the next task of the chair in 
which to confirm the lead coordinators for twelve thematic groups.  However, before 
the G-77 coordinating groups would disperse for coordination of strategies, the coalition 
heard concerns from notable countries such as Saudi Arabia, China, Bolivia, India and 
Singapore. While reiterating the need for all coalitions to ‘keep within the family’ by 
not creating blocs outside of G-77, the statements pointed towards an underlying 
conflict within the great coalition. The issue of vulnerability had shaken the coalition, 
especially amongst the African Group, GRULLAC and ALBA countries all calling for 
African and South American countries to be listed as vulnerable countries. This was a 
contentious issue as Annex I countries had stressed over the years that they would not 
support any discussions to give special consideration for countries other than SIDS and 
LDC. In light of the Convention’s special consideration for small islands and least 
developing states as vulnerable states, these states would have direct access to claim for 
climate finance. The South African chair of G-77 reminded member coalition heads and 
delegates during the plenary, that the issue of vulnerability divided the coalition, and 
requested members not to use term vulnerability in the negotiation rooms410. This would 
lead to a second issue, when these countries reminded both coalitions and delegates of 
the ‘do no harm policy’ which is a general understanding amongst states ensuring that 
outcomes under the climate change regime did not affect their ‘right’ to development411. 
It was stressed over and over again and negotiators were reminded that the principles 
                                                     
410 The chair of the G-77 coalition was South Africa in 2015; throughout the ADP process the coalition 
was steered by Ambassador Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko. South Africa had a special interest in leading the 
climate change negotiations for the global south in order to complete the process for an agreement that 
started in Durban three years earlier.  
411 Fry,  106. 
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and objectives of sustainable development agreed in other conventions should not be 
watered down or hindered by climate change policies412.  
 
The work of the coordination thematic groups were in line with the sections of the 
current draft of the Geneva text413. Although there would be no delegate from the 
Pacific in a lead coordinator role, according to one Pacific negotiator, it was imperative 
for negotiators to maintain a presence in the groups and follow attentively the actions of 
the G-77 leads414. In the two days of preparatory, the coalition would be divided into the 
work of coordination groups to find a common ground amongst the delegate and 
coalitions positions. Like AOSIS, any issues of disagreement were brought to the 
plenary, or were to be raised in a special heads of delegations meeting. However, unlike 
AOSIS where a pathway was sought, in almost all instances of divergence with G-77, 
there would be no resolution.   
 
This belied the challenge for the grand coalition of the south, for if there were one 
statement of opposition, whether it be from one of its coalition or from a member state, 
the proposal or position would not be taken up by the group. A state may wish to take 
this issue up separately in the ADP process. The coalition’s position would only focus 
on the watered down and limited position. However, herein lies the greatest asset of the 
group. Once the 134 member countries had found agreement on a position, the coalition 
had a louder voice to situate it on the agenda for bargaining with coalitions from Annex 
I countries. In other words, a consensus amongst G-77 member was a formidable 
bargaining chip for any state. The Chair would coalesce the common positions from the 
coordination leads to draft the G-77 statement for main ADP plenaries.  
 
                                                     
412 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa), in discussion-talanoa with the author, November 5, 2017. 
413 general/objective; adaptation and loss and damage; mitigation; finance; technology development and 
transfer; capacity building; transparency; preamble; definitions; time frames; implementation and 
compliance; and procedural and institutional provisions. 
414 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 17), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. The negotiator 
mentioned in past negotiations,  the AOSIS coalition members would follow with interest a lead 
coordinator for Brazil suspicious in case they made national deals with the Umbrella group over the 
consensus of the G-77 membership.  
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Inside: Coalition of Rainforests Nations and maintaining REDD Plus  
The Coalition of Rainforest Nations are part and parcel of G-77 and attend its coalition 
plenary sessions. During the coordination breakout sessions for G-77 on May 30, the 
CfRN convened in a separate location. Its membership comprised of over 42 tropical 
countries with vast rainforest reserves, however with only a handful of countries active 
in the negotiations.  Born out the of pre-Bali COP conferences, Papua New Guinea led 
the diplomatic fight with support from the New York based non-profit organisation 
Rainforest Coalition415. By 2015, Panama had assumed leadership of the coalition with 
secretariat support provided by the Rainforest Coalition.  
 
The coalition’s preparatory meetings were held outside of the chambers of UNFCCC, 
with twenty negotiators from Papua New Guinea joining fellow comrades from South 
America, South East Asia and Africa. The group’s work centred on one issue, the 
carbon credit mechanism of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD Plus), and with one goal, that of ensuring it was cemented in the 
new agreement416. The group did not have any coordinating groups, the strategy of the 
group was to inform and to carry the positions of state and relative coalitions they were 
associated with. The CfRN divided its work around priority clauses and paragraphs of 
the Geneva drafting text through which it could strengthen ambitions for protecting 
rainforests and REDD plus mechanism. The group were successful in incorporating the 
issue in the text, the strategy therefore was to keep it from being removed. For Papua 
New Guinea, apart from finance and adaptation, market mechanisms utilising 
rainforests were a main priority. As one of its negotiators said, Papua New Guinea 
shared the same positions and was satisfied with the work of AOSIS and G-77 China in 
other areas. However, as a matter of delegation strategy it focussed the bulk of its work 
on the CfRN to represent the interest of the Pacific in conserving rainforests417.  
 
                                                     
415 Coalition for Rainforest Nations, "Coalition for Rainforest Nations - About," Coalition for Rainforest 
Nations, https://www.rainforestcoalition.org/about/  
416 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 7), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 28, 2015. 
417 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 1), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 5, 2015. 
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Inside: Cartagena Dialogue bridging a divide  
The Cartagena Dialogue Group was created in 2010 to bridge the divide between the 
north and south coalitions. The 40 plus group of countries would meet to “discuss 
openly and constructively the reasoning behind each other’s' positions, exploring areas 
of convergence and potential areas of joint action.”418 By sharing state positions and 
progress amongst the various coalitions, the group hoped to find middle ground on areas 
of impasse on climate change negotiations. The non-political group would meet at the 
fringes of the UNFCCC negotiation sessions and was not open to observers. Prior to the 
Bonn sessions the 14th and 15th Cartagena Dialogue regional meetings were hosted by 
then Chair, Mexico, in Mexico City and Paris respectively419. In the evening of the final 
day of the preparatory week thirty plus negotiators convened in a hotel conference room 
just outside of the UNFCCC Bonn headquarters.  
 
Having led the coalition and hosted one of its regional meetings in Majuro in 2013, 
Marshall Islands was a key player in the group. During the ADP2-9 Marshall Islands 
alongside Switzerland were key coordinators for the group420. With representation from 
almost every regional, economic and issue-specific coalition, members would express 
concerns on the process and modality of how negotiations would take place over the 
next two weeks, especially the flexibility of the chairs. Instrumental in the group’s 
discussions were possible areas countries could agree on common language or landing 
zones of the negotiations text. There was no bargaining, but simply an appraisal of 
various parties’ points of views. The group reiterated that it would not create a political 
bloc in the process and agreed to meet two more times over the negotiation session. 
Needless to say, it would be a group where countries from both divides would come to 
share constructive ideas, not to blame each other or the negotiating text—but to find a 
way forward.  
                                                     
418 http://sdg.iisd.org/events/13th-meeting-of-the-cartagena-dialogue-for-progressive-action/  
419 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 28), in discussion-talanoa with the author, Nov 20, 2015. 
420 The group would meet in the conference room of the famous Derag Livinghotel Kanzler at 7.30pm, 
attended by Antigua & Barbuda, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Chile Colombia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, 
France, Germany, Guatemala Ghana, Indonesia, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Peru, Samoa, Spain, Swaziland Tanzania, Thailand, 
Timor-Leste, Uruguay, UK and the European Commission, United Arab Emirates, Honduras, 
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Coalition Consensus 
These insights on the preparatory week on the work of coalitions reflect the significance 
of political groupings in garnering support from fellow states. Coalition blocs provided 
a platform for states to not only work with likeminded states that shared the similar 
positions, but more importantly compromises in the text of the agreement through each 
day of negotiations. These compromises reflected the ‘daily consensus outcomes’ 
coalitions created. These internal coalition bargaining events are vital in receiving the 
numbers to support and carry a position, before negotiations happen in the following 
two weeks. In using the framework of reaching consensus and consensus building, how 
was consensus built and reached within coalitions? 
 
Building coalition consensus was determined by the structure of a coalition and the 
willingness of member state actors. As highlighted in all coalitions, especially the 
reflections on AOSIS, these groupings had a well-established machinery and structure 
that allowed internal bargaining to take place from coalition plenaries, heads of 
delegations, and coordination groups. These internal structures harnessed the 
cohesiveness of the groups through its activities by coordinating and monitoring key 
positions. For G-77 the focus was on all 12 key issues of the agreement; AOSIS 
prioritised their efforts on four issues (legal, mitigation, finance, and adaptation and loss 
and damage); for CfRN the focus was on maintaining REDD Plus; while for Cartagena 
it was more a case of coordinating information sharing. The respective coalition 
structures and their respective priorities also determined key actors in the process - that 
of the Chair and the lead coordinators as the mouthpieces of the groups.  
 
Reaching coalition consensus was a daily task; and it was observed that a notable group 
of individuals were influential in the process. This core group comprised certain states 
with key interests in particular issues and were the most vocal. In the example of 
AOSIS, Singapore, Marshall Islands, Cook Islands, Grenada, Jamaica, St Lucia and 
Belize were the most vocal in the meetings, and unsurprisingly these states had 
technical negotiators as lead coordinators supporting the Chair of Maldives421. The lead 
                                                     
421 It is important to note here, that two other Pacific countries, Tuvalu and Solomon Islands were lead 
coordinators but in the LDC. Tuvalu was the lead coordinator for Mitigation and Loss and Damage, while 
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coordinators were instrumental in the detailed negotiation of texts, as the voice of 
member states in the negotiating chambers of the informal facilitated groups (to be 
detailed below). The chairs of coalitions have a representational and influential role in 
the overall politics. By this, in any impasse on key issues the chairs facilitate and voice 
the concerns of the group. This did not mean the other states did not have an active role, 
as all parties would continue to follow and support the role of lead negotiators 
throughout the process. However, the most influential individual was the lead negotiator 
or chair speaking on behalf of AOSIS. This small group would not only have 
coordinated the group’s position by way of persuasive debates (speeches, press 
statements and during negotiations with other coalitions); their work very much 
depended on bargaining in informal settings and networking (using media, or bilateral 
meetings).  
 
The preparatory week was only the beginning. The next section will look at what 
happened during the negotiation allocated to ADP2-9 during June 1-11. This section 
will then look at two insider accounts: first, on the day in the life of a negotiator in the 
negotiation chambers, and second, the work or attempts of Pacific state delegations to 
work in a regional group.   
 
ADP2-9 Negotiation Phase 
Timeline of ADP2-9 Process 
On the first day of negotiations, the ADP Co-Chairs Daniel Reifsnyder of U.S. and 
Ahmed Djoghlaf of Algeria422 convened the opening plenary where they explained how 
the negotiations would take place: there would be a main Contact Group that would act 
as the ‘formal chamber’, to be supported through the work of twelve informal 
negotiating groups. The Co-Chairs would divide their workload with Co-Chair 
Reifsnyder looking after six issues: general/objective; adaptation and loss and damage; 
technology development and transfer; transparency of action and support; 
implementation and compliance; and preamble. Djoghlaf chaired the negotiating group 
                                                     
Solomon Islands, coordinated Capacity and Technology Transfer. An account for LDC is not listed here 
as the researcher, representing Samoa did not have access into this coalition and in its meetings.  
422 U.S. represented Annex I and Algeria representing non-Annex countries. 
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that addressed: mitigation; finance; capacity building; time frames; procedural and 
institutional provisions; and definitions. For most delegations, the heads or lead 
negotiators participated in the contact groups, which were deliberately scheduled not to 
coincide with any informal negotiating group. 
 
Over the two-week negotiation period of ADP2-9, the main Contact group met four 
times: Monday June 1, Thursday June 4, Monday June 8 and Thursday June 11. The 
actual work of negotiations or ‘touching the text’ took place in separate informal 
facilitated discussion groups. The groups or negotiating chambers, undertook the first 
reading of these sections of the Geneva negotiating text identifying paragraphs that 
could be streamlined and consolidated. To guide the work in these informal sessions, 
the groups worked on the basis of the Co-Facilitators’ inputs and the Co-Facilitators 
issued an output following each session. Working documents that captured the 
outcomes of discussions on specific paragraphs within the text were then issued on a 
regular basis423. There was no objection from member states to this proposal, and 
therefore from this consent of silence a mandate was given to establish the 12 informal 
negotiation groups. 
 
The ADP Co-Chairs identified 24 facilitators, two per negotiation groups (one Annex I 
and one non-Annex I state) to lead the negotiations and tasked to report back to the 
main contact group.424 There was no facilitator from the Pacific. However, according to 
one negotiator that was asked by the Co-Chairs to join the facilitator taskforce, “it was a 
strategy by UNFCCC to take us out of the process, so that our attention will be chairing 
and not pushing our state and coalition positions”425. 
                                                     
423 ENB, "Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Conference 1-11 June 2015." 
424 There was no representative from the Pacific present in the list of the 24 Facilitators at this session. 
According to two Pacific delegates the ADP Co-Chairs had approached them to be facilitators, but they 
declined. One stated that they could not be present, and another said it would limit their delegation 
capacity as they would then concentrate on facilitating and not pursuing they country’s positions. This 
was one way of the Co-Chairs taking out key negotiators and be present. A list of the 24 facilitators could 
be found on 
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/updated_information_on_facilitators_and_co-
facilitators.pdf  
425 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 5), in discussion-talanoa with the author, July 26, 2015. 
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Upon establishment of the 12 negotiating chambers, the facilitated groups then 
undertook an exercise to cluster, unpack and consider the placement of text, with the 
help of tables. Some facilitated groups continued consideration of how to further 
streamline and consolidate the text, while others progressed to conceptual 
discussions.426 As indicated earlier, in the preparatory phase states and coalitions had 
already identified key leads that follow these 12 issues. Within these meetings, the 
‘unwritten rule’ and practice for these negotiations, was for member state negotiators to 
sit behind or nearby their lead coordinators who made positions on behalf of the group. 
This however did not limit the opportunity for states to make separate interventions 
outside of the position of the coalition during the negotiations. However, as indicated by 
numerous negotiators this approach of speaking outside party lines was not only 
frowned upon, but also a tactic seldom used in the final moments of the negotiations.   
 
In the occasions during the week where there was an impasse in facilitated groups, one 
of the co-facilitators would convene a spin-off group. These spin-off groups allowed 
opportunities for parties with divergent issues on a position to focus on finding a 
compromise where it be on a particular clause or sentence from the text, before re-
joining the facilitated negotiating groups. These spin-off groups were usually closed 
from observers, while the negotiating groups were open to all, but only state delegates 
could intervene. 
 
The second Contact Group meeting on June 4 assessed the progress of discussions from 
the first three days. Delegates raised serious concerns “over the slow pace of the 
deliberations, lack of clarity on the method of work of the facilitated groups and limited 
coordination time for party groups”.427 Nevertheless, the Co-Chairs received the 
mandate from the parties to continue the modality of the 12 informal negotiating groups 
into the second week.  On June 8, the third Contact Group assessed the outcomes of the 
first week of the facilitated groups where heads of delegations called for more 
consistency in the work across the 12 negotiating groups to capture the parties’ inputs. 
During this meeting, the Co-Chairs introduced a revised text based on the work from the 
                                                     
426 ENB, "Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Conference 1-11 June 2015." 
427Ibid. 
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first week. It employed the language of compromise, while still highlighting text with 
‘options’ where there was disagreement. The revised text on June 8 had been reduced 
from 90 pages to only 86 pages.  
 
The last contact group occurred, as per schedule on June 11. This would be the 
agreement phase or the final moment of negotiations for ADP2-9, which will be 
covered in the concluding section of this chapter. The following two accounts reflect the 
work undertaken by Pacific states at the negotiations. The first account follows a day in 
the life of Pacific negotiators, who on June 3 were following the issue of Adaptation 
and Loss and Damage. It follows how negotiators traversed the terrain of coalition 
politics and its structures, and how they engaged in the ADP process modality of 
‘informal negotiating group’. Closely associated with the events of this day was a 
meeting by the heads of delegations from the Pacific on the previous day to see whether 
it was feasible for the Pacific to make interventions in the negotiating chambers. This 
will be the focus of the second account. It highlights the attempts of the fourteen Pacific 
states to mobilise in Bonn, and to effectively voice their concerns inside the 
negotiations.  
 
Inside: Informal Facilitated Negotiation Groups ‘a day in the life of Pacific 
negotiators’ 
Coordination within AOSIS 
At 8:00am on June 3, negotiators with membership to AOSIS would convene for the 
daily routine morning coordination meetings, just like the preparatory coalition 
meetings.  It was the third day of ADP2-9 negotiations, and already there were signs of 
frustration from the slow process of the first two days in the informal negotiation 
groups. While members of AOSIS continued to press and make statements in the four 
groups they had identified to focus upon - Legal, Mitigation, Loss and Damage and 
Adaptation, and Finance – the membership had to divide to follow other facilitated 
groups. There was language in the negotiating text in other groups that had direct links 
to AOSIS priority issues. For example, matters of finance were negotiated in technology 
development and transfer; implementation and compliance; capacity building; and 
procedural and institutional provisions facilitated groups. The lead coordinators were 
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given the opportunity to report back on the progress of negotiations and state of play or 
politics from other groups, especially the Umbrella Group and European Union.  
 
Pre-empting strategies on loss and damage 
During the AOSIS coalition plenary, the lead coordinator for AOSIS Adaptation and 
Loss and Damage, Jamaica, informed that the G-77 Adaptation and Loss Damage 
cluster would meet 10.00am, before an ADP facilitated spin-off workshop at 12.00pm. 
An impasse to negotiations from the first two days had led to the creation of a spin-off 
group while focussing on adaptation clauses looked into loss and damage428. This early 
in negotiations, loss and damage were seen as a no-go zone; there were multiple options 
on the table signalling diverging views of parties. These ranged from options of deleting 
the clause to have no mention in the text, to the extremes of loss and damage with 
reference to compensation. In pre-empting this, the AOSIS adaptation coordination 
group met separately to swiftly identify a lead coordinator to speak on loss and damage. 
There was strong conviction amongst members that it should be a delegate from the 
Pacific nations. These sentiments flowed from a meeting called by heads of delegations 
a day earlier, from its negotiators to recalibrate and refocus on the issue of loss and 
damage. Unfortunately, due to national mandate constraints by Cook Islands and Tonga, 
who were originally requested to coordinate on the issue, these two countries were 
restricted in taking on the task.  For Cook Islands their main experts in the area were 
consultants, and as per understanding in their delegations they could not make public 
interventions. This was further compounded by the fact that Cook Islands was only an 
observing member of G-77 and could not carry out this role effectively when AOSIS 
met within G-77429. For the Tongan delegate, instructions from its Nukualofa capital 
instructed its members to only follow the finance coordination group. Thus, the head 
delegate from Marshall Islands agreed to temporarily follow the issue of Loss and 
Damage for both the Pacific grouping and AOSIS, until another representative could be 
identified at a later date. Before meeting with G-77, the group mandated the lead 
                                                     
428 During ADP 2-9, the issue of loss and damage was attached under one clause of ‘Adaptation and Loss 
and Damage’. Many Pacific states like Tuvalu, Marshall Islands and Caribbean states like St Lucia 
publicly made aware their position had remained firm that Loss and Damage should be a separate clause. 
The joint clause was a compromise to positions held by US and the Umbrella group at the time, for the 
issue to not be listed in the negotiations.  
429 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 17), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. 
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coordinators to work with G-77 to streamline the text on common language - but to hold 
off on any deletion of text until the group was consulted.  
 
Seeking support amidst G-77 politics 
During the G-77 coordination group on adaptation and loss and damage, around 50 
representatives would situate themselves around their coalition lead coordinators. 
Pacific representatives present (Cook Islands, FSM, Kiribati, Palau, Samoa and 
Vanuatu) with other AOSIS members would sit around those from Marshall Islands and 
Jamaica. Tuvalu and Solomon Islands would also situate themselves nearby, but their 
work was focussed on coordinating the positions for the LDC group, as Tuvalu was a 
lead coordinator on the issue of Loss and Damage. Not all representations from the 
various coalitions under G-77 were present, there was only AILAC, Likeminded, 
ALBA, African Group, Landlocked and BASIC. In the preparatory week, the work of 
the southern coalition would see members sign up to Gmail and google drive where 
documents of the group would be shared. At the same time some members of the group 
would have skype chat rooms and WhatsApp accounts in order for members to share 
information in real time while attending parallel informal facilitated and spin-off 
groups. 
 
Under the G-77 lead coordinator from Bolivia, the group attempted to streamline 
language by identifying texts under the loss and damage text acceptable to all. If there 
was a wording where there was no agreement, the coordinating group would seek to 
find a compromise. This would then become the ‘text for G-77’ to be presented at the 
upcoming facilitated group. Any clauses or wording with no agreement were deferred. 
Only the coordinators of the individual coalitions would make interventions. However, 
the work of the group could not be completed in time before the spin-off facilitated 
group. 
 
Negotiating in coalitions and amongst the parties 
From a small meeting, the group including the Marshall Islands coordinator would 
convene with more than 120 negotiators from all parties for the ADP Adaptation Spin-
Off. The chair facilitator introduced a work agenda that allowed members to explore all 
the clauses from 50 to 78 (that included loss and damage) which amounted to 13 pages 
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of text. At the pace negotiations were going in the first three days, it was doubtful that 
parties would even agree to one line. However, on good faith members quickly 
approved without objections to clause 51 (commitments under the Convention) and 65 
(institutional arrangements); this would amount to around two pages completed. This 
nonetheless, would be the last compromise as the next two hours were spent in vain 
trying to find a compromise in other clauses. There would be a five-minute pause after 
every objection, where members of each coalitions moved into human ‘huddles’ to re-
group and seek state delegates for instructions. Lead coordinators from the Arab Group, 
African Group and Likeminded Group would pace up and down the hall and act as 
‘runners’ to privately speak with other southern coalitions including Marshall Islands 
for support or to object proposals made by the Annex I groups. From the Umbrella 
Group, it seemed like their lead coordinator, Canada, would make objections on their 
behalf to any proposals that may be rendered by any of the G-77 members. Although 
state delegates who were not lead negotiators would not make formal interventions in 
this meeting - it was in their best interest to make sure their objections were 
communicated to the AOSIS or G-77 coordinators via WhatsApp, text, email, hand 
written paper messages or face to face contact. Cohesiveness and trust between the lead 
coordinators and members of their group were vital. This alleviated any suspicions that 
the lead negotiator would be involved in making a special deal based on their national 
interests rather than the interest of the members of the coalition. This act would be seen 
as both relationship and career suicide and although it happened rarely, this has 
happened in the past, according to one Pacific negotiator430. The ADP chair facilitators 
would take the progress made in the group, and report back to the Contact Group, in this 
case the next day.  
 
Inter-coalition consensus 
These scenes illustrated above, although based on one particular spin-off group and 
internal coalition bargaining, were played out across more than a dozen informal 
negotiation groups and spin-offs, all operating in parallel to each other at the same time. 
This was the norm for the 10 days of negotiations during ADP2-9. It consisted of a 
daily program of coalition monitoring, coordination and bargaining of positions from 
the morning, and sometimes until the early hours of the following morning.  The work 
                                                     
430 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 14), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. 
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of AOSIS’ coordination groups were infused into the coordination groups of the G77. 
This inter-coalition relationship was based on trust and professionalism, amidst a 
complex web of national politics and individual egos. Despite the literature depicting 
AOSIS as moral leaders of the convention calling on their frontline states, according to 
negotiators they had to go beyond the normative narrative. “You cannot survive in the 
negotiations with emotions … you have to be professional and nothing is ever personal” 
said one seasoned negotiator431. Two other negotiators mentioned that people in the 
negotiations can also have big egos, which may lead them to stray from their national 
mandates432. To build and harness this working relationship amongst negotiators 
irrespective of coalitions required face to face meetings, as well constant real time 
communication during negotiations using social media platforms. The more official 
communications across the groups would be reserved for emails.   
 
The attempts by AOSIS membership to mobilise and secure a lead coordinator to 
respond to a possible negotiation on the text of loss and damage clauses, were futile. 
However, this cautious strategy highlighted the ability of Pacific negotiators through the 
ad hoc role of Marshall Islands, to participate effectively in the ADP negotiations. The 
support of fellow Pacific state negotiators by situating themselves around the loss and 
damage ad hoc lead negotiator reflected their consent and legitimised a fellow islander 
to be their voice in the negotiations. Nevertheless, a more striking example of Pacific 
solidarity during the negotiation phase, was evident in the attempts by Pacific states to 
work collaboratively in a regional collective. The group would work under the guidance 
of their respective heads of delegations (who were usually Pacific ambassadors in New 
York accustomed to the PSIDS433 negotiations bloc) and the technical support of 
regional officials from SPREP. Although the group did not have an official name, this 
research calls this working collective during ADP2-9 as Pacific SPREP-SIDS. This 
collective would later transform into the Pacific SIDS coalition at the global COP21 
negotiations, and will be explored in detail in Chapter Six. However, the emphasis on 
                                                     
431 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 34), in discussion-talanoa with the author, December 4, 2015. 
432 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 7), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015, and, Pacific 
negotiator (Talanoa 9), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 30, 2015. 
 
433 This thesis distinguishes three Pacific collectives described in this research. PSIDS New York refers to 
the collective based in New York, the Pacific SPREP-SIDS is the group at in Bonn at ADP2-10 and 
Pacific SIDS coalition is the group that was active in the COP21 negotiations.  
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SPREP was in light of the facilitative role of the regional organisation before and during 
the negotiations, and the historical role in providing technical and diplomatic support 
for Pacific island delegations.  
 
Inside: Pacific SPREP-SIDS Collective 
SPREP’s technical mandate: mobilising a Pacific collective 
Pacific island delegates had travelled to Bonn the after first SPREP HLSM of one-day 
meeting and training in Apia. The meeting was in part SPREP’s mandate to support 
Pacific negotiators from the early days of UNFCCC negotiations and cemented in the 
Pacific Leaders’ Action on Climate Change declaration in 2005. Amidst the final days 
of the preparatory week, the mechanics of a Pacific island states negotiators’ collective 
started to emerge. On the last day of G-77 coordination an email was circulated from 
SPREP’s officials434 at the session for a special informal gathering of Pacific island 
countries at a café with “no agenda, but open to participants to bring concerns”435. This 
informal meet and greet session, which was seen by Pacific delegates as a ritual, was a 
means to seek consent from members whether or not to establish a working group for 
ADP2-9. In addition, the informal gathering was used to gauge if there was a need for 
technical support for the individual countries, and if there was a need to have an 
informal information sharing group amongst Pacific negotiators436. There was a 
resounding acclamation for consent for a collective to share information and coordinate 
positions, though SPREP officials reiterated it could only coordinate based on technical 
support. Any political support would need to come from their capitals, or amongst the 
political focal points, their heads of each delegations. This second level of responsibility 
was agreed to by heads of delegations present at the gathering, Kiribati, Marshall 
Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Federated States of Micronesia, Cook 
Islands and Vanuatu.  The informal gathering had become a collective; although the 
group consented to SPREP officials providing technical support, the question of 
political leadership for the group was still up in the air.  
                                                     
434 SPREP sent three officials to follow the following issues in the negotiations: one officer on adaptation 
and loss and damage; one officer on technology transfer; one officer on mitigation and finance. 
435 Espen Ronneberg, ‘Meeting Sunday’, email, 2015. 
436 Pacific regional organisation negotiator (Talanoa 17), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 
2015. 
  
 
152  
Mobilising through pessimism and frustration 
In a matter of hours, the Pacific collective reconvened for its first formal meeting. In 
one of the small negotiating chambers, SPREP officials opened the meeting informally 
by giving a presentation on the status on the negotiations and contextual information on 
the key issues.  Although SPREP facilitated the meeting by prompting an agenda, it did 
not lead to any discussion. Rather, when the floor opened for general remarks, delegates 
did not hold back on their reservations, faults and challenges for the collective. The 
location and style of the previous informal meeting at the café was questioned. Some 
noted the lack of coordination at the Apia HLSM and lack of positions amongst 
members before coming to Bonn437.  Some delegates remarked on the frustrations of the 
work with AOSIS and G-77 and China and the increasing political tension form the 
multiple coalitions in the negotiations. In the same breath, notable delegates compared 
the lack of Pacific coordination, with fellow Caribbean negotiators who since January 
were already participating as a formal group in the negotiations438. One delegate noted 
that the Pacific was running out of time, and still there was no discussion on the key 
positions for the Pacific439. The Caribbean were five steps ahead of the Pacific in the 
negotiations, and some questioned whether the Pacific should submit a position 
paper440. These pessimistic remarks highlighted the elephant in the room, the question 
of a political mandate and leadership for the group.  
 
The problem of political leadership with no mandate 
The highest form of instructions that guide negotiators actions and positions are national 
mandates. These political and technical instructions not only enable negotiators to 
bargain effectively, mandates are also the instructions which states or coalitions work. 
By Bonn, there was no regional political mandate to work as a group, and it was only 
natural that the collective sought guidance from established diplomatic systems. Palau 
which was also the chair of the Pacific Islands Forum was seemingly the natural choice. 
However, its Ambassador was careful not to take up responsibility as she had not 
                                                     
437 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 9), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 30, 2015. 
438 The Caribbean Group under Barbados as Chair of CARICOM made formal statements at the plenary 
and in breakout sessions of the Geneva negotiations.  
439 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 6), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 27, 2015. 
440 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 25), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 8, 2015. 
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received a mandate from the capital nor the regional organisation to convene such a 
group. Tonga had assumed the chair of the Pacific SIDS (PSDIS) New York collective 
of ambassadors. Nevertheless, the Ambassador was reluctant at the time to convene the 
meeting until he had sought an affirmation from fellow Pacific ambassadors in New 
York. One experienced delegate suggested one way around could be instead of making 
interventions acting on behalf of a Pacific collective, delegates may use the phrase ‘I 
speak on behalf of the following countries…’. What was clear despite the need for 
political leadership, the heads of delegations who were representatives of 
institutionalised sources of regional leadership (Tonga and Palau) were careful not to 
misinterpret or assume mandates that may lead to a diplomatic fall-out. Despite the 
impasse, Tonga agreed to lead the group temporarily and to consult with the heads of 
delegations in a separate meeting. With this issue at bay, the group would then focus 
attention on its purpose and possible strategies.  
 
The Pacific collective were present in at least five coalitions, and negotiators took the 
opportunity to share intelligence and updates on the progress of the various coalition 
coordination groups. Apart from Coalition of Rainforests (as Papua New Guinea 
representatives were not present) and the Coalition of Vulnerable Nations (who had not 
officially met), presentations on the work of the AOSIS, G-77 and the Least Developed 
Nations were made. There were increasing frustrations on the strategies of particular 
countries in AOSIS holding back positions in AOSIS and also in G-77. Tuvalu and 
Solomon Islands informed the collective of their work in LDC coordination groups, and 
lobbied for Pacific to maintain their stance on the 1.5 degrees long-term temperature 
goal. Others shared information on the U.S. lack of support on the loss and damage 
issues, and another informed of rumours in the corridors of the UN Secretary General’s 
team of climate experts possibly preparing a special SIDS finance package. There were 
brick walls or states with the AOSIS and G-77 alliances that were stalling negotiations, 
and there was a need for Pacific states to have a voice.  
 
Other than Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Solomon Islands who had delegates that were 
lead negotiators in other coalitions, there would be a notable absence of other Pacific 
states in the actual negotiating chambers. As members shared information, the group 
quickly identified loss and damage and adaptation, finance, the 1.5 long-term 
temperature goal, and mitigation as key issues among the membership. Utilising the 
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same structural strategies of AOSIS and G-77, Pacific coordination leads were 
identified to follow the discussions and report back to the group.  
 
The members of the Pacific collective gave the consent for the group to continue to 
meet throughout the ADP2-9 session. The Pacific collective met on five other occasions 
throughout the negotiations as a group, not including the meetings amongst the heads of 
Pacific delegations or in coordination groups. The delegates agreed that it would operate 
without an official name or referring to regional entities, in other words, the collective 
would be recorded in the negotiations as a Pacific Group. There would be no formal 
statements as a group during the formal ADP plenaries, but it encouraged members to 
speak out during the various facilitated groups and any necessary spin-off sessions in 
their national capacities. The collective established a skype and google gmail group that 
would be administered by SPREP officials. The group was to meet online and face to 
face periodically during the negotiations to share information and possible talking 
points. To go around the political abyss of speaking on behalf of a coalition negotiators 
would use their national capacity to speak on positions during the negotiations that were 
dear to the Pacific islands.  
 
After the first formal meeting, the heads of delegations met separately, and 
overwhelmingly gave consent to Tonga as head of PSIDS to lead the political 
coordination of the group. This consent amongst heads of delegations provided the 
mandate the collective needed to coordinate, strategise and bargain in the negotiations. 
Although at this early phase the coming together of Pacific negotiators seemed trivial 
and for some late in the game, it would prove essential in events leading up to the final 
days of the Paris negotiations, to be discussed in Chapter Six. It became apparent from 
these initial meetings that there were many factors holding back Pacific delegates from 
working in a formal coalition. There was an air of pessimism amongst delegates from 
the Pacific as to whether such a collective and its enthusiasm would carry the voices of 
Pacific states and if it was better to focus on the traditional coalitions, or the work of 
individual delegations.  
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Inside: Aspirations of the Collective and Challenges of Delegates from the Pacific 
Expectations for SPREP to provide technical and political support 
SPREP had a significant role in the climate negotiations supporting Pacific island states. 
“Like all other regional organisations, SPREP officials [were] an extension of our 
public service”441. The Climate Change Division’s officials within SPREP were present 
in the negotiations since 1991. The organisation “convened a series of training 
workshops that addressed the details of the FCCC process, provide[d] insights into the 
workings of the COP, simulated negotiation proceedings using recent instances as 
examples, and also provides for opportunities to caucus on the issues pending in the 
negotiations”442. The organisation provided technical briefing packages for all its 
members, including the lead up to Bonn. One negotiator recalls SPREP had a strong 
presence in the lead up to the Bali COP and Copenhagen COP, where SPREP officials 
worked tirelessly in providing briefings in between the UNFCCC sessions and actual 
negotiations443. 
 
SPREP was mandated to provide technical support, although this was confused by some 
negotiators as including political coordination. Some held the sentiment that post-
Copenhagen, it seemed SPREP started to hold off on providing any political advice444. 
Much of this was assumed to be the role of Australia and New Zealand as financial 
members of SPREP, in that it bequeathed advice to information sharing and technical 
and not political coordination445. The last time there was meaningful coordination under 
SPREP was at Doha 2012; and since then Pacific negotiators only communicated 
informally during the sessions, and worked collaboratively under AOSIS, LDC and 
G77446. Another negotiator pointed out that the Pacific states were united under 
SPREP’s guidance in the Biodiversity Convention negotiations, however their 
                                                     
441 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 20), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 8, 2015. 
442 SPREP, "Conference of the Parties Support," Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Program, http://www.sprep.org/Policy-and-Science/conference-of-the-parties-cop-support   
443 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 11), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. 
444 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 10), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. 
445 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 11), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. 
446 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 11), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. 
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delegation were frustrated with the lack of coordination under the climate change 
regime447.  
 
Lack of political mandate reflective of regional architecture 
The instructions from respective capitals was political unity under AOSIS. Without a 
political mandate the regional collective was restricted to speaking on behalf of a group 
of countries at the frontline of climate change. This absence according to a veteran 
negotiator, “[t]he current regional architecture [was] not supporting [the work of 
negotiators] … member countries were denied to put [climate change as a] priority at all 
levels”448.  The participation of Australia and New Zealand in the main regional 
organisations, PIF, SPC and SPREP restricted a tougher collective response from 
Pacific island countries in the negotiations. “Because the architecture [did] not allow 
them to talk freely- [a] space for leaders to deliberate in a sense of urgency… the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum was created to act a platform to address climate 
change in a manner that demands and commands consensus”449. There were promises 
that the PIDF meeting in Suva later in September would formalise Pacific positions in a 
way that was reflective and inclusive of governments, private sector, and civil society. 
The aspirations of PIDF devotees, would see the organisation garner regional support 
and that the PSIDS in New York would be the mouthpiece in the negotiations450. 
 
Capital/Regional expertise vs. Diplomatic UN expertise 
The delegations from the Pacific at the ADP2-9 Bonn session were generally the same 
as other UNFCCC mandated meetings. These delegations were multi-actor; they 
comprised of government officials from capitals (usually from the foreign affairs, 
environment/climate change or finance ministries), diplomats from UN missions, and 
NGO expert consultants. While not all state delegations shared this problem, certain 
Pacific delegations identified an internal-delegation struggle between the diplomats in 
New York and officials from capital. One delegate attributed this difference to the 
                                                     
447 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 23), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 8, 2015. 
448 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 26), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 7, 2015. 
449 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 26), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 7, 2015. 
450 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 26), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 7, 2015. 
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bigger tension that climate change negotiations took place in Bonn, whereas negotiators 
felt it should be far away from political intervention and diplomatic bargaining in New 
York. The New York based delegate argued that capital technical negotiators do not 
fully understand the political ramifications of climate change negotiations and their 
political linkages to diplomatic work in other treaties and conventions negotiated in 
New York451. From a capital-based negotiator’s perspective, sometimes UN based 
diplomats do not realise the hard work officials do on the ground, and the trickle-down 
effect of policy whether it be finance or adaptation agreed at the international level452. 
Climate change negotiations are political, but so too were its impacts on people’s 
livelihoods. Furthermore, the indifference between capital officials and diplomats was 
linked to a lack of communication amongst individual delegates before and during the 
negotiations. Some delegations would come to meetings without any preparations or 
political instructions or mandate for the negotiations from their own capitals453. For 
some delegations, they would only meet or communicate for the first time upon arrival 
at the negotiations. In one of the Pacific collective meetings, a delegate from capital 
openly remarked in front of their own head of delegation (who was based in New York) 
that there was little communication and any form of information sharing before coming 
to Bonn.  
 
Negotiator Capacity and Inconsistency 
Another challenge that became apparent and voiced by many negotiators was the lack of 
capacity and the consistency of participation by negotiators themselves. Except for a 
handful of key negotiators who had been a part of the negotiations for years (some from 
the very beginning of the regime) there was a high turnover from year to year. “You 
would work with one person in one year, and not see them next year… there are not 
enough people from the Pacific following the negotiations from year to year”454. With 
only two UNFCCC funded officials, it was difficult to ensure that the same two people 
would attend from year to year. The representation at these meetings were the 
prerogative of states, and negotiators would rotate for many reasons. Some had passed 
                                                     
451 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 9), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 30 2015. 
452 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 34), in discussion-talanoa with the author, December 4, 2015. 
453 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 19), in discussion-talanoa with the author, December 4, 2015. 
454 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 34), in discussion-talanoa with the author, December 4, 2015. 
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away or moved to other ministries or posted to overseas missions, and others moved to 
regional organisations, drawn by the pay packages, that forbade them from interacting 
in the negotiations politically.  
 
Consistency in the meetings also meant sustained participation during the sessions.  As 
one negotiator remarked that they “would find that if [they] missed one session, [they] 
would be lost at the next”.455 Not all delegates would attend the meetings to participate 
in the ADP process; some held roles as facilitators in the SBI and SBSTA bodies and 
others concentrated on bilateral meetings with donor countries and financial institutions. 
Negotiator fatigue, especially among seasoned negotiators who have been part of the 
process. One way around this issue as one negotiator stated, was to follow the 
Singapore approach of rotating negotiators every three years so that they can acquire 
new skills in trade or security negotiations456. Others reflected on the inconsistency in 
the rhetoric of state leaders, and the work of their negotiators. While leaders would 
make grandiose announcements and highlight the plight of Pacific nations to climate 
change unfortunately, there would not be the same level of rigour and perseverance 
from officials in the negotiation’s chambers. The smaller delegations like Tuvalu and 
Marshall Islands heavily invested resources to ensure that the same team of negotiators 
and supporting staff would always be present at each session457.  
 
Complex relationships with NGO consultants and advisers 
The participation of non-state actors or NGOs in the regime and within AOSIS 
coalitions is well documented. The UNFCCC negotiations, as one negotiator stated, 
were not party driven, but driven by the influence and passion of NGOs present within 
delegations458. Like other AOSIS countries, Pacific states have had a long history of 
NGO involvement in the delegations acting as advisors or consultants. Some advisors 
had been part of delegations since the days of Kyoto Protocol negotiations and have 
consistently committed over the years providing both institutional and historical-context 
                                                     
455 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 16), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 28, 2015. 
456 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 6), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 27, 2017. 
457 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 10), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. 
458 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 17), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. 
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capacity not just for their country delegations but for other Pacific states as well. “There 
are some that are genuine, their heart and soul are in Pacific”, remarked one delegate459. 
 
For the negotiations in Bonn, Marshall Islands had used the services of Independent 
Diplomat, a non-profit organisation of former diplomats and international lawyers to 
coordinate their positions. At the same time Palau contracted experts from Climate 
Analytics in Germany to pursue its positions on climate finance and mitigation. They 
stood out in the negotiations from the Pacific being nationals from Western countries. 
During one of the AOSIS heads of delegations’ meetings, one particular state 
questioned whether the coalition could trust non-indigenous negotiators. According to 
one Pacific head of delegate, “[they] felt an uneasiness in the meeting in having to 
defend [their] delegation; [they] trusted [their] delegates”460.  
 
In the Pacific, SPREP had contracted international lawyers and climate change experts 
from the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), 
World Wildlife Fund, University of the South Pacific, UN Environment Program, and 
Climate Analytics over the years and have developed a negotiations skills training 
framework. They are integral to the operations of SPREP as previously mentioned the 
May HLSM preparatory work in Samoa was supported and led by Climate Analytics.  
 
There would always be scepticism on the allegiance of NGO consultants to their 
organisation funders. “There is a lot of climate change funding around, if NGO want to 
make money they only need to participate in the negotiations”. 461 There had been 
numerous instances in the past where advisers were fired during the negotiations 
speaking beyond their mandate, and some were let go after a change in political 
governments back at capital.462 In essence, non-state consultants or advisers were at the 
mercy of the state preferences. “You have to be frank with them (NGOs) about their 
intentions and before acting on [their] behalf they needed to sign and abide to [their] 
                                                     
459 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 9), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 30, 2015. 
460 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 25), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 8, 2015. 
461 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 9), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 30, 2015. 
462 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 10), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015. 
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contracts”.463 For Cook Islands and Palau, its advisers were only allowed to provide 
technical support, without any speaking privileges464. For Marshall Islands its advisers 
accorded privileges to speak in the negotiation chambers, and at the absence or 
invitation of the head of delegation, could speak on their behalf at the plenary 
sessions.465 
 
ADP2-9 Agreement Phase 
ADP Process: The Consensus Point 
On the afternoon of June 11, the final ADP2-9 Contact Group took place with a 
stocktake of all the 12 facilitated informal negotiation groups. The plenary allowed 
discussions on specific sections of the Geneva negotiating text undertaken by the 
negotiating groups, where although there had been some progress, there continued to be 
an impasse on many options. When a consolidated text was produced based on other co-
facilitators report, the final page tally had only come down to 85 pages. The chamber 
deliberated the work for the next three ADP sessions that had been scheduled before 
Paris in December. Despite the slow progress in the text negotiations, the main success 
of the ADP2-9 session was that it allowed parties to familiarise themselves with the 
mechanics of how the process of negotiations of the text would take place. The Bonn 
session would be the first substantial negotiations amongst the parties on the text, and it 
was evident there was a big divide amongst the states on all key issues. The task of the 
road ahead would not be an easy one.  
In concluding the negotiations, the Co-Chairs of ADP put forth a request to parties for 
mandate to allow the UNFCCC secretariat to find common ground in the various 
options put forth by parties without omitting or deleting any of the existing options. 
This text would then be circulated to parties before the next ADP2-10 in August. 
Without any reservations, the parties put forth their consent to the proposal, and 
effectively continue the negotiations until Paris. Despite little progress in streamlining 
the text, as co-chair Djoghlaf highlighted in his final remarks, the success of the session 
                                                     
463 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 25), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 8, 2015. 
464 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 17), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 4, 2015, and Pacific 
negotiator (Talanoa 23), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 8, 2015. 
465 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 25), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 8, 2015. 
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should be measured in the trust built and the fact that ‘nobody was left behind’466. As 
negotiators in Bonn expected all along, there was to be no final agreement during the 
session with three other ADP meetings already planned to continue the work of refining 
the negotiation text. Although the events that unfolded in the agreement phase of final 
day of negotiations were an anti-climax, it was a necessary ritual for the Co-Chairs to 
receive the consent from parties for the international negotiations to continue.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the work of Pacific island states inside the international 
negotiations of the UNFCCC ADP2-9. The conference was not expected to reach a final 
agreement on climate change. Rather it was part of a series of negotiations to negotiate 
a text agreement on climate change, projected to be completed at the end of 2015. The 
purpose of the international negotiations conference was for parties to streamline and 
negotiate the draft text. The ADP2-9 was a summit not only to build consensus for the 
purpose of producing an institutional text, but also to build the relationships among the 
parties themselves. This chapter has described the events and how they unfolded in the 
preparatory week and the ten days of negotiations based on the timeline of the 
conference.  
In following the daily work of negotiators within international negotiations, this 
research supports the literature that inter-state coalitions are central to Pacific states 
participation. From the very first day of preparatory meetings to the final days of Bonn, 
states and their negotiators operated within the structures, conditions and politics of 
coalitions. There was no evidence that Pacific states worked in isolation from any of the 
established coalitions. As the ADP2-9 was deemed a significant summit to build 
consensus among parties, coalitions have a central role in facilitating this process. This 
claim is supported by three inside accounts detailed in this chapter, of how states 
operate inside coalitions that is coalition consensus, inter-coalition consensus and 
informal collective consensus.  
                                                     
466 ENB, "Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Conference 1-11 June 2015." 
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The first account was an in depth look into the structures of how states work and 
maintain cohesiveness inside the well-established coalitions such as AOSIS, G-77, 
CfRN and Cartagena, in what is deemed here as coalition consensus. These coalitions or 
negotiation blocs are central meeting points for likeminded states to gather information 
on issues, process and party politics of the negotiations. Coalitions allowed states to 
formulate and coordinate strategies to engage in the negotiations. The four coalitions 
examined here all operated under the rule of consensus, where states at a daily basis are 
constantly negotiating and bargaining amongst each other for a group position. For 
coalition consensus to be effective, states and their negotiators work within a structure 
of coordination groups where they identify lead coordinators to speak on their behalf 
during the closed-door negotiations. While disagreements amongst members inside 
coalitions were prevalent, there were mechanisms such as the heads of delegation 
meetings or private negotiations facilitated by the chair that tried to mitigate these 
problems.      
To substantiate this claim on coalition consensus, the second inside account detailed 
how Pacific state delegates participated during the negotiations. The account traced a 
day in the life of negotiators by following the issue of loss and damage, from the 
AOSIS coalition plenary in the morning, until it reached the ADP spin-off negotiation 
chamber later that day. This daily navigation of room to room sequential meetings 
included the coordination and management of inter-coalition consensus. In this case, the 
Pacific negotiators within AOSIS worked collaboratively with the numerous coalitions 
under the G-77. Negotiators would not only have to manage the politics of one 
coalition, but at the same time lobby for the support of multiple like-minded coalitions. 
This routine task was made easy by the fact that most coalitions had a similar structure 
of thematic coordination groups, with lead coordinators initiating strategy and sharing 
information. While inter-coalition consensus gave a platform for states to reach out to 
parties who were not normally associated with small island states, working within and 
amongst multiple coalitions paradoxically drowned out the voices of Pacific states in 
the negotiation rooms.  
The third account explored the aspirations and cohesiveness of Pacific negotiators 
during the negotiations. The various negotiators who shared their stories by talanoa all 
indicated a need for Pacific negotiators to work together. But implementing this Pacific 
solidarity or voice in the negotiations was challenged by the lack of a regional political 
mandate to mobilise as a group, which was linked to the politics of competing regional 
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architecture and the UN New York approach to the negotiations, the inconsistency and 
limited number of representatives attending the meetings, and to some extent the 
intention of NGOs involved in Pacific delegations. Despite these obstacles, the Pacific 
states as per practice over the years, worked together informally as an information-
sharing collective facilitated by the PSIDS New York ambassadors and officials from 
SPREP. Although the group was not a negotiation bloc, it used similar coalition 
structures of thematic groups and coordinators to inform members of the daily progress 
of negotiations. At the same time the informal collective would also act as a filter of 
information on the positions and strategies pursed by multiple coalitions. 
Overall, this chapter contributes to our understanding of multilateral consensus 
negotiations by emphasising the role of coalitions or small likeminded groups in 
building consensus. Small groups can be either established formal coalitions or informal 
collectives that help states not only manage the complexity of information and 
strategies, but also to keep up with the fast moving pace of negotiations. In order for 
states to perform effectively in negotiation rooms, they need to reach out and form small 
groups with common positions. The small groups would then identify a smaller 
coalescent group of individuals or lead coordinators that would not only speak on behalf 
of the coalitions, but in effect of the states themselves. The lead coordinators of small 
groups had higher levels of influence in the negotiation process with the amount of 
information and access. The observations inside spin off negotiation chambers and in 
plenary sessions, reveal that when an official makes an intervention in these settings 
they are not only pursuing their state position but a collective group stance. Conversely, 
if a state that does not speak inside negotiations, that does not mean they do not have a 
position or free riding in the negotiations. But rather they have already agreed to a 
common position with small groups they are associated with.  
Furthermore, underpinning the behaviour of states to be associated with particular small 
groups was the creation and management of relationships at the individual level. 
Negotiations is a relational activity. The positions and strategies of small groups were 
managed and conditioned by the inter-personal relationships of negotiators. Inside 
negotiation chambers and coalition meetings, it was seldom to find a competitive or 
polarising atmosphere amongst negotiators; rather it was a cordial affair of information 
sharing. In order to build consensus, negotiators needed to reach out and listen to the 
views of other parties. There was not direct confrontation in the exchange of positions 
in the meetings or in the corridors, but rather flexibility to build common ground on 
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diverging. With constant contact over the years, negotiators have formed both 
professional and personal relationships that allowed for communication of issues.  
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Chapter Five: Regional Negotiations- Pacific Islands Development 
Forum and Pacific Islands Forum   
 
Introduction  
Beyond the international negotiations at the UNFCCC, and as Chapter Three 
highlighted, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity in the Pacific region in 2015. 
Regional, sub-regional and partner-regional forums prioritised climate change in their 
meeting agendas with the intention to make a strong stand and express their unwavering 
support for the multilateral efforts in Paris. These intentions were reflected in the 
political declarations that came out of various summits since 2013, as listed in Table 12, 
with an emphasis on the six declarations in 2015 that specifically addressed COP21 
negotiations. These political declarations were signals of Pacific states’ determination to 
assume climate change leadership and action needed globally and in the region.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore multilateral consensus decision making at the 
Pacific regional level. It traces the negotiations that took place within the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum and the Pacific Islands Forum in September 2015. By returning to 
main question of this thesis, how do states build and reach consensus in multilateral 
negotiations, the analysis here traces how regional climate change political declarations 
were made. What happens inside these regional multilateral meetings, and how do states 
make decisions by consensus? Who are the actors and who are the actors involved in the 
decision making? What is their input, and how do they influence the final outcome? 
 
This chapter explores the decision making processes, structures and politics of the PIDF 
and the PIF in 2015 by tracing three political declarations made by these organisations 
in August and September. For PIDF, with its Suva Declaration on Climate Change, it 
would be the coming of age of a new organisation attempting to find its feet amidst an 
overcrowded regional architecture, and to promote an inclusive voice for its people. As 
for PIF, while the anticipated PIF Leaders Declaration for Climate Change Action was 
geared to find a common ground or collective consensus amongst Pacific island states 
including Australia and New Zealand—there was also an uneasiness by the grouping of 
PIF SIS that a regional consensus would also mean a watered down response. The SIS 
collective took it upon themselves to make their intentions known by conceiving its SIS 
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Leaders Declaration on Climate Action. These three declarations would be negotiated 
within a span of 10 days of each other in a time of the year where regional political 
roadshow was at its highest peak.   
 
The existing literature on the decision making process within these organisations 
emphasise the significant role of consensus467. This view of consensus is not only 
argued as the preferred procedure in deliberations, but its success rests with the 
cognitive decision making abilities and personality of leaders468. Whether it be the 
Governing Council for PIDF or the Leaders’ Retreat for PIF, there was an assumption 
that consensus is a product of leaders’ dialogue using the values associated with the 
Pacific Way and Talanoa. What the literature presupposes is that very little to no 
negotiations took place amongst the leaders, only political discussions. However, unless 
one is a state leader it is difficult to trace and analyse leaders’ decision making in these 
closed-room leaders’-only meetings. Nevertheless, this chapter will explore 
interactional consensus in the meetings that occur before the leaders’ meetings and 
point to the negotiations behind the scenes.  
 
Both the PIDF Summit and the PIF Leaders’ Meeting are multilateral forums, that do 
not necessarily focus on climate change but address a wide array of regional issues. This 
chapter deals with the discussions in the meetings that focussed on climate change, and 
specifically the impending UNFCCC negotiations in Paris. The chapter will first 
investigate the PIDF meeting and unpack the structures and politics of inclusive 
consensus diplomacy that incorporates government, private and civil sector. The second 
half of the chapter will then look at decision making in the PIF structure by 
concentrating on the work of two sub-bodies: Smaller Island States and the Forum 
Officials Committee.  
 
                                                     
467 See Eric Shibuya, "The problems and potential of the Pacific Islands forum," The Asia-Pacific: A 
region in transition  (2004)., Stephanie Lawson, "‘The Pacific Way’as Postcolonial Discourse: Towards a 
Reassessment," The Journal of Pacific History 45, no. 3 (2010)., Greg Fry, "Whose Oceania? Contending 
visions of community in Pacific region-building," Pacific Futures  (2004). Sandra Tarte, "New regional 
Pacific voice? An observer's perspective on the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), inaugural 
summit, Denarau, Fiji, 5-7 Aguust 2013,"  (2013); "Regionalism and changing regional order in the 
Pacific Islands," Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies 1, no. 2 (2014). 
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The Pacific Way: Consensus Decision Making in the Pacific 
Regional politics in the Pacific is synonymous with two interrelated concepts, the 
Pacific Way and consensus. The Pacific Way is an elusive term, that has been 
interpreted by leaders, regional organisations and scholars to mean various things. What 
is clear, is that term was first coined in a speech by Fiji Prime Minister Ratu Kamisese 
Mara at the UNGA 1970:  
We like to think that this is the Pacific Way, both geographically and 
ideologically. As far as we are authorised by our friends and neighbours, and we 
do not arrogate to ourselves any role of leadership, we would hope to be act as 
representative and interpreter of that voice.469 
Mara never elaborated on what he meant by the Pacific Way, but it has been used to 
mean various tenets of consensus decision making in the region.  For more than four 
decades the Pacific Way has been evoked to call for collective action and solidarity 
within the various regional policies, communiques and speeches by leaders. Regional 
organisations like the Pacific Islands Forum have used the term in their rhetoric and 
guiding principles as a basis for regional cooperation and regional identity470.  
 
The Pacific Way has also been used to describe a form of regional politics based on 
broad shared political values. In Jack Corbett’s work with Pacific politicians, the term 
means “shared ideas about solidarity and reciprocity, the fostering and maintenance of 
kinship networks and relationships, attachment to land and ocean, respect dignity, 
consultation and shared leadership”471.The Pacific Way has been described as regional 
decision making process that requires unanimous compromise from all parties. There 
was an underlying notion that a Pacific way of decision making meant no state was left 
out of the process; and while inevitably it involved long discussions and may involve 
frank disagreements, no resentment will be felt.  
 
                                                     
469 Ratu Kamisese Mara, The Pacific way: A memoir (University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 238. 
470 Williams and McDuie-Ra, 18. 
471 Jack Corbett, "“Everybody knows everybody”: Practising politics in the Pacific Islands," 
Democratization 22, no. 1 (2015). 
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The Pacific Way has also been defined as a diplomatic norm of incorporating, among 
other things, consensus building through non-conflictual discussion472.  It involved 
sitting and thinking about the process and getting that right as much as it does in trying 
to develop solutions; once the participants are happy with the process, solutions are 
likely to follow473. However, as Ron Crocombe and Stephanie Lawson attest, the Pacific 
Way originates and supports the decision making of perspectives and interests of 
elites474. A post-colonial critique, and consequence of the Pacific Way has since 
developed into an anticolonial frame of colonised and coloniser, where developed 
members of regional organisations of Australia and New Zealand have been criticised 
for their heavy handedness.  
 
The existing literature on decision making in regional organisations has tended to focus 
on the instrumental role of leaders in building and reaching consensus. At best these 
studies describe assumption of what leaders do in closed PIF Leaders retreat, or a 
normative ideational account of when countries collectively choose to work together. 
Scholars have articulated the Pacific Way as a form of consensus decision making 
associated with leaders’ respectful dialogue and discussion of issues to consolidate a 
collective diplomacy475.  This idiosyncratic feature of regionalism decision making was 
not synonymous with negotiation or bargaining. But at the same time since the idea of 
Pacific Way was coined and introduced by leaders in the 1970’s, its usage by Pacific 
leaders and description by academics has evolved into a regionalism discourse with 
strong postcolonial resonances476. However, a product of such analyses has created a 
dichotomy of ‘insiders/islanders/colonised’ and ‘outsiders/developed neo-colonisers’ 
                                                     
472 Michael Haas, The Pacific way: regional cooperation in the South Pacific (Praeger Publishers, 1989), 
16-17. 
473 Jim Rolfe, "Peacekeeping the pacific way in Bougainville," International Peacekeeping 8, no. 4 
(2001). 
474 See Ron G Crocombe, The Pacific way: An emerging identity (Suva: Lotu Pasifika, 1976)., and 
Lawson. 
475 See Greg Fry, "Climbing back onto the map? The South Pacific Forum and the new development 
orthodoxy," ibid.29 (1994)., and "Framing the islands: knowledge and power in changing Australian 
images of" the South Pacific"," The Contemporary Pacific  (1997). 
476 Stephanie Lawson, "Postcolonialism, neo-colonialism and the “Pacific Way”: a critique of (un) critical 
approaches," in ANU School of International, Political and Strategic Studies Discussion Paper ed. State 
Society and Governance in Melanesia (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2010), 5. 
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(Australia and New Zealand) engaged in regional forums477. This research 
acknowledges the validity of these arguments but offers another explanation in the way 
consensus decision making takes place within Pacific regionalism. Moving beyond the 
analyses of outcomes and focus on leaders’ perspectives, it traverses the processes 
within the organisations. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the consensus 
decision making process by going inside regional organisations in high-level meetings 
and studying the processes, actors and activities as they occur. Based on the data 
collected from the PIDF and PIF meetings, this research will attempt to detail how 
consensus is built and reached inside multilateral meetings. These clues will hopefully 
inform and contribute to further understanding of Pacific Way as regional form of 
consensus decision making.   
 
The Pacific Islands Development Forum  
PIDF Context  
A product of Fijian foreign policy  
Established in 2013, PIDF was initiated by the Fijian government at a time when it was 
isolated from political multilateral institutions such as the Commonwealth of Nations 
and the PIF.478 Ignored and sanctioned by its traditional international partners, the Fijian 
military government undertook foreign policy initiatives to legitimise its place in 
international and regional politics. Fiji increased its diplomatic relations and missions 
around the world and took on global leadership roles in the Non-Aligned Movement in 
2011 and G-77 coalition in 2013 as part of its ‘look north policy’. In its neighbourhood 
it adopted an activist approach to call out the failures of existing regional 
architectures.479 This failure stemmed from a belief that ‘outsiders interference’ or 
Australia and New Zealand, could be countered through ‘islanders only’ organisations 
like the revitalised Melanesian Spearhead Group and the PIDF480.  The PIDF offered, in 
what Sandra Tarte calls ‘stepping outside the box’ from ‘business as usual’, a new way 
                                                     
477 "‘The Pacific Way’as Postcolonial Discourse: Towards a Reassessment." "Postcolonialism, neo-
colonialism and the “Pacific Way”: a critique of (un) critical approaches." 
478 Tarte, "Regionalism and changing regional order in the Pacific Islands." 
479 George Carter and Stewart Firth, "The Mood in Melanesia after the Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands," ibid.3, no. 1 (2016): 18.  
480 Campbell Cooney, "Fiji shuns Pacific Forum membership unless Australia and New Zealand are 
expelled," ABC News, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-29/fiji-shuns-forum-membership/5418014. 
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of engagement at both the international and regional level.481 These promises included 
harnessing an islander only negotiating bloc at the UN level with links to the Pacific 
Small Islands Developing States, and fostering relationships with non-traditional 
partners such as China, Russia and United Arab Emirates to name a few.482  
 
Political Roadshow with notable absences 
The third PIDF Summit on September 2-4, 2015 was strategically scheduled around the 
height of regional politics meetings, with the gathering of the PIF Leaders the following 
week. However, there was a disadvantage in hosting the meeting in the first week of 
September as it coincided with the tenth session of the UNFCCC ADP negotiations in 
Bonn. This took away many of the region’s technical negotiators from Suva who were 
well versed and apprised of the issues negotiated at the international level.  
Furthermore, of the fourteen Pacific island states that were a party to the UNFCCC 
process, only eleven states accepted PIDF’s invitation. The notable absence of three 
states from the fourteen signatories to the UNFCCC reflected regional political 
sensitivities: in part the history of dissonance towards Fiji and the PIDF by Samoa and 
Niue, and by Palau which at the time was the incumbent chair of the PIF483. This 
disadvantage of attaining a full house of political and technical players did not derail the 
efforts of the twenty-three Pacific island states and territories (including Timor Leste) 
that accepted the organisation’s invitation. The annual summit would also draw 
delegations and observers from more than 32 countries and at least 50 civil society and 
private sector organisations willing to witness and participate in this new regional 
political endeavour. 
 
The promise of Inclusive Diplomacy and Pacific voice 
The curiosity in PIDF would be the promise of inclusive diplomacy, where private 
sector and civil society representatives had an equal seat at the table with states in 
political dialogue. Political regionalism in the Pacific, whether regional or sub-regional, 
                                                     
481 Tarte, "Regionalism and changing regional order in the Pacific Islands." 
482Ibid. 
483 Samoan prime minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi and Fijian prime minister Josaia Voreqe 
Bainimarama have had a history of open media tit for tat, that stem from calls for Fiji government to 
undertake democratic elections after the military coup of 2006.  
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was state-oriented. Participating states at the PIDF were encouraged to have non-state 
actor representatives in their delegations with at least one private sector and one civil 
society representative in their delegations. The inclusion of the private and civil society 
sectors on an equal footing with government officials in a multilateral forum was a 
novel idea in the state-centric Pacific. This idea of inclusivity was not limited to 
independent states in the Pacific, but also the commonality of developing island entities. 
PIDF promised the inclusion of territories like Guam, New Caledonia, French Polynesia 
and Tokelau, as well as Timor Leste, which is not traditionally seen as a Pacific state484.  
 
The annual Summit was the third meeting for the organisation. In its first two years, the 
themes of ‘Leadership, Innovation and Partnership for Green/Blue Pacific Economies’ 
in 2013 and ‘Green Growth in the Pacific: Building Resilient Sustainable Futures and 
Genuine Partnerships’ in 2014 were a response to global negotiations and discourse 
around sustainable development and green growth. It was unsurprising with attention 
focused on the UNFCCC Paris negotiations, that the organisation would premise its 
talks in 2015 on climate change, ‘Building climate resilient green blue Pacific 
economies’.  In the months prior to the Summit, the PIDF secretariat carried out a 
public campaign to build both political and public momentum amongst Pacific states on 
the issue of climate change. Pivotal in this public diplomacy campaign was the 
attraction of the UN Climate Change Envoy (and former Irish President) H.E. Mary 
Robinson, and to some extent the then Prime Minister of Thailand485 as a drawcard. 
Nevertheless, it would be the call for a ‘Pacific voice’ in the international negotiations 
that would be the main attraction for governments, civil society and private sectors. The 
sub-regional political statements issued earlier in the form of the Melanesian Spearhead, 
Boknake Haus and Taputapuatea declarations articulated these voices. However, there 
was a gap for an inclusive regional political declaration. PIDF through its summit 
promised to be a platform to create a consensus voice of the Pacific in the COP21 
negotiations in the form of a PIDF climate change declaration.  
 
                                                     
484 Timor Leste president Xanana Gusmao was the keynote speaker at the first PIDF inaugural summit. In 
2016 Timor Leste officially signed the PIDF charter to become an official member of the organisation.  
 
485 The Thailand prime minister was not able to attend due to civil unrest and instability in the country 
However the Deputy PM General Thanasak Patimapragorn, represented the Thailand government.  
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PIDF Pre-Negotiation Phase 
A PSIDS New York Draft Text 
The notion of a possible PIDF climate change declaration was heralded from the 
beginning of the year486. According to the official report of outcomes of the PIDF 2015 
meeting and statements during the summit, the initial text, which was then called the 
PIDF Leaders Declaration on Climate Change had originated from the Pacific Small 
Islands Developing States (PSIDS) negotiation bloc in New York.487 From the board 
room table of the Fiji Mission to the United Nations, the ambassadors and senior 
diplomats in New York who worked directly with the wider membership of AOSIS 
drafted this initial text. “The direct involvement of PSIDS Ambassadors [was] to ensure 
the ownership aspects of the draft declaration [was] strengthened and [was] in synergy 
with the Sustainable Development negotiations happening at the same time… [that] 
would also enable our Pacific voice to be loud and clear within AOSIS, our negotiating 
block in the UNFCCC process at the global level”488. The draft text was then circulated 
by the PIDF secretariat to members of the PIDF senior officials via email prior to the 
September meeting.  
 
Discussions and Negotiations in PIDF structure: Officials Committee, 
Ministerial Executive Board and Governing Council  
The official program of the PIDF Summit identified three days of official meetings or 
plenaries between September 2-4, and two days of preparatory meetings took place on 
August 31 and September 1 as shown in Table 14. These preparatory meetings were 
divided into the three key bodies of the organisation: Senior Officials Committee, 
Executive Board and Governing Council.  
 
 
                                                     
486 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 26), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 7, 2015 
487 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 20), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 8, 2015, and Pacific 
negotiator (Talanoa 26), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 7, 2015. 
488 PIDF, "Pacific Isladns Development Forum Third Leaders Summit Outcome Document ‘Building 
Climate Resilient Green Blue Pacific Economies’," (Suva: Pacific Islands Development Forum 2015), 8-
9. 
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Table 14. PIDF 2015 official program and schedule of meetings 
Date Meeting 
August 31 Pre-meetings: Senior Officials Committee and Executive Board 
September 1 Pre-meetings: Governing Council 
September 2 Official Plenary: Challenges, Leadership, Partners and 
Innovations 
September 3 Official Plenary: COP21 Strategy and Talanoa Climate 
Migration 
September 4 Official Meeting: Governance and Charter 
Final Plenary: Conclusion of PIDF Summit 
 
The participating delegations were asked to nominate a ‘tripartite delegation’- one 
government official, one private sector representative and one civil society 
representative to serve on the Senior Officials Committee, chaired by Solomon Islands 
High Commissioner to Fiji. The Committee was responsible for coordinating and 
approving the final agenda for the organisation. More importantly, the Committee 
would be the main site where the text of the climate change declaration negotiations 
took place, if there were any disagreements. The recommendations and approval of the 
committee were taken up to the next level of the organisation, the Executive Board. 
This was the ministerial level body that was chaired by the Fijian Foreign Minister. The 
ministers or senior ambassadors would check approve the decisions of officials, a forum 
that was more focussed on discussion and less on negotiations. Both the Senior Official 
Committee and the Executive Board met on August 31. 
 
Once the ministers had approved the agenda, the supreme body for the PIDF, the 
Governing Council took place. The meeting was chaired by Fijian Prime Minister and 
reserved for heads of governments, plus two non-state member representatives: one 
from the private sector and one member from civil society. In the Council’s 
deliberations, it approved the decisions made by the Board and Committee on items 
ranging from the new Charter of the organisation, a new Secretary General, to the 
operations and budget of organisation. More importantly they approved the latest 
version of the draft text, which was then renamed the Suva Declaration on Climate 
Change. But this was not the end of the process, it was only the beginning of 
deliberations around the Suva declaration. After months of email circulation and online 
draft negotiations, followed by two days of discussions by officials and leaders, the 
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revised text would go through a process of open public scrutiny. Before the start of the 
official meetings, delegates and observers received a revised draft of the Suva 
Declaration as approved by the Governing Council. 
 
PIDF Negotiation Phase  
Townhall style Plenaries 
In the newly restored Grand Pacific Hotel, more than 300 leaders, government, civil 
society and private sector officials converged to “find a Pacific voice in climate 
change”489. The three day Summit was divided into three program plenary panels, with 
break out parallel sessions during some panels. The plenaries were styled similar to 
townhall meetings. Leaders and their official delegations were situated in reserved 
seating at the front of the plenary hall. Observer states and registered intra-
governmental, private and civil society organisations were then allocated reserved 
seating in the next section; while the public and media were given access to the 
remaining half of the hall.  
 
All sessions were open to all delegates and observers, to make interventions and raise 
questions after statements from leaders. The plenaries on the first day concentrated on 
the challenges, leadership, partnership and innovation implicit in the concept of Climate 
Resilient Green Blue Pacific Economies. Prominent government and civil society 
leaders were invited to make remarks in a seminar style panel with a delegate question 
and answer session towards the end. The sessions attempted to define synergies between 
sustainable development and climate change actions to realise ‘Green Blue Economies’. 
According to the outcomes of the first day, climate resilient actions ought to be 
inclusive of Pacific peoples in a decision making process that was inclusive of civil 
society, women, youth and persons with disabilities as equal partners.490 The underlying 
theme from sessions was the call for a “unified voice on climate change [which] must 
be a centre piece of meetings with world leaders… not deterred by size”491.  
                                                     
489 Tanasak  Patimapregorn, "Keynote Address By His Excellency General Tanasak Patimapregorn 
Deputy Prime Ministry of the Kingdom of Thailand," news release, 2015, http://pacificidf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/DPM-Thailand-Speech-3rd-PIDF-Speech.pdf. 
490 PIDF,  28-30. 
491 Ibid., 26. 
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Inside: Consultative Open Process (Talanoa Diplomacy) - Strategy for COP21 
The second day was the most anticipated day for many, and it proved to have more than 
300 registered participants in attendance. The focus of deliberations would be on two 
key issues; strategy for COP21 and climate change migration. Unique in the format of 
PIDF deliberations was the use of a consultative open process or the talanoa diplomatic 
tool of consultation. Dialogue in the formal plenary, informal negotiations and all 
official meetings incorporated the ideals of the indigenous Fijian iTaukei (and also other 
Polynesian cultures) dialogue approach of talanoa. Talanoa is “a traditional word used 
in Fiji and across the Pacific to reflect a process of inclusive, participatory and 
transparent dialogue”492. The purpose of talanoa was to allow a space to share stories, 
ideas, skills and experience. By this practice of sharing stories participants would build 
empathy and make wise decisions for the collective good.493  The traditional iTaukei 
concept of talanoa as a diplomatic tool of dialogue was adapted by PIDF. To be 
inclusive, it meant discussions needed to go beyond government officials and to provide 
a space for civil society and private sector to be engaged in the decision making 
process, and more importantly be a part of a consensus process where all sectors were 
on an equal footing.  
 
The climate change and migration plenary invited Pacific leaders such as Kiribati’s 
Anote Tong, Tuvalu’s Enele Sopoaga, Tonga’s Samuela Akilisi Pohiva, Marhsall 
Islands Tony de Brum and UN Climate Change Envoy Mary Robinson - to speak on the 
plight of frontline atoll island states and their policies towards environmental refugee 
status, sovereignty and resettlement issues. The open talanoa session from leaders 
univocally called for more concerted efforts from Pacific islands to work together in 
having clear messages and working together in the negotiations. As UN Climate Change 
Envoy Mary Robinson affirmed in her statement to the Pacific delegates, “[b]ecause of 
your lived experience, you understand climate change in a way a few do… you are 
witnesses to the human impact of climate change and know how lives and livelihoods 
                                                     
492 UNFCCC, "2018 Talanoa Dialogue Platform," United States Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform. 
493 Ibid. 
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can be damaged; your voice and leadership matter, your knowledge and your insights 
are needed.”494  
 
A united Pacific voice  
The COP21 strategy session was divided into two sessions: an open plenary followed 
by three parallel thematic sessions. The purpose of this plenary was to provide an 
update on the status of current UNFCCC ADP negotiations, “and to discuss possible 
strategies to ensure the (proposed) new agreement addresses core concerns of the 
region”495.  Of priority from the panellists and responses from participants was the 
aspiration for a ‘united Pacific voice’ that was beyond the science of climate change, 
and for positions that enshrined a secure future for Pacific peoples. The idea of a united 
Pacific voice was not only a regional political declaration but also a mandate for Pacific 
countries to take action in the negotiations.  
 
When the floor was opened for dialogue, participants urged leaders and negotiators to 
continue to demonstrate leadership on the narrative of Pacific states as frontline states 
“shaping solutions, and not just victims” of climate change496. This climate leadership 
from Pacific states encouraged Pacific states to submit Intended Nationally Determined 
Commitments that factored in decarbonised economies from the Pacific. In doing so, 
this message should not be restricted to just the formal UNFCCC ADP negotiations, but 
should include a Pacific voice in other multilateral forums later in the year. These 
forums included the COP21 French Presidency informal meetings, IMF-World Bank 
Annual Meeting, the UN General Assembly and the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting (CHOGM). The initial joint plenary set the tone for the three 
parallel sessions (government, civil sector and private sector) would focus on.  
 
                                                     
494 PIDF, "PACIFICIDF News," news release, 2016, http://pacificidf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/Pacificidf-News-Volume-4.pdf. 
495 "Pacific Isladns Development Forum Third Leaders Summit Outcome Document ‘Building Climate 
Resilient Green Blue Pacific Economies’," 32. 
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Civil Society Sector Panel 
The session was led by a Fijian minister and a youth NGO advocate, which brought 
together groups such as the disabled, youth and women as well as addressing issues 
such as security, human rights and migration. The session discussed the role of civil 
society in advocacy, awareness and the conscience of the community in climate change 
discussions. Participants highlighted the need for climate change mitigation and 
adaptation actions to take into account civil society, youth and persons with disabilities. 
There was a demand that for every COP21 Pacific delegation there needed to be a youth 
delegate to voice these concerns in the global forum. Furthermore, gender equality and 
the effective participation of women and indigenous peoples were seen as important for 
effective action on all aspects of climate change. The session highlighted notable 
strategies on key messaging in COP21 to include ‘Survival Message: Our Survival is 
not negotiable’ and the intergenerational equity perspective of youth, women and 
indigenous communities expressed in the language of human rights497. 
 
Private Sector Panel 
Moderated by Fiji’s Attorney General and PIDF Climate Change Advisor the aim of the 
private sector session was to gauge the interest and participation of the private sector in 
private-public partnerships on climate change.  This session allowed the private sector 
to discuss its role in dealing with climate change issues through investment, technology 
and pursuing low-carbon development pathways. The outcomes emphasised 
suggestions on how new agreements can foster private-public partnership and catalyse 
support for actions.  Central to the outcomes of the group was to create a supportive 
business environment through partnerships and reduce structural barriers to incentivise 
private sector investment and engagement.498 
 
Government Sector Panel  
While the two previous panels centred on messaging and implementation of climate 
change partnerships on the ground, the discussion in the government panel was more 
focussed. The discussion led by the Tuvalu Prime Minister and interim PIDF Secretary 
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General considered key issues to be included as part of the Paris agreement. He stressed 
the need for a protocol under the Convention with clear links to vulnerability of Pacific 
island states, mitigation and adaptation. As a legally binding agreement it should 
identify commitments for five year periods for ambitions to be reviewed, with 
commitments and high ambitions from all parties to the UNFCCC to be realistic. 
Participants also identified loss and damage compensation for land and ocean long-term 
damage to be embedded in the agreement, with financing as an integral part.499 While 
these messages should be considered by Pacific negotiators in COP21, what is essential 
is a coordinated and united voice. The feedback from the three parallel consultative 
groups was presented to the Senior Officials Committee drafting group. 
 
Inside: PIDF Senior Officials Committee - Drafting Group  
The Senior Officials Committee with the assistance of the PIDF Secretariat were 
responsible for the main negotiating forum to incorporate public submissions on the 
proposed declaration. During the three day summit, the Committee met twice daily, in 
the morning and again in the evening to consider and negotiate these submissions. 
These proposals were in the form of individual email submissions, recommendations 
from the various plenary panels from the first two days, but most importantly the COP 
21 Strategy sessions. In an email notification to all delegates and then again during the 
Summit opening presentation, delegates were invited to send comments or text 
considerations by 8.00pm, which the Committee would then consider and negotiate 
whether to include it in the text. 
 
After months of email negotiations, and face to face deliberations by the PIDF hierarchy 
during the preparatory phase, the text draft that was circulated to the public on the first 
day was labelled ‘Version 6’. This meant that the text had been negotiated and revised 
on six occasions since the original draft from PSIDS New York and reflected input from 
capitals and negotiations of officials. The PIDF interim Secretary General 
acknowledged that this process was vital for “PIDF to be the mouthpiece that connects 
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the political negotiations of the Pacific with Caribbean and other AOSIS countries—
with the leaders and officials in the Pacific islands”500.  
 
Upon receiving feedback from the various talanoa sessions on COP21 Strategies and 
Climate Migration the Committee drafting group met in the evening to re-draft and 
negotiate the wording. When the final version was circulated on the concluding day as 
‘Version 8’, there were notable inclusions and changes to the text. Most obvious was 
the emphasis from civil society on the inclusion of gender, youth and disability to be 
part of the Pacific voice messaging and positions. The final version called on the 
development of a PSIDS regional taskforce to look into climate financing. There was 
stronger messaging on loss and damage and the long-term temperature goal of 1.5 
degrees, it was agreed, should be cemented in the Paris agreement.  
 
The Suva Declaration as affixed in Appendix II, proposed two key issues that were not 
necessarily part of current UNFCCC ADP negotiations. This included the establishment 
of mechanisms for the payment of ocean and ecosystem services, as suggested by key 
regional environment NGOs501 whose officials were part of the drafting committee. The 
declaration also carried the position pursued by the leader of Kiribati and certain NGOs 
from Australia on a new global dialogue for an international moratorium on the 
development and expansion for fossil fuel industries, especially coal mines.   
 
PIDF Agreement Phase 
When the final text was circulated to the public the next day and a motion was carried in 
the final plenary to accept the text, there was no hesitation. This was after the 
Governing Council of Leaders had met in the morning to approve the final text from the 
work of officials the night before. According to anecdotal discussions, there were no 
                                                     
500 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 26), in discussion-talanoa with the author, June 7, 2015. 
501 One of these environmental organisations was the Oceania branch of  International Union for 
Conservation of Nature  
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major changes during the leaders’ meeting, as the heavy lifting was completed in the 
negotiations by officials and the PIDF secretariat the night before.  
 
In tracing the processes of consensus decision making in PIDF, the role of leaders was 
vital in approving and affirming consent. The open consultative plenaries brought 
together not only civil, private and government sector actors; but also, delegates and 
observers to suggest positions to consider for a Pacific united voice. The PIDF Summit 
provided a platform that would consolidate these declarations, and also include private 
and civil society to convey their messages and contributions for COP21 directly to 
leaders. Nonetheless, it would be informal backroom negotiations of a small group of 
officials and the PIDF Secretariat where decision making took place. The research could 
not identify who were present nor how many officials were present in the final drafting 
group when the text was finalised. What is clear, however, was the significant role of 
civil society members in the final outcome. According to Bainimarama, “We go from 
here to Paris with a clear signal in our Suva Declaration on Climate Change - of our 
determination to finally get the world community to act… the Suva Declaration is 
destined to be an historic document of an historic moment in which the Pacific came 
together as one”502.  
 
The Pacific Islands Forum  
PIF Context 
Regionalism and a Political Forum Legitimacy 
The PIF was established in 1971 as the main political multilateral organisation in the 
region. Created out of the demand by Pacific leaders for a space to dialogue the ‘high 
politics of the region’, this ‘inner circle of regionalism’503 was conceived in the era of 
decolonisation. In part it was borne out of the frustration of newly independent states 
about colonial government administrations’ unwillingness to discuss political issues in 
technical regional arrangements such as the South Pacific Commission on issues like 
                                                     
502 PIDF, "PACIFICIDF News," 2. 
503 Greg Fry, "The politics of South Pacific regional cooperation," in The South Pacific: problems, issues 
and prospects, ed. Ramesh Thakur (New York: Springer, 1991), 169. 
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self-determination and the French government’s nuclear testing policy in its 
territories504.  
 
Over the next four decades, the Forum’s membership had grown from the seven 
founding states Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Cook Islands, Nauru, Australia and New Zealand505 
into a robust organisation that includes all the sixteen independent states in the Pacific 
region506. As the preeminent regional political body, the Forum’s legitimacy is 
cemented in the recognition by states and intragovernmental bodies outside of the 
region. These partner relationships were visible in the PIF Dialogue Partners meeting, 
which was established in 1989 for its 18 observer partners to meet with its Pacific 
counterparts507. More importantly, the Forum’s legitimacy was affirmed in the work of 
its highest council, the PIF Leaders Meeting. The Leaders Meeting allowed states to 
consider both international and regional politics. The communique sets out the annual 
priorities for the region. The Leaders Meeting was also responsible for approving 
political declarations or mandates of cooperation on shared regional issues of concern 
that ranged from security, law enforcement, development agenda, transportation, a 
nuclear-free Pacific to climate change.   
 
Decision Making by Consensus 
The PIF communique decisions and its subsequent political declarations serve as the 
instruments by which regional policies are developed and implemented508. The 
organisation has no charter, so judgements are reached by members at each Forum 
meeting by a process of discussion and those conclusions on which consensus has been 
                                                     
504 Shibuya, "The problems and potential of the Pacific Islands forum," 104. 
505 In the first meeting of the South Pacific Forum 1971 Australia and New Zealand participated as 
observers. The were elevated to full members in 1972. 
506  The organisation in 2016 increased to 18 to include two French territories- comprises 18 members: 
Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New 
Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu 
507 Canada, People’s Republic of China, Cuba, European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and the 
United States 
508 PIF, "Forum Standing Meetings," Pacific Islands Forum https://www.forumsec.org/forum-standing-
meetings/. 
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achieved are announced in a communique509. From its earlier work around self-
determination and a nuclear-free Pacific, the organisation’s agenda over time came to 
incorporate regional security, fisheries, ocean management, governance and 
opportunities for economic and political integration to name a few. This regional agenda 
and priorities were coordinated by the PIF Secretariat510, under the leadership of the 
Secretary General, amongst the nine technical regional organisations that make up the 
CROP511.  
 
Beyond the implementation of leaders’ decisions, it is vital to explore how decisions by 
consensus are created in the Forum. As indicated earlier consensus was believed to be a 
product of consensus discussion, and not consensus by negotiation which on the surface 
seemed straightforward. However, the process of discussions was also a source of 
uneasiness and frustration amongst members especially when regional good impinges 
on national policies and interests. As the PIF or the South Pacific Forum when it was 
known in its early years was established with no formal constitution to guide its work, it 
depended on the leaders’ prerogatives year by year.  
 
The Chair of the Leaders’ Meeting (and the rotating host of the annual summits) and the 
Secretariat have considerable influence in suggesting rules of procedures for leaders to 
approve. This proved advantageous for member states to suggest agendas and priorities 
for the region leaders to consider.  With no formal voting rules in the Leaders’ council, 
the preferred and only rule of procedure was consensus.512 According to Michael Haas 
the significance of consensus of the organisation meant working around the philosophy 
of the ‘Pacific Way’ or a system of ‘unanimous compromise,’ where everyone 
sacrificed something for the overall benefit of the whole and all decisions are made by 
                                                     
509 G Robin South and Joeli Veitayaki, Global initiatives in the South Pacific: regional approaches to 
workable arrangements, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Management (Canberra: Asia Pacific 
Press, 1999), 12-13. 
510 Formerly known as the South Pacific Bureau of Economic Cooperation,  
511 The nine agencies of CROP as of 2015 were: Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO); Pacific Islands 
Development Programme (PIDP); Fisheries Agency (FFA); Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS); 
Pacific Power Association (PPA); Secretariat for the Pacific Community (SPC); Secretariat of the Pacific 
Regional Environment Programme (SPREP); South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO); and 
University of the South Pacific (USP)  
512 Shibuya, "The problems and potential of the Pacific Islands forum," 105. 
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consensus.513  However, this sacrifice would be a source of tension in what was 
perceived as the domination of former colonial power members Australia and New 
Zealand in the agenda setting514. “While the Pacific Way is supposed to bring about 
flexibility and compromise, the strong desire for consensus (at times for its own sake, it 
seems) gives each Forum member a de facto veto during the Forum meetings, thus 
weakening the collective unity and power of the Forum”.515 While members of the PIF 
have had a strong resolute and common understanding of social development in 
improving gender, health and education equity, there would be a sense of nervousness 
in discussing security, economic development, and of interest to this thesis - climate 
change.  
 
Divergence on Climate Change: Australia New Zealand and Islands’ states 
From the outside, and as noted earlier in Chapter Three, climate change has been a 
regional priority since the late 1980’s and is evident in the communiques and political 
declarations of the past twenty-five years. However, upon closer inspection within the 
Forum leaders’ meeting, climate change as policy has not met all members’ 
expectations. There was a wide range of views and different approaches in how Pacific 
governments approached climate change. While Pacific islands states, especially small 
low-lying states like Tuvalu and Kiribati, have impressed the need to address climate 
change as an existential and human security threat, for developed states of Australia and 
New Zealand the issue was a matter of economic security.  
 
This divergence would be more pronounced in 1997 as Pacific island states were 
pushing for stronger ambitions and timetables in the negotiations leading up to the 
Kyoto Protocol, and many were expecting this position in a PIF declaration. However, 
former Australian Prime Minister John Howard famously remarked publicly on the eve 
of 1997 Forum leaders’ ‘Big Retreat’, that he would not agree to any regional statement 
on binding targets for greenhouse gas reductions if they were to damage Australia’s 
                                                     
513 Haas. 
514 Rosaleen Smyth, Nii‐K Plange, and Neil Burdess, "Big brother? Australia's image in the South 
Pacific," Australian Journal of International Affairs 51, no. 1 (1997)., and Jim Rolfe, "New Zealand and 
the South Pacific," Revue Juridique Polynesienne 1 (2001). 
515 Shibuya, "The problems and potential of the Pacific Islands forum," 108. 
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economy516. When the communique was finalised it only noted ‘deep concerns’ and 
urged parties at the then forthcoming UNFCCC negotiations to ‘pursue vigorously an 
outcome’517. This led to statements by leaders like Tuvalu Prime Minister Bikenibeu 
Paeniu to say “Australia dominates us so much in this region. For once, we would have 
liked to have got some respect”518. With the power of the veto in multilateral consensus 
vested in one state or in this case its leader, states needed to appease the demands and 
reservations of Australia and New Zealand. The consequential climate change 
declarations and communiques have since become calls for action, and apart from the 
Majuro declaration, they take note of the different views amongst members. 
Furthermore, with the differing perspectives and interests on climate change, a binary 
relationship was thus created between island states on one side (belonging to AOSIS) 
and Australia and New Zealand on the other (of Annex I).  
  
Multifaceted politics of PIF 2015 
The potential regional leadership and financial wealth of Papua New Guinea was on 
display, and scrutiny, as the nation hosted leaders from around the Pacific and observer 
partners from outside the region. In many ways the 46th PIF Leaders was a first. It 
would be the first official meeting of the new and first woman PIF Secretary General 
Dame Meg Taylor, who was also a proud Papua New Guinean. The Forum would 
experiment with its new regional strategy of process-driven agenda under the 
Framework of Pacific Regionalism, that replaced the shared goal outcome-oriented 
strategy of the Pacific Plan. At the same time, after five years of suspension from the 
organisation, the newly democratically elected Fijian government were invited to re-join 
the Pacific family.  
 
Although the PIF meeting would take place only three days after the PIDF Suva 
gathering the mood changed from optimism to uncertainty. Climate change would not 
be the only issue raised with the leaders. From the new Framework of Pacific 
Regionalism process members identified an agenda that included West Papua’s self-
                                                     
516 Bernadette Hussein, "‘The Big Retreat’," Pacific Islands Monthly November 1997, 11. 
517  PIF, "Forum Communique: Twenty-eighth South Pacific Forum Rarotonga Cook Islands," ed. Pacific 
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determination, women’s health (regional response to cervical cancer), information and 
communication technology and fisheries. But it was expected that climate change would 
dominate political discussions. In the lead up to the PIF meeting in Port Moresby 
September 7-11, 2015, regional media and commentators expected a showdown in the 
dialogue around Pacific positions for the COP21519. There was an anticipation as in 
previous PIF meetings before a major UNFCCC meeting like the Kyoto and 
Copenhagen COPs, that a political declaration from regional leaders would be 
produced. 
 
The traditional stance of the Annex I members over the years, that any international 
agreement on climate change should not jeopardise their economic development, would 
be paramount. In a way PIF provided a platform for Pacific states to lobby and convince 
Australia and New Zealand of their climate change positions. This attempt to affirm an 
ambitious regional declaration needed the cooperation of its ‘big brother’ or as Marshall 
Islands foreign minister argued "[a]s the world's biggest per capita polluter, what 
Australia decides to do is very important."520  
 
PIF Pre-Negotiation Phase 
The program, as outlined in Table 15, for the forty-sixth meeting of PIF Leaders 
Meeting from September 7-11 which included the meeting of SIS, the Pacific state 
members in the African Caribbean and Pacific group at the European Union, not to 
mention the various bilateral meetings with partner states participating in the PIF Post-
Forum Partners Dialogue. However, the most significant of these dates where state 
delegations and media focussed much of their attention was on the ‘closed’ plenary and 
leaders’ retreat on September 9 and 10 respectively. While the plenary included all 
delegation officials and invited organisation observers, the retreat was set aside for 
leaders only (and with prerogative of the Chair may include one official) where the final 
decisions or the communique by the leaders would be decided. In a setting like the 
                                                     
519 See Greg Fry, 21 September 2015, 2015, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/author/greg-fry/.and Liam  
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520 Pacific Beat, "Marshall Islands foreign minister Tony de Brum slams Australia's proposed 2030 
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papal conclave, leaders would be situated in a room to dialogue for as much time as 
needed to reach a consensus or until the talks collapsed. Failure to achieve a common 
understanding was never an option and had not occurred in the forty plus years of the 
PIF’s existence.   
 
Table 15. PIF 2015 official program and schedule of meetings 
Date  Meeting 
September 7 Pre-meeting (Official): Smaller Islands States Leaders Meeting 
September 8 Pre-meeting: Pacific ACP Leaders Meeting 
September 9 Official Meeting: Pacific Islands Forum Plenary Session 
September 10 Official Meeting Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Retreat 
September 11 Official Meeting Pacific Islands Forum Post-Forum Partner 
Dialogue 
 
The politics and assumptions on leaders’ decision making in the ‘closed room’ arena of 
the retreat, has been the focus of many academic scholarship, media and anecdotal 
reports. However, this fascination with the outcome statements tends to overshadow the 
processes and the actors involved in building consensus before the retreat. The leaders 
retreat is the consensus point where decisions and agreements in one form are reached. 
Thus, the focus of subsequent sections trace the making of the two declarations that 
come out of the Port Moresby meeting: the PIF Smaller Island States Climate Change 
Declaration, and the PIF Leaders’ Climate Action Declaration. The argument here is 
that while leaders engage in diplomatic discussions on the totality of these declarations, 
the more detailed negotiations in the texts of these political mandates are conducted in 
the two subsidiary bodies of the Forum: SIS meeting, and the Forum Officials Meeting. 
The crux of Pacific diplomatic negotiations were held in these informal chambers.  
 
Inside: Smaller Island States meeting - The making of Smaller Island States 
Declaration on Climate Change 
Representing the most vulnerable and smallest island economies in the region, SIS 
membership consists of Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Republic of the 
  
 
187  
Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu521. “Against a background of ‘unique and particular’ 
vulnerabilities linked to their small size, lack of natural resources, and remoteness, SIS 
face a range of development challenges that limit their capacity to ensure resilience and 
long-term sustainable development”522. The sub-group formed around PIF talks in the 
late 1980’s523, but were officially recognised at the 1991 Forum meeting with their 
special development needs that led to its first formal meeting in January 1992524. In 
advocating special consideration of the smallest nations in terms of regional policy 
making, the implementation of a special hub and spoke model was created in 2006 
where officers from the seven countries were integrated into the structure of the PIF 
Secretariat in what was known as the SIS Unit525. Beyond the hub and spoke model, the 
main political discussions amongst members were facilitated in a dual structure: the SIS 
Officials Forum and the SIS Leaders meeting. The officials met alongside the Forum’s 
Officials meetings in the months prior to a PIF meeting, while the SIS leaders 
traditionally met outside of the PIF meetings at some regional airport hub, either Suva 
or Auckland. However, in 2015 for the first time the SIS leaders meeting was 
incorporated into the official Forum program with a meeting on Monday September 7, 
2015.  
 
Smaller islands vulnerabilities and special consideration 
The Laguna Hotel in Port Moresby would be the site of diplomatic flurry as six 
delegations of the seven-member countries of SIS met to discuss their particular 
regional political needs. Niue’s absence was noted by the outgoing chair of the 
collective, due to flight schedules that did not allow the delegation to arrive before the 
September 7 meeting526. Before the chairmanship passed from the President of Palau to 
the Prime Minister of Tuvalu, the members agreed on the program of procedures for the 
one-day meeting. An open plenary from 10am-12pm, followed by lunch, and to be 
                                                     
521 In 2016, the Federated States of Micronesia officially joined the SIS group to increase the membership 
to eight.  
522 PIF, "Smaller Island States," Pacific Islands Forum https://www.forumsec.org/smaller-island-states/  
523 Ron Crocombe, The South Pacific (Suva: University of the South Pacific, 2001). 
524 PIF, "Smaller Island States". 
525 "Smaller Island States". 
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concluded with a leaders’ retreat with a leader plus one official from 1.30pm-3pm. In 
effect the six-hour meeting program was a condensed version of the PIF leaders meeting 
that would take place two days later. All sessions were closed from media and non-
official observers - with exceptions made to invited non-member or organisation 
representatives. The plenary would only be allocated to leaders or heads of delegations 
to make interventions based on an agenda established at the meeting of the SIS 
Officials, one month prior on August 11. This preparatory meeting of officials meeting 
was vital in preparing the political agenda that required what PIF Secretary General 
Dame Meg Taylor called an exclusive focus on SIS, with the Forum Secretariat to be 
more ‘in touch’ with the regional needs of smaller island states527.  
 
During the plenary, it was clear which states sponsored an initiative to be taken up by 
the SIS collective from the leaders’ interventions. Palau’s emphasis on ocean 
conservation saw its President reiterate the importance of supporting international talks 
around ocean and sustainable development to increase marine protected areas and 
sanctuaries in the islands. Ocean conservation management policies were also shared by 
the Cook Islands leader who stressed the need for more marine park initiatives that 
supplemented the vision of Pacific islands as large ocean states. The Kiribati delegation 
prompted the leaders to revisit issues of regional transportation especially shipping and 
airspace (air travel) amongst the smaller island nations in the central Pacific.  The head 
delegate for Marshall Islands pointed to the need for a special fund for SIS initiatives to 
be separate from the budget of PIF Secretariat. There was general feeling of consent that 
the issues around ocean management, fisheries, infrastructure, sea and air transportation 
should be incorporated into the workplan for the PIF Secretariat’s SIS Unit. The plenary 
heard how the SIS officials were able to elevate the subgroup’s priorities for fisheries 
and climate change in the agenda of the PIF Leaders meeting; however, as Tuvalu, 
Kiribati and Marshall Islands leaders noted in their remarks there was a need for SIS 
solidarity in the impending talks with the rest of the Pacific leaders around climate 
change priorities leading up to COP21. The leaders’ remarks on the need for solidarity 
sparked a change in the tone of meeting. The intervention by leaders started to probe 
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questions and calls for the group to mobilise politically and send a collective message 
for the upcoming PIF Leaders meeting. 
 
The question of SIS political agency 
Although SIS in the past met as a group to discuss political issues, there was no 
evidence that the group lobbied within the PIF leaders’ meetings as a separate political 
coalition or collective. At best the grouping of seven countries identified certain issues 
for discussion, but never collectively held the PIF meeting to account for a SIS group 
position. However, the heightened atmosphere around a strong Pacific leaders’ message 
on climate change for Paris led to the plenary entertaining discussions around SIS 
political agency. The outgoing chair of SIS and Palau President Tommy Remengesu 
remarked in his opening remarks that were reported in media, on the need for solidarity 
among small island leaders to fight climate change. 
Let us make our message in Paris a message that we (SIS) can be proud to bring 
back to our people, one that will protect our environment and our cultural 
heritage. Our countries may be seen as small but we are in fact pioneers and 
trailblazers in restoring balance to our earth528. 
 
This line of thought was shared by another leader that pushed for the membership to 
consider having, for the first time, a SIS meeting communique with the statement “it 
would be remiss of us not to make noise”529. But the idea of a communique would 
receive less traction as the six nations favoured a more powerful statement from the 
group in the form of a SIS political declaration. The Tuvalu chair then supplemented the 
motion that SIS officials should meet in the lunch hour to draft this political declaration. 
The officials were given instructions to complete a declaration draft by the time leaders 
met in the afternoon, which was to also reflect all the regional and sub-regionals 
declarations, specifically the outcomes that were mentioned in the PIDF Suva 
Declaration.  
 
                                                     
528 Tommy Remengesu remarks reported in ibid. 
529 Smaller island state leader remarks during SIS closed leaders plenary, September 7, 2015. 
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SIS Officials Drafting Team  
Immediately during the lunch hour, the ad hoc group of officials converged in a separate 
room. The group invited special observers from CROP agencies including the PIF 
Secretariat, SPREP and SPC for technical and logistical support during the meeting. 
According to participants in the meeting, the group was chaired by a senior official from 
Tuvalu. But it would be the leadership by technical negotiators from Palau’s climate 
change ambassador and representatives from SPREP who were familiar with the current 
state of UNFCCC ADP talks that would drive the talks. Anecdotal evidence pointed 
towards these key technical negotiators, and other climate change negotiators from the 
six participating states who at the time of the Bonn ADP2-10 talks were the drafters of 
the initial text in the weeks before Port Moresby. The small group had negotiated and 
revised a text through email circulation that was focussed primarily on the issues 
debated in the ADP talks. The final SIS text was concise and were more in line with key 
issues which pursued in the multiple coalitions like AOSIS, Least Developing Countries 
and G-77 the seven states were associated with. These hard-line positions were reflected 
in the text as follows: 
 
To this end we urge that COP21 must deliver a legally binding agreement, 
which will: 
a) Limit global average temperature increase to well below 1.5 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels; 
b) Ensure that human rights to exist as a people are protected; 
c) Uphold the polluter pay principle; 
d) Address all sources of greenhouse gas emissions including those from 
international transport; 
e) Carry out a review to conduct a major renewal of international mitigation 
commitments every five years with flexibility for Small Island Developing 
States and Least Developed Countries, to examine the most recent science, as 
well as pathways for higher ambition, and provide an opportunity to recommit to 
stronger action; 
f) Include a mechanism to address loss and damage as a stand-alone element of 
the agreement and within that mechanism create a facility to effectively support 
people displaced by the impacts of climate change; 
g) Ensure ease of access to adequate and predictable finance, technology and 
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capacity building to ensure that Small Island Developing States and Least 
Developed Countries can transition to fossil fuel free economies and to have the 
ability to adapt to the impacts of climate change; and 
h) Recognise the special circumstances of Small Island Developing States and 
Least Developed Countries and direct additional efforts to assist them meet the 
challenge of climate change.530 
 
The officials draft team took less than an hour to complete their work. With a focussed 
agenda that primarily highlighted positions of the UNFCCC, there were little to no 
negotiations amongst the parties with the drafting talks fixed on consensus discussions 
531. The final text as endorsed by the leaders, and affixed in Appendix III, reaffirmed the 
AOSIS and other previous regional declarations, while reminding everyone that the 
negotiations were more than just economic: they were at the very least about ‘survival 
and security’532.  As the SIS chair, President Remengesau of Palau stated in the media, 
“We need to be frank and honest with reality. And the reality is that it is upon us and 
whether it is 1.5 or 2 percent, we are already seeing the impact of climate change in 
Small Island Countries”.533 The urgency and fears of a watered down PIF text had 
already played out in the media and academic circles as the showdown of regional 
climate diplomacy534. Despite the numerous declarations from the Pacific, as one 
Pacific leader reiterated for the importance of a united voice from the Forum “it would 
be the PIF declaration that is read and circulated within the UN”535. 
 
                                                     
530 PIF, "Smaller Island States Leaders’ Port Moresby Declaration on Climate Change ", ed. Pacific 
Islands Forum (Port Moresby: Pacific Islands Forum, 2015). 
531 Ibid. 
532 The author participated in the proceedings of the meetings as part of fieldwork. Half way during the 
morning of September 7, there was a call from Palau and Tuvalu for an SIS Declaration, whereby key 
officials were then whisked to another room over lunch to draft and agree on text- before sending it back 
to the SIS plenary in the same afternoon for confirmation. Part of this account can be found in Freddy 
Mou, "SIS Leaders Demand 1.5 degree target," (Sydney2015). 
533  ibid. 
534 See Greg Fry, September 4, 2015, 2015, http://devpolicy.org/pacific-climate-diplomacy-and-the-
future-relevance-of-the-pacific-islands-forum-20150904/.   and Cochtrane. 
535 Pacific island leader remarks during SIS closed leader’s plenary, September 9, 2015. 
  
 
192  
PIF Negotiation Phase 
The PIF Leaders Meeting, September 9 and 10 
The PIF Port Moresby leaders meeting would be the first testing ground leading up to 
Paris for Pacific island countries to reach a consensus with its fellow regional Annex 1 
partners, Australia and New Zealand. In the days leading up to Port Moresby PIF 
Secretary General Dame Meg Taylor described the meeting as game changing, "it 
would be good to see that we [Pacific island states] come closer with the two OECD 
members [Australia and New Zealand] situated in the Pacific… they are members of the 
Pacific Islands Forum, but they are also developed economies [so] issues for them are 
different to those in the rest of the Pacific"536. Although the program for the PIF Leaders 
meeting would be set aside in a five day program the crux of regional agenda 
discussions and any necessary negotiations took place in the two days of Leaders 
Plenary and Leaders Retreat on September 9 and 10 respectively. Both these sessions 
were closed off from media and the general public, and with the exception of associated 
state and regional organisation observers only official delegations were present in these 
meetings.  
 
PIF Plenary Session 
While the main plenary and photo opportunities with leaders was a grandiose and jovial 
affair, there was a slight uneasiness among climate change policymakers in Port 
Moresby. The UNFCCC ADP2-10 had just finished over the weekend, and there was 
news of a deadlock in the Bonn talks where New Zealand and Australia had prominent 
roles in the Umbrella Group. The PIF formal plenary on September 10 allowed for frank 
discussions and interventions among leaders and regional organization heads on how it 
should conduct its work in Paris. The Premier of Niue compared climate change to a 
slow cancer and argued that instead of “making declaration after declaration, the region 
needs to be pragmatic”. 537This view was not shared by the Tuvaluan Prime Minister. 
The leader articulated the need for a robust regional diplomatic strategy to coordinate 
and share resources and know how to speak as one voice in Paris. In order for this to 
                                                     
536 Meg Taylor, 15 March 2016, 2015.  
537 Toke Talagi, 2015. 
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happen, the leaders argued for a strong declaration from PIF, from words to action that 
clearly sets out the Pacific’s marching orders for COP. 
 
During the plenary, the leaders were informed by heads of SPREP and the SPC on 
regional preparations for COP21. As the organisation tasked with providing technical 
support for Pacific negotiators, the head of SPREP reassured leaders of the One Team 
approach of CROP personnel to travel and support the country delegations, and the 
upcoming negotiator training for ministers and officials at the SPREP HLSM in 
November. While the plenary meetings came to an understanding of shared support, it 
was also “not just one voice, but many voices with one message”538.  
 
PIF Leaders’ Retreat 
The following day, the Leaders’ Retreat would convene in a meeting room of the Grand 
Papua Hotel. For over eight hours the 16 leaders plus their one official would meet in 
seclusion to decide the direction of the region for the next year. The conclave-style 
meeting of leaders and their top officials would also invite the PIF Secretary General 
plus her one official to record the final decision of leaders that would become the 
communique. As indicated earlier, the agenda of the leaders meeting would revolve 
around 20 regional and international political issues. And central to this discussion 
would be climate change, and the shared positions from the Forum members for the 
UNFCCC Paris meeting539.  
 
While both the Retreat and Plenary revolved around the decision making of leaders, it 
was not the only Forum subsidiary body to meet. Behind the façade of charismatic 
speeches, press conferences and jovial leaders’ family photo in PNG traditionally 
inspired shirts, a separate informal process negotiation took place. For more than three 
                                                     
538 Pacific regional organisation head, remarks made during PIF plenary, June 9, 2015. 
539 The 2015 PIF agenda focussed on 20 issues: Framework for Pacific Regionalism, Fisheries, 
Information Communications Technologies (ICT), Cervical Cancer, West Papua, Hiri Declaration, 
Regional Governance and Financing, Forum Foreign Minister, Ministerial Meeting, French Polynesia, 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, Radioactive Contaminants in the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, Strengthening the Post-Forum Dialogue, PACER Plus, Post-2015 Development 
Agenda/Sustainable Development Goals, Implementation of the Forum Compact, Pacific Leaders Gender 
Equality Declaration (2012), Smaller Island States Leaders Meeting, Civil Society Organization Dialogue 
and Climate Change. 
  
 
194  
weeks, and throughout the Leaders’ plenary, the details of a PIF consensus on climate 
change were negotiated by the Forum Officials Committee (FOC). More specifically, 
this was the task of an ad hoc drafting group for the PIF climate change declaration.  
The FOC oversaw the work of the PIF Secretariat and in effect acted as the board of 
directors. Comprised of one representative per member state their work was to give 
general policy directions to the Secretary General, and to make reports and 
recommendations to the Forum Leaders’ meeting. The Committee’s chair was rotated 
annually amongst the membership and was not necessarily the same as the host of the 
PIF Leaders’ meeting; in 2015 the head of the FOC resided with Tuvalu. According to 
the PIF Agreement 2005 that describes the powers of the sub-committee, all matters, 
wherever possible were decided by consensus, or if necessary by a majority of the 
representatives present and voting540.  The subcommittee met at least once a year during 
the months leading up to the Leaders meeting541.  
 
Inside: Forum Officials Meetings: Drafting Group on PIF Climate Change 
Declaration 
A PIF Secretariat Draft Text 
On August 12 and 13 the FOC convened to prepare for the Port Moresby meeting, and 
for the first time deliberated an agenda derived from the public submission process of 
the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. During these discussions it was evident that the 
membership had recognised the need for a climate change declaration from the 
Leaders’- and a special ad hoc drafting committee was established to negotiate this 
statement. Like the PIDF Suva draft with its initial text originating from the Pacific 
SIDS group in New York, it was believed that the PIF text was drawn up by PIF 
Secretariat officials tasked with the mandate on climate change financing. The FOC 
climate change draft text was sourced from positions already approved in previous PIF 
climate change and sub-regional declarations as well as items identified as pivotal to 
member states currently debated in the ADP process.  
 
                                                     
540 PIF, "Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum," (Port Moresby: Pacific Islands Forum 
2006). 
541 South and Veitayaki, 12-13. 
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The August FOC drafting group could not complete their task by finding consensus in 
the text. However, the group agreed to continue negotiations over the next three weeks 
over emails and online submission from their respective capitals. This online 
negotiation process would see the PIF Secretariat sending a revised word document 
attachment to the political focal points (usually Ministries of Foreign Affairs). The 
officials from the capital would make comments/submissions and insertions in the text 
via word document track changes, and then send a copy to all members. This process of 
making insertions or comments on a document online, was a common practice for many 
if not all regional policy documents and strategy plans. The changes would then be 
negotiated in person when the group reconvened in Port Moresby.  
 
From online to face-to-face negotiations 
While the elaborate opening ceremony for Leaders took place on the evening of 
September 6, in a separate venue the drafting group reconvened to continue their work. 
The group assessed the latest version of the negotiated text which had been recalibrated 
by the PIF Secretariat staff taking into account the notes emailed from officials. The 
first meeting was to check its consistency and wording with the SIS Leaders Climate 
Change Declaration, and the outcomes of ADP2-10. In this meeting only negotiators 
from Papua New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand who were present at the ADP2-10 
were able to attend in time, while Palau and Tuvalu were represented by officials who 
were knowledgeable with the state of play in the negotiations given their involvement in 
the past. Other states sent officials who were not tied up with protocol work of the 
opening ceremony, usually staff from foreign affairs or Prime Minister’s office officials. 
Observing the deliberations were regional organisation staff from SPREP and SPC for 
technical support. However, the group could not complete its work due to 
disagreements in the texts and the consent was for the group to meet the following day. 
 
In similar circumstances as the previous day, away from the Leaders’ Plenary in a 
separate room, fewer than twenty officials reconvened between 11.00am to 1.00pm to 
further flesh out the draft text of the declaration. This time, out of the sixteen states only 
eight states were present in the negotiations. The absence of officials from the previous 
day was apparently because they were needed to support leaders in the plenary meeting, 
or because they were involved in various bilateral meetings at the conference venue. For 
those present in the drafting session, there was a sense of urgency in completing their 
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task before the Leaders’ meeting the next day. According to anecdotal accounts from 
those present in the meeting, there was a clear distinction in the strategy of officials who 
were also UNFCCC technical negotiators, and officials who had little knowledge about 
the jargon and wordsmithing of climate speak. On one side, Australia and New 
Zealand’s lead climate change negotiators maintained the hard-line tactic of not 
agreeing to language that committed them to action on loss and damage, finance and 
mitigation. On the other PNG were mainly focussed on inserting language on REDD 
forest. Some officials were reported to have confused the issue of the 1.5 degree long-
term temperature goal and failed to recognise the intricacies of agreeing to language that 
did not provide any concrete action. It was left to the Palau official to act as the 
mediator amongst the parties to provide some acceptable language to salvage key issues 
that were acceptable to all parties. As one observer official noted, “there was some wins 
and losses, you can see in the passion and willingness in some of the negotiators from 
the Pacific their willingness, but because they were not used to the UNFCCC lingo and 
wording tactics, they couldn’t push as hard”542. By the end of the meeting the group had 
come to an understanding on common language but would reconvene one last time in 
the evening.  
 
In the final drafting group meeting, after postponement from 5.30pm to 9.00pm only 
four states sent officials to the final meeting. Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Australia and 
New Zealand were reported to have attended the final meeting to negotiate any final 
changes. It was believed that other negotiators were occupied with respective delegation 
responsibilities to prepare leaders for the Retreat, as well as various side events in the 
evening. Although there were anecdotal reports of suggestions for improvements to the 
language of the text and even the possibility of a new text altogether, this did not 
happen. The fact that officials from other Pacific states could not be present to provide 
consent meant that the old text from earlier in the day would remain. As some of the 
changes proposed included wording and paragraphs that were inserted by states in 
absentia, there was reluctance by some negotiators to touch the text without the political 
mandate of those that sponsored the wording. In the end, the version from the 1.00pm 
                                                     
542 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 17), in discussion-talanoa with the author, September 9, 2015., Pacific 
negotiator (Talanoa 24), in discussion-talanoa with the author, September 9, 2015. 
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meeting, which was also the ninth draft version, became the final text. This research 
could not substantiate whether there were any changes to the text when delivered to the 
Leaders’ Retreat for final consideration the next day. However, it was generally 
assumed by those involved in the negotiating of the text that the decision of Leaders 
was confined to agreeing to the declaration as a whole. 
 
PIF Agreement Phase 
Reflections on the Final Text 
In the end, the Port Moresby PIF Leaders Declaration on Climate Change Action 2015 
was received with mixed reviews when considering the binary relationship between the 
positions pursued by island states, and that of New Zealand and Australia. As one 
participant said in corridor discussions, “there were some wins and some losses in the 
negotiations”543. For some leaders, the Declaration did not fully deliver on what they 
had intended.  
It's not the best outcome that we would have liked but I think we must respect 
that whether we accept that or not is a different question but at this point and 
time we would like to be able to sit down as colleagues and agree on the range 
of numbers rather than one or the other and I think this is the way we have come 
out of this meeting544.  
Kiribati President Anote Tong’s statement above could be explained by their position 
on a moratorium on fossil fuel and coal industries, which was not surprisingly vetoed by 
the Australia’s Coalition Party government, reluctant to disestablish an industry its 
energy sector relied heavily on. Leading scholars called the diplomatic endeavour as an 
“exercise in creative ambiguity aimed at papering over the fundamental differences 
between Australia and New Zealand on one hand, and the Pacific Islands on the 
other”.545 The text was obscured under layers of text diplomacy manoeuvring. Such 
arguments were based on the 1.5 degrees long-term temperature goal text – although 
                                                     
543 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 17), in discussion-talanoa with the author, September 9, 2015., Pacific 
negotiator (Talanoa 24), in discussion-talanoa with the author, September 9, 2015. 
544 Anote Tong quoted in Radio New Zealand, "Forum leaders agree to disagree on climate change," 
Radio New Zealand, https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/283881/forum-leaders-agree-
to-disagree-on-climate-change. 
545 Greg Fry to The Strategist, September 21, 2015, 2015, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-pacific-
islands-forum-declaration-on-climate-change-consensus-at-the-cost-of-strategy-on-the-road-to-paris/. 
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listed in the declaration, the membership could only find common ground on the 
UNFCC COP20 decision 1/20 language that states: “holding the increase in global 
average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels.”546 Furthermore, 
media reported that the New Zealand Prime Minister stated that “the Leaders did not 
agree to a single and unified position”547. 
 
Nonetheless, the fact that an agreement was achieved despite various strong oppositions 
and key asks reflects success of consensus decision making in the Forum. The final 
Declaration PIF Leaders Climate Change Action is affixed in Appendix IV. The 
statement by leaders in the plenary clearly articulated the expectation that PIF had to 
deliver on a declaration. Failure or no agreement was not an option. Unlike other 
regional negotiations like PACER Plus that had been ongoing for years, a statement 
from the Pacific countries on climate change was a must. The question that PIF 
delegations had to answer in their deliberations was how strong the language should be, 
or in other words, what positions could the developing island state members agree with 
their developed state partners.  
 
PIF a turning point? 
In effect the Forum meeting was the first real opportunity for Pacific states to lobby 
Australia and New Zealand on positions negotiated at ADP. Under the scrutiny of 
Leaders’ commitments, as well as media and public expectation, the Forum became a 
site of negotiation lobbying. In the final clause of the Declaration, states found common 
ground on thirteen positions to be included in the Paris Agreement. These positions 
were watered down principles on adaptation, mitigation, REDD+, financing, loss and 
damage, technology transfers and special consideration of Small Islands Developing 
States and Least Developing Countries. They were expressed in amicable language 
generally agreed to in the UNFCCC negotiations. Although media and academic 
commentary post-meeting reported on the watering down or ambiguous language as 
part of the Australia and New Zealand heavy handedness, another argument can also be 
said of Pacific island officials. Pacific officials, in this case technical negotiators from 
                                                     
546 UNFCCC, "Lima Call for Climate Action Decision 1/CP.20." 
547 Fry Pacific Islands Forum: climate ‘consensus’ on the road to Paris. 
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Papua New Guinea, Palau and to an extent Kiribati and Tuvalu- were able negotiate 
directly with Australia and New Zealand and push for a position on some of sensitive 
issues in the ADP. The mediator role of Palau’s climate change ambassador, Ngedikes 
Olai Uludong, in the negotiations to try and bring all parties to the table was in part her 
knowledge on the sensitivity of the issues at the international level and negotiator 
expertise as the former lead negotiator for AOSIS.  In a surprising policy direction, 
Australia and New Zealand for the first time agreed to discuss and support the issue of 
loss and damage as a separate standalone issue in the agreement, as well as supporting 
an increase in climate financing, specifically vulnerable island nations. Throughout the 
ADP negotiations, these requests were not openly entertained by Australia and New 
Zealand as Annex I states. However, the PIF meeting affirmation would be the first 
signal of a compromise in international level negotiations. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined regional multilateral consensus decision making in the Pacific 
region. It traced the work of the PIDF and PIF, more precisely during the ten days of 
regional high-level summitry in September 2015. Although far removed from the 
formal UNFCCC negotiations, the preparations for the highly anticipated Paris climate 
change COP21 meeting in December took centre stage in the agendas of the PIDF 
Summit and PIF Leaders’ Meeting. Both these regional multilateral forums were 
perceived by most if not all of the fourteen Pacific island states as significant diplomatic 
arenas in which to craft a united Pacific voice. 
 
For PIDF, the eleven-member states recognised the contribution of the new political 
organisation to foster a consensus amongst Pacific small island developing states and 
one that was inclusive of civil society and private sector. For six of the seven members 
of the SIS of the PIF, their annual meeting would serve as a platform to mobilise 
politically through a declaration that emphasised their special vulnerabilities and the 
urgency for an agreement in Paris. And finally, the PIF Leaders’ Meeting was not only 
the main forum for all sixteen Pacific states to craft positions from the Pacific, but more 
importantly it was a unique platform for the fourteen island states to lobby the Annex I 
states.  
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Consensus Decision Making in Pacific Regionalism 
This research finds that in 2015, consensus decision making on issues of climate change 
in regional multilateral organisations took place in complex structural layers that were 
not largely reliant on the leaders but lay mostly with a small group of officials. This 
thesis supports existing literature that leaders have the final authority to approve all 
decisions but dialogue for the Consensus Point rests within the formal closed chambers 
of the PIDF Governing Council for PIF, the SIS Leaders Meeting for PIF SIS, and the 
PIF Leaders Retreat for PIF. At the same time leaders play an important role in 
approving a framework and setting the political will in the early phases of negotiations. 
For PIDF this takes place in the Council’s meeting of the last day of pre-negotiations, 
and for SIS and PIF Leaders this work is carried out in the early plenary sessions of 
negotiations. They affirm whether a consensus joint decision will take place, and in the 
case of the meetings in 2015 they mandated that an outcome was to be established, and 
failure was not an option.  
 
Small Groups of Officials 
While leaders were instrumental in affirming decisions, the task of negotiating the 
detailed language and wording of what the final outcome would like, took place in 
informal settings with a small group of officials. These small groups were the PIDF 
Senior Officials Committee, the PIF SIS Officials Committee and the PIF Forum 
Officials Committee. In all three climate change declarations examined here, officials 
representing the various participating states had met either face to face or virtually in 
pre-negotiation meetings. The process would start with an initial draft sponsor: for 
PIDF it was the PSIDS negotiation bloc in New York, for SIS it was a group of 
technical negotiators involved in ADP and for PIF it was the PIF Secretariat’s staff 
working on climate change. The sponsored drafts would then be negotiated either or 
both in preparatory meetings and online email negotiations. The preliminary result from 
this process would be considered by Leaders and given the mandate to continue or to 
discontinue. Once the consent from Leaders was received, usually through affirmations 
in the opening plenary, negotiation bargaining and monitoring by officials would then 
take place.  
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This negotiation process took place in closed informal chambers, where participating 
states would take on board new or revised positions from national policies, or as in the 
case of PIDF submissions from civil society and the private sector. The positions of 
states pursued by the persuasive debates of its official negotiators present in the room 
during this stage is most vital. The ability of states to influence the outcome of decisions 
made in regional organisations rests heavily on the presence of representatives who can 
lobby other officials in favour of a compromise. This compromise or ‘watering down’ 
of positions involves states not agreeing to a common position, but in reaching a 
decision on language or text that officials and their states could live with. This 
agreement not to disagree is dependent on the interactional finesse and relationship of 
negotiators in the room. This was exemplified throughout the accounts of officials 
involved in the PIDF, SIS and PIF officials meeting. While officials present ranged 
from diplomats, foreign affairs people, environmental climate change practitioners, and 
the representatives of regional organisations and non-governmental organisations (as in 
the case of PIDF), there was a smaller coalescent group driving these negotiations.  
 
Smaller Coalescent Group of Technical Negotiators 
This subgroup of officials had in common the technical expertise needed in climate 
change diplomacy and were highly knowledgeable about UNFCCC ADP issues and 
process. For PIDF these were officials from Fiji and regional and non-governmental 
organisations, for SIS they were officials from Palau, Tuvalu and Marshall Islands; and 
for the PIF they were officials from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Palau, 
Tuvalu and to some extent Kiribati. Despite representing diverse views and priorities in 
the private closed meetings, these officials had built relationships and expertise from 
being involved and well versed in climate speak language. The manipulation of text 
language that can be acceptable to all parties is the product of this smaller group. 
Although this research does not list in detail the individual positions that states pursued 
through their key negotiators, central in protecting their positions was having the right 
technical negotiator to be engaged in the process to protect their key positions. Once the 
smaller coalescent group of technical negotiators had reached a consensus on a text or 
language, this text would then be delivered to leaders for final affirmation.  
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Pacific Multilateral Consensus: Pacific Way and Talanoa Diplomacy 
The concepts of the Pacific Way and Talanoa Diplomacy have been constructed and 
incorporated in the process of decision making to depict a form of deliberation. From 
mapping the process, actors and activities of regional politics, this research finds that 
these concepts are used in practice at the different levels of consensus decision making. 
The Pacific Way describes the political dialogue of leaders in both consent for an 
agenda of negotiations to take place, and in agreement to conclude or affirm decisions. 
As mentioned above, the details of these decisions whether in the language of a final 
communique or political declaration are negotiated by a small group of officials, and in 
particular a smaller coalescent group of technical officials. Leaders invoke the concept 
of Pacific Way to initiate a process and to conclude an outcome.  
 
On the other hand, the concept of Talanoa Diplomacy depicts a stage during 
negotiations. It involves dialogue among participating negotiators and is not solely 
state-centric but inclusive of the positions shared by non-state actors. There is no 
bargaining of ideas or positions, but rather a platform to gather different viewpoints to 
be strengthened or to be considered in the final outcome. This concept was mainly 
invoked and practised within PIDF, in an open forum. This proved advantageous in 
consolidating legitimacy for decision making that actually took place in closed small 
group officials’ negotiations. However, while the practice is perceived as inclusive, 
Talanoa Diplomacy is also exclusive with the fact that only invited participants can 
contribute during the dialogue. 
 
These concepts are incomplete. Pacific consensus is not just the product of dialogues of 
elite leaders or inclusive actor dialogue but is the product of the finesse and skill of a 
small group of officials. In analysing the climate change political dialogue in 2015, 
officials who were knowledgeable about climate change issues, had strong informal 
relationships with other officials and were equipped in the skill of manipulating text 
drove both the agenda and the conclusion of climate consensus in the Pacific.   
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Chapter Six: Global Negotiations - UNFCCC Paris Climate Change 
Conference 
 
Introduction: 
This final empirical chapter will explore the pinnacle of multilateral forums for climate 
change negotiations in 2015, the Paris Climate Change Conference, more commonly 
known as COP21. It was more than just the annual meeting of the UNFCCC parties; the 
mega conference completed four long years of climate negotiations for a new global 
consensus on the climate change regime post 2020.  
 
As detailed throughout the preceding chapters, multiple multilateral processes at the 
international and regional levels prepared parties for what was to come in Paris. For 
Pacific island countries this came in the form of participating in the various UNFCCC 
ADP meetings throughout the year that concentrated in producing a draft text document. 
Meanwhile at the regional level, various sub-regional and regional organisation 
gatherings emphasised the need for a proactive and collective approach from Pacific 
states, especially in the main December conference.  
 
What happened at the Paris COP21? How did Pacific states engage in the negotiations? 
Did the actions of Pacific states help build and reach a global consensus, or the Paris 
Outcome? Who were the actors from Pacific delegations most influential in the process, 
and what activities did they employ? What lessons can be learned in explaining how 
states create multilateral consensus? These questions are central to this chapter, which 
details how delegations from the Pacific islands participated in the final multi-party 
negotiations. The COP is a megaconference of not one, but many meetings and 
subsidiary processes happening at the same time. The focus here is to trace the 
particular negotiations around the drafting and conclusion of the Paris Outcome. It was 
a process in December that would begin with the negotiations in the twelfth session of 
the ADP (ADP2-12), before the Comité de Paris at the ministerial level would proceed 
with the final leg of negotiations. 
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The chapter opens by describing some of the political dynamics and preparations 
leading up to Paris, with special attention on the preparations by Pacific island states in 
the months prior. Before the official start of the conference, a week allocated to 
preparatory meetings for the various coalitions would take place within AOSIS and the 
newly established Pacific SIDS. In this preparatory phase of negotiations, the thesis 
explores the work of Pacific delegations in the negotiation phase where the leaders’ 
High-Level Segment and the final ADP2-12 would conclude their work. Instrumental in 
this phase would be the role of coalitions, including Pacific SIDS. The main and final 
section focuses on the last week of negotiations during the Comité de Paris negotiations 
when the negotiations were officially controlled by the French government. This 
Agreement Phase that would come in the final week of intense negotiations at the 
ministerial level is described here as the Consensus Point; not just for the COP 21 
meeting per se, but the consensus point on a global multilateral consensus on climate 
change. There were not one but multiple activities happening at the same time and for 
the Pacific states the work of Tuvalu on Loss and Damage, and Marshall Islands on the 
High Ambition Coalition were pivotal in ensuring Pacific priorities were entrenched in 
the final Paris outcome. The concluding section will analyse the contributions from 
Pacific island states and attempt to draw diplomatic lessons on consensus decision 
making from this global multilateral conference.  
  
COP21 Context  
Global multilateral conference, global participation 
The medieval statement, all roads lead to Rome, to describe the linkages of the ancient 
Roman empire, aptly describes the climate change negotiations of 2015. Instead of 
Rome, all climate negotiation roads lead to Paris, the site for negotiations on a new 
global consensus on climate change. For four years the 196 parties of the UNFCCC 
undertook numerous domestic consultations. Regional multilateral forums in the 
Pacific, Caribbean, Africa, European Union and Latin America to name a few, sought a 
common understanding amongst their members. Intra-governmental arrangements and 
alliances, like G20, G-7, World Economic Forum, Commonwealth Heads of 
Governments, and APEC Economic Leaders meeting, which were traditionally 
accustomed to economic and trade talks, had prioritised the Paris climate change 
negotiations in their deliberations of 2015.  
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Beyond these state-centric entities, a conglomeration of private companies, cities and 
market capitals took part in climate partnership conversations. NGOs such as 
environmental activists, development delivery organisations, social justice movements 
and even climate change deniers, were spearheading public campaigns that drove 
momentum. Vital in calls for global climate citizenry to not only care but also call out 
states to act in the negotiations were the media, and individual celebrity activists such as 
former U.S. Vice President Al Gore and movie star politician Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger. All these informal processes and many more conversations on climate 
change negotiations mattered; these processes exemplified global political will and the 
expectation that the Paris negotiations would succeed.   
 
French leadership and proactiveness 
After an intensive year of negotiations, the work of the UNFCCC ADP was nearing an 
end. Time was running out with a mandate to finalise a text by December 2015. The 
Paris Climate Change Conference was expected to be a diplomatic showcase of global 
political will on climate change. French officials were engaged in various diplomatic 
innovations to encourage political will. France had co-led with the current chair of Peru 
various informal consultations; starting with lead negotiators in January, by June these 
meetings converted to informal ministerial consultations. “The goal of the ‘informal 
ministerial consultations,’ which (brought) together around 40 delegations including 
about 30 ministers, was to discuss the overall balance of the agreement, its level of 
ambition and the degree of differentiation that should be retained in order to take into 
account the situation and levels of development of the different UN member states”.548 
These informal ministerial meetings intensified into the traditional Pre-COP meeting, 
where over 60 ministers convened from November 8-10 to explore possible 
compromises and general political momentum and prepare for resumption of 
negotiations at COP 21549.  
 
                                                     
548 France Diplomatie, 15 March, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-
policy/climate/events/article/climate-opening-of-informal-ministerial-consultations-20-21-07-15. 
549 ENB, "Paris Climate Change Conference 29 November-12 December, Daily Report Monday 30 
November 2015," ed. Earth Negotiations Bulletin (Paris: International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 2015). 
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In all these meetings, France had identified two Pacific states and their influential role 
on key positions and in coalition networks. The Marshall Islands had built a formidable 
position and negotiation team around the issues of mitigation pursued through the 
AOSIS coalition. Meanwhile Tuvalu’s strong stance on the issue of loss and damage on 
top of its leadership role in the grouping of states that belonged to the Least Developed 
Countries were pivotal reasons for their participation.  The role of the Chair was not to 
isolate parties with differing interests, but rather to ensure that they had a seat at the 
table. The calls for an inclusive and transparent decision making process was a major 
reason for Tuvalu’s reluctance to agree to the final terms of the Copenhagen Accord in 
2009550.  
 
Learning from past mistakes 
The ghosts of the diplomatic failure of the major climate change conference in 
Copenhagen 2009 loomed over the minds of participating delegates, the French Chair 
and the UNFCCC secretariat throughout the year, and especially in the  days leading up 
to Paris. The legitimacy of UNFCCC process was under scrutiny, and many feared that 
history could repeat itself in a secret deal. Would France, despite its promises of an 
open and transparent process for all member parties, usher in a secret deal with the 
major economies? Would the global south countries be shut out of the room in the final 
days of negotiations? Could the major economies such as U.S., China and India refuse 
to sign on or even spoil the negotiations? Even if there were an agreement, would there 
be enough ambition from parties to actually make a difference in terms of decreasing, if 
not stabilising greenhouse gas emissions? Would there be enough financial 
contributions to help states transform economies and adapt to existing climate change 
impacts? These questions and more framed the narratives of media, and especially the 
politics amongst states heading into Paris.  
 
Paris COP 21 was not just a political negotiation, but also a logistical negotiation. The 
scene was set in the one of Paris’ northern suburbs at the Le Bourget Convention Centre 
with an estimated budget of €170 million to cater for the 12 days of multilateral 
                                                     
550 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 26), in discussion-talanoa with the author, November 5, 2017. 
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negotiations November 30-December 11551. Two weeks before the conference, a series 
of terrorist attacks in central Paris killed 129. This led to an already tightened security 
operation at the conference venue and across France with over 30,000 police and 
military officers deployed in over 285 security points552. The fear of further attacks 
during the talks did not derail willingness as seen in the convergence of participants in 
the weeks leading up to the talks. With more than 36,000 participants from 196 parties, 
2 observer states and over 1,236 observer organisations (ranging from UN bodies, 
specialised agencies, intragovernmental bodies and non-governmental organisations), 
and media it would become one of the biggest multilateral gatherings in history553. 
Among this multitude only a little more than 23,000 of the participants registered were 
officials or received pink badges. Not all officials were participating in the talks. COPs 
are mega-information sharing platforms that include exhibition zones for private and 
civil society sector initiatives, a media centre, and a public exhibition. The level of 
access to various zones depended on the accreditation badges, where official 
participants with the pink badges enjoyed access to all zones, and especially to the 
formal negotiation chambers for officials.   
 
Pacific island states and COP21 Preparations 
Regional Political Mandate 
The urgency and importance of COP21 could be seen in the preparations by Pacific 
island states in the months leading up to Paris. As explored in Chapter Four through its 
delegations’ participation in the various UNFCCC coalitions, there were amicable 
attempts to engage in the various preparatory ADP negotiations in June (ADP2-9), and 
again in August (2-10) and October (ADP2-11) sessions. While maintaining close 
linkages within traditional issue-specific political groupings (AOSIS, LDC, G-77, 
Coalition of Rainforest Nations and Climate Vulnerable), there was also an awareness 
and growing impetus that Pacific states should engage in the negotiations as a political 
collective. The result of these calls for a ‘united Pacific voice’ materialised in the 
                                                     
551 The Local, "The Paris COP21 climate summit in numbers," The Local 
https://www.thelocal.fr/20151130/cop-21-in-numbers-the-facts-and-figures-to-know. 
552 Justin Worland, "Paris Climate Conference to Proceed with Heightened Security After Attacks," in 
World Climate Change (Time, 2015). 
553 UNFCCC, "Provisional list of participant UNFCCC COP21 30 November- 11 December 2015," 
(Paris: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). 
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various political declarations from regional organisations in the Pacific, which were 
highlighted in Chapter Five. The PIDF Suva, PIF SIS and PIF Port Moresby 
declarations not only substantiated shared positions amongst member states, but more 
importantly created a political mandate for leaders and their respective technical 
negotiators to work collectively. Furthermore, it was a mandate for greater unity and 
support from various regional agencies. This is reflected in the PIF Leaders’ Climate 
Action Declaration stated as an operating instruction and affirmation of positions: 
[we] recognise the importance of amplifying the Pacific voice at all avenues 
possible with a view to influence the Paris outcome, and note the positions of 
the region as expressed in other meeting outcomes and declarations, including 
the Smaller Island States Leaders’ Port Moresby Declaration on Climate 
Change in September 2015, the Suva Declaration on Climate Change in 
September 2015, the Nuku’alofa Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable 
Weather and Climate Services for a Resilient Pacific in July 2015, the 
Polynesian Leaders’ Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate Change in July 
2015, the Lifou Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change in April 2015, the 
SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway in September 2014, 
the Majuro Declaration on Climate Leadership in September 2013, and the Niue 
Declaration on Climate Change in August 2008”554 
Although the PIF declaration was a consensus non-binding agreement that included 
Australia and New Zealand, it would be the 14 island state members that were more 
inclined to carry out these instructions to engage in the negotiations as a collective.  
 
One CROP Team Plus: regional organisations support and preparations 
Conveniently, the various declarations in turn provided the opportunity for regional 
intra-governmental organisations and their technical staff to support member states and 
influence the process. For the CROP agencies such as PIF, SPREP, SPC and the 
University of the South Pacific the political declarations affirmed their existing 
scientific and technical-negotiator support roles. On the other hand, for organisations 
like PIDF, the Suva Declaration provided the necessary recognition for both the 
                                                     
554 PIF, "Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Declaration on Climate Change Action." 
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organisation and its networks like the PSIDS New York negotiation bloc and various 
regional NGO groups. 
Even before the days of the 2009 Copenhagen COP, the University of the South Pacific 
would offer to member states the opportunity for students studying in their climate 
change program to be a part of their delegation by providing research capacity during 
the COP negotiations. The success of the intern program would be seen in the fact that 
many negotiators and some lead negotiators from the Pacific were past students of the 
USP climate change program555. Supported with funding from the European Union and 
the university itself, the program would send eight students and two lecturers with 
expertise in climate science, climate finance, law, as well as rapporteur experience 
supporting national and international meeting not only for six countries, but for the 
regional exercise. As the head of the USP contingent to COP21 Professor Elizabeth 
Holland described their contribution in the media, “[w]e are there to strengthen the 
Pacific voice at COP21 and help our regional delegations negotiate a better future for 
the Pacific”.556 
 
The capacity provided by SPC and SPREP were informed by their roles as technical 
implementing agencies of various climate change projects in the region. Their advice 
during negotiations would prove useful in determining language in the new global 
agreement that would open new opportunities for financing, and a broadened agenda on 
climate change that was not limited to existing projects around adaptation and 
mitigation. Leading up to both the PIF Leaders Meeting in Port Moresby and again 
before COP21 negotiations, SPREP had circulated fifteen briefing papers on the 
different issues. These papers were produced to help the Pacific islands prepare their 
national stances by providing them with an overview of the current status of the 
negotiations leading into Paris557. However, the most important contribution regional 
organisations offered Pacific island states was the institutional knowledge on the 
processes and issues of the COP, and the strategies by which negotiators and leaders can 
                                                     
555 USP, "USP students in COP 19 meeting," University of the South Pacific 
https://www.usp.ac.fj/news/story.php?id=1386. 
556 "USP’s emerging Climate Leaders to support the Pacific at COP21," University of the South Pacific 
https://www.usp.ac.fj/news/story.php?id=1976; ibid. 
557 SPREP, "Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme Annual Report 2015," ed. 
SPREP (Apia: Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, 2016), 13. 
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engage effectively. In a timeline of international and regional meetings that seemed 
serendipitous, the pronouncement by leaders for states to work together would give 
teeth to the pre-scheduled SPREP organised HLSM in Apia of November558.  
 
The Pacific High-Level Support Mechanism (SPREP and CROP Plus) 
The HLSM training provided a platform for delegations from the Pacific to develop 
their joint plan of action, in collaboration with various CROP regional organisations. 
This was of vital importance as a similar training session held earlier in May helped 
prepare negotiators for the Bonn ADP sessions. The November meeting would not only 
focus on training for negotiators but more importantly ministers that will attend the 
upcoming COP in Paris. The German based and funded NGO, Climate Analytics, 
provided UNFCCC negotiation training and political briefings, a service not only for 
the Pacific, but other small island states such as the Caribbean and states under least 
developing countries559. For Climate Analytics it was a role that cemented their 
leadership and influence in both the AOSIS and LDC coalitions.  
 
However, the November meeting was run as an intensive three-day session of political 
negotiations and media training, in a secluded resort. This isolation tactic not only 
allowed countries to strategise and align coordinating positions before Paris, but also 
fostered close and trusting negotiator relationships among state negotiators and the 
regional organisation support team. This joint plan of action to work together would 
become known as the One CROP Team560. Beyond CROP agencies, there was also the 
inclusion of partners like PIDF and various UN agencies based in the Pacific, and some 
thought the name of One CROP Team Plus seemed more appropriate. On top of the 
negotiation simulation exercises, a communication campaign initiative, Pacific Voyage 
to COP21, also known through the hashtag #4PacIslands, was established to promote 
Pacific voices in the negotiations. The strategy was coordinated through SPREP and 
was intended to include collaborations via press conferences, exhibition booths, as well 
                                                     
558 The HLSM initiative was also carried out at the national level throughout 2015 in training sessions 
were held in Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu and the Federated States of Micronesia, which was also attended by 
Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. This training provided Pacifi delegations with a ‘feel’ for 
how negotiations work. 
559 Climate Analytics. 
560 SPREP, "Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme Annual Report 2015," 13. 
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as support for regional media journalists to attend and report on the conference through 
traditional and social media. Apart from the organisations associated with CROP and 
PIDF, outside of the region, the PSIDS New York chair and representatives played a 
pivotal role in the HLSM preparations  
 
PSIDS New York  
Heralded by one Pacific scholar as arguably the strongest example of Pacific collective 
diplomacy561, PSIDS was the name given to a negotiation bloc of the 12 Pacific island 
states with permanent representative missions at the UN headquarters in New York. It 
had previously interacted in UN politics as the Forum Group, when it included Australia 
and New Zealand, while others referred to the group as the Black SOPAC group562. 
However, due to regional voting rules and differences in positions at the UN563 the 
negotiation bloc concentrated on the affairs of island states. Since 2009, the work of the 
bloc revolved around the UN agenda in New York on security, human rights, and 
sustainable development. Except for Papua New Guinea and Fiji564, all other missions 
were also active in the climate change negotiations in Bonn.  
 
The PSIDS group of ambassadors provided both the leadership and the links between 
capitals and the work of AOSIS coalition, as well as the wider UNFCCC structure. With 
the AOSIS chair residing in New York, the collective would communicate key 
strategies and positions pursued by the small island states coalition to officials in the 
Pacific. With their knowledge and experience of the political processes of UN meetings, 
the diplomats in New York, it was expected, would guide technical negotiators and 
provide leadership during climate change negotiations. After all most of the 
ambassadors were accorded head of delegation status in the UNFCCC process. A 
pivotal strategy was ensuring there was Pacific representation in the allocated SIDS 
                                                     
561 Manoa. 
562 According to one Pacific official, before PSIDS a small informal of Pacific island negotiators worked 
independently from the PIF Group in New York, without New Zealand and Australia involvement in the 
UN sustainable development negotiations (that led to the Millennium Development Goals. The informal 
grouping mainly comprising of deputy permanent representatives were nicknamed the Black SOPACs. 
563 Manoa, 93. 
564 Diplomats from these missions were not involved in climate change negotiations. Officials from the 
capital Suva and Port Moresby took the lead in these discussions.   
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seats within the UNFCCC body. Some of these seats included the Vice President of the 
UNFCCC Bureau, and the Executive Board of the Green Climate Fund and were 
usually selected from within the group of ambassadors.  
 
COP21 Pre-Negotiation Phase  
One Conference, Five Meetings: COP21, CMP11, SBI43, SBSTA43, ADP2-12 
The Paris Climate Change Conference was a mega-conference consisting of 12 days of 
multilateral negotiations, in which five meetings would take place (see Table 16). These 
meetings would take place most, if not all, at the same time. The program of the 
conference was divided into two weeks. In the first week of November 29-December 5, 
the 43rd sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI43) and the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA43) met to finalise 
outstanding decisions and reports relating to the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The decisions from these negotiations were then finalised in the second week as part of 
the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP11). Meanwhile, the process attempting to complete the negotiations of the draft 
text agreement for a post 2020 climate change agenda or ADP2-12 had until December 
5 before handing over to the French chair of the 21st session of the COP in the second 
week. In amongst the COP21 session, the French presidency scheduled a special High-
Level Segment on November 30 where more than 150 leaders were confirmed in 
attendance. 
 
Table 16. Paris Climate Change Conference 2015 official program and schedule of 
meetings 
Nov 23- Nov 28 Pre-sessional (LDC (23/24), African Group (25/26), 
SIDS/AOSIS (25/26) and G-77 (27/28) preparatory meetings  
Nov 29- Dec 6 Leaders High-Level Segment (Nov 30) 
SBSTA Meetings (Conclusion of agenda for COP/CMP) 
SBI Meetings (Conclusion of agenda for COP/CMP)  
ADP2-12 Meetings (Draft of Paris Outcome) 
Dec 7-Dec 11 High-Level Segment of COP21 and CMP 11 (Finalise and 
approve work from SBSTA and SBI) 
Comité de Paris (Finalise draft of Paris Agreement from ADP) 
Dec 12 (extra day) Comité de Paris 
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Final Plenary of Paris Climate Change Conference 
 
A seemingly straightforward and simple program of two negotiations process-  
one that negotiated the current regime under Kyoto which ends in 2020, and the other 
negotiating a new regime for post 2020 - was in fact a complicated affair. The 
description in Chapter Three of the numerous structural layers of negotiating chambers 
during a COP would confuse and overwhelm any first time negotiator. Negotiations 
move at a rapid pace with negotiators having their own language that would prove 
difficult for those unfamiliar with the process. With so much information to absorb at 
one time, as one Pacific regional organisation official remarked during a leaders’ 
meeting, it is like “drinking from a firehose…everyone is overloaded”565.  
 
Heading into the twelfth and final ADP session, there was goodwill and momentum in 
the negotiations after the ADP2-11 meeting in October. This was despite the slow pace 
of ADP 2-9 in June and major disagreements amongst parties in ADP 2-10 during 
August.  In the October meeting, a revised text by the ADP Co-Chairs found favour 
amongst parties which allowed agreement to dramatically cut the text from 85 to 41 
pages. This new draft text would be given the title ‘Paris Outcome draft’566. Parties had 
consented to a new modality understanding that no new text would be inserted into the 
agreement; instead the focus was on finding a compromise in the options already 
identified in the text, and if there were any strong reservations ensuring that they be 
listed in a non-paper567. This meant that new agendas like that proposed by Pacific 
states under the Suva declaration of ocean payment mechanisms or a moratorium on 
fossil fuels would receive no welcome by other parties. The parties leading into Paris 
agreed to focus on the draft text at hand, as they feared opening the negotiation agenda. 
Furthermore, as a sign of negotiators goodwill and in part the urgency to finalise the 
draft text as much as possible, the ADP group agreed to add an extra day’s negotiation 
                                                     
565 Pacific regional organisation head, remarks and presentation at the PIF leaders meeting, September 9, 
2015. 
566 UNFCCC, "ADP2-12 Draft Paris Outcome " in Revised draft conclusions proposed by the Co-Chairs, 
ed. UNFCCC (Paris: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). 
567 ENB, "Paris Climate Change Conference 29 November-12 December, Daily Report Monday 30 
November 2015." 
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to convene one day earlier on November 29. But before negotiations took place, as per 
UNFCCC practice, a week of preparatory meetings for the various coalitions took place. 
 
Inside: AOSIS Preparatory 
At the headquarters of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) in downtown Paris, the multiple UNFCCC inter-state 
coalitions convened to undertake a stocktake of both common positions of each group, 
and also their negotiators. This would prove essential for AOSIS in its first preparatory 
meeting. In the most pivotal of all meetings, the Maldives Chair needed to ensure that 
its lead coordinators from throughout the ADP process would be present to continue 
their work. Fortunately, at least one of the two lead negotiators per coordination group 
were able to attend. The strategy for the coalition changed from the previous meeting. 
Instead of just focussing on the four priority issues of legal, adaptation/loss and damage, 
adaptation, mitigation and finance; the alliance’s attention expanded to include new 
coordination groups – capacity, technology transparency and two additional specific 
group- preamble, and loss and damage. The latter reflected the separation of the loss 
and damage from the adaptation text in the new draft Paris outcome, an outcome that 
was a product of not just the LDC and AOSIS coalitions but the work of Tuvalu. 
 
There was acute awareness that the final meetings in the coming two weeks would not 
only rely on the relationships and collaborations of technical negotiators but include the 
politics of leaders and their national interests. While negotiations focussed on the finer 
details of a proposed agreement, the involvement of ‘political masters’ meant balancing 
issues that were beyond the climate change regime, from trade and security to 
development aid. The dynamics of the negotiations would mean political leaders were 
apprised of AOSIS’ common positions, with the hope that these positions were 
articulated in leaders’ persuasive speeches and debates. During the two-day preparatory 
meeting for AOSIS on November 24 and 25, delegations were asked to say which 
political leaders were attending the leaders High-Level Segment of COP21, and 
especially leaders participating throughout the next two weeks of negotiations. 
Seasoned negotiators reminded the coalition plenary of past COP processes such as the 
Durban COP17 Indaba process and the Lima ministerial process, where at the final 
moments of decision making only officials with ministerial positions were allowed 
access to the room. In anticipation of a similar situation, the AOSIS coordination groups 
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were tasked to prepare daily briefing notes and talking points for leaders and heads of 
delegations.  
 
The AOSIS coalition plenary would be the site not only for individual delegations to 
gather, but also the smaller sub groups with allegiance to the small islands collective to 
regroup. As indicated in Chapters Three and Four, AOSIS was a coalition bound by the 
shared identity of vulnerable island states. At the same time the islands grouping 
emanated from three inter-regional geographical regional subgroups: Pacific, Caribbean 
and AIMS (African, Indian and Mediterranean states). Throughout the year, the 
Caribbean island states under the regional political stewardship of the Caribbean 
Community were actively engaged in the ADP negotiations. The AOSIS preparatory 
meeting provided a platform for the chair of the group, Barbados, to inform the small 
islands grouping of their regional positions. Although there was no active association 
amongst the AIMS countries, there was a general understanding that the four Indian 
Ocean states of Maldives, Mauritius, Comoros and Seychelles collaborated on 
UNFCCC issues through their UN permanent representative offices568. As for states 
from the Pacific, the AOSIS preparatory meeting became the platform for the 
reinvigorated Pacific SIDS-CROP Plus collective to begin its work.  
 
Inside: Pacific SIDS Preparatory 
Confirming a Pacific negotiation strategy 
In the Bonn ADP2-9 session six months earlier, attempts by Pacific delegates to work 
effectively as a regional group were challenged by the absence of a political mandate. 
This all changed with the various regional political declarations in September that called 
for a collective united Pacific voice in the negotiations. These declarations signalled 
collaboration by regional organisations under CROP, PIDF and the UN New York 
based negotiation bloc PSIDS to work under the CROP Plus enterprise to support 
national delegations. The preparatory meeting in early November at the SPREP HLSM 
in Apia initiated discussion on strategies for the group to take to Paris, but more 
                                                     
568 This statement was corroborated by three Pacific/AOSIS negotiators (Talanoa 9, 13, 20), in 
discussion-talanoa with the author, November 17 and 18, 2015. 
  
 
216  
importantly the consent amongst negotiators for the PSIDS modality of negotiations to 
lead the process. 
 
During the lunch hour of the first day of AOSIS preparatory meetings, the chair of 
PSIDS and Tongan ambassador to the UN called for a special meeting for all Pacific 
delegates. In a corner of the plenary room, just under 50 negotiators huddled to confirm 
the process of how a Pacific SIDS-CROP Plus would operate in the next three weeks. 
Member delegates confirmed the discussions in Apia, and there was consent for Tonga 
to lead in the mobilisation of the Pacific group. Furthermore, it was confirmed in the 
meeting that PIF officials would act as the secretariat to arrange logistical support.  
 
There was no disagreement in using Pacific SIDS as the identifier name for the group, 
as well as having meetings three times a week – Monday, Wednesday and Fridays. 
These meetings would be open to all delegates from the Pacific and act as the coalition 
plenary, while a separate process for heads of delegation meetings would take place ad 
hoc under the guidance of the Tongan chair. Needless to say, members acknowledged in 
the first preparatory meeting that the most immediate task for the small delegations 
would be to support leaders attending the upcoming High-Level Segment of COP21.  
 
  
Figure 3 and Figure 4. Images of negotiators from the Pacific at the Pacific SIDS preparatory 
meeting on November 26, 2015. Photographs by author. 
 
Uneasiness within the group 
On the third day of the preparatory week, on November 26 the Pacific SIDS group met 
again during the mid-morning break, this time with a sense of urgency and panic 
amongst negotiators. The scheduled France-Oceania Summit would take place only a 
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few miles away, where the French President would indicate France’s regional 
partnerships with Pacific leaders and heads of regional organisations. There were 
intermittent reports from the meeting that key issues discussed in COP21 were being 
discussed at the leaders’ level. A draft of the France-Oceania Summit communiqué was 
negotiated by officials the night before, some of whom were involved in the UNFCCC 
negotiations. These negotiators would share with the rest of the Pacific SIDS network 
the fears that the communiqué did not have an ambitious text on 1.5 degrees, and there 
was not a strong stance on loss and damage. The request from those in the drafting room 
of the Summit was for UNFCCC negotiators to be part of the drafting team. The 
twenty-minute meeting discussed the fears of negotiators that leaders might be cornered 
into agreeing to terms that would jeopardise the red lines already in place. In a hastened 
but orderly fashion, key negotiators with high-level access to the summit left the 
UNESCO venue to provide guidance and support for leaders. This event illuminated the 
uncertainty held by negotiators of the involvement of political leaders, not just by 
Pacific delegates but by all parties to the UNFCCC process. There was uneasiness not 
only amongst parties, but also within delegations about what political leaders might 
agree to that could unravel the work of negotiators for the past three years. While little 
was to come of the final communiqué of the French-Oceania Summit569, this example 
proved the point of how rumours of a possible secret deal could derail the process that 
negotiators agreed to. 
 
Multi-actor Team 
While overcoming the political sensitivities of a regional grouping the initial Pacific 
SIDS preparatory meetings highlighted a key feature shared amongst all Pacific 
delegations, who were all multi-actor and eclectic in their compositions. Delegations 
from the Pacific, as in many UNFCCC meetings, were not solely composed of 
government officials but included many non-state actors (see Table 17). In this most 
pivotal of all meetings, Pacific states sent their most influential negotiators, but also 
represented in the delegation were states’ special partnerships with international, 
regional and national NGOs.  Although 38,000 were registered to attend COP21, only 
15,000 were state officials with direct access inside the negotiations from the 197 
                                                     
569 France-Oceania Summit, "Declaration of the Fourth France-Oceania Summit, Paris 26 November 
2015," (Paris: France-Oceania Summit 2015). 
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participating parties. However, only 375 officials or ‘pink badge’ negotiators would 
represent the 14 Pacific island states. Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Palau, Marshall Islands 
and Tuvalu would send the most officials with more than 35 delegates each; while Niue 
would not be represented by a state official but by the international NGO Climate 
Policy Watch. Most Pacific states were represented by their leaders, except Solomon 
Islands, Vanuatu and Tonga who were represented at the High-Level Segment by their 
ministers.  
 
Most government official delegates were limited to the two UNFCCC paid delegates 
and were mainly from government departments or agencies that carried out climate 
change policy and projects on the ground. There was a notably high number of foreign 
affairs officials and state diplomats posted at missions in Geneva, Brussels and New 
York, where the majority of their work focussed on protocol support for leaders and 
their bilateral meetings during the multilateral forum.  
 
Contributions and the permanence of NGOs 
The most notable feature of the delegations was the strong presence and lobbying 
capacity of NGOs. As indicated in Chapter Three and Four, NGO representatives have 
been part and parcel of Pacific delegations since the early days of the climate regime. 
They have worked alongside government officials in providing the essential scientific 
and issue-related research during the negotiations. During the ADP negotiations 
throughout the year, a handful of NGOs were consistently part of the process: Climate 
Analytics, Independent Diplomat, Islands First, Environmental Law, and for the 
regional organisations SPREP and USP, as outlined in Table 18.  
 
By the time of the Paris meeting there would be a stark increase in the number and type 
of NGOs attending. According to delegates the majority represented special relations 
these NGOs had with Pacific governments or their leaders. This included Kiribati’s 
President special relationship with Climate Institute and The National Conservatory; the 
Palau government had a special affiliation with ocean management/biodiversity NGOs 
like Conservation International and Mission Blue to name a few; while Marshall Islands 
(most notably its Foreign Minister Tony de Brum) throughout the years had maintained 
a close working relationship with international climate change lawyers from the firms 
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Independent Diplomat, Track 0 and Energia. Scholars and students from universities 
including USP, the University of California, Yale University and the Australian 
National University found their way into the delegations because of their research. 
Pacific delegations, notably Palau and Tuvalu, would also be the door through which 
Taiwanese government officials were able to participate in the negotiations without the 
interference of China. Meanwhile the notable private sector participation from the PNG 
delegation were cooperatives and individuals involved in the REDD Plus initiatives and 
forest conservation projects who mainly attended side events.  
 
Other than financially supporting their own delegates, governments relied on the 
generosity of other states (like Taiwan) and NGOs to help fund their participation. Most 
if not all NGOs were self-funded to attend the meetings under the flag of Pacific states. 
This multi-actor feature in delegation teams, was not unique to Pacific state delegations 
but applied to many developing states. In the coalition plenaries of AOSIS and G-77, as 
well as anecdotal reports from LDC meetings, it was not unusual for someone of 
European descent to be speaking on behalf of a Pacific or African state. 
 
 
Table 17. Pacific officials delegation composition at COP21 
  
Govt 
Officials 
(Capital) 
Govt 
Diplomat 
(NY) 
Reg. 
Orgn. 
Intl 
Consult 
NGO 
Reg / 
Local 
Consult 
NGO 
Media Private 
Sector 
Academia TOTAL 
Cook Islands 8   3 1 1  1  1 15 
Fiji 26 2 6   5  1  2 42 
Kiribati 13    6 2  2  4 27 
Marshall 
Islands 15 4   12 8      
39 
Micronesia 
(Federated) 9 2   8 2      
21 
Nauru 10 2     1       13 
Niue 0 4   4         4 
Palau 12 1    10      4 14 41 
Papua New 
Guinea 44  1   3  1   6 2 
57 
Samoa 7 1 4         1 13 
Solomon 
Islands 12 1 1        6 2 
22 
Tonga 10 1 2 2  1      16 
Tuvalu 20 4         9  2 35 
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Vanuatu 19   5 1  3   1 1 30 
 State Actors- 224 Non-State Actors in Official Delegations- 151 375 
Source: UNFCCC, "Provisional list of participant UNFCCC COP21 30 November- 11 December 
2015," (Paris: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). 
 
Table 18. Pacific Delegations Breakdown of Ministers and Non-State Representation 
 Total 
Ministerial 
Representation Non-state Representation 
Cook Islands 15 Prime Minister SPREP, Environmental Law, Media  
Fiji 42 
Prime Minister + 5 
Ministers SPC, PIDF, USP, Media 
Kiribati 27 President + 1 Minister 
Conservation International, Climate Institute 
(Australia), 4 students 
Marshall Islands 39 
Prime Minister + 2 
Ministers 
USP, Energia, Independent Diplomat, Track 0, 
Pacific 350 
(Federated) Micronesia 21 President 
Institute for Governance and Sustainable 
Development, The Nature Conservancy, Law of 
Nature Foundation 
Nauru 13 President + 1 Minister   
Niue 4  No officials attended 
Climate Policy Watch NGOs attended on behalf of 
Niue 
Palau 41 President + 1 Minister 
Taiwan, Mission Blue, Conservation Institute, 
Earth Justice, Climate Policy Watch, Climate 
Analytics, Islands First, Uni Carolina, Yale Uni 
Papua New Guinea 57 
Prime Minister + 4 
Ministers 
Rain Forest Coalition, PNG Forest Landowner 
Groups, Pogera Alliance, University of PNG 
Samoa 13 Prime Minister SPREP, Australian National University 
Solomon Islands 22 Minister USP 
Tonga 16 Deputy Prime Minister SPREP, UNDP Pacific, Red Cross 
Tuvalu 35 
Prime Minister + 1 
Minister Taiwan 
Vanuatu 30 2 Ministers PIF, USP, UN, Pacific 350 
Source: UNFCCC, "Provisional list of participant UNFCCC COP21 30 November- 11 December 
2015," (Paris: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). 
 
COP21 Negotiations Phase  
Leaders High-Level Segment 
There was an atmosphere of high anticipation to conclude years of hard toil in the 
official opening of negotiations on November 30. While ADP negotiations started a day 
earlier and had been conducted in smaller chamber rooms, the ceremonial proceedings 
of the Paris Climate Conference took place in the main plenary rooms of the Le Bourget 
venue. In accepting the invitations by UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon and the 
French President François Hollande, more than 150 state leaders attended the special 
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High-Level Segment. This auspicious event would be the only time outside the annual 
UN General Assembly meetings to bring so many state leaders together.   
 
The involvement of leaders at the beginning of the conference was essential in 
establishing political will and was an attempt not to repeat the failures of past 
diplomatic endeavours in the climate regime. Steering away from the infamous 
Copenhagen COP15 diplomatic formula where secret deals were made by leaders of 
developed economies in the final moments, the High-Level Segment at the beginning 
was seen by some as preserving the integrity of leaders if negotiations collapsed in the 
final days. At the very least leaders would only take part in setting the agenda of the 
negotiations and then leave Paris. This would leave ministers and lead negotiators to 
negotiate the details of the proposed agreement. Needless to say, the segment was more 
than a platform for the proclamation of climate policies and aspirations by leaders 
through persuasive speeches. It was a signal of global political will shared by the 
participating states: from small island states, to developing and emerging economies, to 
the more developed and industrialised countries. 
 
Statements by Pacific Leaders 
For Pacific leaders present at the High-Level Segment it was an opportunity to articulate 
key issues that were at the heart of the concerns of Pacific states. The Cook Islands’ 
Prime Minister Henry Puna argued that “we didn’t cause the environmental problem, 
but we want to be part of the solution…that is act with solidarity and unity as a global 
family, the time for action is now”.570 The impacts of climate change had brought 
danger to the small island states which prompted Federated State of Micronesia 
President Peter Christian to call on the UN to declare a global state of emergency due to 
climate change571. In noting the political choices that states had to make in the weeks of 
negotiations, the Fijian Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama described the 
conundrum as: 
                                                     
570 Henry Puna, "Statement by Prime Minister of Cook Islands H.E. Henry Puna at Leaders Event 
Opening of COP21," UNFCCC https://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop21/events/2015-11-30-14-45-leaders-
event  
571 Peter M. Christian, "Statement by President of the Federated States of Micronesia H.E. Peter M. 
Christian at Leaders Event Opening of COP21," ibid. 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_micronesia.pdf. 
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It is whether to side with what I have called the coalition of the selfish on 
climate change – those nations bereft of vision, obsessed with short-term 
economic gain and betraying the long-term interests of their people. Or to side 
with us in the coalition for action on climate change – those nations led by men 
and women who are enlightened, bold and accept the irrefutable evidence. And 
who have the long-term interests of both their people at heart and the long-term 
interests of the planet we all call home572. 
 
On issues specific to the negotiations, Papua New Guinea’s Prime Minister Peter 
O’Neill pursued what he called “the most effective mitigation option available in the 
world…to anchor the REDD Plus Mechanism and its accompanying decisions” in the 
new agreement573. Samoa’s Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi cautioned that 
despite achieving an agreement “it will take a long time to effect, and our countries will 
continue to suffer until climate change is reversed…that is the reason why we consider 
Loss and Damage an essential part of the Agreement”574. The consideration for loss and 
damage to be anchored in the agreement was more pronounced in the eloquent words of 
Tuvalu’s Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga, who called for a permanent mechanism for 
loss and damage to be anchored in the ‘treaty’ with easy access to predictable 
finance575. Mitigation and the need for strong ambition from all parties in limiting 
warming to below 1.5 degrees, ratcheting up national targets every five years were 
central in Marshall Islands President Christopher Loeak’s statement, which declared 
that “COP21 must be a turning point in history, and one that gives us hope”.576And 
although its key issues were not part of the negotiations agenda, Kiribati President 
                                                     
572 Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama, "Statement by Prime Minister of Fiji Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama at 
Leaders Event Opening of COP21," ibid. 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_fiji.pdf. 
573 Peter Paire O’Neill, "Statement by Prime Minister of Papua New Guiinea Peter O’Neill at Leaders 
Event Opening of COP21," ibid. 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_papua_new_guinea.pdf. 
574 Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, "Statement by Prime Minister of Samoa Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi at 
Leaders Event Opening of COP21," ibid. 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_samoa.pdf. 
575 Enele Sopoaga, "Statement by Prime Minister of Tuvalu Hon Enele Sopoaga at Leaders Event 
Opening of COP21," ibid. https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/past-conferences/paris-climate-change-
conference-november-2015/statements-and-resources/statements-made-during-the-leaders-event. 
576 Christopher J. Loeak, "Statement by President of the Marshall Islands Christopher Loeak at Leaders 
Event Opening of COP21," ibid. 
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_marshall_islands.pdf. 
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Anote Tong took the opportunity to remind the global audience of the plight of frontline 
states and a call from the Pacific for a global moratorium on new investments in coal 
mines577. 
 
Overall, the statements by Pacific and other world leaders affirmed their faith in the 
UNFCCC process and the need for a global solution that involved commitments and 
contributions by all parties. More importantly, these statements prompted a pre-
condition that a consensus was expected by the end of the two weeks negotiations. But 
as Nauru’s president Baron Waqa cautioned delegates about rhetorical affirmation, 
“we have grown complacent in our inspirational rhetoric and good 
intentions…But this all must change here in Paris. Vulnerable countries and 
communities alone can no longer be left to pay the price of climate change”578.  
 
With the pomp and ceremony of the High-Level Segment, and the protocol work of 
catering to leaders, the real work on negotiations would formally begin. As one 
negotiator was reported to have said, “nothing gets done while the leaders are here”579. 
As the majority of leaders departed, the focus for all remaining delegates would be in 
the finer details of the Paris Outcome draft. 
 
ADP2-12: Technical Negotiators Refining the Final Text 
From November 29 until December 5, the twelfth and final session of the ADP took 
place. There was a clear understanding amongst all parties, especially during the 
preparatory week, that the work of the ad hoc group would not conclude in a final 
agreed text. However, there was an earnest acknowledgement by technical negotiators, 
most of whom had participated in the ADP process for years, that the next seven days 
would be their final chance to control the conditions of negotiations. Any unresolved 
                                                     
577 Anote Tong, "Statement by President of Kiribati Anote Tong at Leaders Event Opening of COP21," 
ibid. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_kiribati.pdf. 
578 Baron Waqa, "Statement by President of Nauru Baron Waqa at Leaders Event Opening of COP21," 
ibid. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_nauru.pdf. 
579 ENB, "Paris Climate Change Conference 29 November 12 December 2015, Daily Report Tuesday 1 
December 2015," ed. Earth Negotiations Bulletin (Paris: International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 2015). 
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disagreements in the draft Paris Outcome by the end of the week would be at the mercy 
of a higher political level where ministers, special envoys, ambassadors and heads of 
delegations would control the process.   
 
During the first week more than 150 negotiating informal groups, mainly open to 
official delegates and not observers, met in parallel580. This presented an inevitable 
problem of coordination and communication, especially for small delegations seeking to 
follow and synthesise changes proposed in multiple venues. The traditional negotiation 
blocs or coalitions have over the years built systems and processes to try and minimise 
this problem. The daily coalition coordination meetings in the mornings and evenings 
(for AOSIS, LDC, G-77) and some in the afternoons (CfRN and Pacific SIDS) were 
useful in summarising and providing a bigger picture on the state of negotiations. But 
the most effective way to obtain up to the minute information was to join the various 
coalitions’ coordination groups.  Apart from face to face coordination group meetings, 
the marvels of technology and social media such as skype, WhatsApp, Facebook 
messenger and group email accounts revealed any blocks or potential breakthroughs 
from the informal sessions. Figure 5 is a snapshot image of the AOSIS Finance 
Coordination group WhatsApp account, that details the of information and strategising 
among members of the coordination group.  
                                                     
580 Peter Christoff, "The promissory note: COP 21 and the Paris Climate Agreement," Environmental 
Politics 25, no. 5 (2016): 773. 
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Figure 5. Image of WhatsApp AOSIS Finance Coordination Group during COP21 negotiations. 
Image provided by author. 
 
The modality of negotiations in ADP2-12 continued as it had been in the Bonn meetings 
under the leadership of the Co-Chairs from Algeria and the U.S.. Negotiators and the 
UNFCCC secretariat struggled to reduce the text to manageable proportions. There 
were repeated attempts to incorporate references to aspects of sustainable development 
and rights discourses in ways that reflected the breadth of concerns captured in Agenda 
21581. The ADP contact group persisted as the main plenary where the stocktake of all 
decisions from the twelve negotiating informal groups would be tabled. Each meeting of 
the contact group began with reports back from the co-facilitators of the spin-off 
groups. Unlike previous ADP sessions, because of the time pressure the negotiation 
process would see the contact group meet daily in the morning at 10.00am and in the 
evenings at 5.00pm. Meanwhile the various informal negotiating groups and the 
multiple informal spinoff negotiations associated to the ADP issues would occur 
throughout the day. Matters not assigned to specific spin-off groups were discussed in 
the contact group, including both decision and agreement text. Although the general 
rules of UN meeting times encouraged parties not to go beyond 6.00pm, if parties 
                                                     
581 Most of these elements were eventually cordoned off in the preamble to the Agreement. 
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consented, negotiations continued. This loop hole was used by many of the informal 
negotiating groups and the spin-off sessions to extend negotiations well into the night, 
with some finishing at 3.00am. Some notable meetings that took place after midnight in 
which Pacific negotiators were present included spin-offs in mitigation, adaptation and 
loss and damage.  
 
By Friday December 4 the various informal negotiating groups and spinoff sessions had 
completed their work. Parties agreed that the ADP Co-Chairs would produce an 
updated, clean and streamlined text, with clear options, developed in consultation with 
spin-off group co-facilitators. The Co-Chairs in return would produce two documents, a 
revised draft agreement and decision text on workstreams 1 and 2, the compilation text, 
and a document containing the work of the ADP contact group incorporating bridging 
proposals by the co-facilitators, which was the compilation text with bridging 
proposals.582 These two documents would serve as the outcome of the ADP process, 
adopted by the ADP on Saturday, 5 December, and subsequently forwarded to the 
incoming French presidency for the COP. By this point the draft of the Paris Outcome 
text had come down to 43 pages, but there were still 800 brackets of options that parties 
needed to resolve583.  
 
Established Coalitions and the ad hoc Pacific SIDS coalition in the Negotiations 
Within the ADP modality of negotiations, coalitions and their lead coordinators would 
remain the most influential actors. Whilst Pacific delegates continued to support 
AOSIS, LDC, CfRN and G-77, there was also a growing consciousness that Pacific 
SIDS needed to have an active role. Cracks started to emerge in the G-77 in the African, 
ALBA and Landlocked Mountainous coalitions with disagreements on the issue of 
vulnerability and the do no harm policy. The latter referred to the principle in the G-77 
that states should not pursue issues in the climate change regime that impinged or 
limited the development aspirations of countries, a position stonily pursued by emerging 
                                                     
582 ENB, "Summary of the Paris Climate Change Conference 29 November-12 December 2015," ed. 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (Paris: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2015). 
583 UNFCCC, "ADP2-12 Draft Paris Outcome ". 
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economies such as China, India, Brazil and the oil producing nation of Saudi Arabia584. 
The cohesiveness of the global south became shaky as the various coalitions attempted 
to assert special consideration status or special vulnerability as a way to gain special 
access to any new agreements on financing for mitigation and adaptation. Only small 
island states had been accorded special consideration from the early days of UNFCCC. 
While this continued to be a priority for AOSIS, Pacific delegations made clear that the 
Pacific SIDS coalition should be active in the talks.  
 
Inside: Pacific SIDS and Negotiations 
Despite the ecstatic atmosphere at the Pacific SIDS meeting in the preparatory week, 
when the group met for the first time during the negotiations on December 2 there was 
an air of uneasiness. With most Pacific leaders having left Paris, delegates were able to 
concentrate on the negotiations. As one delegate said in a statement during the meeting, 
“our Leaders have eloquently reaffirmed and conveyed our issues during the Leaders’ 
segment yesterday and the onus is on us as officials and technicians to take 
(operationalise) these messages in the negotiations”585. The rapid process and multiple 
negotiation venues at one time were starting to take a toll. The meeting started with 
reservations of particular states about the benefit of another coalition when AOSIS was 
already making advancement on speaking on behalf of Pacific states. Senior officials 
spoke on duplication of interests and an added layer of work for negotiators; while 
others indicated that the work of Pacific SIDS was too late in mobilising positions in 
Paris. The negotiations were moving rapidly and there was little time to mobilise and 
write new positions. Many of the reservations made by delegates were not verbalised in 
previous discussion in the previous preparatory week coalition meetings or regional 
HLSM. Some delegates highlighted that the positions carried by AOSIS were 
originating and pursued by Caribbean negotiators, and in the same way there needed to 
be more Pacific negotiators if not speaking, then following the AOSIS and G-77 
coordinators closely. 
 
                                                     
584 In numerous G77 meetings these states would reiterate the do no harm policy to remind member 
countries of obligations to the development agenda- over climate change demands.  
585 Pacific negotiator remarks during closed Pacific SIDS meeting, December 2, 2015. 
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However, after delegates were able to speak on uncertainties the focus of attention then 
shifted to what can be done. What was clear from the challenges raised by delegates 
was the need for visibility of Pacific negotiators in the current negotiations. “While the 
question of small delegation size is always an issue, however it is important that we step 
up and enhance our collective visibilities in the process now and into the future 
strategically positioning our region vis-à-vis the constraints/challenges we confront as 
island states”586. Although the group valued and supported the work of AOSIS, states 
felt that issues on loss and damage, 1.5 degrees and special consideration needed more 
emphasis. It was noted by negotiators who were present in the October ADP2-11 
session that four informal coordination groups were established (Finance, Loss and 
Damage, Adaptation, Mitigation) and that they would be reinvigorated for the final 
negotiations. The CROP Plus organisations were encouraged to support delegate 
officials, and ministers in the coming week by providing technical support. 
 
 
Figure 6. Image inside Pacific SIDS coordination meeting on December 3, 2015. Photograph by 
author. 
 
A proposal by one of the states to confirm a negotiating team, with the Tongan chair as 
the lead negotiator and coordinators from the four groups to speak on behalf of Pacific 
SIDS, did not find favour among all parties. The membership were more in favour of 
having the points of contacts for the Pacific SIDS coordination groups collect and share 
information—and especially mobilise negotiators from the Pacific inside the various 
coordination groups of AOSIS, LDC and G-77. However, if there were positions the 
major coalitions pursued that were not in favour of Pacific states, the Pacific SIDS 
                                                     
586 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 26), in discussion-talanoa with the author, December 3, 2017. 
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coordinators were encouraged to speak on behalf of the group. These occasions 
occurred mainly in the informal spinoff sessions, where Pacific SIDS coordinators made 
interventions on draft texts that were as seen as red lines for Pacific states. 
 
 
Figure 7. Image of Pacific SIDS huddle during ADP 2-12 spin-off negotiations on adaptation 
December 4, 2015. Photograph by author.  
The progress of the ADP negotiations process was dependent on the relationships of 
negotiators mainly formed from working within coalitions, but also the confines of 
working with parties from across the table. Despite representing various state and 
coalition interests, seasoned negotiators had formed special working relationships with 
counterparts throughout the years. This meant understanding that negotiators have a 
professional role in delivering the positions of their states or coalitions inside the 
chambers. As one Pacific negotiator testified, 
I have learnt to survive in the negotiations by leaving my emotions and personal 
views outside the room. In my early days after a long day, I would go to my 
hotel room and cry; confused as to why these countries support such a decision. 
But I realised my counterparts are only doing their job, just as I am. Once a 
negotiation session was complete, we would have coffee and learn about each 
other’s work on climate change, and their families. It is through these personal 
exchanges that I am able to understand where they are coming from, and if 
possible find a compromise. But our resolve remains our countries’ red lines587.  
                                                     
587 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 34), in discussion-talanoa with the author, December 4, 2015. 
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When the ADP process had come to an end, the focus of the various coalitions and that 
of the newly formed Pacific SIDS changed approaches. With ministers and lead 
negotiators expected to have a more active role in the negotiations, the role of coalitions 
was relegated to information sharing hubs. No longer would the unwritten rules of 
technical lead coordinators speak on behalf of a group; in the final week or consensus 
point of negotiations this opportunity would be the prerogative of individual states. 
While coalitions included NGOs within delegations, in the final stretch it would be the 
ministers or appointed heads of delegations who would pursue and iron out 
disagreements.   
 
COP21 Agreement Phase: Global Consensus Point  
The official start of COP21 in the second week December 7-12, when the chair changed 
from Peru to France, would prove to be the consensus point in the negotiations. The 
official program of the COP/CMP would be carried out during the day to finalise 
decisions approved by SBSTA and SBI. This official agenda did not, however, include 
the negotiations of the draft Paris Outcome. These negotiations would again take place 
in the Le Bourget plenary theatres. The finalisation of the Paris Outcome would be 
completed under the negotiation process of the Comité de Paris, or the Paris Committee. 
 
Inside: Comité de Paris 
French diplomatic flair 
The French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius was nominated as the COP 21 President, 
and along with the UNFCCC secretariat, given the responsibility of a diplomatic 
endeavour to complete the negotiations. When he accepted the ADP incomplete draft 
text of the Paris Outcome Fabius outlined an open-ended single-setting group, the Paris 
Committee, to make progress on the text and facilitate a compromise. The committee 
would work under the principle, inter alia, of “nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed”588 and where footage of the meetings would be transmitted to screens at the 
                                                     
588 ENB, "Paris Climate Change Conference 29 November-12 December 2015: Paris Highlights 7 
December 2015," ed. Earth Negotiations Bulletin (Paris: International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 2015). 
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conference site to facilitate transparency. An ambitious timeline was set where 
negotiations would take place and be completed within the first three days, that is, to 
remove all remaining 800 brackets in the draft text by Wednesday December 9, and to 
allow negotiations to be completed within the timeframe allocated of Friday December 
11.  
 
As the Committee was an extraordinary process and different from the usual COP/CMP 
program, its meetings were scheduled in the evenings after 7.00pm. This would prove 
testing for many, especially in the harsh winter nights of Paris. In the spirit of fairness 
and egalitarianism, each member party were given three tickets to enter the Committee 
room, irrespective of rank. Furthermore, the work of the Committee would be supported 
under four informal working groups facilitated by ministers to work on cross-cutting 
issues: support; differentiation in the context of mitigation, transparency and finance, 
including pre-2020 finance; ambition, long-term objectives and periodic review; and 
acceleration of pre-2020 ambition589. These facilitated groups would carry out 
consultations throughout the day with parties, and report back to the Committee. On the 
first two days, the Committee meetings finished just before midnight, with only some 
progress.  
 
But it would be the French personal touch that held the negotiations together. The 
presidency took on an active role by carrying out numerous bilateral meetings with 
parties and coalitions to find compromises in the language text during the day. The 
diplomats were meticulous in making contact not only with parties with strong positions 
but also coalitions. This included three reported bilateral meetings with AOSIS, and a 
meeting with Pacific SIDS leadership. On the morning of December 9, COP President 
Fabius met with leaders, ministers and heads of delegations from the Pacific led by 
Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Fiji and Cook Islands.  
 
                                                     
589 Ibid. 
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Indaba of solutions: A new process and timeline 
The original timeline of the Committee to complete its work by Wednesday December 9 
was in vain. Some parties were reported to be content with a revised clean text that was 
circulated in the late afternoon. One negotiator described the optimistic mood was a 
result of the Presidency “involving the ministers early and often in the process, which 
built relationships and facilitated constructive conversations on sticking points”590. 
Needless to say, there were reservations expressed by some states, and without a 
consensus the Committee reconvened in the evening with a new timeline and process 
proposed by the chair. This time there would be indaba or meeting of ministers and 
heads of delegations. States were given three tickets to enter the negotiation chambers at 
midnight on Wednesday and Thursday evening, but official interventions were reserved 
to the level of ministers. During the indaba, two parallel consultations took place, the 
first on differentiation, finance and ambition, facilitated by COP21 President Fabius; 
and the second on other issues still requiring work, such as loss and damage, response 
measures, cooperative approaches and mechanisms, and preamble, facilitated by COP20 
President Manuel Pulgar-Vidal of Peru. 
 
The midnight and evening sessions of COP21 would famously become known as the 
indaba of solutions591. The conditions in which the meeting took place were anything 
but comfortable. Only the seasoned negotiators and sizable delegations were prepared 
for the cold conditions. The thermostat temperature in the rooms dropped dramatically, 
as ministers were seen in the live telecast broadcast putting on extra layers of coats. 
Outside in the corridors, technical negotiators were seen pacing up and down, or 
huddling in corners trying to get compromises from fellow negotiators before reporting 
back via email or text messages to their political bosses in the main indaba chambers. In 
some corners negotiators who were awaiting instructions from inside would doze off for 
quick naps. The more endowed delegations had chambers in their country pavilions for 
ministers to rest and only come to the meetings when sticky issues were about to be 
                                                     
590 "Paris Climate Change Conference 29 November-12 December 2015: Paris Highlights 11 December 
2015," ed. Earth Negotiations Bulletin (Paris: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2015). 
591 Indabas is a tool of negotiation from the Zulu and Xhosa people of southern Africa, first introduced in 
climate negotiation talks in Durban in 2011. The practice adapted into the UNFCCC was restricted to 
high-level representation, usually ministers level, to negotiate on behalf of state. 
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discussed. These pavilion offices would also be the site in which these bigger states 
would carry their own bilateral discussion with other parties. The smaller delegations 
had to resort to the open café spaces around the entrances to conduct their bargaining.    
 
The indaba of Wednesday midnight lasted until 4.00am. Throughout the Thursday, 
parties awaited the advice of the chair for the start of the second round of the indaba. 
Meanwhile the Le Bourget was abuzz from the afternoon as hordes of negotiators were 
seen moving from chamber to chamber, and from one country pavilion to another. Even 
the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon was reported to be engaged with parties in 
bilateral meetings to smooth the path towards an agreement. The various coalition 
coordination meetings were unusually quiet; with the focus now at the political level, it 
was more of a site of rumours on which delegation was meeting with who. But it would 
be the French Presidency and UNFCCC secretariat’s unprecedented personal attention 
to consultations with key parties including small island nations that would prove key in 
concluding the negotiations.  
 
When the indaba negotiations reconvened at 9.00pm on Thursday evening, there was 
optimism that a conclusion was near. The goal post for the conference to be completed 
by Friday December 11, was extended by twenty-four hours to allow for the work of 
legal and linguistic interpretation of the agreement. The key issues raised during the day 
by parties on differentiation, finance and ambition were the main and last issues to be 
negotiated in the final indaba592. After four hours of intense negotiations, the French 
chair thanked all ministers in attendance and called for an adjournment. Many were 
anticipating a longer session, but there were some differences which the chair had 
sought to meet with parties separately. The president promised that a revised text would 
be delivered on the morning of December 12.  
 
In that final and pivotal week of negotiations, only a handful of ministers from the 
Pacific remained in Paris. Many leaders and ministers had returned to the Pacific, after a 
weary two months of global travel, while others like those from the Marshall Islands 
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were in the middle of elections. The ministers from Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and 
Nauru, who were in Paris, were pursuing key issues which in the absence of leaders 
would be watered down in the final agreement. Most notable and significant in these 
endeavours were Tuvalu’s hard bargaining with the U.S. on loss and damage, and 
Marshall Islands’ role in garnering a global partnership between the developed and 
developing nations divide through the High Ambition Coalition.   
 
Inside: Tuvalu vs. United States of America - Loss and Damage 
Throughout the ADP process, despite the multiparty negotiations, the language on loss 
and damage became synonymous with a tussle between the small island nation of 
Tuvalu and the world’s biggest economy, the U.S. At the 2014 Lima COP20, the LDC 
and AOSIS argued for the agenda on loss and damage to incorporate some kind of 
compensation or redress mechanism for states that would suffer the permanent loss of 
environment or cultural resource due to inability to adapt to impacts of climate change. 
Not surprisingly this proposal met with stiff opposition from the Annex I parties, 
especially the U.S.593. As the ADP negotiations progressed throughout 2015, the LDC 
and AOSIS continued to pursue the issue, although it quickly became apparent that 
compromise would be the product of a David vs. Goliath battle, that is, the battle of 
Tuvalu and U.S. 
 
The U.S. had a three-pronged strategy or options on the issue in the negotiations. 
Firstly, the U.S. pursued the extreme measure that the final agreement should not 
contain any text on loss and damage but be kept to the COP21 conference decisions. 
This strategy was pursued from the time of the January ADP2-8 Geneva conference, but 
failed when it did not receive sufficient support from LDC and AOSIS states. A second 
option was to incorporate loss and damage under the umbrella of the adaptation article. 
“Presumably they were of the view it would create significant and sufficient ambiguity 
over its context…. (and) direct discussions more towards risk avoidance rather than risk 
transfer or addressing permanent and irreversible losses and potential claims for 
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compensation for such losses594”. However, by the time of the ADP August and 
October sessions there was growing awareness and consensus by global south coalitions 
that loss and damage should be separated from adaptation. The final option, only 
relayed in the final days of the COP21, was to insist that the agreement include a clause 
explicitly excluding any consideration of liability or compensation595. 
 
While anchoring loss and damage in the agreement was a key position for LDC and 
AOSIS coalitions, leading this charge was Tuvalu. Tuvalu was not part of G-77, but as 
the lead negotiator for LDC its negotiators were invited to join the G-77 coordination 
group on adaptation and loss and damage at the August-September ADP Bonn session. 
This, as Tuvaluan Ambassador Ian Fry attests: 
“With strong leadership from Bolivia and careful text adjustments, including in 
relation to the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities, the G-77 
and China agreed to a common text on loss and damage. This was agreed in the 
September session of the ADP. Loss-and-damage was no longer an exclusive 
issue for SIDS and LDCs. All developing countries were engaged and had an 
interest”596. 
The group successfully agreed on language to attain the consensus from all the smaller 
coalitions within the global south alliance. Tuvalu and the G-77 then agreed on the 
strategy that it would no longer negotiate on the text of loss and damage until the Paris 
negotiations597. With the support of the 130 plus countries behind Tuvalu, it was clear 
that the U.S. needed to reach out to Tuvalu. One such occasion was a special bilateral 
between Tuvaluan Prime Minister and U.S. Climate Change Special Envoy, Todd Stern, 
at the UNGA climate summit. The meeting addressed U.S. reservations of 
compensation in the text as a red line for President Obama’s support.  
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During the ADP2-12 sessions in the first week of December, there was only one 
informal meeting on loss and damage598. Although the informal meeting was late in the 
evening, there was no appetite from either Tuvalu or U.S. negotiators to move their red 
lines. “Undoubtedly, the French Presidency held the view that this was an issue that 
would be resolved by a small number of negotiators and broader discussions in a large 
group could easily unravel very sensitive negotiations”599.  What was needed was a 
bilateral between the two parties at loggerheads, or with the most to lose/gain, Tuvalu 
and U.S. 
 
The first attempt was on the evening of Tuesday December 7, where a special bilateral 
was organised between LDC headed by the Tuvalu Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga, and 
the U.S. led by its Secretary of State John Kerry. Despite some optimism at the 
beginning, the delegations could still not find a compromise on the language on 
compensation. Secretly the two leaders held a separate bilateral without the knowledge 
of supporting delegation negotiators.  This meeting proved to be the turning point, as 
the leaders found a compromise for compensation to be removed in the text, while the 
U.S. supported loss and damage as a stand-alone article. The discussions of the leaders 
were then communicated to the COP presidency to initiate a second bilateral amongst 
selected negotiators from LDC, AOSIS, EU and Tuvalu. The bilateral agreed to create a 
task force for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related 
to the adverse impacts of climate change in the accompanying decision of the COP.
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Figure 8. Image of U.S.-Tuvalu bilateral on loss and damage, on December 8, 2015. Tuvalu is 
led by prime minister Enele Sopoaga, and U.S. by Secretary of State John Kerry (Tuvalu is 
joined by Timor Leste of the LDC group). 
Source: U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and his team sit with 
Tuvaluan Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga before their bilateral meeting on the margins of the 
COP21 climate change summit in Paris," (Paris: US Department of State, 2015) 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/statephotos/22984110444/  
 
The ability of a small country with limited negotiation resources, to push a country like 
the U.S. into a corner owes much to the resilience and diplomatic finesse of its 
negotiators.  Led by their Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga, Tuvalu’s negotiators pursued 
a careful strategy of holding on to its red lines until the final moment of negotiations. 
The country’s leader and top negotiators were heavily invested in ensuring that loss and 
damage was to remain as a standalone article in the agreement with redress for 
compensation. Throughout the year, Tuvalu’s Prime Minister proactively raised 
awareness on the issue in various international and regional meetings to gain political 
support. As a former diplomat and permanent representative to the UN (in which he was 
also the chair of AOSIS and part of the UNFCCC bureau before joining politics) 
Sopoaga knew the process and politics of climate change and where lobbying would be 
the most effective. In the region, he was consistent in his messaging in the Polynesian 
Leaders Group, PIDF and PIF meetings to elevate loss and damage in the various 
declarations, as a means not only to rally Pacific islands support, but also to put 
pressure on the United States negotiators. It was little surprise that Tuvalu’s Prime 
Minister was famously dubbed as the ‘champion of loss and damage’. 
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Tuvalu was consistent in sending its top two negotiators to all ADP related meetings to 
lobby and build momentum amongst the coalitions. This translated to Tuvalu becoming 
lead coordinators on loss and damage for the LDC coalition, and continuously lobbying 
inside the AOSIS, G-77 and even the Pacific SIDS coordination groups. On every 
committee that discussed the issue, such as the Warsaw Implementation Mechanism for 
Loss and Damage, Tuvalu would ensure that its representatives would have a seat at the 
table. One of them was its Ambassador for Climate Change and their lead negotiator, 
Ian Fry, who had a formidable reputation as a tough negotiator with a background from 
Greenpeace activism and with institutional knowledge dating back to the early days of 
the Kyoto Protocol600.  
 
Inside: High Ambition Coalition 
One of the greatest stories and diplomatic feats to come out of the COP21 was the 
ability of another Pacific island nation to forge partnerships across the political firewall 
between the north and south countries. On the morning of Tuesday December 8, amidst 
the chaos of the Paris Committee talks, the Marshall Islands made an announcement 
with 79 other African, Caribbean, Pacific and European Union countries. They called 
for an ambitious deal by agreeing on the core elements of the Paris deal601. The group 
called themselves the High Ambition Coalition, which one day later increased its 
membership to 100 countries with the U.S. and Brazil joining. The like-minded 
ministers from different regions and groups were brought together under four goals. 
They wanted an agreement at Paris to be legally binding; to set a clear long-term goal 
on global warming that is in line with scientific advice; to introduce a mechanism for 
reviewing countries’ emissions commitments every five years; and to create a unified 
system for tracking countries’ progress on meeting their carbon goals602. 
 
The public show of solidarity by ministers walking side by side holding hands and 
speaking in union at various press conferences was carefully orchestrated at the time 
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when negotiations in the Paris Committee and again in indabas were tense. The 
Marshall Islands Foreign Minister Tony de Brum was reported as stating that the group 
had been waiting on the side-line for days to make the public revelation.  
This being the last three days of this meeting, there needs to be bridging. To 
reach out to those who still have doubts and maybe help convince them that the 
message that we are putting out is for real and it does makes sense and it has the 
support of a lot more people than may first meet the eye603. 
And while the group was a show of solidarity, it also indicated the countries that did not 
share the same views. It became a group that was against any watering down of 
positions that were led by China and India in the late evenings.604 
 
The group of developed and developing countries first met in Berlin in May 2015, as a 
group of 15 ministers that included representatives from Angola, Chile, Colombia, 
Gambia, Germany, Peru, Saint Lucia, Mexico, and the UK; where it was reported that 
“De Brum was the brilliant mind behind it”605. Leading up to Paris the group met in 
secrecy five times, including at the side-lines of the UN general assembly in 
September606. These secret meetings coincided with the French-Peruvian hosted 
ministerial informal meetings for the Paris conference that took place throughout the 
year.  While there was no report of French participation in the discussions, the 
ministerial coalition were very much in favour of supporting the French presidency to 
deliver the highest ambition deal in Paris.  Foreign Minister de Brum was reported as 
saying as the role of the coalition, “(t)o do this, we are building the personal bonds 
between us as Ministers, and forging a joint resolve to fight together”607 
 
 It would be at another informal setting, at a restaurant in central Paris on the night of 
December 6 that the U.S. chief negotiator Todd Stern, would casually meet the group of 
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ministers. It was reported that the Sunday dinner became a meeting that converged on 
issues of common ground. 
 
The work of the coalition came at a vital time. The final consensus point or moments of 
the negotiations were party-led negotiations, and the ability to have a network of 
ministers from across the various divides proved useful when timely political deals 
needed to be made.  The Marshall Islands pavilion office became the hub for the 
alliance. Various state ministers who had joined the cause, including Fiji, Palau and 
Federated States of Micronesia from the Pacific, refined their positions during breaks 
from Paris Committee and indaba sessions. The hospitality from the Marshall Islands 
extended to kava bowl talanoa sessions in the less hectic moments in the second week 
of the conference.  
 
The ambitious demands on which the group found a compromise eventually found their 
way into the Agreement. Of importance to the Marshall Islands and all other island 
states was the compromise on the language on long-term temperature goal. Inside G-77 
China, India and Saudi Arabia were not convinced on the goal of 1.5, as with other 
Annex I countries. However, despite resistance by Annex I parties on 1.5 degrees goal, 
the final agreed text put forth an aspirational target of “…. pursuing efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”.608 Many attributed this 
outcome to the persistence of Marshallese negotiators through various partnerships that 
included participation in the Cartagena Dialogue and the High Ambition Coalition. 
They found language which the major economies could live with.  
 
Tony de Brum, Independent Diplomat and Track 0 
Like Tuvalu’s Sopoaga, Foreign Minister Tony de Brum was a veteran diplomat and 
activist.  For decades he devoted his time to bringing awareness about the plight of 
Marshallese people after U.S. nuclear testing in World War II. For more than a decade 
the leader was zealous in his work in the island state, and at the same time become an 
outspoken advocate for global address on climate change . In part his charisma to build 
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trust and forge discussions amongst ministers was legitimised by his seniority and 
experience in various forums. However, despite de Brum’s diplomatic mastery, it could 
not save his political career back in his home island. During the first week of 
negotiations in Paris, de Brum lost his seat at the general elections. 
 
Two key non-profit organisations were supporting de Brum. Through the previous three 
years, the New York based organisation Independent Diplomat (ID) had provided 
technical negotiator and legal advice for small island nations. “Working carefully and 
deliberately over a number of years, ID helped position the Marshall Islands to such a 
point where they were able to form and then lead the High Ambition Coalition, and 
where they were increasingly invited into other small deal-making rooms” 609. In all the 
negotiations throughout the year, representatives from Independent Diplomat would 
continually shadow the minister or lead negotiations on behalf of Marshall Islands. A 
second organisation that were also instrumental in providing legal advice and 
diplomatic support was the organisation Track 0.  In essence the work of the Marshall 
Islands and the significance of the High Ambition Coalition are best explained in this 
description of Tony de Brum as the emerging climate champion at COP21: 
(The) coalition for ambition, a group of developed and developed countries that 
had agreed to target a 1.5 degree warming threshold – so beloved of island states 
– as well as regular reviews and a long-term climate goal. Significant because 
these talks are wracked with rich-poor divides. Significant because 1.5 degree 
has become a totemic issue in Paris. Significant because it took a veteran Pacific 
Islander to pull some of the world’s top economies into shape. It may yet prove 
to be a tipping point at these talks, when countries came together for a common 
goal and to protect the most vulnerable.610 
 
Inside: Moments of the Final Day 
On Saturday December 12, at 11.00am, the COP21 French president released the final 
text of the Paris Outcome, calling on parties to reconvene later in the afternoon after 
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they had reviewed the text. In a flurry of activity negotiators were seen running from 
room to room to find printers to print copies of the text. The reconsolidated text that was 
once 92 pages in January, known as the Geneva text, became a meagre 16 pages eleven 
months later. With all alternative options and brackets removed the final text was given 
to the 195 parties to decide on its totality. The time for negotiations on terms or wording 
had ended. It was now up to the 197 participating parties to decide whether the 
agreement should stand or be vetoed. In this multiparty consensus process, it only 
needed one country to disagree for the four year negotiation process to fail. While 
awaiting instructions from the French chair for the final plenary to take place, anxious 
scenes unfolded in the coming few hours and rumours abounded. Within the negotiation 
chambers, individual delegations and coalition met to review the details of the final 
outcome.  
 
Pacific SIDS coalition consensus 
Huddled in the small office pavilion of the Palau delegation, members of the 14 Pacific 
island states convened to gauge comments from fellow negotiators. The Palau 
ambassador for climate change had taken over the leadership of the Pacific SIDS group 
after the Tongan chair had departed days earlier for other UN meetings. In a room with 
just under 50 negotiators, these individuals were the remaining vanguards of the united 
Pacific voice. By that time most negotiators had already sent electronic copies of the 
agreement to their capitals for further instructions. There was the notable absence of the 
Marshall Islands and Tuvalu delegations in the meeting, who were believed to be 
occupied in the High Ambition Coalition and the LDC coalition meetings taking place 
at the same time. 
 
The group first focused on the text of the key issues that were pursued as common 
positions for Pacific SIDS: 1.5 degrees long-term temperature goal, mitigation finance, 
adaptation and loss and damage. Some members of the Pacific caucus relayed 
frustration on the vagueness and ambiguous language that would not prompt effective 
implementation. However, negotiators gave consent on the grounds that at least all the 
key priorities had made it on the agenda of the agreement. This was a victory and would 
be the source to progress future negotiations in implementing the agreement. The parties 
acknowledged the work of ministers and key negotiators especially the role of Tuvalu 
and Marshall Islands in the final stages of negotiations in pursuing the controversial 
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issues of loss and damage, and ambitions on the long-term temperature goal. As the 
meeting was coming to an end, anxiety grew among the negotiators as to whether the 
Caribbean states or the Maldives leadership in AOSIS would pull out of the agreement. 
 
 
Figure 9 and Figure 10: Images inside the final Pacific SIDS coalition meeting as negotiators 
peruse and inspect the final text of the Paris Agreement on December 12, 2015. Photographs 
by author. 
 
AOSIS coalition consensus 
The negotiators from the Pacific SIDS quickly reconvened in a nearby room with fellow 
negotiators from the AIMS and Caribbean ocean states. This time the leaders and 
delegations from Tuvalu and Marshall Islands joined the collective. Foreign minister de 
Brum opened the proceedings by acknowledging the great contributions and 
coordination of the Maldives chair in pursuing a year long process of negotiations. 
These acknowledgements to the chair and the wider small island state grouping were 
similarly echoed by the interim Pacific chair from Palau.  
 
Despite the fears of a Caribbean mutiny, there was sigh of relief in the room when the 
Barbados chair of the Caribbean community, and the St Lucia President relayed their 
consent on the final outcome. Many had anticipated that the AOSIS lead coordinators 
who for years passionately pursued both their state and coalition red lines would speak 
against adopting the text. Again, these fears were not realised. The atmosphere, instead, 
was jovial and celebratory; there was no more appetite for the negotiations to continue. 
One delegate in her intervention reflected on the process through poetry which she 
dedicated to her fellow negotiators. The words of the Samoan Ambassador during the 
meeting relayed the shared feelings in the room. 
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We should make the most of the Agreement. We were instructed to return with 
something; it’s not perfect, life is full of imperfections. It is better to have one, 
than nothing at all611. 
 
Similarly, with the conclusion of the Pacific caucus meeting, the anxiety among 
negotiators returned. With the final G-77 meeting to take in the next hour, attention now 
concentrated on whether the great coalition would support the French text or veto the 
agreement. There were murmurs of a possible Chinese and Indian departure, and even 
the frustrations of African and Latin American negotiators were rumoured to be 
instigating a possible fragmentation of the southern coalition consensus. The corridors 
leading to the G-77 meeting were littered with negotiators in multiple huddles 
anticipating a possible showdown.  
  
Figure 11 and Figure 12. Image inside the final AOSIS coalition meeting on reaction to the 
Paris Agreement text on December 12, 2015. Photographs by author.  
G-77 coalition consensus 
The final G-77 coalition meeting started with an uneasy silence in the room. Negotiators 
in their usual practice sat conspicuously behind the leaders and chairs of their respective 
coalitions. The South African chair of G-77 in her acknowledgements to open the 
gathering paid tribute to ministers and especially lead thematic coordinators who had 
led and carried out the wishes of the group in the last week.  In reiterating the 
cooperation of parties to abide by the coalition’s key principle of ‘do no harm’, the 
ambassador stated, “ministers fought a good fight, and should hold their head high; the 
agreement reflected the wishes of the G-77.” The conclusion of the statement followed, 
and even more deafening was an awkward silence. 
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Suddenly, an eruption of loud applause and cheers echoed throughout the room. This 
was a signal from all developing countries and their coalitions of the acceptance of the 
final Paris Outcome. Negotiators who earlier anticipated a return to negotiations if a 
disagreement were to eventuate, sat back comfortably listening to the 
acknowledgements from ministers of various coalitions. The estimated 500 people in 
the room heard reports of the various deals and work undertaken by developing country 
coalitions during the final stages of negotiations. The African group reported on 
numerous consultations with the French presidency on their key interests, although 
some issues were not adequately addressed in the text, Africa “would generally live 
with what was on the table.” Marshall Islands’ Foreign Minister informed and thanked 
countries who were a part of the High Ambition Coalition that the 1.5 long-term 
temperature goal made it to the Agreement. The Maldives chair, speaking on behalf of 
AOSIS, reported on their contribution on the loss and damage bilateral and although not 
perfect, “no one was left behind”. Venezuela speaking for the Group of Latin American 
and Caribbean countries were also part of various last minute consultations and reported 
on the sense of compromise amongst ministers and negotiators to capture in the 
Agreement the sensitive issues. The Philippines noted that Climate Vulnerable Forum 
accepted the text, and despite concerns they could live with it. These and many more 
statements from other heads of coalitions would continue until Nicaragua and Nigeria 
made interventions.  
 
The representative from Nicaragua stated their delegation still had concerns over the 
language on loss and damage. This prompted delegates from Nigeria and Colombia to 
relay concerns that the issue of vulnerability was not forthcoming in the text to reflect 
climate change impacts on African and Latin American countries. The pendulum of 
uneasiness would return as negotiators started to remobilise and prepare for what might 
come. The South African chair in her attempts to settle the coalitions, reminded 
negotiators that outside the room the world was waiting on G-77, and their families 
were waiting for their return. In calling a motion to seek whether parties would like to 
reopen negotiations, there was silence in the room. But unlike the earlier rapture in the 
meeting, parties left the room knowing that although a consensus was agreed, there 
were parties with notable disagreements that could derail the final plenary.  
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Figure 13 and Figure 14. Image inside final G-77 coaliation as the southern coalition consent 
to the text of the Paris Agreement text on December 12, 2015. Photographs by author.  
 
The Final Plenary 
Just after 7.00pm, the doors of the main Le Bourget conference venue opened for all 
195 parties to meet for the final time. Media livestreamed images throughout the world 
of the procession of ministers and their negotiators taking their respective places. The 
formalities of the final meeting accorded speaking privileges to the President of France, 
UN Secretary General and the UNFCCC Executive Secretary and gave them the 
opportunity to thank the parties and the arduous negotiation process. An individual who 
could not be more relieved that the multilateral process she oversaw for four years was 
coming to a conclusion was the head of the UNFCCC secretariat Christiana Figueres. 
We have made history together. It is an agreement of conviction. It is an 
agreement of solidarity with the most vulnerable. It is an agreement of long-term 
vision, for we have to turn this agreement into an engine of safe growth612. 
 
However, events turned when the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry requested a point 
of clarification on the Article 4.4 on page 21 of the 31page final agreement. The text 
had inscribed the work ‘shall’ rather than ‘should’. The request led to a postponement of 
the meeting, as the chair of the COP Laurent Fabius consulted with the UNFCCC 
secretariat in a separate room.   
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In a blink of an eye, ministers and negotiators were seen moving throughout the plenary 
hall in bedlam. Various huddles started to form around heads of coalitions, and key 
parties that were thought to have unresolved disagreements with the text. The Nicaragua 
delegation saw numerous negotiators including Tuvalu’s Prime Minister consult on loss 
and damage. Meanwhile groups formed around Colombia and Nigeria with South 
African diplomats representing the chair of the G-77 moved in between the groups. The 
top envoys on climate change from China, United States and India joined in the 
pandemonium as they moved through the various groups bargaining with the various 
parties. The whole plenary hall was a sea of commotion. The point of clarification of 
‘shall’ rather than ‘should’ was interpreted by U.S. lawyers as an obligation. The text of 
Article 4, “developed country parties shall continue”613 would mean for the Obama 
administration that the Paris Agreement needed to be passed through the U.S. Senate. 
However, the consequence of changing the text would mean re-opening the 
negotiations. There was a risk that all countries with objections would be able to 
readdress the issues in more negotiations that could take days to resolve. 
 
Needless to say, the COP Chair Laurent Fabius unwittingly saved the day. After a 
postponement of fifteen minutes, the chair and his entourage returned to reconvene the 
meeting. Using his diplomatic finesse and tactic, he declared that there was a 
typographic error in Article 4 and the ‘shall’ would become ‘should’. There would be 
no more negotiations, and in the same breath stated in his final remarks the words many 
negotiators had waited for,  
I see the room, I see the reaction is positive, I hear no objection. The Paris 
climate accord is adopted614. 
 
Conclusion: 
After four years of party negotiations, the conditions were right for a climate consensus. 
More than ever, in the lead up to the Paris Climate Change Conference the discussions 
were no longer about the science or existence of climate change, but the politics of 
dealing with climate change. Global citizenry and the unique climate change 
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partnerships amongst states, private sector and civil society outside of the UNFCCC 
negotiations had expected nothing less than an agreement. The intensive year-long ADP 
negotiations that attempted to draft a text agreement would also contribute to the 
increasing political will and momentum amongst leaders, ministers, negotiators and 
their respective coalitions for an inevitable compromise. However, nothing was certain 
until all parties had gone through the process of multilateral consensus decision making 
at the COP21. 
 
The success of COP21 was in part due to the finesse of the French chair in navigating 
the complexities of the UNFCCC structure and the political divide between the north 
and south countries.  Innovative diplomatic initiatives such as the shuttle diplomacy of 
informal ministerial meetings, the egalitarian approach of the Comité de Paris, and the 
unprecedented micromanaged style of countless bilateral meetings during the meeting 
ensured that no state was left behind. Learning from the diplomatic mistakes of the 
infamous COP15 Copenhagen, the approach of the French chair was to ensure that the 
negotiations were as transparent as possible, with states consenting every step of the 
way in what naturally was a party- driven process. With fears of secret deals and closed 
back-room texts not eventuating, the COP Presidency restored the faith of parties in the 
UN multilateral system.  
 
This chapter explored multilateral decision making in the UNFCCC COP21, more 
specifically the concluding negotiations that led to the Paris Outcome or Paris 
Agreement, the full version can be found in Appendix V. It paid special attention to the 
work of delegations from the 14 Pacific island states by augmenting the work of their 
actors: leaders, ministers, technical negotiators and their respective coalitions; and the 
negotiation activities they carried out during the three-week conference. In this multi-
party meeting, this thesis acknowledges that many stories and perspectives from other 
non-Pacific countries were not covered or given the same attention in this chapter. 
Nevertheless, lessons about diplomacy and behaviour of states in multilateral consensus 
decision making can be drawn from the work of these small, poorly-resourced 
delegations of frontline states.  
 
  
 
249  
Consensus Decision Making in Global Multilateral Forums 
Existing studies of decision making and negotiating do so from the vantage point of 
leaders.  This research takes a different approach.  State leaders have an influential role 
in multilateral conferences establishing political will and confirming an agenda of 
negotiations. However as witnessed in COP21, leaders were only present at the 
beginning of the conference. Their role was limited to motivating the initiation of 
negotiations and giving consent for an expected outcome. As evident in the remarks of 
Pacific leaders at the High-Level Segment with the promises that a transparent 
multilateral negotiation process was to take place in Paris, leaders realised that failure 
was not an option. But that would only be the beginning. The work of agreeing to the 
details of an agreement depended upon the skills and competence of their respective 
state delegations.  
 
Coalitions-Traditional and Ad Hoc Negotiation Blocs 
To ensure that negotiations considered all the views of the 196 parties, state delegations 
needed to work with like-minded groups on the issues that they held dear. Established 
negotiation blocs like AOSIS, LDC, CfRN, Climate Vulnerable Forum, Cartagena 
Dialogue and the G-77 and China group were necessary vehicles where Pacific 
delegates would find allies. Moreover, the structures and strategies employed by these 
coalitions conditioned the way delegates behaved and carried out their work. Coherence 
amongst the coalition membership was highly valued; but fragmentation into smaller 
coalitions was also highly probable. Despite their high value in the negotiations, the role 
of coalitions would diminish in the agreement phase. By the time ministers were 
involved in the consensus point of negotiations, allegiance to coalitions would become 
secondary to a state’s national interests.  
 
COP21 would see the emergence of a Pacific SIDS coalition. The group did not develop 
from disagreements in the traditional coalitions, but rather from the shared realisation 
by leaders and negotiators for delegates from the Pacific that they would need to have a 
louder united voice in the negotiations. Previous ADP negotiations in the year showed 
that the key roles inside traditional coalitions- i.e. lead thematic coordinators – were 
occupied by delegates not from the Pacific islands. With a political mandate from 
regional declarations to mobilise in the talks, an almost equal number of state and non-
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state negotiators would be the ones who would participate in the talks under four 
coordination groups. These four groups substantiated the four-common position-issues 
shared by the 14 states: 1.5 long-term temperature goal, adaptation, finance and loss and 
damage. However, Pacific coordination teams would limit their interventions in the 
spin-off sessions in the first week of negotiations. The more fundamental task of the 
coalition was to act as the hub for the collection and sharing of information in the 
numerous negotiation chambers, with the support of CROP Plus regional organisations, 
to empower both technical negotiators in the ADP sessions, and the ministers in the 
Comité de Paris in the agreement phase of negotiations.  
 
Technical Negotiators- consensus builders 
Technical negotiators did the heavy lifting for negotiations in Paris. They were the main 
builders of consensus, they were the foot soldiers from beginning to end. In all phases 
of negotiations, from the spinoff rooms to corridor meetings to the concluding moments 
of the Comité de Paris, technical negotiators were also wordsmiths constantly 
bargaining over each word and bracket in the negotiating text. They were the first to 
arrive at the conference venue during the coalition coordination meetings and the last to 
leave the late midnight meetings. With the fast pace of negotiations occurring in 
multiple rooms, negotiators had to use innovative tools such as social media technology 
to communicate with fellow state delegates and members of their coalitions. Crucial in 
their work was the ability to create informal relationships with parties with differing 
positions to find compromises that would move the negotiations forward.   
 
An intrinsic feature of the Pacific SIDS coalition was its multi-actor team. The 14 
Pacific delegations were small in numbers with poorly resourced and under-trained 
officials. Apart from Niue which was absent, all delegations had at least two officials 
who consistently followed the negotiations and were knowledgeable in the process. To 
overcome these capacity constraints coalitions like Pacific SIDS and AOSIS were 
heavily reliant on partnerships with networks that aligned them with regional 
organisations and NGOs. These non-state actors were able to successfully lobby for 
their objectives and influence the negotiations through timely research support. Most 
NGOs in the Pacific delegations were equally accorded official technical negotiators; 
and with the small size of delegations most negotiators from the Pacific whether official 
or NGO were given a degree of freedom and autonomy to speak on behalf of states.  
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Furthermore, since NGOs were not bound by state politics there was another advantage 
of using them in delegations, as one NGO negotiator said, “NGOs are rat cunning, they 
know how to cut corners and strategise with their networks in other delegations and 
outside in the media to get the work done”615.  
 
Ministers part of the main smaller coalescence group  
When the Comité de Paris and substantive indaba of solutions took place in the second 
week, a smaller coalescence group emerged. In part conditioned by a process introduced 
by the French COP Chair to quickly finalise the talks, the group of ministers and some 
heads of delegations were given the task of finishing the work that started four years 
earlier. But not all countries were represented in the talks. Although the invitation was 
for all parties to participate, the states that were active in their interventions were the 
ones with positions still unresolved. When one state official was asked why their 
country was not active in the talks in the second week, his response was, 
All our country’s positions have been met and reflected in the text since week 
one. We no longer have to be involved aggressively in the talks, but we will 
support with silence from the background inside the room, behind our brothers 
from Tuvalu and Marshall Islands. In Pacific solidarity, they will deliver a much 
stronger text on the issues we hold dear on 1.5 and loss and damage616.  
 
A handful of ministers from the Pacific remained by the start of Comité de Paris, but 
only the Foreign Minister from Marshall Islands and the Prime Minister from Tuvalu 
had an active role in the final days. As the only head of government that remained 
throughout the three weeks of negotiations, Tuvalu’s Enele Sopoaga was affectionately 
known as the champion of loss and damage. Tuvalu’s delegation had maintained its red 
line and one position on the inclusion of loss and damage with a clause on 
compensation from the beginning of the year until the very last days of the talks. Its 
delegation throughout 2015 had successfully gathered enough momentum through its 
associated coalitions. This would force the U.S. who had differing views on the issue to 
reach out in last minute bilateral compromise. The one-position strategy paid off, and 
                                                     
615 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 26), in discussion-talanoa with the author, November 5, 2017. 
616 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 20), in discussion-talanoa with the author, December 4, 2015. 
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the issue of loss and damage would be anchored in the Paris Outcome. Meanwhile the 
persistence of Marshall Islands Tony de Brum in ensuring an ambitious agreement 
rested on the inclusion of 1.5 degrees in the long-term temperature goal. Unlike Tuvalu, 
de Brum reached out to ministers from countries with a disagreement on the ambitions 
targets six months earlier. In secret informal ministerial meetings, Marshall Islands 
would build the trust and confidence of these leaders to form the High Ambition 
Coalition and strike a deal that would see them amenable to the inclusion of 1.5 in the 
final outcome. Both Ministers and their delegations were consistent in their 
participation and their messaging throughout the year. While one stood firm on their red 
line, the other forged partnerships; Tuvalu and Marshall Islands were small parties but 
with big positions.  
 
Small states with a disagreement matter 
In the global multilateral forum that was COP21, it was easy to assume that the smaller 
states like those of the Pacific have little or no influence. Having limited resources and 
manpower in the negotiations, it was expected that like their sinking islands their 
delegations would drown in the sea of complex information and multiple fast paced 
negotiations. That would not be the case.  
 
Small states do matter, they matter in building consensus when they act collectively as a 
group. Through coalitions like Pacific SIDS, AOSIS, LDC and G-77 the Pacific voices 
during the negotiations were echoed throughout the various chambers. Not only do 
coalitions help manage complexity but they provide capacity. On the other hand, 
coalitions build consensus but only to a certain point. In the consensus point where 
reaching an agreement is vital, only a small group will emerge, and in this case 
ministers. As the accounts of Tuvalu and Marshall Islands showed, there were common 
threads in how they were able to have louder voices in the talks and influence text in the 
end. Firstly, both states and their delegations, including their ministers, were involved in 
the negotiations throughout the year. In the six months they were consistently building 
relationships and deals with parties, whether it be G-77 for Tuvalu or the High 
Ambition Coalition for Marshall Islands. Secondly and more importantly, small states 
matter, more precisely, small states with a strongly held position of disagreement can 
influence negotiations and help reach consensus.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
 
In 2015, the Pacific Island Countries, being the frontline states in the fight 
against climate change, were instrumental in concluding one of the toughest ever 
global negotiations for the Paris Agreement. Collectively, the Pacific Leaders 
and their delegations doggedly pursued our region’s priorities until we were able 
to make the world see climate change through our eyes, as the most vulnerable 
communities to climate change impacts. 
       Tuilaepa Aiono Sailele Malielegaoi, Prime Minister of Samoa617 
 
The achievement of a global consensus in Paris 2015 was a success for Pacific island 
states. After the disillusionment from diplomatic failures from Copenhagen, the faith of 
states in the UN multilateral consensus decision making process to deliver an agreement 
was restored. French President Francois Hollande said in his final statement of the Paris 
Climate Conference, “in Paris, we have seen many revolutions. The most beautiful, 
most peaceful has been achieved, a climate revolution”618. This climate revolution or 
consensus on climate change has many stories. The stories of the feats of Pacific island 
states at the COP21 have reverberated throughout the media in statements like those of 
Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi. However, very little detail is 
known about how events unfolded in 2015 from the perspectives of Pacific island states.  
 
This thesis has investigated the question: in multilateral climate change negotiations 
how do small states build and reach consensus? The question addresses an anomaly 
central to the discipline of international relations and diplomatic studies – how do states 
behave inside multilateral negotiations? The research has sought to address the 
scholarly gap in understanding multilateral consensus decision making in the specific 
context of climate change negotiations. Furthermore, it addresses the lacunae in the 
literature on the contributions of the fourteen Pacific island states inside multilateral 
climate change negotiations. The research uses a nuanced methodological approach of 
                                                     
617 Tuilaepa Aiono Sailele Malielegaoi, "Opening Address of the Second Climate Change Conference 
Victoria University Wellington by the Hon Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi," in Second 
Climate Change Conference Victoria University Wellingto, ed. Government of Samoa (Wellington: 
Government of Samoa, 2018). 
618 ENB, "Summary of the Paris Climate Change Conference 29 November-12 December 2015." 
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Global talanoa based on the method of talanoa, and methodologies used in process 
tracing and global political ethnography. This methodology allows analysis of 
multilateral negotiations as they occur in real-time, from the vantage point of Pacific 
island states.   
 
In Chapter Two, the thesis explored how the concept of multilateral consensus decision 
making could be examined with propositions extracted from the disciplines of 
psychology, international relations and diplomatic studies. Multilateral consensus 
decision making is an interactional non-voting process that involves negotiating 
disagreements by three or more parties, attempting to build and reach agreement. The 
literature from the three disciplines also pinpoints certain variables to construct an 
analytical framework to examine real-time negotiations in the phases of pre-
negotiations, negotiations and agreement phase. The framework and its hypotheses are 
examined in detail later in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Three was a contextual and historical chapter on the complex UNFCCC 
negotiations regime and the participation of Pacific island states in these negotiations 
from its inception until 2014. Pacific island states have been at the forefront of 
negotiations most notably in various leadership roles through the coalition bloc AOSIS. 
Pacific states were instrumental not only in establishing the structure of the regime but 
also in affirming special consideration for small islands as frontline states to impacts of 
climate change. This chapter also detailed the diplomatic meetings that took place in 
2015 at the international and regional levels, before the global Paris Climate Change 
Conference in December. The global political momentum for an agreement to eventuate 
at COP21 in December, was prioritised in the summitry of a series of international ADP 
meetings and also in the regional and sub-regional forums in the Pacific. The level of 
heightened attention in the Pacific region was witnessed in the multiple political 
declarations on climate change that came from regional, sub-regional and partner-
regional summits. The three empirical chapters of this thesis provide an in-depth 
description and analysis on four multilateral meetings pivotal to climate change that 
took place in 2015.   
 
Chapter Four examined multilateral consensus decision making at the international level 
negotiations, specifically the UNFCCC ADP2-9 meeting. The chapter traced 
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negotiations by describing the daily movements and routines of Pacific delegates in the 
complex structures of multi-party meetings. These daily accounts emphasised the 
centrality of inter-state coalitions or negotiations blocs in conditioning the behaviour of 
small states in international negotiations. Pacific negotiators worked diligently in 
various small group decision making processes of coalition consensus (within one 
coalition of like-minded states), inter-coalitions (amongst various like-minded 
coalitions), and informal-collective (non-negotiation bloc of like-minded states). The 
latter reflected the informal information-sharing collective of Pacific islands states in 
the negotiations supported by the political leadership of PSIDS New York, and the 
technical science and negotiator support of SPREP. Through talanoa accounts, we know 
that Pacific delegates concurred on the need for a Pacific coalition but were challenged 
by the inconsistency and capacity of negotiators in the meetings, different perspectives 
of capital/regional and New York-based diplomats, and the lack of a political mandate 
from the region engaged in the negotiations as a united Pacific group. This obstacle of a 
regional mandate was explored in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter Five concentrated on multilateral consensus decision making at the regional 
level during two crucial summits: Pacific Islands Development Forum and the Pacific 
Islands Forum. Held within ten days of each other, the meetings produced three political 
declarations on climate change. The chapter followed the making of these three 
declarations by tracing the behaviour of Pacific states in an islander only but inclusive 
forum, the PIDF, and the pre-eminent political organisation that included Australia and 
New Zealand, the PIF. The forums were synonymous with the ideals of Pacific Way 
and Talanoa that emphasised dialogue of leaders rather than negotiations amongst 
parties. However, this research finds otherwise. Consensus decision making was 
initiated and controlled by small groups of officials. In both forums small groups of 
officials that include foreign affairs officials, technical negotiators and regional 
organisation personnel drafted and negotiated the wording and terms of climate change 
texts, as well as communiques. Open plenaries and leaders’ closed retreats which were 
believed to be the sites of consensus decision making were only a façade in front of the 
back room negotiations of small groups of officials. More important was the pivotal role 
of a smaller coalescent group of officials, who were also technical negotiators at the 
international negotiations, in ensuring that key priorities at UNFCCC level were also 
reflected in the declarations from the region. Evident in all three climate declarations 
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was the affirmation of a political mandate for Pacific states to work in the negotiations 
as a united voice.  
 
Finally, Chapter Six detailed multilateral consensus making at the global level in the 
Paris Climate Change Conference or COP21. In this all-important global forum, the 
attention of parties was to reach consensus on a text for a Paris Agreement. The mega-
conference would not only host more than 38,000 state, private sector, civil society and 
interested individuals, but  at the same time see a convergence of the international and 
regional negotiation processes in which Pacific island states were involved in 2015.The 
international negotiations of the ADP held its final session within the first week of 
negotiations, while the outcome of regional declarations for a Pacific united voice saw 
the establishment for the first time of a Pacific SIDS coalition in the negotiations. The 
Pacific SIDS had limited interactions in the negotiation rooms, but their impact was in 
mobilising Pacific negotiators to underscore key demands of Pacific nations through 
established coalitions of AOSIS, CfRN, LDC, Cartagena and G-77. The most crucial 
agreement phase was the final week of negotiations, in which ministers and heads of 
delegations would push the final agreement. In this smaller coalescent group of 
ministers, two champions came from the Pacific. Tuvalu’s Enele Sopoaga and his 
delegation held its red lines on loss and damage until U.S. were forced to have multiple 
bilateral meetings in the final days to create a package on loss and damage. Meanwhile 
Marshall Islands Tony de Brum championed the climate ambition goal of 1.5 long-term 
temperature goal by reaching out and building a High Ambition Coalition of more than 
79 countries from both developed and developing countries.   
 
This concluding chapter will now highlight the key thesis arguments. The first section 
draws out the insights in understanding and building theory on multilateral consensus 
decision making. The second focuses on small Pacific Island states in climate change 
negotiations. The third section turns to the limitations of this research and questions for 
future research that this thesis has prompted. 
 
Conditions of Multilateral Consensus Decision Making 
The purpose of this thesis was not to create new theory, but rather to draw out insights 
from studying multilateral climate change negotiations for possible conditions to assist 
in understanding multilateral consensus decision making. Chapter Two introduced the 
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main hypothesis of this research, namely that Multilateral Consensus Decision Making 
is the sum of two processes: building consensus and reaching consensus.  
 
From the propositions identified as conditions of multilateral consensus decision, this 
research will now explain these conditions based on observations at the during the 
UNFCCC ADP2-9, PIDF, PIF and COP21 conferences. 
 
Table 19. Conditions for Building Consensus 
Building 
Consensus 
Condition Interactional Behaviour 
Communication Takes place as states communicate 
among each other formally and 
informally 
Small Groups Emergence of small groups of 
coalitions, and smaller coalescence 
groups of lead negotiators 
Minority Active 
Participants 
Only a small number of states with 
strong interests and disagreements 
will be active; role as group ‘chairs’ 
Narrowing of Issues Bargaining of multiple issues by 
narrowing to a few key issues, and 
options 
Consent for 
Continuation 
Constant consent by parties for 
process to continue negotiations 
 
Conditions for Building Consensus 
Building consensus refers to the processes and activities that take place in the early 
phases of negotiations that involve states highlighting multiple interests, values and 
ideas of parties; and their attempts through negotiations to streamline them into viable 
options. Across all four forums analysed, consensus building occurred in both the pre-
negotiation and negotiation phases. While the negotiation phase occurred in the days or 
weeks of formal negotiations; for the pre-negotiations phase, this ranged from the week 
of preparatory meetings for coalitions (ADP2-9 and COP21) to even months before the 
start of a meeting (PIF Forum Officials’ Committee). This research finds five key 
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elements shared among all forums that explain the optimal conditions of building 
consensus, as shown in Table 19.  
 
Communication Among States  
The process of building consensus occurred as soon as states started sharing information 
with other parties. This may be informally as in the case of preparatory meetings in the 
HLSM or the PIF Forum Officials Committee, or during formal negotiations in the ADP 
spinoff sessions. The sheer quantity of communication, increasing as it does with the 
number of participants, is difficult to manage. Each participant is likely to experience 
difficulty orchestrating the different signals that are to be sent, sometimes 
simultaneously to different audiences, and interpreting the statements and signals made 
by the other participants619. Party negotiators communicate various proposals and most 
importantly their national red lines. As parties initiate formal and informal 
communication with each other, they entertain the multiple proposals or alternatives for 
later stages.  
 
Small Groups/Coalitions and Smaller Coalescent Groups  
Just as soon as parties start communicating information with each other, small groups or 
coalitions of likeminded states will also form. In the case of PIF and PIDF there were 
no visible coalitions active in the negotiations620. However, in both ADP2-9 and COP21 
established coalitions like AOSIS, G77, Cartagena, LDC and CfRN antedate these 
meetings. Beyond established coalitions ad hoc small groups would emerge usually at 
the pre-negotiations phase, as observed in the Pacific SPREP SIDS collective in Bonn 
and the Pacific SIDS in Paris. From within these coalitions (coalitions consensus) and 
amongst coalitions (inter-coalition consensus like G-77) a smaller coalescent group 
would emerge. This smaller group were a few key individuals of lead 
coordinators/negotiators identified by coalitions to negotiate on their behalf during the 
negotiations. These lead individuals played the vital role of acting as ‘chairs’ of the 
groups that coordinated the group positions and its presentation in the negotiations. 
 
                                                     
619 Touval,  165. 
620 Although it can assumed that sub-regional groupings of MSG, PLG and MLS could potentially act as 
small grouping in PIF and PIDF—this however was not the case,  
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Minority will be Active Participants 
While all interested parties will be present in negotiations, only a minority of states are 
active participants. State negotiators who were silent on an issue were not indicating 
they had no position, but rather that they did not disagree with the offer on the table. 
“Active participants usually have important interests at stake, while the passive ones 
may have joined the negotiation for reasons of status, rather than because of a strong 
concern about the substantive issues621”. Only states with a strong disagreement would 
be more inclined to voice positions or lobby. This was clearly visible in the active roles 
of Marshall Islands and Tuvalu in the ADP2-9, and again during COP21. The more 
passive states adopt a flexible stance and tend to go along with arrangements developed 
by the more active participants622.  
 
Narrowing of Issues  
Closely associated with communication and small group formation is the role of 
negotiators in narrowing issues to be negotiated. These issues and options have been 
identified in pre-negotiations phase where there is little disagreement. This was 
observed in the initial drafting of the Geneva text as well as the three climate change 
declarations from Suva, PIF SIS and PIF Leaders' meeting. Parties would communicate 
red line issues or options usually before pre-negotiations, and these were considered no 
go zone areas. This was seen on the issues of climate migration and fossil fuel 
moratoriums in the PIF meetings and UNFCCC negotiations where despite Kiribati 
preference for the issue to be discussed, Annex I countries requested that these issues be 
put on hold for future meetings, or another forum altogether. By providing options to 
parties to defer, this approach ensured that they would still remain in the talks.  
 
Participants’ consent to continue deliberations 
Vital in the progress of negotiations is the ability for countries to continually provide 
consent for deliberations to continue. In every spin off session of the UNFCCC 
meetings, as well drafting group sessions in the PIDF and PIF, the chairs would ask 
member states for their consent to approve the discussion and give permission for 
                                                     
621 Touval,  167. 
622 Ibid. 
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suggestions for next meetings. The signs of silence in the room would be signals that 
process may continue, especially if it moved from deliberations at the pre-negotiations 
and negotiations phase into the agreement phase623.  
 
Table 20. Conditions for Reaching Consensus 
Reaching 
Consensus 
Condition Interactional Behaviour 
Main Smaller 
Coalescent Group 
Emergence of a main smaller group 
with strong points of disagreements 
that need to be resolved 
Dropping Objections Persuasion and techniques for 
dropping objections: ambiguous 
agreements, package agreements, 
bilateral bargaining 
Consensus Point Final moments of negotiations, 
manoeuvring for last minute results 
 
Conditions for Reaching Consensus 
The table above summarises the conditions for reaching consensus. Reaching consensus 
refers to the processes and activities that involve finalising a decision, where viable 
options are bargained to the point that parties agree not to disagree. In the four forums 
examined, only the PIDF, PIF and the COP21 meetings would undertake this process, 
as the ADP2-9 was part of series of meetings attempting to streamline the drafting 
negotiations text before Paris. The process of reaching consensus occurred in the 
agreement phase and in the Consensus Point before an outcome is resolved. In the 
structure of meetings, this phase would take place usually at a higher political level of 
ministers and head of delegations. A significant element in the structure of these 
meetings was their limited timeframe. In the case of COP21 negotiations were limited 
by the due date of December 12624; for PIF it was limited before the morning of 
September 11 before the leaders went into retreat to approve all meeting. This research 
finds three key elements that explain the conditions of reaching consensus. 
                                                     
623 This scenario was reflected in Chapter Four in the closure of the UNFCCC ADP2-9 meeting  
624 Initially in the official program negotiations were to conclude on Friday December 11. However, the 
recommendation by the French, was approved by member states to continue negotiations by one extra day 
to conclude the work of the Comité de Paris.  
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Main Smaller Coalescent Group  
Although the various small groups of coalitions and smaller coalescent group of lead 
coalitions coordinators would emerge in the pre-negotiations and negotiations phase, a 
new smaller coalescent group would emerge in the agreement phase. Again, not all 
states would be active in this process, with only a minority number of states active at 
this level of negotiations. One differentiation between building and reaching consensus 
is the observed involvement of high-level political actors such as ministers or heads of 
delegations engaged in the negotiations. In the case of PIF and PIDF, it was not the 
leaders but rather the technical negotiators in the final officials drafting room. During 
COP21, the main smaller coalescent group was the Comité de Paris. For states with 
particular unresolved disagreements it was vital that they were represented at this level 
with the right form of representation. Although technical negotiators may have limited 
direct input in the formal meetings, the ministers or heads of delegations who were 
effective were experienced technical negotiators. This was certainly reflected in the 
skills and finesse of Tuvalu’s Prime Minister and Marshall Islands Foreign Minister in 
the final days of Paris.  
 
Dropping objections  
The aim of the main smaller coalescent group was to finalise the agreement by finding 
compromises to any unresolved issues. The ministers or heads of delegations (or in the 
case of PIF – lead technical negotiators) would employ various techniques to persuade 
each other to drop objections. The first would be bilateral bargaining either by the chair 
and a particular state with an objection, or between states. The latter was evident in the 
three bilateral meetings between Tuvalu and the US on the issue of loss and damage. 
This bilateral bargaining together with creating package agreements explains the role of 
Marshall Islands forming the High Ambition Coalition. In the case of the final text of 
Paris agreement and the PIF Leaders declaration the technique was resorting to 
ambiguous and imprecise wording. Despite the disadvantage of an ambiguous 
agreement leading to conflicting interpretations, an imprecise agreement establishes a 
modicum of cooperation amongst the parties to continue625. A further technique as 
explored earlier would be to defer any unresolved issues for another negotiation. Other 
                                                     
625 Touval,  169. 
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techniques of dropping objections identified by scholars, of mediation, compensation 
and side payments, however were not observed by research inside these negotiations626.  
 
Consensus Point  
The Consensus Point or last-minute scenario reflects the last hours or days of the 
negotiations. It is a situation of high political drama and emotions as leaders and 
negotiators rush to conclude the agreement. In some situations, like the PIF officials 
meeting the negotiations are in long closed meetings; while in the case of COP21, they 
occupied the whole week of deliberations of the Comité de Paris. Influencing the 
agreement meant being active in the negotiations and alive to the informal whispers and 
chattering of the corridors. The events that unfolded in Paris reflect the observation by 
Ronald Walker that this period is the vilest feature of multilateral conference of airless 
rooms late at nights, characterised by amending and watering down draft texts627. The 
final minutes of COP21 were halted over a question of ‘shall’ and ‘should’, by the U.S., 
however unity was achieved by the diplomatic finesse of the French chair to mark the 
insertion as typographical error. The conclusion of the consensus point and reaching 
consensus is seen through the absence of opposition, and when a proposal is no longer 
contested.  
 
Overall Conditions for Multilateral Consensus Decision Making 
Consensus decision making among multiple states takes place in a setting that is 
complex and multi-layered. Understanding multilateral consensus negotiations requires 
a comprehensive systemic perspective, one that recognises the variety of structures, sub-
structures, and processes that are present, and how negotiators engage in that process628. 
The fundamental rule of multilateral consensus decision making is that all procedures 
are decided by consensus with no option of voting. This form of decision making is a 
diplomatic endeavour that involves a plethora of actors which are not only state 
officials, but also non-state actors that range from civil society, private sector to 
individuals. These multiple actors bring with them competing national, organisational 
                                                     
626 Ibid., 170. 
627 Walker, 162. 
628 Touval,  171. 
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and personal interests, priorities and resources. Table 21 below summarises the three 
overall conditions for multilateral consensus decision making.  
 
Table 21. Overall Conditions for Multilateral Consensus Decision Making 
Multilateral 
Consensus Decision 
Making 
Condition Interactional Behaviour 
Party-state Driven  States will decide the rules, 
formula and procedures of 
consensus decision making. States 
will decide when an agreement is 
achieved. The significant role of 
Chair.  
Incremental Stages Multilateral consensus decision 
making takes places in incremental 
stages of consent: pre-
negotiations, negotiations, and 
agreement  
Core Group A core group of states and 
individuals with vested interests 
and disagreements, will drive 
negotiations from beginning to end, 
through the various stages of 
negotiations.  
 
Furthermore, there is not one, but various cross-cutting issues negotiated 
simultaneously. It is not possible for one person to fully comprehend all issues, far less 
respond to different positions from multiple parties. The aim of multilateral conferences 
by consensus is not to solve issues, but rather to facilitate a process where three or more 
parties with points of disagreements can find compromises. These compromises do not 
necessarily result in a strongly worded agreement, but rather an agreement with a low 
common denominator. This research finds three key elements to explain the conditions 
of multilateral consensus decision making.  
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Party Driven: rules, formula, procedures, the Chair 
Multilateral consensus decision making is party driven. States determine the rules, 
formula and procedures of how a process of negotiations takes place. In all four forums 
these factors predate the negotiations usually in the early days of the establishment of 
the regimes. For UNFCCCC it was in the period from 1990-1995 before COP1 and for 
PIDF it was before the its first meeting in 2013. Parties may also choose to change or 
amend such rules with the consent of parties, as evident through the various PIF 
Agreement on the Establishment of Pacific Islands Forum 1970, 2000, 2006. Needless 
to say, the agenda for each meeting is agreed to by parties at the beginning of formal 
negotiations. The most important rule is that all decisions are made by consensus, or 
where there is no alternative, by voting. This can prove difficult because consensus is 
time consuming, but parties can insist on a time limit. In the case of the UNFCCCC, the 
international ADP and global COP21 process was designed to reach a consensus by 
December 2015. Just as essential as the rules, formula and procedures of multilateral 
foums is the role and skill of the Chair. Chosen from among their peers, while a 
structural position- the skill and finesse of an individual/state acting can determine the 
outcome of negotiations. They not only facilitate an environment during the 
negotiations to bring members to the table, but as evident in role of France in 
facilitating discussions months if not years before the final conference.  
 
Incremental Stages of Consent  
To solve the issue of time-consuming negotiations, states would identify various stages 
of negotiations. Multilateral consensus decision making takes place incrementally. 
These stages may be within one meeting setting such as the preparatory meetings and 
formal negotiations phase for COP21 and ADP2-9, or with the various structures like 
PIDF (Grand Council, Executive Board, Officials Committee) and PIF (SIS Leaders 
meeting, Leaders Plenary and Leaders Retreat). At the same time these stages can also 
be in the form of a series of meetings like the ADP process. At all times there must be 
consent from parties at the conclusion of each stage, before the process of negotiations 
can begin. 
 
The third condition in multilateral consensus decision making and the main finding of 
this research is the existence of a core group of individuals that are essential in building 
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and reaching consensus. This element is examined in detail in the next section on the 
contributions of Pacific island states in climate change negotiations.     
 
 
 
The Core Group: Pacific Island Negotiators 
In multilateral climate change negotiations how do small Pacific island states build and 
reach consensus? This thesis has explored this question through empirical data that not 
only traces the history of negotiations, but more importantly by actively participating in 
multiple negotiations to observe the behaviour of states.  
 
The key finding is that there is a small core group of individuals in each forum that 
condition and precipitate the building and reaching of consensus in multilateral climate 
change negotiations. This core group are particular states and their negotiators who have 
the most vested interest on a given issue. They will actively participate and perform 
various activities of communicating and sharing information, initiate common positions 
and lobby within various coalitions, ensure their positions are on the table, and actively 
engage in processes of building consensus. A significant player amongst the small 
group is their lead negotiator, who acts as the ‘chair’ or ‘proxy chair’ of the group. At 
the same time, this core group of states and negotiators ensure their presence with a seat 
at the table with the right level of representation to be part of the main smaller 
coalescent group, so as to protect their priority issues from being watered down. 
Throughout this process, they will gain the support of negotiators who are less 
concerned with the issue629.  
 
At the international negotiations of the ADP2-9, while all Pacific island states were 
active in the negotiations more notable delegations had strong interests in the 
negotiations. This core group include the technical negotiators from Tuvalu (on 
mitigation and loss and damage), Marshall Islands (on mitigation and ambition), Papua 
New Guinea (on REDD plus), Samoa, Tonga, Palau (on finance), Solomon Islands (on 
                                                     
629 Ibid., 169. 
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capacity and technology transfer), and Cook Islands (on adaptation and loss and 
damage). For the regional forum at PIDF, Fiji’s leadership role in the organisation was 
complemented with the concerns of Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands and 
Cook Islands. At the PIF SIS summit Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, Cook Islands and Palau 
steered the ship in pursuing bold ambitions for the smaller island states. Meanwhile, 
during the PIF leaders’ summit it was Palau, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea that 
would attempt to lobby and negotiate with Australia and New Zealand to commit to 
sturdier language and ambition from its Port Moresby Declaration on Climate Change 
Action. By the time the final negotiations at the global level took place at COP 21, 
Tonga and Palau would become instrumental in leading the Pacific SIDS coalition, 
while the weight of the Pacific and its voice in the negotiations would lie on the 
shoulders of the negotiators and leaders from Tuvalu and Marshall Islands.  
 
Beyond these states and their negotiators this research highlights the technical 
negotiators in UNFCCC negotiations. These individuals are the voice of the region, 
states and peoples of the Pacific in the closed room chambers of negotiations. They are 
ministers of states, climate change project practitioners, ministry officials, scientists, 
international lawyers, activists, media personnel, private sectors, church ministers, 
academics, and even students. This core group of technical negotiators not only 
condition global and international negotiations, but through their work in the Pacific 
region they greatly influence and control the climate change agenda.  
 
Throughout the intensive negotiations in 2015, from observing the work of these 
climate change leaders, there were notable traits in the strategies of these countries and 
other Pacific island negotiators who supported their work in these multiple forums. 
These activities were in line with Diana Panke’s suggestions of how smalls states can 
influence multilateral negotiations by using strategies to shape negotiations and build 
capacity.  
 
Strategies in shaping negotiations 
Pacific island negotiators influenced multilateral negotiations by employing strategies in 
shaping negotiations. Whether in regional, international or global negotiations, Pacific 
negotiators and leaders have continuously used moral and normative arguments as 
frontline climate change states to frame discussions and change the direction of debates. 
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This frame of the Pacific states as vulnerable reverberated in the regional declarations as 
well as leaders remarks at international forums, in order to ensure that Pacific states 
received special consideration for access to finance, adaptation, mitigation and capacity. 
These moral arguments were used to depict climate change as an existential threat rather 
than an economic issue. Negotiators were successful in influencing negotiations by 
narrowing their focus and building expertise on one or few key priority issues. Not only 
did individual countries prioritise issues like loss and damage, adaptation, finance and 
mitigation ambition; they also included in their delegations scientific and international 
lawyers to increase their expertise. For example, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands, Cook 
Islands, Palau and Papua New Guinea used both international NGO lawyers and 
national law experts in their delegations.  
 
Although Pacific states may not be able to offer side payments, in consensus decision 
making small states have the advantage of veto to pull out of negotiations at any time. 
For the case of Tuvalu, although there were no open threats of the country leaving the 
negotiations, the country’s leader and negotiators did have a record of using their veto 
to not join an agreement630. This gave them leverage to be perceived as blocking 
minorities and demand terms on loss and damage, when the U.S. were pushed to seek 
multiple bilateral meetings with the country’s leader. This example of Tuvalu as a 
competitive player in the negotiations, is part of value claiming631 where countries 
choose to be cooperative, competitive or both. By building a winning coalition of the 
High Ambition Coalition Marshall Islands as a cooperative player not only saved the 
issue of 1.5, but also the negotiations. Palau’s negotiators were more inclined to be both 
cooperative and competitive as the mediators in the various talks. Palauan officials were 
pivotal in building outreach in bringing together Australia and New Zealand in the final 
PIF agreement, as well as their leadership in the Pacific SIDS coalition. 
 
Strategies in building capacity 
More importantly, acknowledging the limited capacity and resources that these 
countries have, Pacific delegations employed strategies to build capacity. Delegates 
worked closely with the secretariats and chairs of the various forums to ensure they 
                                                     
630 At the 2009 Copenhagen negotiations Tuvalu with Bolivia did not consent to the Copenhagen Accord.   
631 Value claiming, also known as distributive negotiation or single-issue negotiation, involves trying to 
get as much of the pre-existing value on the negotiating table for yourself—and away from the other 
party.  
  
 
268 
received adequate information if this was not already provided. For UNFCCC, the 
holding of the SIDS seat by at least one Pacific official in both the bureau and special 
committees ensured that, if not all states, at least one country would receive 
information. A defining feature of Pacific delegations was its multi-actor composition 
with scientific, law, diplomats, media, academics, project practitioners and even 
activists in the delegation as active negotiators. Most if not all non-state actors and some 
states officials also provided institutional knowledge on the issues and politics of the 
regime. Learning from the mistakes and successes of previous global, international and 
regional meetings greatly facilitated the capabilities and strategies of Pacific 
negotiators. This eclectic array of actors added to pooling expertise on particular subject 
matters and constituted a network of Pacific negotiators632. Throughout 2015, 
negotiators from the Pacific involved in international and global negotiations were also 
present if not leading the negotiations in regional forums. In between meetings, this 
network would continually share information and positions via their group email, 
WhatsApp, skype and other social media platforms in order to prepare for the next 
meetings. Furthermore, the various SPREP HLSM and PSIDS in New York preparatory 
meetings were vital in facilitating face to face meetings and training by seasoned 
negotiators.  
 
Overcoming challenges for the Core Group 
This thesis has identified numerous challenges that negotiators faced. From lack of a 
political mandate to operate a regional group, the capacity and expertise of negotiators, 
the politics of regional and New York priorities, lack of instruction and research from 
capitals, the frustrations of negotiators who were also climate change practitioners about 
messy politics and slow pace of negotiations, to the retention of negotiators who were 
finding greener pastures in organisations outside the climate change regime. As one 
seasoned negotiator stated, “take away the low income…. despite personal drive and 
passion to help my country, there are no opportunities to up-skill or be motivated in 
negotiating”633. 
 
These challenges and more require investment by both national governments and 
regional organisation for opportunities to harness the diplomatic capacity of this core 
                                                     
632 Carter, 214. 
633 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 6), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 27, 2017. 
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group of Pacific negotiators. The eclectic multi-actor delegations bring much needed 
expertise. However, the training opportunities that are needed are diplomatic or, to be 
precise, multilateral diplomatic training. The work of SPREP’s HLSM in providing 
both regional and in-country technical negotiators trainings is fundamental and needs to 
be encouraged. Furthermore, beyond three days or one-week training programs, there 
needs to be investment in professional and tertiary long-term training programs where 
multilateral negotiating is not a part-time role, but rather a full-time profession. National 
and regional universities have a role, as in the case of the University of the South 
Pacific’s diplomatic executive training which could serve as a vital conduit634. 
Overcoming negotiator fatigue in the climate change regime is a problem and the 
Pacific should look to other countries which rotate negotiators every three years so that 
they can acquire new skills in trade or security negotiations635. Some states have been 
successful in keeping key negotiators from the early days of the convention in their 
workforce; others continue to maintain relationships with officials who have moved to 
regional organisations and who can provide technical support or negotiate on their 
behalf.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The methodology of global talanoa, that utilises the talanoa method and draws on 
process tracing and global political ethnography has provided this research with a broad 
perspective. It has provided a macro-analysis of the levels of multilateral diplomatic 
decision making, and more importantly an analysis of the work and lives of negotiators. 
There are limitations in the use of global talanoa. The researcher is a Pacific islander 
who observed the negotiations either as a Samoan or Tuvaluan government delegate. 
This research acknowledges that while it opens access to a secretive and closed room of 
negotiations it is also influenced by positionality in encounters, choice of processes and 
interpretation of outcomes636. It was not possible to fully describe the processes and 
activities in each negotiation chamber, or even as much as the work of all the fourteen 
delegations. The encounters and descriptions were selected based on the 
                                                     
634 USP, "School of Government, Development and International Affiars," The University of the South 
Pacific  
635 Pacific negotiator (Talanoa 6), in discussion-talanoa with the author, May 27, 2017. 
636 Mary Q Foote and Tonya Gau Bartell, "Pathways to equity in mathematics education: How life 
experiences impact researcher positionality," Educational Studies in Mathematics 78, no. 1 (2011): 46. 
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recommendations of Pacific negotiators, who said which issue or forum they wanted the 
researcher to follow. The purpose was to see the negotiations through their eyes.  
 
A key limitation of this research is that it does not cover the perspectives of other 
parties in the negotiation, such as those of non-Pacific island states like Australia and 
New Zealand in the PIF, as well as the other 182 parties of the UNFCCCC. And for a 
more objective balance, the research depended on the textual analysis of conference 
reports from ENB, UNFCCC, media reports, and recent academic writing on the 
COP21. This empirical shortfall suggests opportunities for future research. First, we 
should re-examine events in a way that incorporates the perspectives of other parties 
such as U.S., Australia, New Zealand, not to mention the wider members of the 
coalitions like G-77 and AOSIS. The Pacific islands are not the only small island states 
in the negotiations. Future research could explore whether similar challenges and 
strategies were encountered by Caribbean and AIMS counterparts.  
 
This research has offered an incomplete theory on multilateral consensus decision 
making. More research is needed. Research on Pacific island negotiators in the 
multilateral trade, health or even security regimes using the analytical framework and 
global talanoa is another way forward.  
 
Pacific Negotiators and Multilateral Consensus Decision Making 
Continues 
 
Negotiations is a relational activity. This research has highlighted how different Pacific 
actors and negotiators connect and develop relationships with those that share the same 
interests but also with those in opposition, to find the best outcomes and positions for 
the Pacific. These negotiators have demonstrated that although they maybe on opposite 
sides of a position, as in the case of Tuvalu and the U.S., the best way to negotiate is not 
necessarily through open confrontation but rather the cordial exchange of ideas, 
interests and building trusting and respectful relationships. Although this research 
highlights negotiations in one year, the relationships and connections were cultivated 
over two decades through the intention of parties to contribute to global problem 
solving on climate change. Beyond the conditions and strategies of the core group, there 
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is a deeper significance that can be interpreted in understanding how Pacific negotiators 
build and reach consensus. Underpinning the work and persistence of these state 
representatives was their ability to build and foster relationships amongst themselves as 
a region, within negotiating coalitions, as well as bargaining with other states.  
 
The story of Pacific negotiators did not start and end in 2015. The Paris Agreement has 
established a new form of global climate change regime. Instead of a top-down 
compliance system, the world will now be looking forward to parties making voluntary 
contributions to combat climate change. This bottom-up approach requires partnership 
and commitments not just from states, but commitments from cities, business, non-state 
organisations and individuals. It will require a multilateral consensus decision making 
process that is inclusive of states and non-state partners.  
 
The disciplines of international relations and diplomatic studies need to pay further 
attention to the work of Pacific island states. Today, the work of the Pacific SIDS 
coalition with its foundation in 2015, has become a robust negotiation bloc that has 
received both accolades and recognition within the UNFCCC negotiations. Regional 
organisations and their political declarations have identified the need to support the 
Pacific voice in climate change negotiations. Pacific states are no longer just party 
participants, but also procedural leaders. The appointment of Fiji as COP president in 
2017-2018 is evidence of the growing finesse of peoples from the most vulnerable 
region and their capacity to take charge in finding global solutions. 
 
In all four multilateral forums, there was an idiosyncratic practice which the core group 
used to build relationships and reach consensus, the diplomatic tool of talanoa. Talanoa 
or the practice of inclusive, open respectful and non-confrontational dialogue was 
observed in the relationships within delegations, inside coalitions as well as inside 
negotiation chambers.  More explicitly this tool of diplomacy as practiced in the 
regional forums of PIDF has been elevated by Fiji to the global negotiations as part of 
the facilitative dialogue stocktake on contributions from parties since the Paris 
Agreement637. The UNFCCC Talanoa Dialogue which facilitates inclusive, open and 
non-confrontational dialogue amongst state and non-state parties during the negotiations 
has been embraced by negotiators and expected to remain a permanent feature of global 
                                                     
637 George Carter to DevPolicy Blog, 9 November 2017, http://www.devpolicy.org/the-island-cop-
changing-the-negotiation-climate-20171109/. 
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climate change negotiations.  These ongoing contributions, the lessons of how Pacific 
islands states contributed to building and reaching consensus in 2015, reflect the 
diligence of Pacific negotiators, and the contributions of Pacific diplomacy in 
international politics. 
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Appendix  
Appendix I: List of Talanoa 
This list is in chronological order by country. 
Name Position at time of Talanoa and other relevant affiliation 
Teresa Mimetua 
Matamaki 
Senior Environment Officer, National Environment Service of 
Cook Islands, head of delegation for Cook Islands 
Diane McFadden Climate Change Advisor for Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Program, and negotiator for Cook Islands 
Ewan Cameron Climate Change Advisor for Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Program and Nansen Initiative, and negotiator for 
Cook Islands 
Pasha Carruthers Climate Change Advisor for Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 
and former negotiator for Cook Islands 
Amenatave 
Vakasavuwaqa Yauvoli 
Ambassador for Climate Change for Fiji/ interim Secretary 
General of the Pacific Islands Development Forum/ Chair of 
UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation 2013-2015, head 
of delegation for Fiji 
Francois Martel Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Development Forum, 
negotiator for Fiji 
Bradford Mori Climate Change Specialist, Office of Environment and Emergency 
Management, negotiator for the Federated States of Micronesia 
Makurita Baaro Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to 
the UN, head of delegation for Kiribati 
Choi Being Yeeting Climate Change Coordinator, Office of the President, negotiator 
for Kiribati 
Deborah Lynn Barker-
Manase 
Deputy Resident Representative, Permanent Mission to the UN, 
head of delegation and negotiator for Marshall Islands 
Caleb Christopher Legal Advisor, Permanent Mission to the UN, negotiator for 
Marshall Islands 
Rennier Gadabu Attaché Permanent Mission to the UN, AOSIS Fellow, negotiator 
for Nauru 
Malia Talakai Advisor and former AOSIS Lead Negotiator on Loss and Damage, 
negotiator for Nauru 
Ngedikes Olai Uludong  Ambassador to the European Union and Climate Change, former 
Chief Negotiator for AOSIS, head of delegation for Palau 
Joseph Aitaro Grants Assistant, Office of the President, negotiator for Palau 
Gwen Sissou Director REDD+ & Mitigation Office of Climate Change and 
Development, head of delegation and negotiator for Papua New 
Guinea 
Rensie Xhira Bado 
Panda  
Senior Policy Analyst-International Negotiations, Office of 
Climate Change and Development, negotiator for Papua New 
Guinea 
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Frank Aisi Director of International Relations, Office of the Prime Minister of 
Papua New Guinea 
Ali'ioaiga Feturi Elisaia Ambassador and Permanent Representative at UN, former Vice 
President of COP SIDS rep, head of delegation for Samoa 
Anne Rasmussen Assistant Chief Executive Officer Climate Change, Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment, negotiator for Samoa 
Vanda Faasoa-Chan 
Ting 
Assistant Chief Executive Officer Renewable Energy, Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment, negotiator for Samoa 
Ida Fuimaono First Secretary, Permanent Mission to UN, negotiator for Samoa 
Francella Strickland Deputy Permanent Representative at UN, negotiator for Samoa 
Espen Ronnenberg Climate Change Advisor, Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Program, former Vice President of COP SIDS Seat, 
negotiator for Samoa 
Colin Beck Ambassador and Permanent Representative at UN, former Vice 
President of COP SIDS rep, head of delegation for Solomon 
Islands 
Scott Hook  Economic Infrastructure Adviser, Pacific Islands Forum, 
negotiator for Solomon Islands 
Mahe’uli’uli Sandhurst 
Tupouniua  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative to UN, Chair of 
PSIDS New York and Pacific SIDS, head of delegation for Tonga 
Enele Sopoaga Prime Minister, former Vice President of COP, former Chair and 
Chief Negotiator AOSIS, head of government of Tuvalu 
Ian Fry Ambassador of Climate Change and Environment, Lead 
Negotiator for LDC, negotiator for Tuvalu 
Simalua Enele Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Public Utilities, AOSIS Fellow, 
negotiator for Tuvalu 
Brian Phillips Manager Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Unit, 
Department of Meteorology and Geo Hazard, head of delegation 
and negotiator for Vanuatu 
Sylvain Kalsakau  Head of UN and Economic Relations Division, Department of 
Foreign Affairs and international Cooperation, negotiator for 
Vanuatu 
Participants from non-Pacific Countries 
Mark Jariabka Executive Director, Islands First and secretariat of the Alliance of 
Small Islands States  
Carlos Fuller International and Regional Liaison Officer, Caribbean Community 
Climate Change Centre (CCCC), and negotiator for Belize 
Juwang Zhu Chief of the Office of the Under-Secretary-General, UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations  
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Appendix II: Suva Declaration on Climate Change 
We, the Leaders of the Pacific Islands Development Forum following open, 
transparent and inclusive discussions with stakeholders undertaken during the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum Third Annual Summit held in Suva, Fiji 
between 2-4 September 2015 declare that we:  
1. Are gravely distressed that climate change poses irreversible loss and damage 
to our people, societies, livelihoods, and natural environments; creating 
existential threats to our very survival and other violations of human rights to 
entire Pacific Small Island Developing States;  
2. Express profound concern that the scientific evidence unequivocally proves 
that the climate system is warming and that human influence on the climate 
system is clear, but appropriate responses are lacking;  
3. See and suffer from the adverse impacts of climate change, including but not 
limited to increased intensity of tropical cyclones, sea level rise, severe storm 
surges, more frequent and more extreme weather events, coral bleaching, 
saltwater intrusions, higher king tides, coastal erosion, changing precipitation 
patterns, submersion of islands, and ocean acidification, with scientific evidence 
clearly informing us these impacts will further intensify over time;  
4. Note with great regret the suffering of our people from the effects of climate 
change as expressed in common existing statements, declarations and positions 
namely the 2015 BOKNAKE HAUS Communique of the 15th Micronesian 
President’s Summit, the Melanesian Spearhead Group Declaration on 
Environment and Climate Change, and the 2015 Taputapuatea Polynesian 
Leaders Declaration on Climate Change;  
5. Are deeply disappointed that current international pledges for action as 
contained in submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), 
to stabilize global average temperature increase to well below 1.50C above pre-
industrial levels, remain grossly inadequate, with emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) continuing to rise;  
6. Express grave concern that the continued increase in the production of fossil 
fuels, particularly the construction of new coal mines, undermines efforts to 
reduce global GHG emissions and the goal of decarbonising the global 
economy;  
7. Highlight that irreversible loss and damage caused by climate change goes 
beyond adaptation and is already a reality for PSIDS if there is inadequate 
mitigation action, and that climate change is already resulting in forced 
displacement of island populations and the loss of land and territorial integrity 
and further highlight that such loss and damage results in breaches of social and 
economic rights;  
8. Support the establishment of a Pacific Small Islands Developing States regional 
task force on climate financing to ensure adequate funding for adaptation and 
mitigation actions to address, amongst other things:  
a. Our deep concerns about the continued lack of any clear roadmap for 
developed countries to provide USD 100 billion climate finance per year 
by 2020, as well as on substantially scaling up climate funding support 
after 2020;  
b. The implementation of a fully effective operation of the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF) with timely disbursement of funds in order to limit global 
temperature increases to below 1.50C above pre-industrial levels and 
transition towards a global, low emission, and sustainable climate 
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resilient development pathway. Pacific Small Island Developing States 
must continue to be represented and supported on the GCF board;  
c. Our deep concerns of proposals that adaptation funding be provided as 
loans or reimbursable grants rather than grants. As a consequence, 
Pacific Small Islands Developing States will either need to increase debt 
or divert resources from other development priorities to meet adaptation 
costs;  
d. The requirement for a portfolio of funding of bilateral and multilateral 
mechanisms;  
9. Welcome the conclusion of the Structured Expert Dialogue of the 2013-15 
Review under the UNFCCC, that the goal to hold the increase in global average 
temperature below 20C above pre- industrial levels is inadequate in view of the 
ultimate objective of the Convention. The latest science suggests that the 20C 
‘guardrail’ concept is no longer safe for the survival of our Pacific Small Island 
Developing States;  
10. Emphasize that scientific evidence indicates that limiting warming to well 
below 1.50C above pre-industrial levels will significantly reduce impacts, risks, 
adaptation needs, as well as loss and damage, and that actions to this effect will 
not significantly impact on economies;  
11. Reiterate our commitment to the advancement of our national mitigation 
strategies and low carbon economies and net carbon sink status, as part of the 
global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions;  
12. Reaffirm that the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol is the 
stabilization of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system;  
13. Urge all parties to the Kyoto Protocol to ratify and implement the Doha 
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol;  
14. Emphasize that the global nature of climate change requires all countries to 
cooperate with a view to accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas 
emissions on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, with developed 
countries taking the lead with respect to mitigation actions and the means of 
implementation for combating climate change;  
15.  Emphasize that the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement must provide in a 
balanced manner all the six elements identified in the Durban Mandate. Loss and 
damage must be included separately as the seventh element, and that the 
Agreement must ensure a truly shared global vision for a sustainable future;  
16. Recognize that addressing gender based inequality and discrimination is 
essential for effective action on climate change;  
17.  Recognize the importance of engaging, as equal partners, civil society, women, 
youth and persons with disabilities, in all efforts towards building climate 
change resilience;  
18. Recognize that a number of Pacific Islands Development Forum member states 
have submitted proposals to phase out Hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) under the 
Montreal Protocol. Leaders agreed that such action was a critical component of 
comprehensive climate change mitigation strategy and agreed to pursue a phase 
out of HFCs under the Montreal Protocol at its Meeting of the Parties in Dubai 
this year;  
19.  We the Leaders of the Pacific Islands Development Forum following 
consultation with and the agreement of all stakeholders at the Pacific Island 
Development Forum Third Summit therefore call for:  
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a. the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement to limit global average 
temperature increase to below 1.50C above pre-industrial levels in order 
to transition towards deep- decarbonization;  
b. the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement to be legally binding;  
c. the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement to establish explicit 
provisions that ensure the strongest possible efforts will be made to 
achieve and continuously enhance national and global mitigation action, 
including review of mitigation efforts every 5 years, with opportunities 
to recommit to stronger action as informed by science;  
d. loss and damage to be anchored as a standalone element that is separate 
and distinct from adaptation in the 2015 Paris Climate Change 
Agreement;  
e. a special provision in the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement to fast-
track urgent action required to assist the most vulnerable countries that 
are already experiencing existential threats from climate change;  
f. an integrated approach to transitioning Pacific countries to low carbon 
transport futures, in particular sea transport given its central role in 
providing connectivity for Pacific Small Island Developing States, 
including a regional strategy to advocate for and monitor implementation 
of sector targets through relevant UN agencies commensurate with the 
1.50C threshold;  
g. a new global dialogue on the implementation of an international 
moratorium on the development and expansion of fossil fuel extracting 
industries, particularly the construction of new coal mines, as an urgent 
step towards decarbonising the global economy;  
h. increased support for adaptation measures that address all vulnerable 
sectors including health, water and sanitation, energy, agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries; 
i. adaptation measures for Pacific Small Island Developing States to be 
100% grant financed; 
j. support the establishment of mechanisms for the payment of ocean and 
ecosystem services; 
k. stronger regulations regarding climate proofing of infrastructure as well 
as revision or formulation of building and zoning codes;  
l. the development of Pacific based research and technology capacity as an 
essential foundation for innovation in our response to climate change;  
m. capacity building on formal and non-formal education, knowledge 
management, with a particular emphasis on national languages and 
communication of climate change;  
n. support to enable the greater involvement of community, civil society 
(including women, youth and persons with disabilities) and the private 
sector, in our climate change responses and initiatives.  
 
4
th 
September 2015  
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Appendix III: Smaller Island States Leaders’ Port Moresby Declaration on 
Climate Change 
 
We, the Leaders of the Pacific Smaller Island States, represent the most vulnerable 
countries in the world and at the frontline to the impacts of climate change. 
We are deeply concerned that the future of our nations is threatened by the impacts of 
climate change. 
We are already suffering the impacts of climate change and call upon the international 
community to respond with a concerted and ambitious approach to address the greatest 
threat to humanity. 
The world must rapidly transform its use of energy from fossil fuels to low carbon 
development, including renewable energy and other technologies that may become 
available to move to zero emissions. 
At the end of this year, nations will come together in Paris for the COP 21 to agree on a 
new protocol, legal instrument or an agreed outcome to address climate change. This is 
our last chance to reach an outcome that must reverse the global warming pathway to 
ensure the future survival and existence of our nations, people and culture. 
We reaffirm our call for a new and ambitious international climate change agreement 
that will be adopted in Paris. It must be comprehensive, forward looking, effective and 
legally binding in all aspects. 
We, Leaders of Pacific Smaller Island States recognise and align with the positions 
expressed in the statements issued by other Pacific Summits on Climate Change, in 
particular the Suva Declaration on Climate Change in September 2015, the Nuku’alofa 
Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Weather and Climate Services for a Resilient 
Pacific in July 2015, the Polynesian Leaders’ Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate 
Change in July 2015, the Lifou Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change in April 
2015, the SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway in September 
2014, the Majuro Declaration on Climate Leadership in September 2013, and the Niue 
Declaration on Climate Change in August 2008. 
To this end we urge that COP 21 must deliver a legally binding agreement, which will: 
a. Limit global average temperature increase to well below 1.5 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels; 
b. Ensure that human rights to exist as a people are protected; 
c. Uphold the polluter pay principle; 
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d. Address all sources of greenhouse gas emissions including those from 
international transport; 
e. Carry out a review to conduct a major renewal of international mitigation 
commitments every five years with flexibility for Small Island Developing 
States and Least Developed Countries, to examine the most recent science, 
as well as pathways for higher ambition, and provide an opportunity to 
recommit to stronger action; 
f. Include a mechanism to address loss and damage as a stand-alone element of 
the agreement and within that mechanism create a facility to effectively 
support people displaced by the impacts of climate change; 
g. Ensure ease of access to adequate and predictable finance, technology and 
capacity building to ensure that Small Island Developing States and Least 
Developed Countries can transition to fossil fuel free economies and to have 
the ability to adapt to the impacts of climate change; and, 
h. Recognise the special circumstances of Small Island Developing States and 
Least Developed Countries and direct additional efforts to assist them meet 
the challenge of climate change. 
 
We, Leaders of the Pacific Smaller Island States also call on all nations, particularly the 
advanced economies in our region and beyond, to rise to the challenge of climate 
change and take transformational action to steer us on a path where climate change is no 
longer a threat to our planet. 
As a first step in this direction we call for a global moratorium on all new coal mines. 
We cannot afford to lock in any further fossil fuel emissions. Green-Blue economies 
must be the way for now and into the future. 
We, Leaders of the Pacific Smaller Island States are committed to a sustainable and 
resilient future. We call on all others to follow and to leave no one behind. 
 
7th September, 2015 
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Appendix IV: Pacific Island Forum Leaders Declaration on Climate Change 
Action 46th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Summit – Port Moresby 2015 
 
We, the Leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum: 
1. are deeply concerned about the serious impacts of and growing threat posed by 
climate change to the economic, social, environmental and cultural well-being and 
security of Pacific Island Countries and Territories (PICTs), and our peoples. 
2. are alarmed at the current and projected impacts of climate change, coupled with 
the region’s physical vulnerability and limited capacity, are exacerbating the challenges 
on the sustainable development efforts and future existence of Pacific Island Countries 
and Territories. 
3. reiterate that Pacific Island Countries and Territories are amongst the most 
vulnerable and least able to adapt and to respond; and the adverse consequences they 
face as a result of climate change, including the exacerbation of climate variability, sea 
level rise, ocean acidification, and more frequent and extreme weather events, are 
significantly disproportionate to negligible collective contribution to the global 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
4. are serious about reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and are committed to 
show leadership through ambitious submissions of Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), implement commitments under the Majuro Declaration for Climate 
Leadership in 2013 to reduce emissions and reliance on fossil fuels, and promote low 
carbon development through supporting initiatives such as the Sustainable Energy for 
All (SE4All), SIDS DOCK and REDD+. 
5. are gravely concerned that we are already facing adverse effects of climate 
change with the current average global temperature increase of 0.85 degree Celsius, and 
any further warming could push many countries beyond their capacity to adapt. 
6. declare that an increase of 1.5 degrees Celsius would severely exacerbate the 
particular challenges facing the most vulnerable smaller island states of the Pacific and 
urge, all effort be made to stay within the global temperature goal, as noted by the 
Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC in its decision of 1/CP20. 
7. recognise the need to accelerate and intensify efforts to adapt to the impacts of 
climate change, and to further develop and implement policies, strategies and legislative 
frameworks, with support where necessary, to climate-proof essential physical 
infrastructure, adapt key economic sectors and ensure climate-resilient sustainable 
development for present and future generations. 
8. acknowledge that successful interactive action is achievable and note that the 
phasing down of hydrofluorocarbons(HFCs) under the Montreal Protocol has been 
important in mobilising action and, that such action has key benefits for climate change 
mitigation. 
9. reaffirm that the Paris Conference 2015 is crucial for all in order to deliver an 
ambitious, legally-binding agreement under the UNFCCC applicable to all, which 
reflects the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities, in light of different national circumstances. 
 
10. recognise the importance of amplifying the Pacific voice at all avenues possible 
with a view to influence the Paris outcome, and note the positions of the region as 
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expressed in other meeting outcomes and declarations, including the Smaller Island 
States Leaders’ Port Moresby Declaration on Climate Change in September 2015, the 
Suva Declaration on Climate Change in September 2015, the Nuku’alofa Ministerial 
Declaration on Sustainable Weather and Climate Services for a Resilient Pacific in July 
2015, the Polynesian Leaders’ Taputapuatea Declaration on Climate Change in July 
2015, the Lifou Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change in April 2015, the SIDS 
Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway in September 2014, the Majuro 
Declaration on Climate Leadership in September 2013, and the NiueDeclaration on 
Climate Change in August 2008. 
11.  call for the timely conclusion of the negotiations under the UNFCCC to adopt a 
new, ambitious and legally binding international climate change agreement applicable 
to all Parties, in Paris at COP 21, and for the Paris outcome to include, inter alia: 
 
a. recognition of the special circumstances and vulnerability of Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS), particularly those in the Pacific, and Least 
Developed Countries; 
b. support for ongoing and improved weather, climate, water, and related 
environmental services, their analysis and modeling of impacts to inform 
political, economic and social policies in the Pacific; 
c. ambitious, clearly-defined and transparent commitments by all Parties to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions through their INDCs, in line with the 
ultimate objective of the UNFCCC to stabilise greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system; 
d. provisions for regular review of mitigation commitments, in light of the most 
recent science, as well as pathways for higher ambition, and provide an 
opportunity to recommit to stronger action; 
e. acknowledgement of the importance of transparency and accountability to 
the environmental integrity and effectiveness of the new agreement; 
f. requirements that Parties will make their strongest possible efforts to achieve 
and progressively enhance national and global mitigation action; 
g. accelerated and effective delivery of international support for the design and 
implementation of adaptation and mitigation actions especially for the most 
vulnerable countries already experiencing existential challenges from 
climate change, in relation to capacity building, technology transfer, 
knowledge and information sharing, and improved access to climate change 
finance; 
h. a commitment to scale up the provision of financial resources, noting the 
commitment by developed country Parties, in the context of meaningful 
mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of 
mobilising jointly US$100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of 
developing countries, from a wide variety of sources, and a request for 
Parties to continue to enhance their enabling environments and policy 
frameworks to facilitate the mobilisation and effective deployment of 
climate change finance; 
i. simplified access to financial resources to support climate change action and 
resilience that accounts for the particular circumstance of SIDS, especially 
those in the Pacific, and Least Developed Countries. The outcome should 
also encourage Parties to ensure improved effectiveness of existing and new 
support, and provide support for readiness activities for capacity constrained 
countries, such as Pacific Small Island Developing States and the Least 
Developed Countries; 
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j. inclusion in the Paris outcome of loss and damage as a critical and stand 
alone element for building resilience against climate change impacts, 
including responding to extreme weather and slow onset events, and builds 
on the ongoing work of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts in developing countries 
that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change; 
k. inclusion in the Paris outcome relevant provisions to support further actions 
under the Warsaw Framework for REDD+; 
l. recognition of the disproportionate impact of climate change on women, 
youth, the elderly, disabled, indigenous peoples and other vulnerable and 
marginalised groups, and acknowledgement of the contribution of these 
peoples to the effective implementation of the Paris outcome; and, 
m. acknowledgment of the crucial role women will play in a global solution to 
climate change and the importance of gender responsive outcomes that 
encourage full and equal participation of women in all climate change 
actions, decision-making processes and improved accessibility to financial 
resources. 
 
 
10 September 2015 
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Appendix V: Paris Agreement  
The Parties to this Agreement, 
Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”,  
Pursuant to the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action established by decision 
1/CP.17 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its seventeenth session,  
In pursuit of the objective of the Convention, and being guided by its principles, 
including the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances,  
Recognizing the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent 
threat of climate change on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge,  
Also recognizing the specific needs and special circumstances of developing 
country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change, as provided for in the Convention,  
Taking full account of the specific needs and special situations of the least 
developed countries with regard to funding and transfer of technology,  
Recognizing that Parties may be affected not only by climate change, but also by 
the impacts of the measures taken in response to it,  
Emphasizing the intrinsic relationship that climate change actions, responses and 
impacts have with equitable access to sustainable development and eradication of 
poverty,  
Recognizing the fundamental priority of safeguarding food security and ending 
hunger, and the particular vulnerabilities of food production systems to the adverse 
impacts of climate change,  
Taking into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the 
creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined 
development priorities,  
Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties 
should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider 
their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous 
peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in 
vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, 
empowerment of women and intergenerational equity,  
Recognizing the importance of the conservation and enhancement, as 
appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of the greenhouse gases referred to in the 
Convention,  
Noting the importance of ensuring the integrity of all ecosystems, including 
oceans, and the protection of biodiversity, recognized by some cultures as Mother Earth, 
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and noting the importance for some of the concept of “climate justice”, when taking 
action to address climate change,  
Affirming the importance of education, training, public awareness, public 
participation, public access to information and cooperation at all levels on the matters 
addressed in this Agreement,  
Recognizing the importance of the engagements of all levels of government and 
various actors, in accordance with respective national legislations of Parties, in 
addressing climate change,  
Also recognizing that sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of 
consumption and production, with developed country Parties taking the lead, play an 
important role in addressing climate change,  
Have agreed as follows:  
Article 1 
For the purpose of this Agreement, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the 
Convention shall apply. In addition:  
(a) “Convention” means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, adopted in New York on 9 May 1992;  
(b) “Conference of the Parties” means the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention;  
(c) “Party” means a Party to this Agreement.  
Article 2 
1. This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its 
objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the 
context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by:  
(a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C 
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 
°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks 
and impacts of climate change;  
(b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and 
foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner 
that does not threaten food production; and  
(c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate-resilient development.  
2. This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances.  
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Article 3 
As nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all 
Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts as defined in Articles 4, 7, 
9, 10, 11 and 13 with the view to achieving the purpose of this Agreement as set out in 
Article 2. The efforts of all Parties will represent a progression over time, while 
recognizing the need to support developing country Parties for the effective 
implementation of this Agreement.  
Article 4 
1. In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim to 
reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that 
peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid 
reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a 
balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the 
context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty.  
2. Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally 
determined contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic 
mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions.  
3. Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a 
progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and 
reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national 
circumstances.  
4. Developed country Parties should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy- 
wide absolute emission reduction targets. Developing country Parties should continue 
enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time towards 
economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets in the light of different national 
circumstances.  
5. Support shall be provided to developing country Parties for the implementation of 
this Article, in accordance with Articles 9, 10 and 11, recognizing that enhanced support 
for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions.  
6. The least developed countries and small island developing States may prepare and 
communicate strategies, plans and actions for low greenhouse gas emissions 
development reflecting their special circumstances.  
7. Mitigation co-benefits resulting from Parties’ adaptation actions and/or economic 
diversification plans can contribute to mitigation outcomes under this Article.  
8. In communicating their nationally determined contributions, all Parties shall provide 
the information necessary for clarity, transparency and understanding in accordance 
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with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.  
9. Each Party shall communicate a nationally determined contribution every five years 
in accordance with decision 1/CP.21 and any relevant decisions of the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement and be informed by 
the outcomes of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14.  
10. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Agreement shall consider common time frames for nationally determined contributions 
at its first session.  
11. A Party may at any time adjust its existing nationally determined contribution with a 
view to enhancing its level of ambition, in accordance with guidance adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.  
12. Nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties shall be recorded in a 
public registry maintained by the secretariat.  
13. Parties shall account for their nationally determined contributions. In accounting for 
anthropogenic emissions and removals corresponding to their nationally determined 
contributions, Parties shall promote environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, 
completeness, comparability and consistency, and ensure the avoidance of double 
counting, in accordance with guidance adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.  
14. In the context of their nationally determined contributions, when recognizing and 
implementing mitigation actions with respect to anthropogenic emissions and removals, 
Parties should take into account, as appropriate, existing methods and guidance under 
the Convention, in the light of the provisions of paragraph 13 of this Article.  
15. Parties shall take into consideration in the implementation of this Agreement the 
concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, 
particularly developing country Parties.  
16. Parties, including regional economic integration organizations and their member 
States, that have reached an agreement to act jointly under paragraph 2 of this Article 
shall notify the secretariat of the terms of that agreement, including the emission level 
allocated to each Party within the relevant time period, when they communicate their 
nationally determined contributions. The secretariat shall in turn inform the Parties and 
signatories to the Convention of the terms of that agreement.  
17. Each party to such an agreement shall be responsible for its emission level as set out 
in the agreement referred to in paragraph 16 of this Article in accordance with 
paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Article and Articles 13 and 15.  
18. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional 
economic integration organization which is itself a Party to this Agreement, each 
member State of that regional economic integration organization individually, and 
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together with the regional economic integration organization, shall be responsible for its 
emission level as set out in the agreement communicated under paragraph 16 of this 
Article in accordance with paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Article and Articles 13 and 15.  
19. All Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse 
gas emission development strategies, mindful of Article 2 taking into account their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of 
different national circumstances.  
Article 5 
1. Parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and 
reservoirs of greenhouse gases as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1(d), of the 
Convention, including forests.  
2. Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including through 
results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in related guidance and 
decisions already agreed under the Convention for: policy approaches and positive 
incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries; and alternative policy 
approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the integral and 
sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the importance of incentivizing, 
as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated with such approaches.  
Article 6 
1. Parties recognize that some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the 
implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher 
ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable 
development and environmental integrity.  
2. Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative approaches that 
involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards nationally 
determined contributions, promote sustainable development and ensure environmental 
integrity and transparency, including in governance, and shall apply robust accounting 
to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting, consistent with guidance adopted 
by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.  
3. The use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to achieve nationally 
determined contributions under this Agreement shall be voluntary and authorized by 
participating Parties.  
4. A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support 
sustainable development is hereby established under the authority and guidance of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement for use 
by Parties on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body designated by the 
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Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, and 
shall aim:  
(a) To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering 
sustainable development;  
(b) To incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions by public and private entities authorized by a Party;  
(c) To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will 
benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also be used 
by another Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and  
(d) To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions.  
5. Emission reductions resulting from the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of this 
Article shall not be used to demonstrate achievement of the host Party’s nationally 
determined contribution if used by another Party to demonstrate achievement of its 
nationally determined contribution.  
6. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement 
shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from activities under the mechanism referred to 
in paragraph 4 of this Article is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to 
assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.  
7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement 
shall adopt rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism referred to in paragraph 
4 of this Article at its first session.  
8. Parties recognize the importance of integrated, holistic and balanced non-market 
approaches being available to Parties to assist in the implementation of their nationally 
determined contributions, in the context of sustainable development and poverty 
eradication, in a coordinated and effective manner, including through, inter alia, 
mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, as 
appropriate. These approaches shall aim to:  
(a)  Promote mitigation and adaptation ambition;  
(b)  Enhance public and private sector participation in the implementation of 
nationally determined contributions; and  
(c) Enable opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant 
institutional arrangements.  
9. A framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development is hereby 
defined to promote the non-market approaches referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article.  
Article 7 
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1. Parties hereby establish the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, 
strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to 
contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response 
in the context of the temperature goal referred to in Article 2.  
2. Parties recognize that adaptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, 
subnational, national, regional and international dimensions, and that it is a key 
component of and makes a contribution to the long-term global response to climate 
change to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems, taking into account the urgent and 
immediate needs of those developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change.  
3. The adaptation efforts of developing country Parties shall be recognized, in 
accordance with the modalities to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement at its first session.  
4. Parties recognize that the current need for adaptation is significant and that greater 
levels of mitigation can reduce the need for additional adaptation efforts, and that 
greater adaptation needs can involve greater adaptation costs.  
5. Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender- 
responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration 
vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by 
the best available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of 
indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation 
into relevant socioeconomic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate.  
6. Parties recognize the importance of support for and international cooperation on 
adaptation efforts and the importance of taking into account the needs of developing 
country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change.  
7. Parties should strengthen their cooperation on enhancing action on adaptation, taking 
into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework, including with regard to:  
(a) Sharing information, good practices, experiences and lessons learned, 
including, as appropriate, as these relate to science, planning, policies and 
implementation in relation to adaptation actions;  
(b) Strengthening institutional arrangements, including those under the 
Convention that serve this Agreement, to support the synthesis of relevant information 
and knowledge, and the provision of technical support and guidance to Parties;  
(c) Strengthening scientific knowledge on climate, including research, 
systematic observation of the climate system and early warning systems, in a manner 
that informs climate services and supports decision-making;  
(d) Assisting developing country Parties in identifying effective adaptation 
practices, adaptation needs, priorities, support provided and received for adaptation 
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actions and efforts, and challenges and gaps, in a manner consistent with encouraging 
good practices; and  
(e) Improving the effectiveness and durability of adaptation actions.  
8. United Nations specialized organizations and agencies are encouraged to support the 
efforts of Parties to implement the actions referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article, 
taking into account the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article.  
9. Each Party shall, as appropriate, engage in adaptation planning processes and the 
implementation of actions, including the development or enhancement of relevant plans, 
policies and/or contributions, which may include:  
 (a)  The implementation of adaptation actions, undertakings and/or efforts; 
(b)  The process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans; 
(c)  The assessment of climate change impacts and vulnerability, with a view to 
formulating nationally determined prioritized actions, taking into account 
vulnerable people, places and ecosystems;  
(d) Monitoring and evaluating and learning from adaptation plans, policies, 
programmes and actions; and  
(e) Building the resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems, including 
through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources.  
10. Each Party should, as appropriate, submit and update periodically an adaptation 
communication, which may include its priorities, implementation and support needs, 
plans and actions, without creating any additional burden for developing country 
Parties.  
11. The adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article shall be, as 
appropriate, submitted and updated periodically, as a component of or in conjunction 
with other communications or documents, including a national adaptation plan, a 
nationally determined contribution as referred to in Article 4, paragraph 2, and/or a 
national communication.  
12. The adaptation communications referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article shall be 
recorded in a public registry maintained by the secretariat.  
13. Continuous and enhanced international support shall be provided to developing 
country Parties for the implementation of paragraphs 7, 9, 10 and 11 of this Article, in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 9, 10 and 11.  
14. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall, inter alia:  
(a)  Recognize adaptation efforts of developing country Parties;  
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(b)  Enhance the implementation of adaptation action taking into account the 
adaptation communication referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article;  
(c) Review the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support provided 
for adaptation; and  
(d) Review the overall progress made in achieving the global goal on adaptation 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.  
Article 8 
1. Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and 
damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme 
weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in 
reducing the risk of loss and damage.  
2. The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate 
Change Impacts shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement and may be enhanced 
and strengthened, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Agreement.  
3. Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, including through the 
Warsaw International Mechanism, as appropriate, on a cooperative and facilitative basis 
with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.  
4. Accordingly, areas of cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action 
and support may include:  
(a)  Early warning systems;  
(b)  Emergency preparedness;  
(c)  Slow onset events;  
(d)  Events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage;  
(e)  Comprehensive risk assessment and management;  
(f)  Risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions;  
(g)  Non-economic losses; and  
(h)  Resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.  
5. The Warsaw International Mechanism shall collaborate with existing bodies and 
expert groups under the Agreement, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies 
outside the Agreement.  
Article 9 
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1. Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing 
country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their 
existing obligations under the Convention.  
2. Other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support 
voluntarily.  
3. As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take the lead 
in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, 
noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including 
supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of 
developing country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a 
progression beyond previous efforts.  
4. The provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance 
between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and 
the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant 
capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing 
States, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.  
5. Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and 
qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, 
including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to 
developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to 
communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis.  
6. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account the relevant 
information provided by developed country Parties and/or Agreement bodies on efforts 
related to climate finance.  
7. Developed country Parties shall provide transparent and consistent information on 
support for developing country Parties provided and mobilized through public 
interventions biennially in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines to 
be adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Agreement, at its first session, as stipulated in Article 13, paragraph 13. Other Parties 
are encouraged to do so.  
8. The Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including its operating entities, shall 
serve as the financial mechanism of this Agreement.  
9. The institutions serving this Agreement, including the operating entities of the 
Financial Mechanism of the Convention, shall aim to ensure efficient access to financial 
resources through simplified approval procedures and enhanced readiness support for 
developing country Parties, in particular for the least developed countries and small 
island developing States, in the context of their national climate strategies and plans.  
Article 10 
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1. Parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology 
development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
2. Parties, noting the importance of technology for the implementation of mitigation and 
adaptation actions under this Agreement and recognizing existing technology 
deployment and dissemination efforts, shall strengthen cooperative action on 
technology development and transfer.  
3. The Technology Mechanism established under the Convention shall serve this 
Agreement.  
4. A technology framework is hereby established to provide overarching guidance to the 
work of the Technology Mechanism in promoting and facilitating enhanced action on 
technology development and transfer in order to support the implementation of this 
Agreement, in pursuit of the long-term vision referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.  
5. Accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long- 
term global response to climate change and promoting economic growth and sustainable 
development. Such effort shall be, as appropriate, supported, including by the 
Technology Mechanism and, through financial means, by the Financial Mechanism of 
the Convention, for collaborative approaches to research and development, and 
facilitating access to technology, in particular for early stages of the technology cycle, 
to developing country Parties.  
6. Support, including financial support, shall be provided to developing country Parties 
for the implementation of this Article, including for strengthening cooperative action on 
technology development and transfer at different stages of the technology cycle, with a 
view to achieving a balance between support for mitigation and adaptation. The global 
stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account available information on 
efforts related to support on technology development and transfer for developing 
country Parties.  
Article 11 
1. Capacity-building under this Agreement should enhance the capacity and ability of 
developing country Parties, in particular countries with the least capacity, such as the 
least developed countries, and those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change, such as small island developing States, to take effective 
climate change action, including, inter alia, to implement adaptation and mitigation 
actions, and should facilitate technology development, dissemination and deployment, 
access to climate finance, relevant aspects of education, training and public awareness, 
and the transparent, timely and accurate communication of information.  
2. Capacity-building should be country-driven, based on and responsive to national 
needs, and foster country ownership of Parties, in particular, for developing country 
Parties, including at the national, subnational and local levels. Capacity-building should 
be guided by lessons learned, including those from capacity-building activities under 
  
 
294 
the Convention, and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-
cutting and gender- responsive.  
3. All Parties should cooperate to enhance the capacity of developing country Parties to 
implement this Agreement. Developed country Parties should enhance support for 
capacity- building actions in developing country Parties.  
4. All Parties enhancing the capacity of developing country Parties to implement this 
Agreement, including through regional, bilateral and multilateral approaches, shall 
regularly communicate on these actions or measures on capacity-building. Developing 
country Parties should regularly communicate progress made on implementing 
capacity- building plans, policies, actions or measures to implement this Agreement.  
5. Capacity-building activities shall be enhanced through appropriate institutional 
arrangements to support the implementation of this Agreement, including the 
appropriate institutional arrangements established under the Convention that serve this 
Agreement. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Agreement shall, at its first session, consider and adopt a decision on the initial 
institutional arrangements for capacity-building.  
Article 12 
Parties shall cooperate in taking measures, as appropriate, to enhance climate change 
education, training, public awareness, public participation and public access to 
information, recognizing the importance of these steps with respect to enhancing actions 
under this Agreement.  
Article 13 
1. In order to build mutual trust and confidence and to promote effective 
implementation, an enhanced transparency framework for action and support, with 
built-in flexibility which takes into account Parties’ different capacities and builds upon 
collective experience is hereby established.  
2. The transparency framework shall provide flexibility in the implementation of the 
provisions of this Article to those developing country Parties that need it in the light of 
their capacities. The modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 
of this Article shall reflect such flexibility.  
3. The transparency framework shall build on and enhance the transparency 
arrangements under the Convention, recognizing the special circumstances of the least 
developed countries and small island developing States, and be implemented in a 
facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national sovereignty, and 
avoid placing undue burden on Parties.  
4. The transparency arrangements under the Convention, including national 
communications, biennial reports and biennial update reports, international assessment 
and review and international consultation and analysis, shall form part of the experience 
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drawn upon for the development of the modalities, procedures and guidelines under 
paragraph 13 of this Article.  
5. The purpose of the framework for transparency of action is to provide a clear 
understanding of climate change action in the light of the objective of the Convention as 
set out in its Article 2, including clarity and tracking of progress towards achieving 
Parties’ individual nationally determined contributions under Article 4, and Parties’ 
adaptation actions under Article 7, including good practices, priorities, needs and gaps, 
to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.  
6. The purpose of the framework for transparency of support is to provide clarity on 
support provided and received by relevant individual Parties in the context of climate 
change actions under Articles 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and, to the extent possible, to provide a 
full overview of aggregate financial support provided, to inform the global stocktake 
under Article 14.  
7. Each Party shall regularly provide the following information:  
(a) A national inventory report of anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases, prepared using good practice methodologies 
accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement; and  
(b) Information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving 
its nationally determined contribution under Article 4.  
8. Each Party should also provide information related to climate change impacts and 
adaptation under Article 7, as appropriate.  
9. Developed country Parties shall, and other Parties that provide support should, 
provide information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support 
provided to developing country Parties under Articles 9, 10 and 11.  
10. Developing country Parties should provide information on financial, technology 
transfer and capacity-building support needed and received under Articles 9, 10 and 11.  
11. Information submitted by each Party under paragraphs 7 and 9 of this Article shall 
undergo a technical expert review, in accordance with decision 1/CP.21. For those 
developing country Parties that need it in the light of their capacities, the review process 
shall include assistance in identifying capacity-building needs. In addition, each Party 
shall participate in a facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress with respect to 
efforts under Article 9, and its respective implementation and achievement of its 
nationally determined contribution.  
12. The technical expert review under this paragraph shall consist of a consideration of 
the Party’s support provided, as relevant, and its implementation and achievement of its 
nationally determined contribution. The review shall also identify areas of improvement 
for the Party, and include a review of the consistency of the information with the 
modalities, procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph 13 of this Article, taking 
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into account the flexibility accorded to the Party under paragraph 2 of this Article. The 
review shall pay particular attention to the respective national capabilities and 
circumstances of developing country Parties.  
13. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Agreement shall, at its first session, building on experience from the arrangements 
related to transparency under the Convention, and elaborating on the provisions in this 
Article, adopt common modalities, procedures and guidelines, as appropriate, for the 
transparency of action and support.  
14. Support shall be provided to developing countries for the implementation of this 
Article.  
15. Support shall also be provided for the building of transparency-related capacity of 
developing country Parties on a continuous basis.  
Article 14 
1. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement 
shall periodically take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess the 
collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term 
goals (referred to as the “global stocktake”). It shall do so in a comprehensive and 
facilitative manner, considering mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation 
and support, and in the light of equity and the best available science.  
2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement 
shall undertake its first global stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter unless 
otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Agreement.  
3. The outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, 
in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation 
for climate action.  
Article 15 
1. A mechanism to facilitate implementation of and promote compliance with the 
provisions of this Agreement is hereby established.  
2. The mechanism referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall consist of a committee 
that shall be expert-based and facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is 
transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive. The committee shall pay particular 
attention to the respective national capabilities and circumstances of Parties.  
3. The committee shall operate under the modalities and procedures adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement at its 
first session and report annually to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Agreement.  
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Article 16 
1. The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.  
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Agreement may participate as 
observers in the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement. When the Conference of the Parties serves 
as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, decisions under this Agreement shall be 
taken only by those that are Parties to this Agreement.  
3. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Agreement, any member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties representing a 
Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Agreement, shall be 
replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this 
Agreement.  
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement 
shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Agreement and shall make, 
within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation. It 
shall perform the functions assigned to it by this Agreement and shall:  
(a) Establish such subsidiary bodies as deemed necessary for the implementation 
of this Agreement; and  
(b) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation of 
this Agreement.  
5. The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and the financial procedures 
applied under the Convention shall be applied mutatis mutandis under this Agreement, 
except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.  
6. The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Agreement shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with the first 
session of the Conference of the Parties that is scheduled after the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement. Subsequent ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement shall be held in conjunction with 
ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties, unless otherwise decided by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.  
7. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Agreement shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary 
by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement 
or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request 
being communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third 
of the Parties.  
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8. The United Nations and its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not party to the 
Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement as observers. Any body or agency, whether 
national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in 
matters covered by this Agreement and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to 
be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Agreement as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of 
the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject 
to the rules of procedure referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article.  
Article 17 
1. The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the 
secretariat of this Agreement.  
2. Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and 
Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention, on the arrangements made for the functioning 
of the secretariat, shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Agreement. The secretariat shall, 
in addition, exercise the functions assigned to it under this Agreement and by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.  
Article 18 
1. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention shall 
serve, respectively, as the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and 
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement. The provisions of the 
Convention relating to the functioning of these two bodies shall apply mutatis mutandis 
to this Agreement. Sessions of the meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Agreement 
shall be held in conjunction with the meetings of, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the 
Convention.  
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Agreement may participate as 
observers in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the 
subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Agreement, decisions under this 
Agreement shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Agreement.  
3. When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention 
exercise their functions with regard to matters concerning this Agreement, any member 
of the bureaux of those subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the Convention but, at 
that time, not a Party to this Agreement, shall be replaced by an additional member to 
be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Agreement.  
Article 19 
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1. Subsidiary bodies or other institutional arrangements established by or under the 
Convention, other than those referred to in this Agreement, shall serve this Agreement 
upon a decision of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Agreement. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Agreement shall specify the functions to be exercised by such subsidiary bodies or 
arrangements.  
2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement 
may provide further guidance to such subsidiary bodies and institutional arrangements.  
Article 20 
1. This Agreement shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or 
approval by States and regional economic integration organizations that are Parties to 
the Convention. It shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in 
New York from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017. Thereafter, this Agreement shall be 
open for accession from the day following the date on which it is closed for signature. 
Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the 
Depositary.  
2. Any regional economic integration organization that becomes a Party to this 
Agreement without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the 
obligations under this Agreement. In the case of regional economic integration 
organizations with one or more member States that are Parties to this Agreement, the 
organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for 
the performance of their obligations under this Agreement. In such cases, the 
organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this 
Agreement concurrently.  
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional 
economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with 
respect to the matters governed by this Agreement. These organizations shall also 
inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial 
modification in the extent of their competence.  
Article 21 
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which at 
least 55 Parties to the Convention accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 per 
cent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.  
2. Solely for the limited purpose of paragraph 1 of this Article, “total global greenhouse 
gas emissions” means the most up-to-date amount communicated on or before the date 
of adoption of this Agreement by the Parties to the Convention.  
3. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts or 
approves this Agreement or accedes thereto after the conditions set out in paragraph 1 
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of this Article for entry into force have been fulfilled, this Agreement shall enter into 
force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit by such State or regional economic 
integration organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession.  
4. For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article, any instrument deposited by a 
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those 
deposited by its member States.  
Article 22 
The provisions of Article 15 of the Convention on the adoption of amendments to the 
Convention shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Agreement.  
Article 23 
1. The provisions of Article 16 of the Convention on the adoption and amendment of 
annexes to the Convention shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Agreement.  
2. Annexes to this Agreement shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise 
expressly provided for, a reference to this Agreement constitutes at the same time a 
reference to any annexes thereto. Such annexes shall be restricted to lists, forms and any 
other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or 
administrative character.  
Article 24 
The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to this Agreement.  
Article 25 
1. Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article. 
  
2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence,   
shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their 
member States that are Parties to this Agreement. Such an organization shall not 
exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa.  
Article 26 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Agreement.  
Article 27 
No reservations may be made to this Agreement.  
Article 28 
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1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into 
force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving written 
notification to the Depositary.  
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of 
receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may 
be specified in the notification of withdrawal.  
3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having 
withdrawn from this Agreement.  
Article 29 
The original of this Agreement, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian 
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary- General 
of the United Nations.  
DONE at Paris this twelfth day of December two thousand and fifteen.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have 
signed this Agreement.  
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